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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines government administrative action that can be described as
'management', in the context of the logistics of mobilizing royal armies during the
reigns of Edward I, Edward II and Edward III. Its purpose is to contribute to
understanding of how fourteenth-century government worked.
Mobilization required the issuing of detailed instructions for administrative
actions to be taken by individuals. The actions covered recruiting, arranging transport,
and providing for supplies. Government's objective was to assemble armed forces at a
particular place and time. Merely issuing the instructions did not guarantee that all
would be fulfilled, or achievement of the overall objective. Government had to make
on-going arrangements to try to ensure that orders were obeyed, to correct failures, to
monitor progress, and, if necessary, to modify plans in good time. Those arrangements,
and consequent actions, are the 'management' that is studied.
The detailed management of mobilizations for eight selected campaigns, from
Edward I's Second Welsh War (1282-3), to Edward III's Reims campaign in 1359-
1360, is described. Recruitment, transport and supplies are considered, first in relation
to each other for individual mobilizations. They are then considered as separate themes,
followed by a discussion of the coordination of planning, in Chapter 9.
The thesis shows that in mobilizing armies Edwardian government made good
use of practical management techniques. Planning was coordinated. Plans were by and
large based on realistic, deliberately collected, quantitative information. Progress and
other reports were required, and acted upon. 'Progress chaser' appointments were made
to supervise executive action. 'Privatisation' was used pragmatically, particularly in
1359.
Chapter 10, 'Conclusion', argues that, though in mobilization as in other fields,
what are remembered are administrative failures, in fact Edwardian government was
managerially sophisticated enough to be able to mobilize its armies effectively. This
ability to manage effectively may therefore be more true of its general administration
than sometimes appears.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis addresses the government's management of the logistical aspects of
fourteenth-century mobilizations. A simplified description of the process that had to be
managed could run as follows.
Once the king, usually with the support of his council, had decided to raise an
army, obviously planning would have to take place. First, numbers to be mobilized,
where the muster should be, and when, had to be determined. It seems reasonable to
assume that these decisions would be the province of the royal command. Next, a
consequential view had to be taken of what supplies, and how much of each, the
government should provide. For a campaign overseas, a calculation of the transport
needed had to be made. These estimates would be worked out by experienced
household and central staff. The staff would then subdivide the total figures; detailed
allocations of what should be required of each would be made to a large number of
individuals. Orders would be sent to them via chancery writs. The writs carried
instructions as to quantities, place, timing, as appropriate. The recipients of these
instructions would then obey them, taking the necessary action. The result, in theory,
would be that the mobilization took place as planned.
It is a seemingly universal experience that, especially in large-scale
administration, something will go wrong. It was not sufficient merely to issue orders:
steps had to be taken to try to ensure that instructions were obeyed, to monitor progress
and to correct failures - that is, to manage. That management is the subject of this
thesis.
The action to be managed comprised recruiting and assembling suitably
equipped soldiers, arranging for at least their initial supplies, providing transport, and
planning the appropriate coordination of these operations. Individuals' performance of
their allocated tasks had to be watched, controlled and, if inadequate, admonished and
corrected. These are the matters with which this thesis is concerned. It does not study
the processes of the taking of the original policy decision and the consequent issuing of
orders. Nor does it consider, except incidentally, wider issues such as war finance,
military obligation, campaign success or failure, or the economic and political context
of war. Its objective is to examine how, once the impleiterning orders had been issued,
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the process of mobilization of armies was managed, through what agencies, and with
what degree of sophistication and success.
By comparison with the time of Henry ILI the next three reigns, from the
accession of his son in 1272 to the death of his great-grandson in 1377, were a period of
frequent, large-scale wars. Preparing for and conducting them absorbed much of the
energies and attention of the royal government. Its efforts to command the human,
financial and economic resources of England for these wars had wide-ranging
consequences: J. R. Maddicott says of the period 1294-1341, '...the pressure brought by
war, particularly the pressure of taxation, shaped the economic and political
development of England." Discussion of the Edwardian wars has therefore concerned
itself primarily with the changing nature of warfare itself, with the wars' implications
for the balance of constitutional and political power, with their social and economic
effects, and usually only incidentally with the administrative details of the actual
mobilization of the armies.
In the 'Introduction' to The Medieval Military Revolution the editors A. Ay-ton
and J. L. Price write 'It has become customary to see the late thirteenth century as
marking the start of a "new age" of war, as paid armies were mobilized for ambitious,
large-scale wars and the costs of war soared to levels not previously experienced...'.
However, they comment also, 'Just how far the later thirteenth century marked a
watershed in European warfare is open to debate: 2 In this debate, 3 attention naturally
tends to be directed to the nature, size and components of the armies that took the field,
rather than to the management of the process that brought them there. That aspect is
not one of the subjects of the essays edited by Ayton and Price. C. J. Rogers is
primarily concerned with the part played by the development of the use of artillery in
baule. 4
 General histories of medieval warfare, being mainly interested in war itself like
1 J. R. Maddicott, The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown 1294.
1341 (Past and Present Supplement 1, 1975), p. 1.
2 A. Ayton and J. L. Price (eds.), The Medieval Military Revolution. State,
Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (London, 1995), p.
12.
3 M. Prestwich discusses the origins of and participants in this debate in the final
chapter of his Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages. The English Experience
(London, 1996), pp. 334-346, under the heading 'Conclusion: A Military Revolution ?'.
4 C. J. Rogers, 'The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War', The
Journal ofMilitary History, LV (1993), pp. 258-275.
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those of Oman5 or Contamine,6 touch only incidentally on recruitment. The same is
broadly true of the essentially narrative histories of the Hundred Years War such as
those of C. T. Allman& and J. Sumption.8
M. R. Powicke's detailed examinations of the processes of recruitment come in
studies of the bases of military duty,9 and so see them more in that context than as
expressions of the mechanics of administration. N. B. Lewis's articles l ° are particularly
concerned with the discharge of feudal obligation and the content of indentured service.
A. E. Prince's study of recruitment" looks at the numbers of men in the armies, and his
general survey 12 covers the range of administrative orders issued for actions to mobilize
men and ships. J. E. Morris's 'truly pioneering' 13 account of the Welsh wars, which
analyses an Edwardian army, 14 is concerned with its composition, internal organisation
and fighting qualities, not the significance for the structure and efficiency of
administration of the means by which it was raised. In his work on the reign of
Edward I, /5 M. Prestwich notes that 'The need to organise the supply of men, money and
5 C. W. C. Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages AD 378-1511, revised edn.,
ed. J. H. Beeler (New York, 1953).
6 P. Contamine, War in The Middle Ages, trans. M. Jones (Oxford, 1984).
7 C. T. Allmand, The Hundred Years War. England and France at War c.1300-
c.1450 (Cambridge, 1988).
8 J. Sumption, The Hundred Years War. Trial by Battle (London, 1990).
9 Military Obligation in Medieval England A Study in Liberty and Duty
(Oxford, 1962); 'The General Obligation to Cavalry Service under Edward I', Speculum,
XXVIII (1933), pp. 814-833; 'Edward II and Military Obligation', Speculum, XXXI
(1956), pp. 83-119.
1 ° 'An Early Indenture of Military Service, 27 July 1287', BIHR, XIII (1935), pp.
85-89; 'The Last Medieval Summons of the English Feudal Levy, 13 June 1385', EHR,
LXXIII (1958), pp. 1-26; 'The Recruitment and Organisation of a Contract Army, May
to November 1337', BIHR, )(XXVII (1964), pp. 1-19.
"'The Strength of English Armies in the Reign of Edward III', EHR, XLVI
(1931), pp. 353-371.
12 'The Army and the Navy', in EGov.atW, Vol. I, pp. 332-393.
13 M. Prestwich's foreword to J. E. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I, new
edn. (Oxford, 1996), p. v.
14 Ibid., pp. 35-109.
15 M. Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance under Edward I (London, 1972).
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materials prompted a development of administrative techniques', 16 putting them in the
context of general political and constitutional issues. This is also naturally the focus of
G. L. Harriss' King Parliament and Public Finance. 17 H. J. Hewitt, 18 on the other
hand, concentrates in detail on the material requirements of both the offensive wars of
Edward 11-1 and the concomitant defensive arrangements that were made.
Research and writing on the English armies and wars under the three Edwards
have naturally recognised the vast amount of administrative action required. Interest in
its management has, however, been largely incidental to concentration on other themes.
If, instead, the government's on-going management of the administrative process of
mobilizing armies is observed as it was carried out, and as it changed over time, a
number of aspects of the medieval English state might be illuminated.
R. W. Kaueper described developments from the last decade of the thirteenth
century thus: `Kings harnessed the full power of the state for the purposes of war on a
gander scale and over longer periods than previously was thought possible.' 19 How
effective was this harnessing of the 'full power of the state'? One measure may be seen
in the degree of success and the nature of the arrangements for mobilizing armies. The
greatest change by the end of our period was that by then the whole army, from the
Black Prince down, was at royal pay. This in itself must be evidence of limitation on
the crown's power: it had to pay for military service for the sort of wars it fought,
because it could not command that service by simply summoning subjects to a duty Of
arms. Of course, the finance for that payment was still extracted from the country by
the crown;2° to achieve this finance the royal goverment often had to accept an
increasing amount of prior communication and consultation, to put it at the least, with
16 Ibid., p. 282.
17 G. L. Harriss, King, Parliament and Public Finance in Medieval England to
1369 (Oxford, 1975).
18 H. J. Hewitt, The Organisation of War under Edward III 1338-1362
(Manchester, 1966).
19 R. W. Kaueper, War, Justice and Public Order (Oxford, 1988), p. 3.
20 And from the Italian bankers; but the English king's ability to raise the loans
(on some of which he defaulted in due course) was derived from the existence of a
history of general taxation going bask to the Danegeld, taxation that provided the
'security' for them. Indirect taxes applied in particular to the rich wool trade in one
form or another were a substantial security resource, enabling the crown to accumulate
and anticipate future revenues in a way necessary to meet the cost of war. (See Harriss,
King, Parliament and Public Finance, passim.)
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formal assemblies of its subjects. 21
 Though the crown retained freedom of action, often
by citing urgent necessity, E. B. Fryde (among others) points out that parliamentary
sessions nevertheless provided opportunities to air complaints about 'the hurts done to
common people'. 22 Thus the change in the way armies had to be raised modified the
relationship between crown and community.
Still, it is far from clear that the need to finance wars led to a substantial
reduction in Edward III's authority. W. M. Ormrod sees in the twenty years after 1340-
1341 a recovery not only in the popularity but also in the power of the crown, to an
extent unknown since the time of Edward 1• 23 Military victories buttressed the
monarchy's prestige, enabling it to preserve its rights and obtain from parliament grants
of the taxes needed without making forced concessions. Edward Ill's deliberate
cultivation of the commitment of the magnates to his wars facilitated an atmosphere of
cooperation, not conflict, with his policies. G. L. Harriss 24 concludes his survey of the
debate over that question with this judgement: 'The crown's authority cannot be
measured simply in terms of its ability to command and enforce, for it ruled through its
capacity to invoke and mobilize the participation of the political elite.' 25 An obvious
demonstration of that is the way in which many magnates and others became, in effect,
willing 'recruiting sergeants' for Edward III. They contracted with the crown to provide
(at the crown's expense) and to lead armed men recruited and organised by them in their
indentured retinues, for the armies and expeditions that fought in France. 26
 This was
delegation to subjects - perhaps 'privatisation' might even be an alternative, if
21 Harriss, King, Parliament and Public Finance, Ch. IV, Ch. XVI; Powicke,
Military Obligation, Ch. XII.
22 'Parliament and the French War 1336-1340', in T. A. Sandquist and M. R.
Powicke (eds.), Essays in Medieval History Presented to Bertie Wilkinson (Toronto,
1969), p. 269.
23 'Edward III and the Recovery of Royal Authority in England 1340-60',
History, LXXII (1987), pp. 4-19.
24 'Political Society and the Growth of Government in Late Medieval England',
Past and Present, 000CV1II (1993), pp. 28-57.
25 Ibid., p. 56.
26 The history of the development of the indentured retinue has been described
by, among others, B. D. Lyon, 'The Money Fief under the English Kings, 1066-1485',
EHR, LXV1 (1951), pp. 161-193; J. W. Sherborne, Indentured Retinues and English
Expeditions to France 1369-1380', EHR, IMDC (1964), pp. 718-746; and N. B. Lewis
(above, p. 8 n. 10).
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anachronistic, term - of the task of managing the mobilization of a major element of the
armies.
Powicke, following Stubbs, argued that Edward I's aim was that 'the host should
be again the whole nation in arms'. 27 At the risk of over-simplifying a long and
complex evolution, 28 the problem of achieving such an objective might be described as
one of integrating two theoretically distinct sets of military obligation. The first, and
older, was the natural requirement for all men of a particular curtlthurlity to jOiti iri
providing defence against a raiding enemy. By the nature of the event, this requirement
would usually be needed only for a limited time, and in a limited area. The second was
the obligation to serve the king in arms in return for the grant of rights to lordship over a
holding of land. This obligatory service, limited to forty days, would not be restricted
to a localiry, though, possibly by conflation with the older communal defensive
obligation, there remained the question of whether it included service outside the realm.
Of course, as Kaeuper, for example, points out, even under the Anglo-Saxon kings, and
certainly after them, English forces were of mixed origin. They could include men
serving by obligation only, men serving by obligation but paid, volunteers, conscripts,
and genuine hired mercenaries. 29 And as S. Reynolds demonstrates, the concepts of
feudalism, including their consequences for the relationship between land tenure and
military obligation, do not necessarily describe the real world. 30 Mobilizing an
effective and coherent army against this background of somewhat ambiguous rights and
duties presented a substantial challenge to the government's ability to manage.
This was particularly the case because the Edwardian wars were not fought to
defend England against invasions or raids. Incursions did take place, by the Welsh into
the march, the Scots across the border, and the French and their allies against the coasts,
but usually these did not initiate the conflicts. Edwardian wars were mostly aggressive.
In order to be able to keep armies in the field for the greater length of campaign
involved in offensive wars, and to make fuller use of the manpower of the nation, the
king had to concede increasingly that the army had to be paid.
This was a gradual and erratic progress. Powicke considered that 'The army of
Edward I achieved a balance between contractual, feudal and communal troops, which
27 'General Obligation to Cavalry Service', p. 814.
28 Powicke, Military Obligation, Chapters 1-3, gives an account of the process.
29 War, Justice and Public Order, p. 34.
30 S. Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals. The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted
(Oxford, 1994).
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exceeded anything achieved before or after.'31 As far as the communal troops were
concerned, there were, over time, variations in the points from which royal pay was
conceded to the levies from the counties. Normal practice was for pay from the time
they left their home county. However, in 1322 the force raised from the levy of one
man per viii was to serve for forty days after the muster at the charge of the viii: an
earlier scheme of that year had intended that levies from the counties should only be at
the king's wages from the time of the muster of the whole army at Newcastle. 32 M.
Prestwich's survey of 'Cavalry Service in Early Fourteenth-Century England' 33 shows
how various were the terms of summons and service. N. B. Lewis contrasts Edward
111's reliance in 1336 on obligatory service for the nucleus of mounted troops with his
use in 1337 of magnates as recruiting agents. 34 Examination of procedures for
recruiting for different wars can perhaps suggest whether the progress towards a
contract army entirely at pay was a sustained policy derived from the practical need for
planning certainty, the consequence of evolution, or fundamentally an ad hoc response
to differing circumstances and experience, requiring different management
arrangements.
Once the decision to put an army into the field had been taken by the central
royal authority, it had to be communicated to the population at large. A substantial
number of men had to be nominated for the task of selecting and collecting troops,
firstly piecemeal, and then to bring them together to the muster. Small units on their
way to the muster could feed themselves with provisions carried with them,
supplemented with purchases (and no doubt thert) 35 from locals en route. On the other
hand, specific arrangements were required to have bulk quantities of supplies available
for the army assembling at the place of muster. This in turn necessitated some attempt
at quantification and planning. When the war was to be fought overseas, planning and
quantification were even more necessary to coordinate, however approximately, the
assembly of troops with that of maritime transport
31 Military Obligation, p. 97.
32 
see below, Chapter 4, p. 72.
33 in J. Gillingham and J. C. Holt (eds.), War and Government in the Middle
s Ages. Essays in Honour of J. 0. Prestwich (Woodbridge, 1984), pp. 147-58.
34 'The Recruitment and Organisation of a Contract Army', pp. 5-6.
35 In 1325 Richard Damory and Richard de Stapledon were appointed to deal
with 'felonies.. .by men-at-arms, mounted and on foot.. .coming to Plymouth to go on the
king's service'. CPR 1324-1327, p. 65.
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For the normal administrative routine of the realm, sheriffs and the permanent
shire officials - escheators, coroners, constables and bailiffs, to name but a few 36 - were
the mechanism through which the central government acted in the counties; in the
incorporated towns the borough officers performed the same role. 37
 When an army had
to be mobilized, the permanent officials were increasingly supplemented by ad hoc
appointees to carry out or supervise the many tasks involved. Who the latter were to be,
why they were needed, how responsibility was divided between them and the permanent
officials, and how central control was enforced, constituted a managed process that
illustrates medieval government in action.
Mobilization in particular can illustrate how long administrative arrangements
took to be implemented. '...Upon [a prompt and reliable system of communication]
depended the power to enforce the king's justice, demand the king's revenues, and
summon the feudal army or the estates of the realm.' 38 For this purpose a number of
messengers were maintained by the crown, and their time to deliver orders for
mobilization arrangements to sheriffs and other agents of the crown would be only one
of the factors that planners needed to take into account. In many cases those who
36 An impressive list of government officers (which includes some strictly
neither 'permanent' nor local) is given in the commission of oyer and terminer of 18
November 1341 'touching complaints against the king's justices, escheators, sub-
escheators, coroners, sheriffs, under-sheriffs, taxers, admirals of fleets, keepers and
constables of the peace and castles and land on the coast, takers and receivers of wool,
sellers, assessors and receivers of the ninth and other subsidies, barons of the
exchequer, clerks of the chancery, exchequer and of the receipt and other of his places,
keepers of forests, verderers, clerks and other ministers of forests, chases and parks,
collectors and controllers of customs, troners, butlers and their substitutes, receivers,
keepers of his horses and their grooms, stewards and marshals of the household...,
clerks of the market, purveyors of victuals, purveyors of his household, and of the
households of Queen Philippa and Edward, duke of Cornwall..., keepers of gaols,
electors, triers and arrayers of men-at-arms, hobelers and archers, bailiffs itinerant and
other bailiffs.' CPR, 1340-1343, pp. 363-4.
37 One can make '...the broad assumption that borough officers are the king's
officers.' 'Chester and London had sheriffs who were locally appointed and
controlled.... They were royal administrators behind city walls.' E. T. Meyer,
'Boroughs', in EGov.atW, Vol. III, pp. 110-111.
38 Mary C. Hill, The King's Messengers 1199-1377: a Contribution to the
History of the Royal Household (London, 1961), p. 4.
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received the orders would then have to delegate at least initial action to subordinates.
The amount of time allowed between the date set for a muster and the date of issue of
orders for recruitment of county levies should give a picture of how quickly government
expected to be able to act through this administrative chain. Whether muster dates
were met, and what action was taken if they were not, should describe how well the
whole operation was managed.
The regular meeting of the county court was the main forum for official
pronouncements; it was the first named in the list of places where sheriffs were ordered
to make proclamations. 39
 Further, 'The novelty of the fourteenth century lay.. .in the
intensity of the government's efforts to influence opinion and in the activity in public
affairs of a well attended county court.' 4° Proclamations were one of the means used to
induce public opinion to support English claims on France. Prayers and preaching, and
of course the statements made to parliaments explaining and justifying the need for
financial grants,'" were others. From the meeting together at the county court
originated many petitions to parliament, and on parliament's cooperation depended the
ease with which the crown obtained the taxes needed as the basis for financing its wars.
As the recruiting of men for the army came to be a matter of quotas to be found county
by county, the county court became, from the 1290's on, the place in which the county's
quota was broken down and allocated to individual hundreds. 42
 Often, therefore, writs
of military summons and the appointments of men to recruit the quotas had a preamble
designed to create a favourable climate of opinion. Thus the detailed administration of
the process of recruiting had a connection with the recognition of the importance of
public opinion.
Recruitment of armies that would stay in the field for longer periods than
previously withdrew labour from more productive activity. K. B. McFarlane sees it as
'...unlikely that the raising of armies caused any great dislocation of the labour
market.'43
 To assess the scale of this dislocation M. M. Postan added estimates of other
manpower supporting the field armies to the number of those actually in arms. Whether
39 J. R. Maddicott, 'The County Community and the Making of Public Opinion
in Fourteenth-Century England', TRHS, Fifth Series, xxvm (1978), p. 35.
Maddicott, 'The County Community ', p. 43.
41 ibid., p. 42.
42 ibid., p. 29.
43 K. B. McFarlane, 'England and the Hundred Years War', Past and Present,
XXII (1962), p. 5.
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even this total had a significant economic effect has been much debated. 44 Even
though there were frequent wars in this period, their impact on manpower available for
peaceful economic activity must have been much less than that of the Black Death.
However, other aspects of the process of mobilization must also have been damaging.
To the withdrawal of manpower should be added the duration, and perhaps also
importantly the uncertainties, of the whole operation of preliminary array and
purveyance. The disruptive effects on communities with relatively little surplus
resources of stocks, equipment and, after the plague, men, may have been greater than
might appear from looking solely at the size of the armies themselves. The timing in
relation to the agricultural calendar of withdrawal of labour and draft animals could be
particularly damaging. Like almost any large-scale administrative action, the recruiting
of Edwardian armies gave rise to confusions, negotiations, delays, bribery and
corruption, as J. R. Maddicott shows. 45 How the royal administration reacted to or tried
to anticipate these problems has a bearing on views of its general effectiveness and
managerial control.
Though the Statute of Winchester of 1285 was primarily a police measure, it
created a reserve of manpower, theoretically at least equipped according to wealth with,
and accustomed to, arms, from which armies could be raised. Powicke points out that it
was Edward I who 'introduced the systematic use of commissioners of array for the
assembling of selected communal troops under his standard.' 46 These commissioners,
unlike the permanent shire and borough officials, held ad hoc, temporary appointments.
This delegation to local men of responsibility for effecting central authority's wishes,
which is paralleled by the increasing use of local worthies as keepers and justices of the
peace,47 is arguably a characteristic of the development of English government.
44 e.g. M. M. Postan, 'The Costs of the Hundred Years War', Past and Present,
XXVII (1964), pp. 34-53: A. R. Bridbury, 'Before the Black Death', Economic History
Review, Second series, X>CX (1977), pp. 393-410; K. B. McFarlane, 'England and the
Hundred Years War', pp. 3-13.
45 The English Peasantry.
46 Military Obligation, p. 118.
47 B. H. Putnam, 'The Transformation of the Keepers of the Peace into Justices
of the Peace, 1327-1380', TRHS, Fourth Series, XII (1929), pp. 19-48. G. L. Harriss
writes 'In the matter of public order the interests of the Crown and its justices were
challenged by the claim of the landowning class for a greater share in the legal as well
as fiscal and administrative government of the shire.' King, Parliament and Public
Finance, p. 401.
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Therefore it is significant to observe who the commissioners of array were, how they
carried out their task of seeing to the selection and recruitment of soldiers, what powers
of further delegation they had, what sanctions were available to them, to what extent
they were themselves supervised, and how the permanent local officials, especially the
sheriffs, cooperated with them.
In so far as it may be possible to describe in detail what were the stages that
brought a man from his manor to the muster, some flesh may be added to the bones of
administrative procedures. On whose orders were the able-bodied villagers from whom
the army was to be drawn assembled? Who actually made the selection? What
happened to the conscripts when the selection had been made? Who made sure they
kept together, and reached the place of the general muster, and by the date set in the
original orders to the commissioners? Was the government able to keep track of them?
What sort of things went wrong? How and, in particular, how quickly did the
administration react to manage the consequences?
The size and make-up of Edwardian armies, the numbers of heavy cavalry, men-
at-arms (a sometimes ambiguous category)," hobelars, crossbow-men, mounted
archers, foot archers, speannen and others, are difficult to determine with precision.°
This is so particularly when feudal elements served without pay. The instructions to
commissioners of array, however, do give the specific numbers of communal troops
sought, as do those to town officials. Comparison of the total and the separate quotas of
these recruiting orders can indicate which was set first, and therefore at what level of
authority. Also the shire quotas may show whether there was any consistent policy to
determine which areas should, or could, supply greater or smaller numbers. Where pay
figures are available for identifiable levies, comparison of actual with originally
specified numbers will reflect the efficiency of the system. If a fairly consistent figure
for the proportion of 'wastage' appears, it might be possible to infer that this could be
something planners would take into account in setting the original quotas. It would
still, however, leave the intriguing question of why a particular size of army or
expeditionary force was considered practical, or indeed appropriate, for a particular
campaign. 5° 0. Coleman says firmly 'It is nonsense to pretend that any part of the
48 'when in 1324 the sheriffs were asked to send in lists of knights and men-at-
arms in their counties, they did not all use the same criteria to define the latter.'
Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 17.
49 A. E. Prince, 'The Strength of English Armies', gives assessments in some
detail for the period 1334-1369.
50 In this thesis no attempt is made to answer that question.
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country's business, from that of the national exchequer to that of the manorial reeve,
could have been conducted by people with no sense of numbers.' 51 Evidence that, in the
development of the administration of recruiting and provisioning armies, use was being
made of statistical records could reinforce that judgement.
This thesis studies the management of the mobilization of armies for planned
offensive war, not the administration of defensive aspects of military activity.
However, the latter can have some bearing on the former. Garrisoning of castles in the
north, and subsequently in France, involved relatively permanent, predictable and
continuous arrangements. These could reflect the degree of sophistication of
administrative procedures. 52 Defence of coasts and ports, should there be an invasion,
required a different structure, since what was needed was an organisation to respond to
less predictable circumstances. Magnates were appointed as keepers of the maritime
lands, with which specific inland counties were associated. The keepers had defined
responsibilities. They had to see to the maintenance of warning signal fires. They
made suitable appointments of arrayers, to ensure that all fencible men were properly
armed according to the Statute of Westminster. The arrayers had to lead the men in the
event of attack. The keepers directed the military action. Coastal defence, being
essentially reactive in its nature, therefore did not necessitate such complicated
logistical prior planning to effect it, and so throws less light on how issues of planning
and provisioning were handled. Nevertheless, the ways the government reacted to the
deficiencies of its plans for defence, revealed by some bitter experience, could be
relevant to an assessment of its ability to adapt its management of military
arrangements.53
As A. E. Prince points out, transport of troops and supplies was the primary
function of the naval effort. 54 The right of the crown to arrest shipping for the purposes
51 'What figures? Some Thoughts on the Use of Information by Medieval
Governments', in D. C. Coleman and A. H. John (eds.), Trade Government and
Economy in Pre-industrial England (London, 1976), p. 105. She points out that '...in
1334 the Exchequer proved perfectly capable of using its own records, and issued the
rolls of 1332 to the new assessors to guide them in striking their bargains with the
localities.' Ibid., p. 102.
52 The use of contracts to organise garrisons could relate interestingly to their
more general use as time passed.
53 E. Searle and R. Burghart discuss this subject in 'The Defense of England and
the Peasants' Revolt', Viator, III (1972), pp. 368-383.
54 A. E. Prince, 'The Army and Navy', in EGov.atW, Vol. I, p. 377.
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of war, not merely for the defence of the realm of England, does not seem to have met
with much, if any, theoretical opposition based on arguments about customary limits on
obligation; in this it contrasts with the insistence on the limited unpaid service
obligation of county levies. Obligation may not have been denied, but might be evaded;
how evasion was met by the crown's officers and agents has a bearing on judgements of
the effectiveness of their management.
The general administration of the naval effort involved the central authority and
the agents it sent out, as well as the sheriffs, the local port officials, and the admirals. It
should thus describe something of the operating relationships between these various
powers. Though there were some king's ships, they were very few in number. 55 The
fleets required for war had to be assembled from impressed merchantmen; J. S. Kepler's
article 'The Effects of the Battle of Sluys upon the Administration of English Naval
Impressment 1340-1343' 56 describes what was involved. Impressed ships had to be
adapted not only to be able to defend themselves, but also, when the war was to be
fought on the continent, especially to carry the large number of horses the army needed.
The division of responsibility for these tasks, and making sure they were carried out,
was a critical part of the managerial requirement for waging these wars.
Although the principle of impressment of ships was not challenged, this did not
mean that in practice it would always proceed without difficulty. The withdrawal of
ships from commercial activity would naturally have an adverse effect on trade, and so
there would be evasion of arrest, by the obvious means of putting to sea. Requisitioned
ships could be out of action for lengthy periods,57 giving rise to complaints, and
requests for permission to sail, on a promise to return by a given date. The extent of
such passive resistance, and the government's response, both to try to prevent and in
action to punish it, could provide another comment on the management of naval
mobilization.
Material relevant to the particular issue of quantitative planning may emerge
from looking at the assembling of fleets. Where there is evidence of negotiation,
between the ports and the officials sent by the crown to obtain ships, over how many an
individual port should supply, a number of issues might be suggested. Was the
government trying to assemble a specific number of ships? If so, can this be shown to
be related to a calculation of how many were needed to transport the assembling army?
55 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 268.
56 Speculum, XXXXVIII (1973), pp. 70-77.
57 K. B. McFarlane plays this down in 'England and the Hundred Years War', p.
5.
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Or was the king sometimes merely collecting as many as he could? When, as certainly
did happen, defined numbers were sought from individual ports, how was each number
arrived at? Answers to such questions will add to knowledge of the amount, and the
sophistication, of planning. There may even be evidence as to by whom and where it
was done. What M. Prestwich suggests was 'a Scheme in 1341 158 for an expedition to be
led by the king, which was probably drawn up for discussion by the council, gives a
number of significant clues: it has quantified details of retinues, ships, sailors and
calculations of costs.
An important factor in planning for foreign expeditions was the coordination of
assembly of troops and availability of suitable transport. Imprecision in arranging this
would not only waste time and money, but would also run very real risks of collapse of
such discipline as there was, and of desertions by masters with their ships, by sailors,
and by soldiers. If there was a substantial delay between the coming together of the
various contingents at the final muster and the availability of sufficient shipping, one
major problem would be that of feeding the army while it waited to embark. This could
put a considerable strain not only on administration, but also on the local population.
Just as the process of assembling an army at the final muster was a protracted one, so
the bringing together of each of the fleets would take several weeks. To integrate the
two must have necessitated allowing a considerable margin of error: whether as time
passed this was reduced might show the administration learning how to improve its
management of this aspect of mobilization for foreign expeditions.
Adequate supplies of food had to be organised for the army as it assembled at
the muster. One basic mechanism was extension of the royal right of prise, for the
maintenance of the king's household, into purveyance, the compulsory purchase of
victuals for the king's armies. What had been purveyed had then to be moved to the
place where the army was assembling. There it had to be stored, and in due course
issued to the troops. Obviously the whole process provided ample opportunities for
corruption and profiteering by those making the compulsory purchases. The burden fell
disproportionately heavily on the peasants, as Maddicott points out, both because the
richer and more powerful were better able to avoid demands, and because the poorer
had fewer surplus resources. 59 Moreover, although payment was intended by the crown,
in fact it often did not take place. Given the inevitable degree of uncertainty as to how
big the force to be fed would be, only very approximate figures of what was needed to
58 'English Armies in the Early Stages of the Hundred Years War; a Scheme in
1341', BIHR, INI (1983), pp. 102-113.
59 'The English Peasantry ', passim.
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be purveyed could be set. Prestwich 6° records that definite standards of diet were used
by the king's wardrobe to work out requirements for garrisons. 61 While the size of
garrisons could obviously be known with much more precision than how many men
would appear at the muster, this practice might have formed some sort of basis for
central calculation of what should be purveyed. If records of orders to purveyors
supported this belief, it would further buttress Coleman's assertion of the ability of
medieval administrators to plan quantitatively. As with allocation of quotas of levies,
consistency or variation in the quantities of provisions to be obtained in different
counties might suggest something of their use of records.
H. J. Hewitt summarised the basic process of securing initial supplies for a large
expedition. 62 A rough estimate of total needs was made and subdivided by counties.
The sheriffs had to secure their county's quota and deliver it to the king's receiver of
victuals at the place of muster, or, for expeditions overseas, at the designated port. This
identifies two key officials, the sheriff and the receiver of victuals, but of course
purveyance required a more elaborate administration, which also had to be managed.
The sheriffs and their staffs were not left to make the purveyances on their own.
Members and agents of the central administration, such as king's clerks from the
chancery or exchequer, sometimes others from the household such as sergeants-at-arms,
were also used in these tasks. The work included arranging intermediate storage and
transport as well as final delivery to the receiver of victuals. Purveyance could be used
to provide victualling for the ships assembled to make the war-time fleets, whose
admirals were also given powers to organise supplies. The relationship between the
local permanent officials and the royal clerks or others appointed ad hoc when
purveyance for the war was needed, and perhaps the change in the balance of
responsibilities over time, could reflect change in the importance of the sheriffs'
previous central role in general administration. From the 1340's, as Maddicott
describes,63 authority to purvey began to be given also to merchants. They were given
power to appoint deputies, arrest those who resisted them, and hand over those arrested
to the sheriffs to be imprisoned. There is something of a parallel here with the
60 'Victualling Estimates for English Garrisons in Scotland during the early
Fourteenth Century', EHR, DOCX11 (1967), pp. 536-543.
61 Bpi •., p.Ibid., 536, referring to a specific instance in 1300.
62 Organisation of War, pp. 53-54.
63 The English Peasantry, p. 54. The reason for the change is there suggested to
be that merchants were more likely to know where supplies could most easily be
obtained.
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'privatisation' of recruiting: the detailed management was being done by men who were
not permanent shire officials, though the social classes involved differed somewhat
from those recruiting armed retinues.
The receivers of the king's victuals were the key appointments for the reception,
unloading, storage and dispersal of purveyed supplies. It would be interesting to be able
to see whether their role extended from the purely administrative management of what
was delivered to them to one of initiating, or at least advising on, planning decisions on
quantities required. What action would, or could, a receiver take if the supplies
delivered to him were proving inadequate for the army he was servicing? An answer
might reveal something of the degree of delegation of independent action allowed to
administrative officials. Provisioning was, however, not a matter merely of issuing
rations. Food could be issued in lieu of pay; payment of wages to troops was so that
they could buy food from the keeper of the king's victuals, just as they had to buy it
from the merchants who were encouraged by proclamation to bring supplies to the
place where the army was mustered. 64 The importance of the supplies brought by these
merchants makes it clear that the government did not attempt to manage the victualling
of armies through its own administrative resources alone.
The detail of the processes of how English armies were recruited, assembled,
provided with transport and provisioned so that they were available to set off to war,
how the great administrative effort necessary actually worked in practice, how its
management perhaps changed in response to the experiences of a century of war, and in
particular how effective and controlled that management was, are the issues that will be
examined in this thesis. Studies of mobilizations for a group of wars fought under the
three Edwards will be used as material. The series includes both wars about which
much has been written, and others that have received less attention. They are at
intervals of approximately a dozen years - 1282, 1301, 1314, 1322, 1324, 1336,. 1346,
and 1359. The armies raised were for Welsh, Scottish and French campaigns, so that it
will be possible to see the government dealing with mobilization for different theatres
64 Food and drink would not, of course, be the only things handled by the
receiver of victuals. Even medieval armies had a need for a wide variety of supplies
over and above the personal equipment which men, from the armoured earl to the
ordinary foot-soldier, brought with them to the muster. H. J. Hewitt gives a summary
account of the range, from cooking utensils to siege engines, and above all bows and
arrows. (Organisation of War, pp. 64-74). It appears to have been the sheriffs,
responding to specific orders, who usually obtained and delivered these.
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of war. The method adopted in making these 'case studies' has been to take them in
chronological order, and examine the administrative aspects of each. At least in theory,
there should be a benefit from approaching the study of management of mobilization
via such a series. It could make it rather more likely that, if there are pronounced
differences or trends, they will reveal themselves: just as importantly, if there are not,
there should be less risk of reading trends into the empirical data. A chronological
approach has also been used within each case, as far as clarity of exposition permits.
The aim of this is to recognise the interrelationship of the different elements of the
process. Whether coordination between them was actually achieved would be evidence
as to the effectiveness of management: it must almost certainly have been the case that
plans for the various administrative actions were developed in relation to each other.
Those plans for the mobilization of armies can be studied from primary sources.
The fundamental material is that which records the government's orders to its various
agents and officials. These are contained in the chancery rolls, some published in the
form of calendars, and some in manuscript. Dated and quantified orders for the general
array and selection of county levies, with the names of the commissioners of array, are
an obvious starting point for examination of the administration's planning, and of its
ability to achieve its objectives. Because the corresponding arrangements for muster of
cavalry, whether in the form of traditional feudal summonses or in more flexible terms,
rarely specify the force required or expected from the individual magnates to whom
they are addressed, they cannot be used for a straightforward quantitative comparison of
intention with achievement. Nevertheless, as with the commissions of array, their dates
of issue and the muster dates they promulgate are relevant to the government's planning
in terms of timing. Chancery writs provide material on the orders to individuals
specifying their special tasks, often in relation to purveyance or the assembly of
shipping. The background of many of these individuals helps to identify the
administration's resources of personne1. 65 Some writs are of particular interest in that
they concern corrective action for failure to obey instructions. Chancery material
specifically related to Wales, in the form of the Welsh roll, 66 is a valuable source for the
Second Welsh War. The Scotch, 67 and particularly the manuscript Gascon68 and Treaty
65 References to them in the Patent and Close Rolls note other tasks they
undertook. Social standing can in relevant cases be established from biographical
compilations, e.g. C. Moor, Knights of Edward I (5 vols., Harleian Society, 1929-1932).
66 CVChR, pp. 157-382.
67 Rot. Scot., Vol. I.
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rolls69 contain many instructions and arrangements for men, supplies and ships for the
wars with Scotland and France. They reveal the great detail involved in ordering the
mobilization of armies and fleets.
Something of what was actually achieved by these orders, and therefore how
effectively the mobilizations were managed, is visible from financial accounts. When
the king himself was with the army the office of the wardrobe accompanied him. This
'department' of the royal household functioned, as Harriss describes, as a mobile
treasury, the war-chest on campaign, and the paymaster of the army. 7° Its records of
week-by-week payments to the various elements of the armies provide numbers that can
often, in the case of county levies, be directly compared with originally ordered quotas.
Fluctuations in the numbers can give an impression, at least, of the scale of desertions.
The dates when pay began show whether dates for arriving at the muster were met or
missed. Payments to leaders of retinues make possible assessment of the numbers of
men-at arms. These accounts 71 are therefore a valuable check on such matters, as well
as covering other details of the process.
In respect of supplies, the accounts of the receivers of victuals contain valuable
information. 72 Sheriffs' administrative accounts provide many more details, particularly
of their activity in obtaining and delivering victuals, equipment for ships, bows and
arrows, and other necessities for the armies and fleets. 73 Chronicles74 can sometimes
put flesh on the bones of such administrative records. In particular the chroniclers
make illuminating comments on the adequacy of provisioning arrangements for the
armies. As, however, the government did not rely solely on purveyance for the
provisioning of the armies, the quantified instructions to sheriffs, clerks or king's
merchants to buy victuals, and the surviving records of what was actually obtained, are
therefore not the whole story. They can only permit a limited assessment of the
effectiveness of the management of this aspect of mobilization.
68 C61.
69 C76.
70 King, Parliament and Public Finance, p. 201; Ch. IX, Ch. X.
71 E101/393/11, BL Stowe Ms. 553, BL Add. Ms. 7967.
72 e.g. E101/20/4, E101/8/14, E101125116.
73 E101/550-598.
74
e.g. Adae Murimuth Continuatio chronicarum, ed. E. M. Thompson (London,
1889): Knighton 's Chronicle, ed. G. H. Martin (Oxford, 1995): Johannis de Trokelowe
et Henrici de Blaneford Chronica et Anna/es, ed. H. T. Riley (London, 1866): Vita
Edwardi Secundi, ed. N. Denholm-Yourig (London, 1957).
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Collections of documents supplement these various records of orders to officials
and their actions. P. Chaplais's, for the War of Saint-Sardos, 75 has correspondence from
Nicholas Hugate complaining of the quality of provisions received at Bordeaux. The
Black Prince's Register76 has useful material, some of it dealing with detailed matters of
managerial control. The major compilations by Rymer, Palgrave and Bain 77 are other
valuable sources.
There is therefore a substantial amount of primary evidence, in increasing
quantity and detail for the later wars. This can be drawn upon to examine how these
mobilizations were organised, how what happened in practice sometimes differed in
detail from what had been planned, and in particular how, or in some cases even
whether, government reacted to or tried to anticipate such incidents. It is of course
most unlikely that all were recorded (or even noticed). Therefore caution will be
necessary in an attempt to generalise from these studies about the degree of
sophistication of the administration's control of the management of the process.
Conversely, it must also be borne in mind that surviving records are inherently unlikely
to draw attention to those arrangements, probably the majority, that proceeded as
intended.
The central aim of this thesis is to describe how the management of the
processes involved in mobilizing armies for the Edwardian wars was conducted.
Chapters 2 - 8, on individual wars, are case studies of mobilizations under each of the
three Edwards. The final chapters, 9 and 10, analyse the themes that emerge from the
case studies, and draw conclusions as to the royal government's management of
mobilization. How sophisticated in terms of quantification and use of records was the
planning process? What was done, what failed to be done in spite of the government's
instructions? What steps were taken to monitor progress? How did goverment react
to administrative failures? How, and how effectively, was the management of the
75 The War of Saint-Sardos (1323-1325). Gascon Correspondence and
Diplomatic Documents, ed. P. Chaplais (Camden Society, Third Series, LXXXVII,
1954).
76 Register of Edward, the Black Prince (4 vols., London., 1930-1933).
77 Foedera; Par!. Writs; Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland, ed. J.
Bain (4 vols., Edinburgh, 1881-1888).
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mobilization of armies handled? Did changes happen dramatically, systematically, or
erratically in ad hoc response to circumstances?
What emerges from these case studies should also have relevance to other
aspects of the times, some closely associated with the prosecution of war and some of
more general, if distant, interest. Did the emergence of the paid army, raised largely by
indentured contracts, happen by policy, or by accidental evolution? How great was the
power of the state to secure the resources it needed? How great a control did the centre
have over its local agents? How, and why, did the allocation of responsibility between
permanent officials, such as the sheriffs, and men of local importance change? What is
the relationship, if any, between the changing techniques of management of
mobilization, and the demands of the 'military revolution'? What relationship might
there be between the management of mobilization, and the wider subject of the reach of
medieval government in other spheres?
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CHAPTER 2
THE SECOND WELSH WAR, 1282-1283
The Second Welsh War, unlike the first, was instigated by an unexpected Welsh attack.
Previously Edward I had had time to prepare and mobilize, since the war of 1277 was,
in military terms at least, an English initiative:' in 1282 he had to react, and quickly.
Though this presented the administration with slightly different problems in managing
the mobilization of the necessary resources, the outcome was even more successful. M.
Prestwich suggests that concern about supplies was one reason for Edward's decision to
allow Llewelyn a negotiated settlement in 1277; 2 with victory in 1283 and the deaths of
Llewelyn and David ap Gruffydd, the semi-independence of the Principality came to an
end.
The first war had shown that the resources of England, 3 properly mobilized and
determinedly applied, would not be defeated. Sir Maurice Powicke, contrasting
Edward's success in 1277 with Henry Ill's failure, wrote, 'In substance the arrangements
were the same - the dispatch of paid forces under household knights, the marshalling of
local shire levies by the sheriffs, the impressment of woodsmen, carpenters and diggers,
the concentration of supplies from quarters far and near,.. .the gathering of ships from
the Cinque Ports and other ports, all these and other measures are familiar.' 4 In general
terms that observation applies also to the war of 1282-1283. This chapter describes the
administrative activity that made those arrangements, and some developments in its
structure.
Appointment of the high military command came first. Within days of David ap
Gruffydd's attack on Hawarden on 21 March 1282, writs of 25 March appointed three
captains, following the pattern of 1277. Roger Mortimer, as before, commanded the
J. E. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I. A Contribution to Mediaeval
History based on Original Documents, new edn. (Oxford, 1996), p. 114.
2 M. Prestwich, Edward I (London, 1962), pp. 181-2.
3 including the ability to call on 'Welsh friendlies' and Gascon mercenaries.
Morris, Welsh Wars, p. 149.
4 Sir Maurice Powicke, The Thirteenth Century, 1216-1307, second edn.
(Oxford, 1961), p. 409.
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forces in the marches of Wales. Reginald de Grey, justiciar of Chester, had
responsibility for Chester and Flint, and Robert Tibetot, a companion of Edward's on
the crusade of 1270 and justiciar of West Wales since 1280, was to command there.
Bogo de Knovill, a household knight and much used agent of the king, carried the king's
instructions to them. Mortimer and Grey were to be supported 'with horses and arms' by
named individuals and by counties adjacent to their commands,5 whose 'knights,
sheriffs and whole community' 6
 were ordered to assist them. Tibetot was to be
supported by the earls of Gloucester and Hereford and 'the knights and all others' of
West Wales.
Royal messengers were sent out in numbers during the first weeks of April:7
The rapidly issued orders of 25 March were quickly followed by the summoning of a
council to meet at Devizes on 5 April, and a call for more troops. The preparations for
the war of 1277 had begun with writs dated 12 December 1276 summoning the feudal
host to muster six months later, on 1 July. This time, presumably reflecting the
different and urgent circumstances, on 6 April an 'affectionate request' went to six earls
and one hundred and fifty-one others to muster at Worcester in six weeks time, on 17
May. They would serve ad yacht:: nostra, 8 'a phrase unprecedented in writs of military
summons.
,9
On 20 and 24 May, however, the traditional summons were issued for the
servicium debit urn of the tenants-in-chief, to muster at Rhuddlan by 2 August. 1 ° Morris
argues that it was political pressure from the earls of Gloucester and Hereford that led
the king now to call out the feudal host, just as earlier he had had to acknowledge
Hereford's rights as constable and to subordinate Robert Tibetot to Gloucester." He
points out that it was previous, and later, practice to give some six months' notice of
muster when a formal feudal summons was issued: in this instance Edward was only
5 Mortimer by Shropshire, Worcestershire, Staffordshire, Herefordshire and
Gloucestershire: Grey by Chester, Lancaster, West Derby and parts of the Peak and of
Flint. CVChR, p. 212.
6 mid.
7 E101/308/5.
8 Foedera, Vol. I, div. ii, p. 603.
9 Morris, Welsh Wars, p. 155.
I° Par/. Writs, Vol. I, p. 224-5.
11 Welsh Wars, p. 158. He argues that the baronage was now insisting on its
rights, in reaction to the king's quo warranto examination of their franchises.
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giving some two and a half months. 12 This implies that if mobilization of the servicium
debitum had always been his intention it would have been called for much earlier, in
March or April. Morris also dismisses the possibilities that the war was 'more serious
than he first thought', and that the response to the 6 April call had proved inadequate
and therefore had to be supplemented by the summons of 20 May. In fact there was a
steady assembly of fighting men, including those from the household and from the
response to the 6 April request for paid service, during the first two or three months of
the war. Morris estimates that by June-July 'in the whole of Wales 800 [cavalry] must
have been serving,' and calculates the number of foot on 15 June as 7,000, all from
English counties. 13
 The latter would presumably have been conscripted in obedience to
the writs of 25 March, 14 ordering the sheriffs, knights and communities of various
counties to provide support for the three captains. The foot would therefore have been
collected by the sheriffs themselves, as in 1277.
Detailed arrangements for obtaining supplies for the forthcoming armies had
been quickly put in hand. On 10 April William de St Clair and William de Hamilton,
keepers of the Bishopric of Winchester, were instructed to provide various victuals to
Chester by 8 July. 15 Protection for the shippers, Thomas Purchaz [to whom 400
quarters of wheat and 200 of oats were delivered], John de Soldon of Ore [200 of barley
and 400 of oats], and Roger Balner of Southampton [60 of wheat and other goods], was
not recorded until 15 June, /6 which may be an indication of how long collection of
supplies could take - a good two months to deliver them to shippers and some three
weeks to sail from the south coast to Chester.
On 14 April appointments were made to obtain provisions from many other
areas. Nicholas de Carevill, one of the king's sergeants, was sent to Ireland with orders
for the bishop of Waterford, justiciar of Ireland, to supply to Chester as quickly as
possible specified quantities of wheat (2,000 quarters), oats (2,000), peas and beans
(400), barley (500), wine (600 tuns), 1,000 salted salmon, cheese and meat. A 'faithful
and discreet' local was to be selected to assist de Carevill. 17 Elias Tolosan, a king's
12 Ibid., p. 157.
13 Ibid., p. 160, from E101/3/30.
14 CVChR, p. 212.
15 CCR 1279-1288, p. 150.
16 CVChR, p. 226. In this the date for delivery is 'before St. Peter ad Vincula' (1
August), implying perhaps that it was being accepted that setting the earlier date had
been impractical.
17 Ibid., p. 214.
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clerk, was sent to Ponthieu, whose seneschal, Thomas de Sandwich, was to cause to be
bought 2,000 quarters of wheat and of oats, 300 of peas and beans and if possible meat
and cheese. The supplies were to be ready at Crotay by 9 June. What had been bought
and where it was stored was to be notified to the warden of the Cinque Ports, Stephen
de Penecestre, for him to arrange shipment. 18 In England, the sheriffs of five south-east
counties from Essex to Hampshire were each ordered to assist another of the king's
clerks, John de Maidenstone, 19 including providing a reliable man from their staff to
work with him. He was to obtain 1,500 quarters of wheat, 2,000 of oats, and peas,
cheese and other victuals. Maidenstone was to receive money for the operation from
Matthew de Columbariis, the king's butler. 20 This set of orders indicates not only
coordinated but also rapid planning: it was only three weeks since the unexpected attack
on Hawarden.
These arrangements also show the administration using central government and
household staff, both lay and clerical, to work with, and, significantly, supervise and
urge, existing local officials. The tasks were centrally and specifically quantified for
each area.
Government collection of supplies was accompanied by simultaneous measures
to direct merchants to bring their goods to places where the armies could buy them. On
15 April the sheriff of Shropshire was ordered to proclaim throughout his shire that
markets for corn and victuals should only be held at Whitchurch or where Roger
Mortimer was. The sheriffs of Gloucestershire, Herefordshire, Staffordshire,
Lancashire and Derbyshire and the justiciar of Chester made similar proclamations in
respect of the force at Chester, and the sheriffs of Somersetshire, Devon and Cornwall
for Gilbert de Clare and the army in West and South Wales. The sheriffs of
Cumberland and Lancashire were also to send men to the Scottish march to obtain
quantities of salt fish, which were to be taken to Chester.21
On 17 April the seneschal of Gascony and the constable of Bordeaux were
instructed to assist a team of purveyors sent to Gascony. Poncius Amati, another king's
clerk, with Bernard Francoun and Elias le Carpenter, had oral orders from the king to
18 ibid.
19 in the Household Ordinance of 1279, clerk of the marshalsea. T. F. Tout,
s Chapters in the Administrative History of Mediaeval England (6 vols., Manchester
1920-33), Vol. II, p. 160.
20 CVChR, p. 217.
21 Ibid., pp. 248-9, dated 15 April. The prohibition of other markets did not
apply to the South-West.
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secure wheat (2,000 quarters), peas and beans (300 quarters), oats (1,000 quarters),
wine (500 tuns), honey (20 tuns), 1,000 bacon pigs and other victuals. The constable
was told to have the supplies bought and delivered to the three purveyors, but if he did
not, they were to make the purchases themselves. Money was to be provided to them by
Matthew de Columbariis. A force of 12 mounted and 40 foot crossbowmen was to be
provided by the seneschal to come to England with the supplies. 22 Here too the
purveyors were given defined quantities to obtain, though it is not possible to know
whether they were related to an assessment of how much would be needed from all
sources, or to an estimate of availability in the various areas. Either way the practice is,
again, witness to quantified central planning.
The different dates for delivery - 8 July, 'with all speed', 9 June at Crotay - make
it clear that what was being set up was not a supply dump to be ready for an army to be
mobilized on the Welsh border by 17 May in response to the 'affectionate request' of 6
April. These supplies must have been intended as provisions for the on-going campaign
in Wales, where very limited local supplies, if any, could be found. 23 If, as Morris
suggested, supply had been a problem in 1277, the management of the mobilization of
sources of supply in 1282 shows that the lesson had been learned.
As Morris records, not insubstantial armed forces were already in the field,
together with household units, in response to the first summons to serve at pay, within
two or three months of the revolt. 24 These might reasonably be seen as an immediate
military response to the Welsh rising: a full-scale counter-offensive would require the
mobilization of non-military support cadres as well. This too had been quickly ordered
alongside the other measures. On 15 April nineteen sheriffs covering twenty-eight
counties, from Northumberland to Wiltshire, were told to send a total of 1,010 diggers
and 345 carpenters to Chester by 1 June. Each sheriff was to appoint one of his men to
conduct them there. 25 The summoning of these workmen must have been part of
deliberate and comprehensive planning based on the April arrangements for a .May
22 Ibid., pp. 216-7.
23 Continuity of supply also involved merchants from Gascony: on 8 March 1283
Peter Johannis de la Roqau, 'citizen and merchant of Bayonne' received a licence to
bring various victuals from abroad to the king's army of Wales (CPR 1281-1292, p. 59).
s In April 1283 John de Bardus, another merchant of Bayonne, was granted protection for
three years 'because he first touched with his cargo of wines at Aberconewey in
Snaudon, while the king was there.' Ibid., p. 64.
24 Welsh Wars, pp. 155-6; 158-160.
25 CVChR, p. 248.
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muster, and so provides additional evidence that a formal feudal muster for 2 August
was not a part of the original intention. As Morris describes, the offensive was already
beginning in June/July.26
Widespread orders for securing provisions continued to be issued. On 2 June
William Bagot27 was appointed to secure corn for the king's armies in Wales from
Gloucestershire, Worcestershire, Shropshire and Staffordshire; presumably proximity to
Wales made their supplies available quickly. The corn was to be taken to Shrewsbury,
Montgomery and Oswestry, 'for the munition of the said armies coming thither'.
Sheriffs and officials of those counties were to 'be intendent...to William or to his
certain order, when he cannot be present in person'. 28 (The phrase 'his certain order'
might be seen as designed to inhibit corrupt requisitioning of grain.) On 12 June all
bailiffs were told to assist the king's pantler, Robert la Wane, and the king's other
sergeants sent to 'divers places and counties of the realm to buy victuals and carry them'
to the army. 29
From 17 May begins a long series of safe conducts for those taking corn and
other supplies to the army. Three of the four May entries involved shipping; two were
for supplies coming from Ireland and Bridgewater, and one for deliveries from the
Channel Islands ordered by Otto Grandison. 3° The greatest number of these protections
- 39 - were in June: one was for John de Orbek, 'merchant of Rouen'. 31 There were 15
in July, 11 in August, one of which was for merchants of Lucca, and another 11 in
September, 8 in October, 6 in November, and, not surprisingly, only one in December.
If the gap between the recording of the safe-conducts and the arrival of the goods might
be guessed to be some three or four weelcs, 32
 the protections suggest that the bulk of
supplies would be available to the armies by, say, mid- to end July, by which time the
campaign was under way.
The safe-conducts were paralleled by a shorter, but still lengthy, series of
protections against having corn, other victuals, horses and carts requisitioned. These
26 Welsh Wars, p. 160 etc.
27 This is probably the knight Sir William Bagot. CCR 1279-1288, p. 134.
28 CVChR, p. 224.
29 Ibid., p. 225.
30 Ibid., pp. 221-2.
31 Ibid., p. 226.
32 as is suggested by that protection for Roger Balner, issued on 15 June in
respect of a delivery required originally by 8 July, referred to above.
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protections were often for ecclesiastics. 33 The first was recorded with a date of 24
May,34
 which is probably evidence that requisitioning was already taking place within
two or three weeks of its being ordered; Maidenstone's appointment was dated 14
Apri1. 35 Later in the year, on 8 November, William Bagot was appointed again, to act
with the sheriffs of Shropshire, Staffordshire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire to buy
corn and arrange its transport to Chester. An additional part of his task was to prevent
profiteering, by requisitioning corn from merchants who had bought up supplies from
others so as to 'thus sell their own corn afterwards more dearly'. In eight other
counties 36 no external appointment was made: the sheriff 'with one of the more lawful
knights of the county to be chosen by the sheriff for this purpose' was to see to this
himself. 37 In another order of the same date, sheriffs of approximately the same list of
counties were told to arrest anyone interfering with itinerant vendors (tranterii) and
others bringing victuals and other necessities to the king and his army in Wales.
Additionally, they were to ensure that there was a regular arrival at Chester or Rhuddlan
of such vendors and transporting carts. 38 The importance of the availability of carts for
victualling the army is shown by the sending of Matthew Checker to obtain carts from
abbeys and priories, 39 by the forceful and threatening order of 16 December to various
abbots and priors, and the justiciar of Chester, to send all their cars and carts (carris et
carettis) to Chester,4° and also by the number of explicit protections needed against
such requisitioning.41
As the war continued, therefore, maintaining a flow of supplies to the armies
involved a wider casting of the net, and use of many reliable agents - royal clerks,
sergeants, household officials, sheriffs, and finally knights. Provisioning was a feature
33 e.g. CVChR, pp. 235 (abbot of Bruern), 236 (abbot of Woburn, canon of St
Chad's), 241 (prior of Norton), 242 (prior of Dunstaple) etc.
34 Ibid., p. 221.
35 Above, p. 28 n.14.
36 Again, counties more or less nearer to Wales - Worcestershire, Herefordshire,
Gloucestershire, Oxfordshire, Northamptonshire, Lancashire, Warwickshire and
Leicestershire. CVChR, p. 245.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., pp. 257-8.
39 E101/351/9, m. 1.
40 CVChR, p. 277.
41 Above, p. 30 n. 23.
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of the war of 1282-1283 to which sustained management attention was successfully
directed.
The picture of administrative flexibility is visible in the use of the king's clerks
in carrying out many different tasks. For example, William de Perton was used in a
wide variety of roles during the war. As early as April he was ordered to purvey two
horses for Giles de Fenes and John de Weston, and in May to pay Robert de Tatteshale,
and receive others to the king's wages. 42 He received money at Chester with which to
pay soldiers' wages. 43 In an order issued in September he was associated with Thomas
de Gwineys, controller of the king's wardrobe, in making £500 available to Roger
Mortimer. 44
 Typically, later he had several different tasks. In December it was Perton
who, with others of the king's household, was to say what was to be done with the
abbots' carts. He was ordered to send the king the 12,000 quarrels in his keeping, and,
with another king's clerk, Richard de Abingdon, to send corn, flour, salt, iron and nails
to Anglesey, as in a letter sent to Geoffrey Meriliun. He sent tents, timber and
carpenters from Chester to Rhuddlan as instructed by John de Dorset. He sent nails and
two smiths with iron and their tools to Bangor. He saw to the loading of ships at
Chester with timber for Rhuddlan, as instructed by Kok Breton. He was told to pay
wages to carpenters brought by Richard de Grey, provide William the king's attiliator
with money for cross-bowmen's equipment, provide sawyers with their saws to Master
Richard the Engineer, and so on.45
Richard de Abingdon worked with another of the king's clerks as well as with
Perton: an undated fragment orders him, with John de Maidenstone (the latter being in
charge of the supply centre at Chester), redirect some victuals to Rhuddlan.47
Maidenstone himself was used for a variety of work during the war. Besides his April
task of collecting supplies, in August he was to pay wages to William le Butiller's force
of footmen (but not to John de Grey's). 48 In December he had instructions, with Perton
42 Calendar of Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales, ed. J. G. Edwards
(Cardiff, 1935), p. 201.
43 E101/351/9, m. 1.
44 Cal. Corresp. Wales, ed. J. G. Edwards, p. 202.
45 Ibid., passim.
46 Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, p. 120.
47 Cal. Corresp. Wales, ed. J. G. Edwards, p. 174.
48 Ibid., p. 202.
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and Abingdon, to see to the loading of timber at Chester, 49 and in 1283 other
arrangements to make for moving and delivery of different items.5°
Thus the range of actions, great and small, financial and administrative, assigned
to these royal clerks illustrates their flexibility and absence of narrow specialisation, as
well as underlining their importance to the coordination of activity. The day-to-day
management of the complex administration of the war depended importantly on them.
As in 1277, control of Anglesey and its harvest was an important aspect of
Edward's strategy. For this the ships due by the Cinque Ports were the main resource.
On 10 April the barons and bailiffs were ordered to be with the king at Danewell with
their service by the feast of St John the Baptist, 24 June.5I
On 15 April the barons of the Cinque Ports were ordered to send 'eight or six.., of
the corn-barons' of each port to meet before the warden at Romney on 12 May, to hear
from two of their number, William Marlepas and Laurence de Windsor, what they had
been told by the king as to the service required of them, and to prepare to perform it.
Some ships were to serve in Wales, and others were to remain for the custody of the
coast. 52 Morris records 28 ships beginning their service from Rhuddlan on 10 July,
joined a few days later by twelve more ships and two great galleys. The galleys were
from Romney and Winchelsea.53
On 28 May the warden was told to have the barons of the Ports choose 'ten or
twelve' carpenters skilled at making barges and punts to be at Chester by 23 June or
earlier if possible. 54 The warden was also to provide two large barges and their crews to
49 Ibid., p. 262.
50 Particulars of his account show he bought wheat from seven suppliers, in lots
ranging from 60 to 100 quarters, and oats in lots from 23 to 400 quarters. He paid
wages for men carting, guarding and grinding the wheat, and even for keeping it safe
during a storm at sea. E10 1/4/5b.
51 C VChR, p. 247.
52 Ibid., p. 249. On 13 April Gregory de Rokesley, keeper of the exchange in
London, was instructed to have made and deliver to the barons of the Cinque Ports
4,000 quarrels, 1,000 immediately to those about to set out to the king's army at
Chester. Foedera, Vol. I, div. ii, p. 604.
53 Welsh Wars, p. 173.
54 CVChR, p. 251. Their wages from the time they set out were to be paid by
'the aforesaid John', presumably John de Maidenstone, who had been ordered to the
south-east to collect supplies. The warden was told that Maidenstone would
communicate the king's wishes to him.
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come to Wales with the service from the Cinque Ports. 55 Another order with the same
date tells Maidenstone to 'provide.. .according to the ordinance and discretion of
Stephen de Penecestre' 200 strong and agile men, well armed, from the the Cinque Ports
in addition to the Ports' service, and pay their wages as far as Danewel1. 56 It seems
certain the barges, carpenters and these men were to enable a bridge across to Anglesey
to be made; on 18 August 'all the king's barons and subjects of the Cinque Ports in his
garrison at Anglesey' were told to assist Luke de Tany to make a bridge there.57
Another reference to ships wanted at Chester is in a letter to the king, attributed
to June-July 1282 by Edwards. 58 It pointed out that although the sender and Renaud
Alard of Winchelsea (a baron of the Cinque Ports) had been ordered 'to bring 40 barges
(escutes) to Chester' this was impracticable. The boats would be too heavy to be
transported by sea. The letter suggested that if such boats were needed the bailiffs of
the Cinque Ports should be told to send carpenters to Chester to make them there. This
suggestion might be related to the 'ten or twelve' carpenters mentioned above. Though
the order for them was dated 28 May, possibly the 'anonymous' letter was earlier than
Edwards' June/July date. If that were so, these skilled 'ships' carpenters' may have been
intended to oversee the work of some of the 345 carpenters summoned to be at Chester
by June. 59 The 40 barges under discussion may have been part of the plans for the
bridge.
The series of orders issued in April within a period of two weeks had covered
the needs of an aggressive response to the Welsh revolt. In parallel with the
mobilization of soldiers, the administration had dealt with securing continuity of
supplies through a variety of agents, providing a naval force from the feudal service of
the ships of the Cinque Ports, and conscripting carpenters and diggers, via the sheriffs,
to support the army. The speed and comprehensiveness with which it had acted is
impressive.
In June more support cadres were summoned. On 1 June the sheriff of Hereford
was required to find 200 wood-fellers and charcoal burners, and Grimbald Pauncefoot,
keeper of the Forest of Dean and one of the household knights, to find 100 more, for
Gilbert de Clare.° On 8 June the sheriff of Shropshire was to find men to clear two
" Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., p. 235.
58 Cal. Corresp. Wales, ed. J. G. Edwards, p. 109.
59 Above, p. 30 n. 25.
60 CVChR, p. 251.
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passes under the orders of William le Botiler of Wemme, captain of the garrison at
Whitchurch. 61 On 15 July a number of sheriffs and the keeper of the Forest of Dean
were ordered to select several hundred wood-fellers in the presence of the clerk William
de Percy, whom the king sent to oversee the choice. 62 Those selected were to be led to
Chester, and then to Rhuddlan, by one of each sheriffs men. Nicholas de Bassingbum
had the same role as de Percy with regard to men to be chosen by the sheriffs of
Leicestershire and Warwickshire, and Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. The total
number of wood-fellers asked for was 1,000, the various sheriffs' individual quotas
being either 100 or 200. The men were to be at Rhuddlan by 8 August.63
A few months later a writ of 11 December required a different procedure. A
number of sheriffs, the keeper of the forest of Dean, and Reginald de Grey, justiciar of
Chester, were to assemble wood-fellers at times and places determined by William de
Percy. This time it appears he himself was to select the men, with the assistance of
local bailiffs, and bring them to the king. Quotas were again 100 or 200, making 800 in
tota1. 64 Possibly the increasing degree of responsibility of William de Percy reflected
dissatisfaction with the response of the local officials. It also again underlines the
general reliance on royal clerks for the administrative actions to support the army.
Subsequently appointments of magnates were made to select reinforcements of
soldiers. On 30 July the bailiffs and other officials of Lancashire were ordered to help
William le Butler de Warrington, a baron, 65 choose 1,000 'men-at-arms' (sic).
appointment was followed on 19 August by a mandate to Maidenstone to arrange for
their payment from 20 August to a few days - the precise date is missing in the text -
after the feast of St Bartholomew (24 August), when they arrived at Chester.° This
61 Ibid., p. 253.
62 William de Percy was well-connected, being the brother of Sir Henry de
Percy. He was granted the Prebend of Thockrington, which was in the king's gift, in
1265, and was witnessing as a canon of York in 1268. (C. T. Clay, York Minster Fasti,
Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Series, CXXIV Vol. II, [1959], pp. 74-5.) In
1286 a protection was issued for Inin, among many others 'going beyond seas with the
king'. CPR 1281-1292, p. 240.
63 CVChR, p. 232.
64 Ibid., p. 277. Lancashire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Leicestershire and
Warwickshire which had to find woodsmen in the first requisition were replaced by
Chester and Wiltshire.
65 Moor, Knights of Edward I , Vol. I, p. 121.
66 CVChR, p. 233.
67 Cal. Corresp. Wales, ed. J. G. Edwards, p. 202.
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may be an indication of the sort of time, some four weeks, needed for men to become
available for action. On the other hand, later in 1282 a letter from the sheriff of
Lancashire, Henry du Lee, gives a picture of a very much shorter time-scale, at least as
apparently expected by the king. The sheriff, addressing himself to Robert Fitz John,
the king's marshal, and - somewhat surprisingly - the clerk William de Perton, says he
cannot assemble the 500 men required of him and bring them to Chester by Friday 16
October, as he only received the order on the preceding Wednesday, 'for the county is
eighty leagues [sic] in length.'68 That would have been so unreasonable an order that
there must have been some other factors, the simplest of which might be a delay in
delivery of the instruction to the sheriff. Possibly the reference to Perton indicates that
he might have been arranging the troops' pay, as Maidenstone had been for those
selected by William le Butler.
On 24 November the bailiffs of Archenfield, Herefordshire, were ordered to be
at Hereford on 18 December to agree days and places for assemblies of 'men at arms',
from whom Hugh de Turberville would choose 100, with a constable, and bring them to
the king. 69 The bailiffs of nine other lands in adjacent areas in the marches of Wales
received the same order. A writ of aid for de Turberville, dated 6 December, gave the
numbers he was to select, which totalled 1,400, but described them as footmen.7°
Similarly William Wyther, another household knight, was sent to choose 300 footmen
from Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, Geoffrey de Langley 200 from Lancashire and
Richard de Bois 1,000 from Staffordshire and Shropshire. 7/ Like Richard de Bois,
Hugh de Turberville was a knight of the household and an important and much used
servant of the king, both before and after the war. 72 In these arrangements the
permanent local officials carried out the administration at the behest of the knights of
the household, but now the latter made the selections.
68	 • •.,iota p. 161.
69 CVChR, p. 276.
7° Ibid., p. 259. Round numbers, ranging from 100 to 300, were allocated to
each of the nine.
71 Ibid.
72 Moor, Knights of Edward I, Vol. V, pp. 56-7. Hugh was the father of the
'treasonable' Thomas de Turbeville. J. G. Edwards, 'The Treason of Thomas
Turberville, 1295', in R. W. Hunt, W. A. Pantin and R. W. Southern (eds.), Studies in
Medieval History Presented to Frederick Maurice Powicke (Oxford, 1948), pp. 296-
309.
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This change is contemporary with the transfer of selection of wood-fellers from
the sheriffs to the king's clerk William de Percy; possibly there was diminishing
confidence in the willingness of local officials to be objective in selecting men for
service. There were other indications of this. When on 12 November military
dispositions of cavalry were being ordered to reinforce William de Valence in West
Wales, instructions went not only to thirty-nine individuals but also to certain sheriffs to
choose an additional 'ten of the strongest and bravest knights at arms'. (This implies that
the sheriffs had previously been involved in selecting knights for the army, though in
this writ they are only to 'admonish and induce.. [knights to serve]. .by all means in their
powee.)73 Significantly, the sheriff of Somerset and Dorset received a special warning
to desist from accepting bribes from the 'strong and powerful for arms' not to choose
them. Concern about the application of pressure or inducements of various sorts to
persuade sheriffs not to be even-handed in selective processes is seen again in writs of
24 November. These, addressed to the sheriffs of five northern counties and to those of
thirty-two others, required them to assemble all £20 land-holders, strong and able 'men
in arms' not already with the expedition to Wales, at York and Northampton
respectively. The names of those each sheriff was assembling were to be given to four
knights of the county, to be reported at York and Northampton. Explicit warning was
given not to give way to pressure to spare or defer 'through love, favour, reward or fear'
anyone who was qualified.74
On 21 March 1283 de Turberville was again commissioned, with Grimbald
Pauncefoot, to raise some 2,500 foot from lands in the Welsh march. 75 Another writ of
the same date shows that he and Pauncefoot were given wide authority to appoint their
own men to see that things were done. The officials and communities of Herefordshire,
Gloucestershire and Worcestershire were ordered to do what they were told by them, 'or
John Sapyn or another to be deputed by Hugh and Grimbald', to provide tree-fellers,
diggers and others, and to provide corn and means of transport for it. The writ also says
that the king's instructions have been given to 'Hugh and Grimbald by word of mouth',
which would make it very difficult for any of their orders to be questioned.
As an additional means of ensuring obedience the sheriff had to report in person
to the king that all required had been done, and this on the day before that on which
CVChR, p. 258.
74 Ibid., pp. 275-6.
75 CVChR, p. 280. The writ ordering this also told officials, bailiffs of various
lords and others, to meet de Turberville and Pauncefoot to set places and times for
assembling men from whom specified numbers were to be chosen.
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completion was specified, an administratively effective technique. 76 Also on 21 March
the officials and whole community of Shropshire and Staffordshire and many others
were ordered to assist Richard du Bois not only to select 2,500 foot, but also to make
provision for corn, victuals, and their carriage to Montgomery. 77 At the same time the
sheriffs of several counties were told to proclaim that all with victuals for sale were to
bring them to Montgomery to sell to the army. The sheriffs had, again, to report to the
king that they had carried out the order; they had also to report the names of any men
who had refused to do as asked. 78 These requirements for reports show that it was
recognised that effective management involves following up as well as issuing orders.
The task of overseeing and ensuring supply of both workmen and provisions was
now being given not to clerks but to important knights. Perhaps by this late stage of a
war that was almost over in military terms the king's clerks were returning to their more
routine tasks in the chancery and exchequer.
Mobilization for the Welsh war of 1282-3 was rapid and effective, and required
the use of many different resources. Straightforward high military command had to be
in the hands of the realm's magnates, as was evident in the early appointments of
Mortimer, de Grey and - after the short interval of Tibetot - Gloucester (the latter being
soon replaced by William de Valence). 79 The first build-up of cavalry forces was
achieved by writs of summons to tenants-in-chief, directly to individual magnates, and
via sheriffs to others. Sheriffs were also responsible for raising levies of foot, but were
supplemented before the end of the year by special appointments of knights close to the
king, such as Hugh de Turberville, Grimbald Pauncefoot, William de Butiller, Richard
du Bois, William Wyther and Geoffrey de Langeley.
Though later some at least of these notables were given responsibility for raising
supplies of victuals, the first appointments for this purpose involved several of the
king's clerks - notably Maidenstone, Tolosan, and Amati. (Amati's associates in
Gascony, le Carpenter and Francoun, are not described as clerks, whereas Amati
himself is.) The task of provisioning was also given to the king's sergeants, including
de Carevill on his mission to Ireland, and the king's pantler, la Warre. The existing
local officials, sheriffs and bailiffs, were almost always required to give support, advice
and assistance to such special appointees. The sheriffs themselves, notably in
76 Ibid., p. 281.
77 Pail. Writs, Vol. I, p. 247.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid, p. 222.
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association with a 'lawful knight of the county', had to gather supplies. Similarly, across
the Channel the seneschals of Ponthieu and Gascony, and the constable of Bordeaux,
had to cooperate with Tolosan, Amati and the others.
The sheriffs were the channel of general communication to their shires. They
arranged for the proclamations directing merchants to bring supplies to the armies; they
proclaimed the feudal summons of 20 May, 8° the requirement of 26 May that £30
landholders should have ready a strong horse suitable for arms, and the countermanding
writ of 22 June permitting fining instead, in view of the shortage of great horses in the
realm. 81 On 2 July sheriffs of various counties were to proclaim certain changed
destinations for the servicium debitum previously summoned to Rhuddlan.82
The sheriffs also had a major role at first in providing conscripted bands of
workmen and labourers, but in this too at least one clerk, William de Percy, came to
play an important part, as did Nicholas de Bassingburn. Later de Percy, and in March
1283 the knights de Turberville and Pauncefoot, seem to have been given still more
authority in this respect.
The king's clerks carried out a wide variety of ad hoc tasks, especially Perton,
Maidenstone and Abingdon. They moved from the financial to the logistical with
apparent easy flexibility, responding on occasion to instructions brought to them by
John de Dorset, Kok Breton or Geoffrey de Meriliun, men whose names appear only
briefly. Other established officials of the household such as the king's butler, de
Columbariis, Rokesley, keeper of the exchange, and Thomas Gurney, controller of the
wardrobe, played their parts. As far as shipping was needed, the warden, Penecestre,
and the barons of the Cinque Ports formed an experienced and capable organisation.
The administrative structures described in the preceding paragraphs worked
satisfactorily. The six weeks allowed for the response to the summons of 6 April seem
to have been about right, as judged by the amount of cavalry available by June.83
Collection of supplies of victuals may have taken rather longer, but was well organised:
the absence of complaints of shortage is evidence of its successful management.
Foedera, Vol. I, div. ii, p. 224.
81 CVChR, pp. 252, 253. In May William de Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, and
Walter de Beauchamp were authorised to bring 36 'great horses' from France. Ibid., p.
217.
82 ibid., p. 254. Important lords received their orders direct. On the same date
new service instructions were given to Hugh de Curteney and ten other individuals, and
on 15 July to the earl of Oxford. Ibid., pp. 253, 254.
83 Morris, Welsh Wars, pp. 159-160.
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Purveyance gave opportunities for corruption and profiteering, as always, but the
administration does seem to have been aware of the need to try to inhibit it. The
admonitions to sheriffs warning them against showing favour and taking bribes in the
selection of both soldiers and workmen show similar awareness. They may be
significant in the light of the trend towards moving sole responsibility for such
recruiting away from the sheriffs; that trend, coupled with Edward's apparent attempt in
April 1282 to raise cavalry without the traditional formal feudal summons may,
however, indicate growing recognition that efficient mobilization required new
management arrangements.
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CHAPTER 3
THE SCOTS WAR OF 1301
The English army that had ended the semi-independence of Wales in the war of 12 82-
1283 had been assembled by broadly, but not completely, traditional measures.
Subsequent Welsh revolts in 1287 and 1294 failed in the face of the effective
mobilization of superior force.'
Scotland proved a more determined opponent. The 'Great Cause', the issue of
the Scottish succession, had enabled Edward Ito act as 'superior lord', and from 1292
treat the successful claimant, John Balliol, and Scotland accordingly. Scottish
resentment, and the opportunity given by Edward's conflict with France from 1294, led
to a brief war, ended by the English victory at Dunbar in April 1295 and Balliol's
submission in July. Open resistance to English domination broke out again in May
1297. William Wallace and Andrew of Moray's defeat of Warenne at Stirling Bridge in
September put them in control. Edward returned from Flanders in March 1298, made
sure of the support of his magnates, and mustered a powerful force at Roxburgh in June.
He marched north in July, but was on the point of withdrawing to Edinburgh, partly
because of supply difficulties, 2 when the opportunity to bring the Scots to battle resulted
in his overwhelming victory at Falkirk. It was only a battlefield victory: most of
Scotland remained beyond his control. Another campaign in 1300, with an army still
including cavalry formed from the traditional feudal levy, and supported by a fleet from
the Cinque Ports and others, had no success beyond the capture of Caerlaverock castle.
At the request of King Philip of France Edward agreed to a truce with the Scots in
October 1300.
1 Sir Maurice Powicke says the response to Rhys ap Maredudd's rising in 1287
provided 'proof of the ease with which troops and equipment were directed from every
part of Wales and the shires on the border in well-ordered combination...', and that in
1294 'In a few weeks he (Edward I) had three armies comprising in all more than
31,000 foot soldiers.' Thirteenth Century, pp. 439,441.
2 Ships carrying stores were delayed - a precursor of Edward ifs problems in
1322. (See below, Chapter 4, p. 79.)
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That truce being due to end at Pentecost, 21 May 1301,3
 he began planning in
good time to be ready by midsummer, 24 June, to renew the war. In view of what
actually happened (in particular later changes that strengthened the secondary army at
Carlisle, the fact that the campaign only lasted effectively till October, 4 and the early
truce, ratified in January) it seems that the war was, or became, essentially a limited,
consolidating operation. Neverthless it had involved elaborate preparations.
The elements that would form the cavalry were called upon first, being given
some four months' notice. On 14 February writs of summons using the words affectuose
requirimus et rogamus rather than formal feudal terms, but without reference to pay,
were issued to eighty-four individuals, including six earls, to muster at Berwick at
midsummer. 5 Roger Bigod, earl of Norfolk and marshal of England, was ordered to
come to the king there with as many horses and arms as possible. If he was not well
enough to come himself, he was to send someone appropriate to fulfil his office as
marshal. 6 On 12 March, William de la Zouche and others were told to be at Berwick;
they were to be at the king's wages.'
Arrangements had been put in hand for naval support. Also on 14 February,
fifty-eight ships with crews and their supplies, to be at the king's wages, were ordered
from mainly east coast ports, but including two from Bristol and one from Haverford, to
be at Berwick at midsummer. The writs defined how many vessels were to be sent by
each port - for example six from Yarmouth, two from Ipswich, one from Harwich - and
were addressed to the ports' officials and commonalty, 8 leaving them to take the
necessary action. Similarly dated and addressed orders to six Irish ports summoned
twelve ships to Dublin for 4 June, 9 thus giving time for them to transport Irish support
across to England. On 2 March the warden of the Cinque Ports, Robert de Burgersshe,
was told the barons and men of the Cinque Ports had also been ordered to send twelve
ships to Dublin for 4 June; he was to make sure the orders were obeyed and tell the king
when the ships were ready for sea. '° The constable of Bristol castle and the bailiff of
Haverford were told, also on 2 March, to send the ships due from those two ports to
3 Powicke, Thirteenth Century, p. 693.
"Ibid., p. 694.
5 Par!. Writs, Vol. I, p. 347.
6 CCR 1296-1302, p. 482.
7 Ibid., p. 486.
8 ballivis et probi hominibus. Foedera, Vol. I, div. ii, p. 928.
9 Ibid.
10 CCR 1296-1302, p. 486.
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Dublin." The central government recognised that it was desirable not to rely entirely
on local port officials. Specific appointments were made to expedite the assembly of
these fleets, and individuals were named in letters patent of 27 March for the task -
Ralph de Sandwich and Geoffrey atte Shire, John de Thorp and Peter de Dunwich for
ships from various ports for Berwick, and Richard de Aston and the sheriffs of Sussex,
Hampshire, Somerset, Dorset, Devon and Cornwall for seventeen ships from their
counties for Dublin. 12
 Obedience to these orders was not universal: in August 1302
Peter de Dunwich, with Thomas de Worbelton, had to be commissioned to punish
sailors from a number of south coast ports who had failed to send ships to the war.13
The assembly of these fleets at Dublin was to support the second army being
mobilized under the Prince of Wales at Carlisle. Writs of 1 March using the same
language as those of February, vos affectuose requirimus, 14 summoned the earl of
Lincoln and a score of other magnates to be there by 24 June, and the sheriffs of
Lancashire, Cumberland and Westmoreland to send to the prince horse and foot ad
arma potentes from their shires. I5 Next month the destination of more cavalry was
changed from Berwick to Carlisle: on 4 April Humphrey de Bohun, earl of Hereford and
Essex and constable of England, and on 12 April Robert de Monte Alto and sixteen
others, were told to attend the Prince of Wales's army.16
As a precautionary measure, presumably in case of a Scottish raid before the
main army was assembled, on 8 April the barons, knights and other potential fighting
men of Northumberland were ordered to move up towards the march of Scotland.17
Purveyance of provisions for the two armies had been agreed at the Lincoln
parliament. 18 Specific quantities to be supplied by the communities in a number of
counties were defined in letters issued on 1 March. With the exception of
Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire, two men, one clerk and one knight, were
nominated to give instructions in each county. The pairings of individuals was such
that clerks had often to deal with more than one knight; for instance the clerk Peter de
" Ibid., p. 487.
12 CPR 1292-1301, pp. 583-4. E101/9/7, dated 16 March, refers to seventeen
ships due at Dublin.
13 Docs. Scotland, ed. J. Bain, Vol. II, p. 334.
14 ParL Writs, Vol. I, p. 348.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. 357.
17 CPR 1292-1301, p. 587.
18 Docs. Scotland, ed. J. Bain, Vol. II, p. 305.
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Dunwich 19 worked with the knight Robert de Fitzwalter in Essex, but with John
Botetor in Norfolk and Suffolk, Master Richard de Havering with Thomas de Burnham
in Lincolnshire but with Thomas de Furnivall in Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. 2° For
Cambridgeshire those nominated were the sheriff Robert Hereward and Walter
Langton, bishop of Coventry and Lichfield, the treasurer. Corresponding orders of 3
April for Huntingdonshire associated the sheriff Robert Hereward with Thomas de
Cambridge, a clerk of Edward of Carnarvon, 21 and for Lancashire Robert de Lathum
with Richard de Loughborough, a clerk of the exchequer. 22 The purveying orders of 18
April appointed Walter de Huntercombe, knight, and Master John de Weston, clerk, for
Northumberland; William de Mulcaster, the sheriff, and James de Dalilegh, clerk, for
Cumberland; and Nicholas de Clypburn, the sheriff, and again James de Dalilegh for
Westmoreland. 23 The latter played a prominent part, receiving and issuing supplies as
keeper of the king's victuals at Carlisle. 24 The provisions from the eastern counties
were to be at Berwick, and those from Lancashire, with others from Ireland, 25 at
Carlisle, by midsummer. 26 Two of the king's clerks, Adam de Brom and Richard de
Wardington, were sent to Ireland to supervise purveyances there. The Prince of Wales
was to be written to, to have victuals from Wales and Chester brought to him at
Carlisle. 27 During April and May appointments were made of receivers for the
provisions being purveyed in Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, Essex, Norfolk and
19 As seen above, later, on 27 March, he was to expedite the delivery of ships,
but it is not clear whether this was an additional or a changed task.
20 CPR 1292-1301, p. 578.
21 Tout, Chapters, Vol II, pp. 179-180.
22 Mid., Vol. II, p. 84, note 2.
23 CPR 1292-1301, p. 579.
24 e.g. E101/8/14 (receiving supplies from the mayor of Newcastle-upon-Tyne);
El 01/8/27 (receiving supplies from Chester, and, via a ship, from Bayonne); Cal. Docs.
Scotland, ed. J. Bain, Vol. II, p. 308, (issuing victuals and wine to the clerk of the
Prince of Wales's buttery), and p. 309, (an acknowledgement by Robert de Towny of
receipt at Ayr from Dalilegh 'keeper of the king's victuals coming from Ireland.')
25 Instructions were given on 3 April to the justiciar, treasurer and chancellor of
Ireland to forward specific quantities of wheat, flour, oats, malt, beans and peas, wine,
salt and fish, half to Skinburness and half to Arran by midsummer. Cal. Docs. Scotland,
ed. J. Bain,Vol. II, pp. 305-6.
26 Ibid., p. 305.
27 Ibid.
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Suffolk, and Yorkshire. They were the sheriff, supported by a named clerk, different in
each case except that of Yorkshire from the one named to organise the purveying. 28 It
is made clear in the 18 April writ of aid for Simon de Kyme, the sheriff of Yorkshire,
and the clerk Ralph de Dalton, that they were responsible for shipping the supplies to
Berwick as well as receiving them. 29 Another entry of the same date on the patent roll
illustrates the sort of problems and compromises involved. In this the king agreed to
accept from 'the good men, religious and commonalty' of Essex a lesser quota than the
original one. However, though he was told by the purveyors that the men of Essex,
concerned about payment, wanted only to hand over their wheat to persons named to
collect the granted tax and pay for what had been taken, the order said they had to
deliver the wheat. It was needed immediately, and the tax collectors would not be
named until Michaelmas. The king did however say he would give them further
security, if necessary, via the two purveyors and the newly appointed receivers, the
sheriff and Hugh de Burgh, the king's clerk.30
In all these plans the orders for each port or county specify the precise number
of ships or of quarters of wheat, oats and other provisions to be supplied. This is
evidence of centrally determined and quantified planning. The objective of the orders
for purveyance was clearly to create supply dumps ready for the armies as they
assembled, as the dates for the musters and delivery of the provisions were the same,
i.e. midsummer (24 June). Taken together the orders for cavalry, ships and supplies
show that planning was centrally coordinated in detail and timing.
In the logistical arrangements the management of the execution and
administration of orders used a variety of agents - existing local port officials, sheriffs,
knights and royal clerks. Purveyance in particular suggests interesting issues of how
responsibility may have been divided. The 'purveying' clerks usually had a wider
geographical remit than the knights for their joint role of 'giving instructions' to the
communities; probably the royal clerks brought the orders for defined quantities that
had been determined centrally, and communicated them, perhaps with some discussion
about practicality, to the knights. These, presumably not always or necessarily in
person, used the weight of their local position to make it clear to minor local officials
and unwilling communities, or individuals of some standing, that the foodstuffs must be
delivered up. The wording of the writs, in that the mandates to purvey were addressed
28 CPR 1292-1301, p. 585 (5 April), p. 588 (18 April and 26 May).
29 Ibid., p. 587.
30 Ibid., p. 589.
46
to the 'commonalty' of the counties, 31 indicates that the actual purveying was not done
by the knights or the clerks themselves. J. R. Maddicott describes the subsequent
action. The county court would divide the quantity required among the hundreds (or
wapentakes): the consequent quotas were sub-divided among the villages roughly
according to their size by two knights of the hundred; the village community then
decided individuals' shares, sometimes via two of their number, sometimes together.32
This process would be bound to take some time. Sheriffs and different clerks (that is,
different from those seeing to the purveying, and, possibly, different not for any
particular reason except for who was available some six weeks later) collected and
transported what had been bought. The sheriffs and their staffs, having established
dealings with local officials and communities, could conveniently make arrangements
for collection, and the clerks sent to work with them would have kept progressive count
of quantities. As the reduction in the Essex men's quota following their protest shows,
keeping overall count could be important.
Adequate supplies of food for the armies were not obtained just by purveyance,
though this did at least give assurance of some availability at a particular place and
time. On 11 April in several counties sheriffs and other officials, including the mayor,
bailiffs and aldermen of London, were told to proclaim that merchants with victuals to
trade should take them to the king's armies for sale, and to encourage them to do so.
Sensibly, the merchants of counties in the east, from Essex to Northumberland, were to
take their goods to Berwick, and those of the south coast counties theirs to
Skinburness. 33 The order to the sheriff of Cornwall of 12 April described action that
went beyond a mere proclamation. He was told that the king had asked the bailiffs and
men of Bodmin, and of other towns with harbours, to 'induce and require' merchants
with victuals to bring them to Skinburness, by sea, for sale, and he was to proclaim this.
Further, he was to deliver to Skinbuniess any of the king's corn in his own custody.34
Thus sheriffs were playing an important part in the detailed implementation of
several aspects of the logistics of securing provisions.
Some were also heavily involved in the collection of county levies, though they
were not acting alone. Cavalry, shipping and supplies having been put in hand, on 12
May orders for the levying of foot soldiers began to be issued. Richard de Harle, the
sheriff, and Richard de Immere were to select 900, adequately armed, from Shropshire
31 Ibid., p. 578.
32 The English Peasantry, pp. 24-5.
33 CCR 1296-1302, pp. 488-90.
34 Ibid., pp. 487-8.
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and 600 from Staffordshire: Richard Talbot, the sheriff, and Robert de Norwico 700
from Gloucestershire and the Forest of Dean: Miles Pychard, the sheriff, and Richard de
Brightwell, another clerk, 600 from Herefordshire and 500 from Worcestershire:
Thomas Malet, Walter Goushull and Henry de Creystok, a clerk of the chancery, 1,000
from Nottinghamshire and 1,000 from Derbyshire: 35 John de Byron, Robert Ughtred and
Ralph de Dalton, the clerk who was one of the purveyors, 4,000 from Yorkshire: Hugo
Golyou, William de Felton and Robert de Barton 2,700 from Northumberland. 36 Writs
of aid in their favour were simultaneously issued for sheriffs, 37 and on 13 May mandates
issued to the arrayers themselves pressed them to proceed with urgency. 38 The writs
said the men were to be ready to set out against the Scots, but when and where they
would be told. These levies called for a total of 12,000 men, which is such a round
figure that it too must have been centrally determined, and then sub-divided among
chosen counties.
It is noticeable that by and large the counties supplying provisions were not
asked to supply foot soldiers as wel1, 39 and the counties along the south coast, from
Kent to Cornwall, were only asked for ships. Though this looks like deliberately
planned use of the varying resources of different parts of the country, it also, in broad
terms, reflected geographical considerations.
The levying clearly did not in the event proceed to Edward's satisfaction. On 15
July he appointed teams of three investigators to look into the taking of bribes, and to
arrest deserters. 4° Significantly, perhaps, these investigators did not include the sheriffs.
On the other hand, individuals, described as clerks, who had been assigned to the task
of recruiting were appointed to the teams - Richard de Brightwell for Herefordshire and
Worcestershire, Ralph de Dalton for Yorkshire, Henry de Creystok for
Nottinghamshire. This suggests that in the other cases where a name recurs but the
35 Later, on 6 June these three were authorised to select as many constables and
horses and arms as needed for their levies (CPR 1292-1301, p. 596). Mounting the
leaders of troops of infantry was usual.
36 Par!. Writs, Vol. I, p. 358.
37 CPR 1292-1301, p. 594.
38 ibid.
39 The exceptions were Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Yorkshire, Lancashire and
Northumberland.
40 Par!. Writs, Vol. I, p. 360. Things seem to have been particularly bad in
Staffordshire; men had received money and provisions, but had then been replaced by
others less useful. Deserters' goods were to be seized. Ibid., p. 359.
48
individual's status is not defined - Robert de Norico 41 for Gloucestershire, Richard de
Immere for Shropshire and Staffordshire - these individuals also were clerks. The
structure of the commissions therefore makes it seem likely that it was the sheriffs, with
their local relationships, who were suspected of having been less than objective in
choosing men. Perhaps anticipation of this was one reason why clerks had been
involved in the original selection. It would be consistent with a growing recognition of
the desirability of not relying primarily on sheriffs to see to the raising of levies.
Mobilizing the army required more than just selecting men: they had to be
brought to the assembly point. Documents recording payments for foot for periods
running into July appear to indicate that at least Richard de Immere was involved not
only in selecting men but also in bringing them to Berwick. 42 Richard de Brightwell
and Henry de Creystok also helped conduct recruits to the muster. 43 This is probably
the case with Robert de Norico too, though the entry in the account only implies it.44
The clerks clearly had an executive as well as an administrative role in the assembly of
the army.
Numbers obtained were not exactly as ordered in detail, and far less in total.
Henry de Creystok received pay for a contingent of 484 foot archers coming from
Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire; Richard de Brightwell had 340 archers coming from
Worcestershire, and 361 from Herefordshire; Richard de Immere brought 554 foot from
Shropshire and 346 from Staffordshire. 45 These are the first figures recorded, being for
pay from 3 July, 22 and 24 June respectively, and so most probably represent the initial
numbers brought to the muster. They compare with the quotas of 2,000 for
Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire together, 1,100 for Herefordshire and Worcestershire,
and 1,500 for Shropshire and Staffordshire. The wide variations in the numbers in
separate units underline the uncertainty of the whole process, and explain the need for
the commissions to deal with bribery and arrest deserters: Herefordshire's 361 were
made up of units of 79, 61, 65, 66, and 90. Staffordshire's 346 were in units of 59, 53,
92, 54, and 88.46
41 Robert de Norico is definitely a clerk, being so described in the wardrobe
account. BL Add. Ms. 7966a, f.116.
42 E101/9/17.
43 BL Add. Ms. 7966a, f 116.
44 It refers to pay for John de Colevall (described as sheriff of Gloucester)
'coming with Robert' to Berwick. Ibid.
45 ibid.
46 Ibid., f.117.
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The pay roll for the king's army in Scotland for the period 12 July - 29
September totalled approximately 7,000 foot, including a few crossbowmen, archers,
hobelars and men in garrisons.° As the areas from which the county levies came
closely match those in the 12 May writs, that compares with the figure of 12,000 in
those orders alone. In 1301 the central government's existing management
arrangements were not able to fulfil its recruiting plans by a wide margin.
During May other military preparations had continued. John de St John, a much
used and trusted officer, 48 was appointed the king's lieutenant for Cumberland,
Westmoreland and Lancashire on 12 May, and the sheriffs and men of those areas were
ordered to obey him. 49 On 21 May the justiciar of Ireland, John Wogan, was authorised
to pardon two-thirds of the debts to the king of those 'coming to him with horse and
arms', with the other third offset against wages.5°
At the end of May and the beginning of June new instructions for strengthening
the army at Carlisle were issued. Theobald de Verdun was told on 28 May to join the
Prince of Wales, or alternatively send his son to the prince. He was to let the king know
which it would be. 5I On 1 and 2 June writs ordered up men from Wales. In the 12 May
writs three arrayers were appointed when the number to be levied was in four figures:
the numbers appointed for the Welsh areas indicate that some thousands were expected.
William de Caumvill, Warinius Martyn and Morgan ap Meredylc, or any two of them,
were to lead contingents from South and West Wales to be at Carlisle for 30 June.
They would be told the number required. Richard de Macy, William de Sutton,
Griffinus Cloyt, Hugh de Leominster and Twain ap Howell, or any two, three or four of
them had the same responsibility for North Wales. Hamo de Macy and William
Trussel, with another discreet knight of the county of Chester whom they were to
choose, were appointed for the men of the county of Chester and a number of cantreds.
47 Cal. Docs. Scotland, ed. J. Bain, Vol. If, p. 313.
48 'John de St John of Basing was one of the council who notified Prince
Edward in Palestine of the death of Henry ILI and their proclamation of his successor.'
(G. E. Cockayne The Complete Peerage, revised G. H. White, (13 vols., London, 1949),
Vol. XI, pp. 323-4.) He was lieutenant of the king in Aquitaine in 1293, and deputy
constable of Bordeaux. Tout, Chapters, Vol. VI, p. 66.
49 Part. Writs, Vol. I, p. 357.
50 CPR 1292-1301, p. 585. Earlier, in March, the justiciar and other Irish
officials had been given authority to make arrangements with the magnates of Ireland
with a view to requesting them to come to the king's army. Ibid., p. 583.
51 CCR 1296-1302, p. 491.
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Hamo and the knight were to lead these men to the prince. 52 Walter Pederton was to
see to the paying of William de Caumvill's men, and William de Melton to the paying
of Hamo de Macy's and Richard de Macy's. 53 Subsequently a writ dated 19 October
1301 ordered the collectors of the fifteenth in the county of Hereford to pay the wages
of certain Welshmen in the king's army in Scotland. It was accompanied by six
acknowledgements, by John de Langford and others, of the receipt of money from the
collectors for the payment of Welshmen in the company of the Prince of Wales, in
Scotland, from 30 August to 2 Janimry. Two clerks, Peter de Abynton and Robert de
Chigwell, were referred to as appointed by letters patent to pay wages to the Welsh.54
A writ dated 22 June appointed Robert Holand and Master Richard de Hoghton, sheriff
of Lancashire as deputy for Earl Thomas of Lancaster, to choose 600 men to be at
Carlisle by 5 July.55
This batch of arrangements gives something of an impression of uncertain and
rather improvised planning. All other orders aimed for concentration of ships, supplies
and armies by midsummer; in one of these cases choice of the third arrayer was left
open; only two weeks were allowed for the selection and arrival at Carlisle of the
Lancashire contingent; numbers required were not specified in the writs.
Arrangements had also been made for the availability of carts. The sheriffs of
Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, and Norfolk and Suffolk, received
orders issued on 12 May to purvey specific numbers of carts. They were to deliver
them to Berwick by midsummer at the latest, with horses and drivers. They were to
certify that payment would be made by Michaelmas, and to tell exchequer officials the
prices of the carts and the names of the owners. 56 An indication of the scale of the
requirement can be seen in a record of receipt of carriages and carts at Berwick for the
Scottish war. 57 They totalled 118 carts and 654 horses, and came from Nottinghamshire
and Derbyshire, Yorkshire, Lincolnshire and Northumberland. The sheriffs needed to
obtain carts also to carry out their responsibility for collecting purveyed provisions and
52 Par!. Writs, Vol. I, p. 359.
53 Ibid.
54 E101/9/26.
55 Par!. Writs, Vol. I, p. 359.
CCR 1296-1302, p. 446.
E101/9/22.
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delivering them,58 so that it seems appropriate that they should be given the task of
finding carts for the army.
Of course, after the date of midsummer fixed for the coming together of men
and supplies, provisions continued to be needed, and similar arrangements were made.
On 14 August the sheriffs of ten counties were once more ordered to encourage the
bringing of victuals to the king's armies for sale. Among them the sheriffs of
Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, Yorkshire, Essex, and Norfolk and
Suffolk were appointed, each with one of the king's clerks, to receive defined quantities
of provisions and bring them to Berwick at the king's charge. It was made clear that
speed was needed. 59 The sheriffs remained important to the carrying out in practice of
what was required.
The first administrative arrangements for mobilization for the war of 1301 dealt
with the basic requirements in a practical, coherent and coordinated way.
Approximately four months' notice was given to the magnates and others who would
have to make up the numbers of the household force of cavalry. A similar amount of
time was allowed for the assembly at the forward bases, Berwick and Carlisle, of
supplies obtained by purveyance. Quantities of provisions to be obtained were centrally
defined and divided among specific counties. Responsibility for delivering them was
allocated to specific persons. Other individuals were made responsible for ensuring that
the shipping ordered in detailed, centrally determined numbers from the officials of
individual ports, would be available according to the timetable. Some six weeks were
allowed for the recruiting and delivery to the muster of the main county levies.
The numbers obtained, however, fell annoyingly short of the requirement.
Edward's administration did not, in 1301, merely issue orders to the sheriffs; it made
additional associated appointments of royal clerks to work with them. It took action, it
seems, to be able to follow up its orders. Importantly, it is clear that inadequate
performance was not permitted to pass unnoticed or unpunished. The fact that the
investigative commissions were issued on 14 July, so soon after the muster date of 24
June, speaks of speedy, and therefore fairly certainly pre-planned, assessment, and rapid
response to failure. The management of the various aspects of the mobilization
involved, sometimes, knights appointed by name, as well as royal clerks and the local
58 For example, under the heading 'expenses for provisions for Scotland' the
sheriff of Nottinghamshire used twelve carts and thirty-six horses 'and for each cart two
oxen'. E101/580/3.
59 CCR 1296-1302, p. 498.
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permanent officials. The clerks played a particularly important part in executive as well
as administrative terms. Though the sheriffs were still an indispensable part of the
administrative process, it had become increasingly desirable at least to monitor, if not
yet replace, their central role in the raising of levies.
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CHAPTER 4.
EDWARD II, SCOTLAND, AND THE WAR OF 1322
Bannockburn
For Edward I Scotland had been an obstinate problem; for his son, notwithstanding the
mobilization of large armies in 1314 and 1322, it provided military disaster and
humiliation.
Edward I had crushed Sir William Wallace's revolt in 1303, only apparently
sealing victory with the capture of Stirling castle in 1304. 1
 Robert Bruce took up the
resistance, narrowly survived through 1306 and made himself Scotland's undisputed
leader by killing John Comyn.2
 In May 1307 he defeated the earl of Pembroke at
Loudon Hill. It was on his way north in response to attempt, again, to bring Scotland to
submission that Edward I died, on 7 July 1307.3
Edward 11 rapidly abandoned the expedition, leaving Bruce room and time over
the next few years to consolidate and extend his hold. The English king's protracted
political conflict with his magnates occupied his attention. Though he was in Scotland
in October 1310 and in the north until the middle of 1311, most of the English earls
would not join him, and little difference was made to Bruce's progress. In 1311 and
1312 Scottish raids terrorised northern England, and one after another English-held
castles in Scotland fe11.4
Early in 1313 the strategically important stronghold of Stirling was besieged.5
In the middle of the year its governor, Sir Philip Mowbray, obtained from Edward
Bruce terms that would require its surrender if no relieving army had come within three
1 Powicke, Thirteenth Century, pp. 708-710.
2 Ibid., p. 713.
3 Ibid., p. 719.
4 M. McKisack, The Fourteenth Century, 1307-1399 (Oxford, 1959), pp. 32-33.
5 Edward Bruce began to besiege it early in 1313. G. W. S. Barrow, Robert
Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland, third edn. (Edinburgh, 1988), p.
276.
54
leagues by midsummer day, 24 June, 1314. 6 Honour as well as strategic considerations
impelled Edward H to respond to the siege.' He was, in 1313, in a politically better
position than recently. Reaction to the killing of Gaveston in July 1312 had already
brought the earl of Pembroke, together with other magnates, 8 to side with him. He felt
strong enough to attempt to raise an army to go to Scotland in force.
The orders for the feudal cavalry were issued on 23 December 1313. Those
addressed to Earl Thomas of Lancaster, seven earls and 87 others summoned them in
fide et homagio to be at Berwick by 10 June themselves, cum toto servitio nob is debito.
The archbishop of York, 18 bishops, 25 abbots, abbesses and priors were also required
to present their service. Sheriffs were ordered to summon the service due from all
holding by military service or sergeanty, 9 including other ecclesiastics, widows and
other women. 1 ° Thus about six months' notice was given via established channels.
Edward had not, however, first obtained the consent of parliament for war, as according
to the Ordinances he should have done. Consequently a number of earls - Lancaster,
Warenne, Warwick and Arundel - refused to go, even though the king argued 'urgent
necessity'. 11 Except for that lack of consent Po-wicke describes the recruitment - feudal,
national, contractual - for what became the Bannockburn campaign as 'impeccably
conservative.' 12 J. E. Morris calculated, from the protections issued, that there would
have been c.2,000-2,500 heavy cavalry, largely made up from the magnates loyal to the
king and their retinues, and from the household.13
6 McKisack, Fourteenth Century, p. 34.
7 A different reason for Edward El's decision, in late 1313, to attack Scotland is
advanced by McNamee. 'In November 1313 Robert I proclaimed that his enemies had
one year in which to come to his peace, or suffer perpetual disinheritance', thus
encouraging Edward's supporters in Scotland to desert him unless he reacted with
force. C. McNamee, The Wars of the Bruces. Scotland England and Ireland 1306-
1328, (East Linton, 1997), p. 61.
8 McKisack, Fourteenth Century, p. 28.
9 Foedera, Vol. II, div. i, pp. 238-239. This order, with only slight variations,
was repeated on 13 April. CCR 1313-1318, p. 97.
1 ° Ibid., p. 86.
11 J. R. Maddicott, Thomas of Lancaster, 1307-1322 (Oxford, 1970), p. 157.
According to the Vita Edwardi Secundi (ed. N. Denholm-Young [London, 1957], p. 50),
they did send knights as their due service.
12 Powicke, Military Obligation, p. 141.
13 J. E. Morris, Bannockburn (Cambridge, 1914), p. 24.
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In spite of those earls' refusal, the king continued preparations to relieve Stirling.
The organisation of supplies for the army began with a number of orders dated 10
March, in which royal officials were assigned a leading role. Nicholas de Tykehull, a
clerk, was given power to requisition horses, agreeing a price with men of the place
from which he was taking them. This order was specially addressed to abbots and
priors, as well as to sheriffs, bailiffs and other 'faithful men', indicating that the
ecclesiastical establishments were a prime source for horses. 14 Master Walter le
Ferrour, valettus, was to obtain nails and horse-shoes in Northumberland, Durham and
Yorkshire. 15 A number of clerks were to buy wheat in five eastern counties, apparently
under the general supervision of Alexander le Convers, 16 and Stephen le Blound was to
do the same in Northumberland and Durham. 17 The sheriffs of the counties were to see
to the delivery of these purchases to Berwick by Easter. 18 Almost immediately, on 14
March, another clerk replaced Convers; 19 he was sent to Ireland to help arrangements
being made there for both men 2° and supplies. 21 The arrangements of 10 March for
obtaining provisions were quickly cancelled. Instead, on 18 March Antonio Pessagno22
of Genoa, the king's merchant, was assigned to buy wheat and victuals in the eastern
counties and ship these supplies to Berwick, and authorised to nominate buyers. 23 The
buying authorities for those previously appointed in the 10 March orders were cancelled
14 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 115a.
15 Ibid.
16 For several counties he was associated with the other clerk named. Ibid., pp.
114b,115a.
17 Ibid., pp. 114b,115a.
18 Ibid., pp. 115,115b.
19 Ibid., p. 116b.
20	 •., p.Ibid., 118a, dated 22 March.
21 Ibid., p. 122b. With Richard de Castelyn he was to supervise and hasten the
delivery to Skinburness of defined quantities of victuals to be obtained by the Irish
officials. The delivery date for these was 1 August. Presumably Edward was
anticipating continuing the campaign once Stirling had been relieved.
22 N. Fryde, 'Antonio Pessagno of Genoa, King's Merchant of Edward II of
England', in Studi in memoria di Federigo Melis (2 vols., Rome 1978), Vol. II, pp.159-
178, summarises his standing as the chief royal creditor and supplier for the royal army
1312-1320, who also served Edward II as diplomat, administrator and soldier. Ibid.,
p.159.
23 Rot. Scot., p. 117a.
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on 1 April, and they were told to return what they had obtained. 24 In orders also dated 1
April the sheriffs of Somerset and Dorset, Gloucester, Devon and Cornwall, were told
to buy and deliver defined amounts of victuals to Skinbumess by 2 June, by the view
and testimony of royal clerks. 25 As usual, the governmental organisation of supplies
was accompanied by proclamations encouraging merchants to bring supplies of arms
and victuals to be sold to the king and the army.26
One other aspect of organisation of the army's needs - carts - is worth notice,
though according to the orders' recorded date they could not have been available in time
to be of use to the force that went to relieve Stirling; nor, the orders being dated 6 June,
could they have been replacements for a baggage train lost after the battle. Thirteen
sheriffs, including the sheriffs of such southern counties as Essex and Hereford, were
told to buy 236 carts. They were to be delivered to Berwick by various dates in July and
August - e.g. some in quindena Sancti Johannis Baptistae, others within a month of the
festival - under the supervision of half a dozen clerlcs. 27 This both underlines the
necessity of carts to an army - the Vita Edwardi Secundi says the wagon train that left
Berwick stretched for twenty leagues 28 - and again illustrates the supervisory role of the
royal clerks in relation to the executive action of local officials.
March had also seen the issue of orders for the collection of the other elements
of the army, and for maritime support and transport. On 12 March John Sturmy and
Peter Bard, valettos nostros, were appointed as joint captains and admirals, and Sturmy
was given authority to choose men and sailors for five king's ships. 29 On 22 March the
local authorities of a number of ports of the south and west were asked - vos affectuose
requirimus et rogamus - to provide specific numbers of ships - 38 in all - by 26 May.
The ships were to go to an assembly point at the ports' cost, and thence in the fleet at the
king's cost. Two of the king's clerks were to supervise this, and reports were to be made
via them. The sheriffs of the ports' counties were told to assist the business. 30 A later
order of 12 May to the two royal clerks to arrest, crew and arm ships as soon as possible
could well be evidence of the ports' tardiness in complying: it could also show that
24 Ibid., pp. 122b,123a.
25 Ibid., p. 122b.
26 Ibid., p. 116a, dated 12 March.
27 Ibid., p.127a,127b. Each sheriff was given a precise quota.
28 Vita Edwardi Secundi, ed. Denholm-Young, p. 50.
29 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 115b.
30 Ibid., p. 117a,117b.
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progress (and lack of it) was being managerially monitored. 31 Other indications of
problems can be seen in an order to many masters of ships going to Scotland to stop
engaging in robbery and taking bribes,32 a request to the bailiffs of Sutton and Plympton
to send at least one of the two ships for which they had been asked, 33 and an order to the
mayor and bailiffs of Southampton to make good the inadequate equipment of their
three ships, by indenture with the clerk Robert de Helliwel1. 34 In the management of
the mobilization of shipping it does seem that, though the port officials were expected
to take the necessary action, supervision by royal clerks was essentia1. 35 The detailed
allocations to individual ports implies a centrally held view of the capacity of each.
The fairly standard 'supporting' order to sheriffs presumably made their authority
available should it be needed; it could also be a medieval recognition of the good
management principle - keep the incumbent official informed of action to be taken by
others in the area for which he is responsible.
The first order for infantry was dated 9 March, though it only required the
bishop of Durham to send 1,000 men to Newcastle by 31 March, to go thence at the
king's wages. 36 Edward also sought to draw on Ireland. On 22 March several lords
were asked to bring as many men as they coWd. 37 Richard earl of Ulster was to be the
captain of whatever force was raised. 38 The justiciar of Ireland was told to choose
4,000 foot archers, and have them ready by Easter, 7 April, to go in John of Argyle's
western fleet, at the king's wages. 39 The treasurer of Ireland was to provide sufficient
ships for the earls and magnates.4° How many Irish actually served is not clear, though
a number of instructions at the end of April and early May 41 to send ships to Ireland
suggest that transport was needed. Mostly these orders were addressed to the local
31 Ibid., p. 126b.
32 Ibid., pp. 123b,124a.
33 Ibid., p. 125b.
34 Ibid., p. 126a.
35 The Cinque Ports also were told to provide their service to Skinburness by 24
June. CCR 1313-1318, p. 98.
36 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 114b. On 20 April he was asked for 500 more. Ibid.
37 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 118a. dated 22 and 26 March
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., p. 122a, dated 28 March.
40 ibid.
41 Ibid., pp.125a,125b,126b.
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authorities, though the 12 May order referred to above went to the king's clerks John de
Merton and Robert de Helliwel1.42
On 24 March levies were summoned from English counties and Wales, to be at
Newcastle by 28 April. Griffin ap Rees was to bring 2,000 men from North Wales, and
Walter Hakluyt 1,000 from the south. Arrayers were named to select and bring 5,000
from six counties, and Hugh Audley, its justiciar, 500 from Chester; the relevant
sheriffs were to pay wages from the county border to Newcastle, from the county
revenues. 43 As usual the sheriffs were to assist the 'selectors and leaders'. 44 40 men
were summoned from Hope castle, and 40 crossbow-men and 60 archers from Bristo1.45
Gilbert de Clare, earl of Gloucester, and five other magnates with holdings in Wales
were 'asked' - vobis mandamus rogantes - for 1,900 soldiers, to join the king at
Newcastle, where he would be cum equis et armis et toto servitio nob is debito, from
Easter. Specific numbers, in round hundreds, were sought from each. The men's
wages, from the day they set off, would be paid by the chamberlain of South Wales.46
On 20 April another 9,500 men were to be chosen from the same English counties, plus
Warwickshire and Leicestershire (500), Lancashire (500) and Lincolnshire (3,000).
This time the selection was to be made by the sheriff and a named clerk; the sheriffs
were empowered to nominate additional selectors, but warned to show no favours in the
selection.47
Finally, on 27 May all infantry were summoned to be at Wark-on-Tweed by 10
June, so that Stirling could be relieved by the due date. 48 Though there are differences
between the list in that order and the previous ones - the biggest being that it does not
include the first 1,000 or the second 1,500 allocated to Northumberland - the total
summoned must have come to around 20,000. 49
 J. E. Morris's estimate that in fact the
42 Above, p. 57 n. 29.
43 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 120. The counties were Northumberland, Yorkshire,
Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Shropshire and Staffordshire.
44 Ibid., p. 120b.
45 Ibid., p. 120a,120b.
46 Ibid., p. 119b.
47 Ibid., p. 124a,124b.
48 Ibid., p. 127a.
49 Morris, Bannockburn, p. 40, sees the figure as 21,540. He also suggests that
the 27 May order indicated impatience with the progress of the muster. As previous
orders had required the levies to come to Newcastle by the end of April, and Wark-on-
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actual number of foot who appeared was only some 15,000 50 is accepted by Barrow51
and Prestwich.52
Inevitably the crushing defeat at Bannockburn colours any assessment of how
well the 1314 mobilization was managed. The number of foot fell short of the number
that had been summoned, but this was by no means unusual. The actual incidents of the
battle itself underlined the lack of discipline apparently inherent in feudal cavalry, as
well as the inadequacy of the English tactics. Whether all the arrangements for supplies
would have provided sufficiently for a prolonged war can not be known, as the
campaign ended quickly and disastrously, only two weeks after the muster.
Nevertheless the mobilization did achieve its main objective, the arrival of a large army
within three leagues of Stirling by the date stipulated to prevent the automatic surrender
of the castle.
The War of 1322
In the years immediately following Bannockburn Robert Bruce and the Scots naturally
held the initiative. Though their attempt to take Ireland was ultimately defeated in
1318,53 in that same year Bruce had taken Berwick and raided Northumberland and
Yorkshire. Political changes in England had seen a formal, if only superficial,
reconciliation between Thomas of Lancaster and the king. This made it possible to
make a serious effort to recapture Berwick by siege in 1319, but Sir James Douglas's
diversionary raid into Yorkshire, where he won a complete victory at Myton-in-Swale,
led Lancaster and the northern earls to insist on returning south. The siege of Berwick
was abandoned, and in December 1319 a truce to last two years was agreed.54
Tweed is some 40 miles further north, it may simply have marked the real start of the
campaign.
5° Bannockburn, p. 41.
51 Barrow, Robert Bruce, pp. 293-4 puts the figure summoned at 21,640, but
agrees Morris's estimate of 15,000 as the actual number.
52 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 117.
53 McKisack, Fourteenth Centuq, pp. 43-44; McNamee, Wars of the Bruces,
pp. 166-199.
54 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
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This expired at the end of 1321. A Scottish raid reached as far as Richmond in
January 1322, signalling that war had begun again. However, Edward II's attention was
focussed on dealing with the internal challenges to his authority. Serious military
arrangements to counter the Scottish threat, other than general defensive warnings,
would have to wait. Though the ferocious intentions of the Scots were invoked in writs
summoning the English forces, 55
 the muster at Coventry, set for 28 February by a series
of summonses and instructions to sheriffs and others, has to be seen as really directed
against internal enemies. Of course the possibility of alliance between the Scots and the
contrariants was a real as well as a propaganda one, but Coventry could not have been a
practical starting place for an offensive war in the north.
Thanks importantly to the rebels' own lack of unity, and particularly to the
political incompetence of Earl Thomas of Lancaster, the king was able to defeat them
piecemeal. Only after the death of Hereford and the capture of Lancaster at
Boroughbridge on 16 March could war with Bruce become the primary objective of
planning.
As Natalie Fryde observes, 'the campaign which followed was one of the worst
failures of the reign'. 56
 No major battle was fought, so there is little evidence by which
to judge whether the organisation of recruiting produced an effective military force,
either for a major set-piece battle or for some other strategic objective - if indeed
Edward had one. Arguably it is this absence of a strategic objective that was
responsible for the ignominious course and end of the war. It probably also had some
bearing on the changes that took place in administrative arrangements for recruiting
policies. Nevertheless, though the size of the army that assembled was again
substantially less than theoretically called for in the original commissions of array, this
was not unusual, as the experience of 1314 shows; it was still a large force, at well over
20,000. In terms of planning it was the arrangements for keeping the army adequately
supplied with provisions, especially once it had entered Scotland, that seem to have
failed to a disastrous degree,57
 and in this respect too overall strategy was ina.dequate.
55 Pan. Writs, Vol. II, div.ii, pp. 544-5.
56 Natalie Fryde, The Tyranny and Fall of Edward II, 1321-1326 (Cambridge,
1979), p. 122.
57 Trokelowe, Anna/es, ed. H.T. Riley, pp. 124-5; Expenditis siquidem
victualibus per terram, et per mare ubique deficientibus, maxima copia exercitus fame
tabefacta numerosaque multitudine prae victus inopia, proh dolor! peritus extincta.
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The writs of military summons to assemble armies to invade Scotland - as
distinct from orders to prepare defensively against Scottish raids - began to be issued on
25 March 1322. 58 Musters were set for 13 June at Newcastle and Carlisle; presumably,
therefore, most of the forces that had responded to the earlier call for muster at
Coventry on 28 February against the contrariants would have disbanded, and not been
kept in arms for a war with Scotland some three months later. The combination of civil
war, preparation for possible defensive action, and now a new aggressive posture must
have produced some administrative confusion, if the following orders addressed to
Cornwall from February to May were in any way an example.59
On 7 February, in common with many other counties, the sheriff of Cornwall
was to array the county forces, and have them ready to move. On 23 March he was told
they could stay in the county, but should be ready to move at three days' notice. In the
25 March series of summonses for the 13 June muster Thomas Lercedekne and
Reginald de Botereux, with the assistance of the sheriff and bailiffs, were to select 500
armed men from Cornwall to go to the muster: from Newcastle they would be at the
king's wages. This was reinforced on 26 March by a writ to the barons, knights and free
men of Cornwall emphasising that, as they had not hitherto been of help, they would do
well to cooperate now. However, on 7 May Lercedekne and Botereux were told that if
the king's clerk Alexander le Conyers (who was now organising a western transport
fleet) certified that naval help was forthcoming from Cornwall, they should not levy
conscripts. Nevertheless, on 16 May, as the York Parliament had granted one foot
soldier per vill, they were told to stay the levy, and any money taken in pursuance of the
earlier commission was to be returned to the communities, or used to arm the men now
to be recruited. Botereux, this time associated with Henry de Chambernon, had to
select, with the advice of the bailiffs of the lords of the towns concerned, the one foot
soldier per vill. Perhaps Cornwall was a special case, but this does give an impression
of very short-term management, absence of longer-term planning, and confusion.
The first writs of summons of 25 March, addressed severally to the archbishop
of York, sixteen bishops, Edward earl of Chester the king's son, the earls of Norfolk,
Kent, Richmond, Pembroke, Arundel, Surrey, Oxford, and Angus, and seventy-four
other magnates, required each to present his servicium debitum at Newcastle on 13
June.6° Additionally, all sheriffs were ordered to proclaim that everyone who owed
58 Pan. Writs, Vol. If ,div. ii, p. 558.
59 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 546, 558, 561, 567, 572, 573.
60 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 558.
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such service should do likewise. 61 A second set of writs dated 26 March asked these
magnates to bring as much extra force as they could, as well as their service. 62 To raise
footmen specific numbers were required by other writs, 63 to be chosen from individual
counties and led to the king to go against the Scots. In a departure from the more
normal practice of being paid by the crown once they left their county boundary, these
levies would only be at the king's wages from the muster at Newcastle. The
commission to Lercedelcne and Botereux for 500 from Cornwall already referred to was
one of these writs, which like those to the magnates were also dated 25 March.
Including that for Cornwall, they totalled 27,900 from twenty-five shires to be at
Newcastle, with another 11,000 from six for Carlisle. In most cases the major towns
were excluded from this levy - for example Exeter in the case of Devon, Salisbury from
Wiltshire, Norwich and Bury-St-Edmunds from Norfolk and Suffolk. Forty-one towns
were later, on 5 Apri1,64 asked individually for help against the Scots. From the
counties the two biggest quotas were 7,000 from Yorkshire (excluding York itself,
Beverley, Craven and Richmondshire), and 4,000 from Lincolnshire (excluding Lincoln
and Stamford). The smallest were 100 from Middlesex and 300 from Worcestershire
(excluding Worcester). Most were for 500 or 1,000. As many men as possible should
be armati, 65 and the rest furnished with adequate arms. The contingents from
Cumberland, Westmoreland, Lancashire, Derbyshire, Staffordshire, Herefordshire,
Richmondshire and Craven were for Carlisle.
The arrayers themselves, (two for each area except Yorkshire with four, and
Lincolnshire, the Forest of Dean and Richmondshire with three each), included some
dozen named as being sheriffs in 1322. 66 For Middlesex, Northumberland and Rutland
the appointments were 'the sheriff and Roger de Brek, William Ridel and John Hakelut
respectively. It can be inferred that the arrayers' authority required there to be at least
61 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 559.
62 ibid.
63 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 559-60.
64 Ibid., p. 563.
65 having some protective armour: the instructions to the Cornish arrayers
specified a padded tunic, light helmet, iron glove and a suit of clothing. The wardrobe
accounts distinguish payments to peditis armatis from those of the peditum nudorum.
BL Stowe Ms. 553, ff. 82v, 81r.
66 The arrayers' names are from Pan. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 559-60, and the
sheriffs' from Lists and Indexes, Vol. IX, List of Sheriffs for England and Wales (Public
Record Office, 1898).
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two of them acting together; where four are named their powers are explicitly for all, or
three, or two of them. Where there are three, power is for all, or two. Arrayers would
be men of local importance, frequently called upon, as Michael Powicke points out, 67 to
be of use to government in one way or another. For instance, Thomas Ughtred, one of
the Yorkshire arrayers, had been a commissioner of array since 1319, a knight of the
shire in 1320, and keeper of Scarborough and then Pickering castles. 68 John Morice
was a member of parliament for Bedfordshire in 1327. 69 John Tempestone, one of the
arrayers for Richmondshire and Craven, held land in Keighley and Skipton and went
from Yorkshire to the great council in 1324. 7° Ralph Gorges had been on missions
abroad in the king's service. 7I Robert Waddesley had already been an arrayer in 1318.72
William Ridel was a keeper of the truce in Northumberland in 1320.73 Richard
Eggebaston and Thomas le Botiller were assessors and collectors of the eighteenth in
1319. 74 William de Isney was assigned to gaol delivery in Lincolnshire in 1320.75
Existing local officials, sheriffs and bailiffs, were ordered to assist the arrayers,
whose role would be basically that of supervising the local action to select men, and
defining an assembly point in the county to which the levies should be brought. An
earlier set of instructions, for an array in August 1314 to resist the invading Scots, goes
into considerable detail. Its context was not identical with that of 1322, but if these
details were applied more generally the process of array was a thorough and controlled
process. 76
In that 1314 order two individuals were appointed to choose horse and foot.
They were to tell the sheriff to proclaim in cities, boroughs and other market towns a
day and place in each wapentake where all men from 15 to 60 years old should
assemble, with the arms to which they were sworn. The penalty for non-attendance
would be imprisonment. The assembly was to include the valetti and sergeants of
67 M. R. Powicke, 'The English Commons in Scotland in 1322 and the
Deposition of Edward II', Speculum, )00CV (1960), p. 557.
68 Moor, Knights of Edward I, Vol. V, p. 72.
69 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 201.
70 Ibid., Vol. V, p. 13.
71 CCR 1318-1323, p. 294.
72 ParL Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 508.
73 CCR 1318-1323, p. 191.
74 CPR 1317-1321, p. 348.
75 Ibid., p. 53.
76 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 130.
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abbots and priors. The constable of each viii was to have a roll of the names of all
within the 15 to 60 age range. The two deputed selectors were to enroll the names of all
suitable to bear arms, and of the leaders who would bring them to Aymer de Valence.
They were also to enroll the names of all who had failed to come before them, and send
the list to the council at York, or to the chancery, so that a commission of oyer and
terminer could be appointed to punish the defaulters. The two selectors were warned to
show no favours and take no bribes, under pain of imprisonment for a year and a day,
and ransom at the king's will.
These arrangements are not only clear and workable, but also buttressed by the
availability in usable form of the necessary information. Additionally, they included
provision of the information necessary for effective follow-up action. Bannockburn had
been a military, but apparently not an organisational, disaster.
The men selected in the array ordered in March 1322 were to be grouped into
(often approximate) twenties, hundreds and constabularies. It is clear from the Liber
Cotidianus of the king's household for the period 1 May 1322-19 October 1323 77 that
possibly the centenars, and particularly the vintenars, of the county levies were
essentially part of their unit, not external appointments: they seem often to disappear
from the army at the same time as their group of twenty. 78 The levies thus organised
were then to be led to the army's muster. Some eleven weeks, between 25 March and
the assembly at Newcastle-upon-Tyne on 13 June, were allowed for completion of these
processes. However, as in the case of Cornwall, subsequently writs of 16 May
cancelled the instruction for these levies, substituting the recruitment of the one man
per viii granted by the York parliament.79
Measures to begin to accumulate supplies in the north were taken in March. As
a preliminary, on 18 March a mandate to the bailiffs of Kingston-upon-Hull ordered
them, as the king was coming to York for an expedition against the Scots, to proclaim
that both native and foreign merchants could come safely with victuals and goods to
sell, and that none would be taken without due payment. 8° On 21 March similar orders
77 BL Stowe Ms. 553.
78 Ibid., ff. 81r, 81v. As the numbers being paid are recorded declining over
time, the vintenars sometimes reduce in number as does the body of the foot, and are in
fact counted in with them, as e.g. Northamptonshire: 30 July 440 foot, of whom 22 were
vintenars; 11 August 240 foot, of whom 13 were vintenars. (Ibid., f.81r.) (This is an
untypically large drop.)
79 ParL Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 573-4.
80 CPR 1321-1324, p. 84.
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to the mayor and bailiffs of Newcastle and the sheriffs of Lincolnshire and fourteen
other counties went out, encouraging merchants to come to York and the north.81
Continuing this theme a series of protections were issued for men, presumably
merchants, though not always explicitly described as such, and for the ships they were
sending south to buy corn and victuals to bring to York and Newcastle. Ten were dated
25 March, some for more than one ship; those who received them had to have found
sureties that they would not deliver their cargoes elsewhere, and would not
communicate with the Scots - or the Flemings. 82 This was an early recognition that the
latter were to be a major problem. More protections were issued on 6, 7 and 8 Apri183
and many more in subsequent months. 84 The total number of ships in these protections
reached well over one hundred. In addition to these independent merchants there were
others acting specifically for the king to obtain and transport supplies. Manautus 85 and
John Franciscus, and Bernard Armigus, merchants of Florence whom the king was
sending overseas to buy corn and bring it to the king for the war with the Scots,
received safe-conducts on 3 April. 86 So did Selo Susse, 'the kings merchant', on 6 April,
who was sent to obtain oats. 87 Raymond Merkades of Penne in the Agenais, a king's
merchant conveying wine, armour and victuals, was given a protection on 20 April.
Three king's merchants bringing more wine, armour and victuals by ship for the
maintenance of the king and his subjects in the north were given protections dated 28
Apri1. 88
 Another foreigner was Godekin de Revel, 'merchant of Almain' who was
'conveying victuals and other wares from beyond the seas for the sustenance of the king
and his lieges in the north, and of those coming to the north.' 89 The condition in the
protections for independent merchants that required them to give undertakings that the
81 CCR 1318-1323, p. 534.
82 CPR 1321-1324, p. 85.
83 Ibid., pp. 86, 87.
84 Ibid., pp. 109, 115, 116, 118, 134.
85 He delivered 1,198 quarters and 5 bushells of corn to Henry de Shiroles,
receiver and keeper of victuals at Newcastle on 22 August. E101/16/18.
86 CPR 1321-1324, p. 90.
87 Ibid. On 4 May a safe-conduct was issued for the men of 'Siglavus Susse',
kings merchant, with two ships going to buy and bring corn to the king in the north.
Ibid., p. 107.
88 Ibid., p. 111.
89	 p. 118.
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supplies they would bring north would not be taken to the Scots, suggests perhaps a
rather surprising suspicion about loyalty and good faith.
No delivery dates being specified, the general purpose of this encouragement of
merchants to bring supplies would seem to be the maintenance of a flow of provisions
towards the army, rather than the setting up of an initial supply dump for the Newcastle
and Carlisle musters.
The accumulation of such a store of supplies in readiness for the assembly of the
army at Newcastle was put in hand on 24 March, by mandates for a number of sheriffs
to purvey various victuals. 90 Quantities of the different provisions - wheat, oats, barley-
malt, hogs, beans, peas, and stockfish, small salt and salt of Poitou - were defined for
each sheriff. The goods were to be sent, as they were bought, to be at Newcastle by 13
June, the current date for the muster. One of the king's clerks, allocated by name for
each area, was sent to supervise the process. 91 The clerk's role would seem to have
been to keep an eye not only on the progress of the purveying, but also in particular on
the despatch of the provisions and their delivery. The process took some time: the
account of the sheriff of Essex, Nicholas Engargne, includes payment to the king's clerk
John de Percebrigge for eighty-eight days from 9 April to 7 July for both videre
provisiones predictas et eas festinare. 92 Thomas de Eggefeki, the chancery clerk who
was assigned to John Haward, sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk, was paid for this task
from 7 April to 22 August.93
Naturally all this involved a series of arrangements, which were included in
some detail in the mandates to the sheriffs. The sheriff of York was to purvey in
Holdemess specific quotas of wheat, oats, and barley-malt. The wheat was to be
ground into flour and the flour put in barrels marked with their contents. 94 500 quarters
of wheat and 800 of oats (the latter against a quota of 1,000 quarters) were purveyed in
Essex. The actual buying of the grain was done, it appears, by the knight John de Lifton
and another clerk, John de Crossety. The wheat was milled into flour, having been
transported at the charge of the sheriff from the various places where it had been
collected, to store in a granary at Chelmsford. Barrels were bought for the flour. These
provisions were transported to ships, the freight costs, the wages of various officials and
9° CPR 1321-1324, p. 90.
91 On 3 April sheriffs were ordered to pay these clerks, some at 2 shillings and
some at 18 pence per day, for this work. CCR 1318-1323, p. 431.
92 E1011556/9.
93 BL Stowe Ms. 553, f. 41r.
94 CPR 1321-1324, p. 90.
67
other expenses being paid by the sheriff. The cost of the provisions was £410, and the
wages and expenses amounted to another not inconsiderable £5411416. Nicholas
Engargne had been succeeded as sheriff by Thomas Gobion at Michaelmas 1322, and it
is the latter's figures that are in the Liber Cotidianus.95
The sheriffs were to make the purveyances out of the issues of their bailiwicks;
this resulted in surer and more immediate payment to the owners than did the issue of
tallies against the wardrobe or exchequer, and would have made the task much easier.
Only some counties, mainly those in the east, were included in this set of orders.
Besides Holderness in Yorkshire, these were Lincolnshire, Norfolk and Suffolk (whose
sheriff had to obtain the stockfish and salt from Great Yarmouth), Cambridgeshire and
Huntingdonshire, Essex, Kent, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, Surrey and Sussex,
Lancashire and Hampshire. 96
 To add to the stores at Newcastle, the seneschal of
Gascony and the constable of Bordeaux were told on 1 April to obtain 2,000 quarters of
wheat and 1,000 tuns of wine, also to be there by 13 June. The people of Gascony
having already been asked for a money subsidy for the war, those officials should
accept the supplies in lieu, or use money from the subsidy to pay for them. If neither
course was practicable, they should pay out of the issues of the duchy. 97 This concern
for arranging payment echoes the instructions to the English sheriffs to use the issues of
their own shires, and reflects consciousness of the desirability of reassuring suppliers
about payment.
The total quantities of the three main victuals in these requisitions for Newcastle
were 7,200 quarters of wheat, 7,500 of oats, and 2,000 of barley-malt. Newcastle was
the mustering place for the magnates' servicium debitum and what extra they would
bring, as well as, in theory, for the 27,900 foot from the commissions of array. The ratio
of supplies to these numbers of mouths bears no particular relation to what was
specified at this same time for the muster at Carlisle.98
95 BL Stowe Ms. 553, f. 44r.
96 CPR 1321-1324, p. 90.
97 Ibid., p. 94.
98 However, as described above, the safe-conducts for merchants and ships
fetching supplies envisaged them delivering them at Newcastle, which could
substantially augment what would be available there. Nevertheless, the apparently clear
absence of correlation between virtually simultaneous planning numbers for men and
those for supplies suggests that - surprisingly - the need for it was not properly
recognised.
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For this muster the commissions of array of 25 March sought 11,000 foot from
Cumberland, Westmorland, Lancashire, Richmondshire and Craven, Derbyshire,
Staffordshire and Herefordshire. 99
 Writs of 3 April summoned additional forces from
Ireland to Carlisle. Richard de Burgh, earl of Ulster, was asked to come with his force
at his own expense: Thomas earl of Kildare and thirty-three others were 'affectionately
required and asked' to bring as much force as they could, and assist the justiciar, John
de Birmingham earl of Louth, in what was required of him. He, with the help of the
other nobles of Ireland, was to choose and bring to Carlisle for 13 June 300 men-at-
arms, 1000 hobelars, and 6000 armed foot. 113° The treasurer of Ireland was to pay their
wages, from leaving Ireland, from the Irish treasury. 101 Thus, in theory, the explicitly
planned number to be at Carlisle was 18,300.
Ireland was also to be drawn upon for supplies. On 24 March the justiciar and
treasurer of Ireland were told to purvey defined quantities of wheat, oats, barley-malt,
beans, hogs, wine and salt to be delivered to the receiver of supplies at Carlisle by 13
June. Payment was to be made out of the issues of Ireland. 1 °2
 Obtaining the quantities
required gave rise to some difficulties, as may be seen from an order of 16 April. This
empowered the justiciar and the treasurer to make the purveyances in the best way they
could, even in privileged towns and markets. The supplies were urgently needed, or the
Scottish expedition would be delayed. Though the king was not certain there was
enough money to pay quickly, he promised that this purveyance would not make a
precedent. City authorities were asked to permit this purveyance, in spite of their
privileges.103
With the additional 1,000 quarters of wheat, 1,000 of oats and 40 tuns of wine
that Thomas de Lercedekne was to obtain in Cornwall and convey to Skinburness,1°4
this totalled 7,000 quarters of wheat, 5,000 of oats and 1,000 of barley-malt. For a
theoretical two-thirds the number of men at Newcastle, the purveyances were for two-
thirds as much oats, two-fifths as much barley-malt, and almost the same quantity of
wheat.
99 excluding the towns of Derby, Stafford, Lichfield, Hereford and Leominster.
Par!. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 560.
1°° Ibid., p. 562.
101 Ibid.
102 CPR 1321-1324, p. 94.
103 ibid.
104 ibid., p. 90.
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These comparisons are, of course, only of the planning figures at the end of
March for preparations to invade Scotland. If the numbers of men specified were
intended to be taken seriously, the contemporary purveying arrangements for their
supplies, though spelt out in such detail, do not suggest the existence of calculated
logistical planning. There may, of course, have been other factors known to those
managing the mobilizations, for example different levels of stocks already at the two
muster points. On the other hand, a different interpretation is suggested by Powicke:
perhaps the large numbers of men to be levied were specified in order to induce the
York parliament to make the grant of one better-equipped man per viii, in return for the
abandonment of what would have been an onerous and costly burden, since the
communities customarily bore part of the costs. 1°5
Although Edward's intention was to invade Scotland after gathering his army
together in June, it could not be assumed that Bruce would wait passively behind his
border to be attacked. Arrangements had to be made to defend the march of Scotland
against a sudden raid. Andrew Harclay, earl of Carlisle, was appointed captain and
keeper of the northern counties of Yorkshire, Lancashire, Cumberland, Westmoreland
and Northumberland, and of the bishopric of Durham, with power to array all their
forces against the Scots. Sheriffs and constables and keepers of castles there were
ordered to obey his orders should that need arise. The bishop of Durham was to return
to his bishopric, array its forces, and have them ready for Harclay's orders. 1 °6 Writs of 6
April to Yorkshire wapentakes and various towns made appointments for the arraying
of all men between the ages of 16 and 60, checking their equipment against the Statute
of Winchester, punishing defaulters, organising them into the usual 20's, 100's and
constabularies, and having them ready to go on Harclay's order. This was expressly
stated as being to protect the march while the army was assembling at Newcastle. 1 °7
 It
is difficult to believe that such orders, reinforced as they were on 3 May by the
instruction to be ready as the Scots were about to invade, 108
 did not to some extent
affect and even confuse the preparations for raising the county levies ordered on 25
March, even before the counter-orders of 16 May caused them to be reversectm
105 Powicke, Military Obligation, p. 103.
1 °6 ParL Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 561-2, dated 26 and 31 March.
101 Ibid., p. 564.
108 Ibid.
109 The reversal included instructions to commissioners who had been appointed
to collect a fine of 600 marks from Buckinghamshire and Berkshire to return any money
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Efforts to obtain more troops for the Newcastle muster had continued. On 4
May London and forty other towns were asked for help against the Scots, in men or in
some other way, 11° On 9 April orders were issued for the recruiting of Welsh foot. The
justiciar of Wales, Edmund earl of Arundel, or whoever was in his place, was to have
the men chosen and led to the king at Newcastle by 13 June. The leaders were to be
Griffin ap Rhees, as in February, for those from North Wales, and the king's valletus
Rhees ap Griffith for those from South Wales. If they were not available the justiciar
was to appoint others. As in the 25 March writs, specific numbers were allocated,
3,900 to counties, 3,400 to keepers of lands in the king's hands and 2,200 to individual
marcher lords. Although the totals were large, the writs pointed out that the detailed
allocations were for small numbers, to ensure that those chosen would be fit and
strong. 111 In all 10,000 were called for: in the event, as usual, this was not achieved.
Those recorded in pay from various dates from mid-July numbered a little under
7,000. 112 The combination of the round figure total, 10,000, and its very detailed and
considered breakdown, is, however, evidence of central planning trying to use
apparently reliable knowledge of local ciciunstances.
The Welsh could be marched to Newcastle, but for the forces coming from
Ireland sea transport had to be found. The 3 April order to John Birmingham promised
that a fleet from the south of England would be sent, 'as accustomed', a phrase
suggesting again a well-informed central planning resource. 113
 On 3 April the bailiffs
and men of Bristol and eleven other western ports were told to prepare ships to send to
Dublin; 114
 on 14 April their destination was changed to Drogheda. 115
 On 24 April
coordination of the raising of ships for duty in the west was delegated to that
experienced clerk Alexander le Conyers, by a writ of aid in his favour to the sheriffs of
already taken. The fine was made to be excused the 25 March levy of 500 men. Ibid.,
pp. 566, 575.
110 Ibid., p. 563.
111 Ibid., p. 565. The grand total came to 10,000, which included 500 from lands
of Arundel himself and some others.
112 BL Stowe Ms. 553, if. 80r,80v.
113 Par!. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 562.
"4 CCR 1318-1324, pp. 530-31. They were to prepare as many as possible, to
carry horse and foot to Carlisle on the orders of the justiciar of Ireland. The king was to
be told how many they would provide, and for how long at their own expense. After
that they would receive wages from the king.
115 Ibid.
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the south-western counties. 116 The region's ports were ordered on 25 April to tell him
what they were doing to provide ships for transport between Ireland and Carlisle. 117 He
must have been an effective and reliable manager; the abbot of Beaulieu had to certify
to Conyers that he was following an order to send his ships to Drogheda: 118 on 7 May
commissioners of array in the south-west were told to stay the levy if he certified that
the ports were promising naval help.119
Assembling an adequate amount of shipping proved difficult. On 15 May the
justiciar of Ireland was told, as well as being notified of the new date of 24 July for the
muster, that there was a shortage of ships to take the men and provisions to Carlisle. He
was therefore to recall all Irish ships capable of this task. All suitable Welsh ships had
correspondingly been ordered to Ireland. 12° An extra problem was the danger from
enemy ships. On 19 May he was told to keep those provisions he had been ordered to
purvey in safe custody near the coast: the sea was infested with the king's enemies, and
the provisions should wait until Robert de Leyburn came to convoy them to
Skinburness. 121
 Robert de Leyburn, who was appointed on 19 May admiral of the fleet
in the western sea, 122 was eventually ordered, on 19 June, to go to Ireland with all the
ships that were now ready and that he could obtain quickly, to convey troops from
Ireland. 123
 This series of augmented arrangements may appear unsatisfactory, but it
does at least suggest that a count was being kept of what shipping was becoming
available, and being matched to needs.
Although it appears that the orders to the justiciar of Ireland were not in
principle affected by the decisions at the York parliament at the beginning of May,
116 CPR 1321-1324, p. 102.
117 CCR 1318-1323, p. 534.
118 Ibid., p. 531.
119 ParL Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 567-8.
120 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 570.
121 CPR 1321-1324, p. 126. The shipping of victuals and men from Ireland is
seen in E101/15/36 - provisions, wine and other victuals sent to Skinburness from
Waterford and Dublin in ships from Teignmouth and Ilfracombe, and E101/16/6 -
account of John Cassel and Jordan Bretnagh of victuals provided at Drogheda and taken
to Skinburness for the Scots war between 14 May and 18 August. In E101/16/16 there
is a list of eight ships at Drogheda, and another twenty-one at Dublin paid for the
freighting of a force of 73 men-at-arms, 304 hobelars and 93 foot.
122 CPR 1321-1324, p. 113.
123 CCR 1318-1323, p. 461.
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those for the raising of forces in England were drastically changed. The earlier writs of
25 March calling for very large numbers of foot - 38,900 in all - to come to Newcastle
and Carlisle at the expense of the counties were cancelled. They would have borne very
heavily on the counties, and as noted above, 124 Powicke suggests they may have been
intended only as a bargaining counter. Probably it was in return for cancelling them
that the government was able to obtain from parliament the grant of one armed and
armoured foot-soldier from each viii that answered before the justices in eyre.
The time between the new date, 24 July, for the muster (the original one having
been postponed 'at the request of the magnates in Parliament') and its general
promulgations on 11 and 15 May 125 allowed the same time as from 25 March to 13
June, almost ten weeks. To select the new force granted by parliament, commissioners
were appointed in all the counties. As has been seen in the account of the variations in
the requirements from Cornwall, they were to make the selection with the advice of the
bailiffs of the lords of the vills or of the liberties. The bailiffs could be present if they
so chose. Sheriffs were enjoined to assist the commissioners, one of whom was
nominated to lead those selected to the muster. The commissioners were explicitly not
to be paid their expenses by the vills or the counties, but were to receive them from the
king. Since they were also to make a return under their seals of how many vills there
were in their areas, that might have been in part at least to diminish the likelihood of
local extortion or comiption. 126 (The requirement to make the returns might also be
seen as obtaining more potentially useful information at the centre.) The expense of
providing the man would be substantial. He was not only to be properly equipped with
both arms and modest defensive armour, but also, in an innovation, to serve for forty
days after the muster at the charge of the vill.127
Some of the commissioners appointed, but by no means all, were the same as for
the 25 March levies. For Devonshire, Bedfordshire and Staffordshire both
commissioners were the same as before, but these are exceptions. In thirteen cases one
name recurs from earlier, but in the remaining eighteen the names are new. There were
half-a-dozen sheriffs, of whom four were involved in March. In eight instances
counties that were paired in March were allocated separate sets of commissioners in
May. These administrative inconsistencies within a few weeks could well indicate that
124 Above, p. 70, n. 105.
125 pall. Writs, Vol. 11, div. ii, pp. 568-70, 571-2.
126 ibid., Vol.II, div. ii, pp. 573-5.
127 The commissioners for Northamptonshire reported that one town was SO
impoverished that it could not provide anyone. Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 577.
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the collection of the men granted by the York parliament was recognised as requiring
special arrangements. The subdivisions of the pairs of counties tends to support that
view.
Returns of the number of vills did not take long: Buckinghamshire's was dated 2
June. 128 A number of writs read as if more than one man was required from many vills,
though extra pressure had often to be applied to obtain them. Truro was told quite
explicitly to send an extra two: 129 a list of seventy-one vills was asked for another 273
men. 130
This may not necessarily be the correct interpretation. The order addressed to
Henry de Chambernon and Reginald de Botereaux, and referring to the parliamentary
grant, said that 'cities and boroughs' were excluded. 131
 A writ of 8 June said the king
expected greater aid from certain places, in the words de quibus quidem civitatibus et
burgis maius auxilium huius hominum armatorm habere intendimus ut est iustum,132
and so told the Cornwall commissioners to induce, and if necessary compel, various
boroughs to supply the one, two or three men assessed on them. 133
 Major towns had
been excluded from the 25 March levies, and forty-one had been separately asked for
help later, on 5 April. In May several of them, and Newcastle, were thanked for
providing not inconsiderable numbers of armed men at their own expense. Spalding
provided twenty. 134 Exeter, Northampton, Cirencester, Oxford, Derby, Winchester,
Leicester, Bedford, Cambridge and Newcastle provided numbers ranging from four to
fifty. 135
 These towns were presumably responding to requests for support separate from
the parliamentary grant.136
Nevertheless, in the list of the payments to the 6,793 peditibus armatis 'from the
cities and vills of England serving at the cost of the towns and vills for forty days', men
from some of these cities are added in with those from the whole county: Oxfordshire
128 Ibid., Vol. IL div. ii, p. 576.
129 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 579.
130 Ibid., Vol. LE, div. ii, pp. 580-1.
131 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 573.
132 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 581.
133 CPR 1321-1324, p. 130.
134 pail. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 568.
135 CCR 1318-1323, p. 553.
136 From Norwich the king preferred to have £200, rather than 60 foot. Ibid., p.
554.
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and Oxford are shown as one figure of 180, Devon and Exeter as 222, though
Canterbury's twenty are counted separately from Kent's 240.137
Superficially at least this new procedure produced a worthwhile force: it
numbered almost 7,000 properly equipped foot-men, obtained at little cost to the
crown. 138 On its own, however, it would not have been adequate for a major offensive,
and the established procedure of levies on the counties was resumed in writs of 8 June.
Arrayers, including some reappointments, were named for seventeen counties, or pairs
of counties, from Yorkshire southwards through the east and centre of England to
Sussex. As usual sheriffs were ordered to help in the process of selection by assembling
men from whom the levy would be chosen. The commissioners were given power to
punish recalcitrants. Quotas per county were mostly less than on 25 March: Yorkshire
was asked for 2,000 rather than 7,000, Lincolnshire for 1,000 not 4,000, Warwick and
Leicester for 600 not 800. The total came to 10,000, 139
 who were to be ready to go
from Newcastle at the king's wages. 14° Even so, the total of foot paid from, in most
cases, 30 July was not quite 4,000, reducing during August by about 600. It included
186 foot-archers from Sussex, and 54 from the Forest of Dean; the 436 from Norfolk
were better equipped, being noted as cum aketone. Otherwise the rest, the vast
majority, were described as pedites nudi. 141
 To the contribution from these
commissions of early June should be added 300 foot archers, selected from Kent and
Sussex by Richard de Echingham from arrays arranged by the sheriff. Echingham was
given authority also to supervise the selecting by the commissioners for those two
counties of the pedites armati from the parliamentary grant, 142 in what appears (from
the absence of mention of anything similar) to be a unique arrangement at this time.
If the gap between the 10,000 summoned and the 4,000 recorded as in pay
properly represents failure of the arrays, that failure may have been partly the
consequence of roughly coincidental but conflicting orders. There were a large number
137 BL Stowe Ms 553, f. 82v.
138 Of course it too suffered from the unreliability of such conscripts; the sheriff
of York was told to find and imprison some who had received their pay and then
deserted, and to send their names to the king. Pan. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 602.
139 10,000 is the same round number as in the demands on the Welsh; the
planning procedure must have begun, as one would expect, with the total wanted, which
was then subdivided.
140 Pan. Writs, Vol. IL div. ii, pp. 578-9.
141 BL Stowe Ms. 553, if. 81r,81v.
142 parl. Writs, Vol. LE div. ii, p. 567.
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of discrete instructions for arraying the whole forces of various areas to defend against
forecast or actual Scottish raids into England. These instructions went variously and at
various times to local lords or knights, like for example Henry de Percy on 1 May,143
John Bustard and Thomas Fairfax in the Wapentake of Ainsty on 15 May' 44
 and again
on 15 June 145
 and 6 July, 146 John de Wisham and John de Ryther in the West Riding on
3 June, 147
 or to the sheriff of Nottinghamshire, the bishop of Durham, the earl of
Richmond, and John de Penrith keeper of Northumberland, on 15 June. 148
 Such
measures did cut across the muster programme. Following Bruce's incursion in the
north-west late in June, on 2 July Andrew Harclay was ordered not to bring the levies of
Cumberland, Westmoreland and Lancashire to Newcastle, but to stay behind to defend
the march.' that case, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that those troops were
being raised originally for the muster at Newcastle. 15° In the cases of the many other
orders to assemble all the local force, including all men from 16 to 60 years old, and
143 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 567.
144 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 571.
145 ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 583.
146 Ibid., Vol. IL div. ii, p. 600.
147 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 576.
148 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 585-6.
149 Ibid., Vol. If, div. ii, p. 598. His contingent that eventually joined the main
army late in August consisted of 2,069 foot, 1,435 hobelars, of whom about one quarter
of the hobelars were paid 2d per day more than the rest - Fryde (Tyranny and Fall, p.
128, n. 46) suggests only they were mounted - and 58 men-at-arms. (BL Stowe Ms 553,
f. 82v.) It is not clear how this force may have related to any numbers resulting from
the call of 15 June to him as keeper of Cumberland and Westmorland to raise men of 16
to 60 years for defence. (Pan. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 586.) However, it seems fairly
certain that Harclay had with him men resulting from the parliament's grant of one per
vill, which was specifically for the Newcastle muster: Robert de Brampton and Richard
de Denton who had charge of that levy in Cumberland had been ordered on 2 July not to
send it to Newcastle, but to follow Harclay's orders, and the same order went to
Westmoreland and Lancashire. Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 599.
15° Another possible instance is the instruction on 15 July to the men seeing to
the collection of the one man per viii in the wapentakes of Yorkshire, to obey the orders
of John de Wisham and John de Ryther. (Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 601.) The latter had
been put in charge of the forces raised from general defensive levies in the wapentakes.
Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 584-5, 600.
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have them ready to resist Scottish invasions, there is no mention of Newcastle or the
muster on 24 July; they are thus probably not to be seen as part of the planned process
of recruiting and assembling the army. /51
 It might not be unfair to see all this as
military panic producing managerial confusion.
Central government administrative machinery was not responsible for
organising detailed response to the summons to the muster of servicium debitum, or to
the associated requests for as much extra force as possible, which had been
promulgated either direct to important individuals or via sheriffs. However, on 20 June
sheriffs were ordered to proclaim, and communicate to individuals as far as possible,
that all bannerets, knights, esquires and mounted men-at-arms who were not already in
the retinues of others, should come to the king. Threats of displeasure in the event of
failure to respond to the proclamation were accompanied and underlined by the
instruction that the sheriffs should report to the king the names of those to whom they
had communicated the order. 152 This is another instance of collection of information at
the centre for possible future action.
A final group of orders to raise foot for the muster from the Welsh march,
though requiring their presence by 1 August, not 24 July, was issued on 15 and 16 July.
Philip de Middleton, keeper of Montgomery, saw to three contingents of 100 and John
Wrothe, keeper of Ewyas Lacy, to another 100. These were included in the count of
c.7,000 Welsh foot. 153
The total force assembled at Newcastle in August from all these arrays came to
some 20,000, if the 2,069 foot whom Harclay had with him are included. To them must
be added the cavalry force from the summons of the magnates and others, with their
own retinues, counted by N. Fryde as totalling 'just under 300 knights, including earls,
barons and other bannerets, and about 950 other fully armoured and equipped men-at-
anns'. 154 Some 2,000 hobelars are also recorded, Harclay's 1,435 and some 600, in
151 There is a possibility that the Yorkshire defence forces were added to the
main army later. On 20 July the supervisors of the arrays in the three ridings were
ordered to march their men to the king. (Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 602). The list of foot
paid from 30 July and 1 August does include respectively 140 from the East and 170
from the West Riding. (BL Stowe Ms. 553, f. 81v). Confusingly, there is also a writ to
John de Sutton and five others to choose 2,000 men from the East Riding, to be at the
king's wages. Par!. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 601.
152 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 586.
153 BL Stowe Ms. 553, if. 80r, 80v.
154 Fryde, Tyranny and Fall, p. 128.
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small units. /55
 Additionally there were the 200 Gascon crossbowmen and lance-
throwers, with the king from 27 July, 156 and the 300 archers from Kent and Sussex
chosen by Robert de Echingham. I57 Other small units appear in the pay records: 29
crossbowmen from the queen's household, 158 two soldarii ad arma with their five socii
and twenty hobelars, 159
 and two other such small groups, 16° who sound like mercenary
troops. One record of the account of 'wages and expenses of Irish soldiers in the Scotch
war' under John de Birmingham the justiciar, lists 73 men-at-arms, including four
bannerets and six knights, 189 hobelars, 93 foot, and 115 others. 161 The account says
the wages are for the seventy-six days from 18 August, when they left Ireland; is it
possible that this refers only to those who remained with Edward when he recrossed
from Scotland to England in September? Did the large force of 6,000 foot, 1,000
hobelars and 300 men-at-arms Birmingham was told on 3 April to bring to Carlisle
never materialise? Alternatively, as the writ ordering the justiciar to raise them said
they were to be paid by the Irish treasury from leaving Ireland, they would not have
appeared in the English accounts of Waltham. The group that does might be John de
Birmingham's own retinue, paid separately by the crown. Even without an Irish
contingent of some 6,000 this was a large army.
It achieved nothing except losses, and these due not to military action but to
failure of supplies, as John de Trokelowe bemoaned, 162
 and the authors of
iCa 163 and the Lanercost Chronicle 164 agreed. A variety of arrangements hadScalacron
155 BL Stowe Ms. 553, if. 82v, 82r.
156 Ibid., f. 83r.
157 Ibid.
15S Ibid., f. 82r.
159 ibid., f. 83r.
160 Ibid., f 82v.
161 E101/16/16.
162 Above, p. 61 n. 57.
163 Scalacronica, a Chronicle of England and Scotland by Sir Thomas Gray of
Heton, ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh, 1836), p. 149: Le dit roi fe trey devers Edynburgh,
ou a Lethe y avoit taunt de malady et de famyne entre lez communes en cel grant host
qe de force lour couenoit retourner pur mefchief de vita/i.
164 Chronicon de Lanercost, ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh, 1839), p. 247: Ante
nativitatem autem Virginis gloriae compulsi sunt Anglici exire terram Scotiae, turn pro
defectu victualium, turn pro peste exercitus. Fame enim sicut dysenteria multos de
exercitu interfecit.
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been used to obtain provisions. Orders to sheriffs for purveyance and delivery to
Newcastle by 13 June had been issued in March. 165
 In May they were told that that they
should adhere to that timetable, although the later muster date had been set. 166
 The
same instruction went to John de Birmingham in respect of his purveyances for Carlisle.
As has been seen, protections to many independent merchants to ship supplies to the
north, without specific delivery dates, were being issued continuously. A protection
was issued on 22 July for Henry le Kyngesfissher and John de Mounely, buyers in gross
of victuals for the king and the army chosen by the commonalty of Lincoln, and another
to Thomas de Secheforde and Geoffrey de Kelleston, similarly chosen by the town of
King's Lynn on 10 August. 167 On 16 July there was a writ of aid for Henry de Shirokes,
receiver of victuals at Newcastle, appointed to purvey hay, oats and victuals in
anticipation of the king's coming there. 168 On 21 July a general order went to all bailiffs
and officials to provide carriage by land or water, and give safe-conducts for the king's
clerk Gilbert de Wygeton and others making purveyances to be sent to Scotland. 169 On
23 July protection was issued for Robert Roterhyring and Walter de Cakehowe,
purveying corn, fish and other victuals for the king in every market town.17°
In spite of this multiple effort to provision the army, John de Trokelowe
describes it as short of supplies even before it entered the scorched earth of Lothian:
Rex...exercitum magnum... contra Scotos con gregavit. Quibus absque victualibus... in
partibus Borealis ordinatis, et ad Novum Castrum super Tynam congregatis Rex cum
suis regnum Scotiae hostiliter est ingressus. 171 The shortage was then compounded by
the failure of sea-borne deliveries, whether because of storms or possibly bad faith, and
most probably because of interruption by hostile ships, especially the Flemings.172
Edward's naval arrangements in the west have been referred to above. 173 The
east was obviously the more important, and most hazardous, sector, and considerable
165 Above, p. 67 n. 90.
166 CCR 1318-1323, p. 555.
167 CPR 1321-1324, p. 195. Leaving purveyance to men chosen by relatively
responsible local communities could have had the effect of improving cooperation in a
process that was inherently unpopular.
168 Ibid., p. 177.
169 Ibid., p. 192.
170 Ibid., p. 195.
171 Trokelowe, Annales, ed. H. T. Riley, p. 125.
in McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, p. 215.
173 Above, p. 71, n. 114; p. 72, nn. 116, 120, 121.
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effort went into trying to protect it. As early as 1 March ports were told to prepare as
many ships as possible to go to the Humber against the Scots. 174 Once the Newcastle
muster had been set for 13 June, the Cinque Ports were asked on 25 March to provide
their service, with a double complement of men, at Tynemouth by that date. 175 On 1
April the men from the south-east coast ports north of the Thames were ordered to meet
the bishop of Norwich and Walter de Norwico, keeper of the treasury, to agree suitable
help for the war. 176 They responded with offers of ships to come to Tynemouth for 13
June, and serve for two months at their own expense, for which the king thanked
them. 177 On 20 April the Cinque Ports, Great Yarmouth and the ports of Norfolk and
Suffolk were told to prepare ships and be ready for the king's summons, to counter the
danger from the Flemings. 178 On 24 April more ships were sought for Tynemouth from
Waynefleet and another seven ports, 179 and Hastings and the south-east ports were told
on 10 May to recall ships at sea and have them ready to be there by 13 June. 18° On 25
June, there being danger from enemy ships - typically of Edward's whole effort in this
war of 1322 the initiative had been lost to the enemy - the east coast ports were told to
recall their ships serving the king, and have them in port armed and ready to set out
again when ordered by John Perbrotm, the admiral. More ships were sought from these
ports, on 25 June the sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk also being told to raise five from
other towns. 181 Generally, however, the provision of ships for his fleet had been sought
directly from the ports' authorities.
It would probably be unfair to attribute the impression of administrative
confusion over the mobilization for Edward II's invasion of Scotland in 1322 - typified
by the account at the beginning of this chapter of the orders for Cornwall - to a failure
of detailed management. The war became a humiliating failure partly because of an
inappropriate strategy. The large numbers of foot recruited were not the most
174 CCR 1318-1323, p. 524.
175 Ibid., p. 533.
176 /bid., p. 536.
177 Ibid., pp. 546-7. Great Yarmouth offered six for forty days at its expense; the
king asked that to be changed to two months and that more should be made ready, to be
at the king's charge, in case they were needed.
178 CPR 1321-1324, p. 102.
179 CCR 1318-323, p. 531.
180 mid., p. 550.
181 Ibid., pp. 462-3.
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appropriate type of force to deal with Bruce, and by their very numbers accentuated the
problem of provisioning the army. Though not as many as asked for in the traditional
commissions actually appeared, possibly because of confusion caused by defensive
arrays, those who did assembled at the muster broadly on time. Responsibility for
seeing to this was clearly put upon local knights and, in by no means all cases, the
sheriff, whereas royal clerks were much involved in the purveying of provisions, and
particularly in the movement of purveyed supplies to the north and the army. Local
knights and some sheriffs also saw to the carrying out of the grant of one man per viii,
which seems to have been quite successful, though such a judgement is hazardous in the
absence of knowledge of the potential number of eligible places. In terms of
administrative planning and performance it does appear that, in the absence of
command of the sea, too much reliance was put on sea transport. Trokelowe described
the consequence as victualibus...per mare ubique deficientibus, with the result that his
quotation from Vegetius foretold: Saepius enim penuria quam pugna consumit
exercitum & ferro savior fames est. 182 The mobilization of naval support does not
appear to have been well planned, giving the appearance of a series of hurried
improvisations rather than of a considered strategy. The same uncertainty of strategic
policy over the whole campaign could not have been compensated for by even
superlatively efficient management.
182 Trokelowe, Annales, ed. H. T. Riley, p. 125.
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CHAPTER 5
THE WAR OF SAINT-SARDOS, 1324-1325
The general historical interest of the War of Saint-Sardos lies primarily in the way its
origins illustrate the ambiguities surrounding ducal rights and territory, and the inherent
juridical weakness of the king of England in his feudal relationship, as duke of
Aquitaine, with the French monarchy. As a military episode the war involved little
more than a few skirmishes, several surrenders of towns, an uneventful siege ended by a
truce, no major English campaign, and no set-piece battle. In spite of Edward II's
bluster about his intentions to come personally to the aid of his duchy with a great force
of men and supplies, no effective military action was taken. However, the flurry of
changing plans gives some picture of the methods and resources used by the crown for
the raising and movement of troops, and of how well or badly they worked. The
records of purveyance of supplies demonstrate the attention to detail that was necessary.
Throughout, the initiative - legal, political, and military - was held by the French.
Consequently the English administration was faced several times with the need to
amend its plans for the recruitment, timing of muster and destination of its forces,
adding to the inherent difficulties of implementing them.
It is perhaps helpful first to summarise the sequence of events to which it had to
respond, before analysing the responses in detail. The immediate l origin of the conflict
came in November 1323 at Saint Sardos with the affront to the French king's authority
by Raymond de Montpezat. The failure of English Gascon officials to respond to the
consequent French summons early in 1324 was aggravated by the efforts in April of the
English embassy of the earl of Kent and the archbishop of Dublin to secure
The longer term origins - the difficult feudal relationship of the kings of
England, as dukes of Guyenne/Aquitaine, to the king of France, apparently settled in
1259, the willingness of French officials and the Parlement in Paris to hear appeals by
Gascons from ducal judgements, the uncertainties about the transfer of territory under
the treaty of 1259, and the reserved rights of the privilegiati not to be transferred against
their will - are set out in, among others, War of Saint-Sardos, ed. P. Chaplais, M. G. A.
Vale, The Angevin Legacy and the Hundred Years War (Oxford, 1990) and Sumption,
Hundred Years War.
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postponement of Edward's homage. By May 1324 the need to be able to defend
Edward's French lands was becoming recognisable, and preparations to do so had
begun. In June Charles IV formally declared Gascony and Ponthieu forfeit. In July
appointments were made to the command of a small English force to go to France, and
the earl of Kent was appointed Edward's lieutenant in Gascony. 2
 When Charles de
Valois' invasion began in August Kent was unable to offer any material resistance.
Besieged in La Reole from 25 August, in September 1324 he had to surrender the
town. 3
 Because the French had problems with Flanders, he was, however, able to secure
a truce that would last six months, until March 1325. Consequently the larger scale
preparations for an English expedition, which were being made in August, were
abandoned. 4
 New plans for assembling and embarking a substantial force to recover the
duchy had therefore to be made, at first to sail in March 1325. In February, at the
request of the English magnates, who said that the planned 17 March embarkment date
gave them too little time to prepare, Edward postponed the general embarkation to 17
May 1325. 5
 Advance detachments under the earl of Surrey departed earlier, reaching
Bordeaux on 10 and 11 May. By May 1325 negotiations through Queen Isabella were
leading towards agreement, so that on 1 May 1325 the general passage was postponed
again, to 2 August, and in July the muster was effectively cancelled.6
There were thus several virtually distinct plans for the raising of an armed force
during the period from May 1324 to July 1325, the administrative arrangements for
which will be examined in this chapter. It appears that at first Portsmouth and
Plymouth were intended as the ports for embarkation of an expedition, to sail in June
1324. Almost immediately Plymouth was preferred, and a later date had to be chosen.
In the event, a small fleet sailed from Plymouth in September. In August orders
envisaged assembly of a new larger army to sail from Portsmouth, at dates successively
postponed and then ultimately, on 17 September 1324, abandoned. Finally, at the end
of the year writs were issued for the large army that would be necessary if Aquitaine
were to be recovered by force. Though a small contingent did reach Bordeaux in May
1325, successive prorogations of the muster date, and its ultimate cancellation, meant
that this force never assembled.
2 Foedera, Vol. II, div. i, p. 560.
3 War of Saint-Sardos, ed. P. Chaplais, p. 88.
4 ParL Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 675.
5 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 696.
6 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 723.
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The first plan envisaged fleets at both Portsmouth and Plymouth: the logistics of
preparing to support the duchy naturally depended upon organisation of shipping to
carry men, horses, arms, supplies of all sorts and money to Gascony. As the impending
threat became obvious, on 10 May 1324 two sets of instructions went out to assemble
transport. Mayors, bailiffs and the whole communities of one list of thirteen ports were
told to prepare and crew 41 of 'the greatest ships of the town', specific numbers being
allocated to each port. These ships were to be at Portsmouth by 10 June. The other list,
also of thirteen ports, was to provide 23 ships, to be at Plymouth by the same date.7
These orders of 10 May went direct to the town officials, who were told to report to the
king the names of the ships and their masters.
The ships were to act as transports for men-at-arms and their mounts, and other
men; some therefore had to be specially equipped to carry the horses. The orders stated
that the sheriff of Hampshire had been ordered to provide the necessary gangways and
hurdles, both for the ships destined for Portsmouth and for those for Plymouth. He was
to be responsible for the carriage of that equipment to those two assembly ports.8
Additional writs make it clear that the arrangements for equipping the ships involved
other officials as well. A writ of aid, also of 10 May 1324, for two king's clerks, John
Devery and Nicholas Acton, described them as appointed to purvey with the king's
money gangways and hurdles for the ships recently ordered to Portsmouth. Further,
under the same date, the sheriffs of Hampshire, Surrey, Sussex and Wiltshire, and the
keeper of the bishopric of Winchester, were ordered to let the two clerks have timber,
poles and other things for that purpose. 9 The important coordinating role of the clerks
can be seen in the instructions to Devery, assumed to have a May date. 1° He was to go
to the ports from Southampton westwards (which suggests that Nicholas Acton would
have had similar instructions for the easterly ports), to see that all the ships were
readied and manned. The scale of manning was precisely defined. A ship of 240 tons
7 CCR 1323-1327, pp. 182-3; pp. 186-7. Both explain that action is necessary 'as
the king understands that certain men are endeavouring to usurp his rights in the duchy
of Aquitaine and to attack the duchy with armed force.'
8 Ibid.
9 CPR 1321-1324, p. 413.
10 Ibid., p. 417. Devery, who was being sent to prepare and hasten the ships, was
ordered on 27 May to be paid 100 shillings towards his expenses. (CCR 1323-1327, p.
110.) Nicholas Hugate's accounts, (BL Add. Ms.7967, f. 2r), show a payment, via John
Devery, assigned to certain ships of Hampshire, Somerset, Devon and Cornwall, of 66s
8d.
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was to have a master and a crew of 60 mariners, of whom two were to be constables,
and a ship of 60 tons (the smallest) a master and a crew of 21 including one constable."
Devery was to check with the men of the ports what the ships' carrying capacities were
for men and horses, and advise the sheriffs responsible for the purveying of the special
equipment as to what was needed. He was to report to the chancellor or treasurer as he
proceeded the names of the ships, their ports, their masters, and the crew numbers, 'for
the more precise payment thereof ..' (i.e. their wages in advance for twenty days' sailing)
'and better purveyance of their victuals in time.' He was also to report to them any
official who defaulted, so that they could take appropriate action. Taken together these
arrangements seem, not surprisingly, a very practical procedure, assuming of course
reasonable degrees of cooperation and communication between port officials, the two
clerks and the sheriffs. In particular the clerks' instructions to report the crew numbers
so that appropriate amounts of provisions could be obtained shows that such
calculations were being made. One aspect that looks a little odd is in the allocation of
ships to the two assembly ports: seven eastern places - Hastings, Romney, Harwich,
Ipswich, Dunwich, and even Great Yarmouth and Little Yarmouth - were to send their
ships to the more westerly rendezvous, Plymouth.12
Before the end of May variations in these plans were being made, Plymouth
becoming the only assembly port. The local officials - mayors and bailiffs - and the
communities of the ports originally told to send their ships to Portsmouth were told on
20 May to send them to Plymouth, certifying 'without delay' the names of the ships and
their masters. 13 Weymouth, one of these ports, was ordered, also on 20 May, to send six
ships there, instead of as previously ten to Portsmouth. 14 These orders were reinforced
by instructions to the sheriffs of Hampshire, Sussex and Dorset to go in person to the
ports of the original Portsmouth' list in their counties (Sandwich, Winchelsea,
Faversham and Rye were not to receive a similar visit) to hasten the preparations. The
sheriffs of Dorset, Devon and Cornwall were similarly to go to the western ports of the
Plymouth' list. The king would be now be arranging for the gangways and hurdles to be
brought from Southampton to Plymouth. 15
Less than a week later, on 26 May 1324, still more changes were put in hand.
The local officials and communities of Lyme, Plymouth, Teignmouth and Exmouth had
11 CPR 1321-1324, pp. 417-8.
12 CCR 1323-1327, pp. 186-7.
13 Ibid., p. 186.
14 Ibid., p. 187.
15 Ibid., p. 187, dated 20 May.
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to provide two ships each instead of just one. The buying and delivery to Plymouth of
the gangways became the responsibility of the sheriffs of Dorset and Devon, in whose
counties these ports were. 16 Boldre, Lymington and Keyhaven (the two latter towns had
not been in either of the 10 May lists) were required to supply two ships 'instead of one',
and Southampton two, not six. Gangways would be supplied by the sheriff of
Hampshire, who was to make similar provision for equipping the ships from Yarmouth
in the Isle of Wight, and Hamble and Hamelok. The sheriff of Cornwall was to provide
equipment for the ship from Fowey, the sheriff of Devon for those from Dartmouth, and
the sheriff of Dorset for those from Weymouth, Poole and Wareham. The sheriffs were
to purvey the equipment 'by the view and testimony of John Devery, or of a person to be
deputed by John.' 17 Thus there is the same basic procedure: direct orders to local
officials in the ports, supplementary action by the various sheriffs in whose shires the
ports were, and a coordinating and overseeing role given to the king's clerk.
The net effect of these changes of 20 May and 26 May was to make Plymouth
the assembly point for 34 ships from ports west of Portsmouth; the local officials of
Portsmouth and ports to the east were told, on 26 May, not to send their allocated
numbers of ships to the king's service, but 'the said ships and other ships of that town to
be at the king's service when summoned.' 18 The reference to 'other ships of that town'
would seem to refer to a blanket order of 10 May to all ports, including ports in Wales
and Ireland, to have ready to set out in the king's service at three days' notice all ships
capable of carrying 40 tuns or more of wine. As before, these orders were addressed to
the ports' local officials, who were to report their numbers of ships to the king. When
needed these ships would form the fleets of the two admiralties, from the Thames
northwards and from the Thames southwards.
The planned assembly at Plymouth ran into difficulties. Hearing of the intention
to requisition them for royal service, masters of ships from various western towns in
Dorset and Devon took their vessels out of port. On 5 June, expressing intention to
punish the defaulters, orders went now to the sheriffs themselves to make up the
16 Ibid., p. 186.
17 Ibid., pp. 187-8.
18 ibid., p. 188. The supercession of the orders to the eastern ports presumably
explains why the clerk Nicholas Acton ceased to be mentioned - the east, it was
suggested above, would have been his area - while his colleague John Devery continued
to be heavily involved.
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numbers from the other ports of these two counties, to assemble by 24 Jtme. 19 The
sheriff of Somerset and Dorset, Thomas de Marlberge, was explicitly told to obtain
replacement shipping from Melcombe, and Nicholas Hugate's account records that he
did. 2° However, on 13 June, orders went to the sheriffs of all the counties sending ships
to Plymouth to tell their owners and masters that the assembly was prorogued to 8 July.
The sheriffs were ordered to have the gangways and hurdles delivered there before that
date. 21
The entry in Hugate's account gives details that fill out the picture of the sheriffs'
actions. Thomas de Marleberge was acting by authority of an order under the great
seal, and the view and witness of John Devery. Two ships from Poole and three from
Weymouth were equipped at his charge to carry horses; the other from Weymouth, two
from Melcombe and one from Lymm were for men. The sheriff of Cornwall brought
wood from Liskeard via Lostwithiel to equip the Fowey ship for horses. 22 The sheriff of
Devon, acting by order of the treasurer, the bishop of Exeter, and of Richard Damory,
seneschal of the household, provided a long list of material - wood, beams, hurdles,
nails and so on - for '41 ships coming to Plymouth.' 23 The sheriff of Hampshire fitted
out five Southampton ships and one each from Lymington and Hamble, also for
horses. 24 Thus, as these changes from the original orders of 10 May to the two sets of
ports proceeded, the role of the sheriffs became increasingly important.
19 Ibid., p. 194. In this order the previous assembly date for ships from
Weymouth, Poole, Warham and Lyme is referred to as the octaves of Holy Trinity, i.e.
17 June.
20 BL Add. Ms. 7967, f. 8r.
21 CCR 1323-1327, p. 194. Additionally, on 19 June the sheriff of Southampton
was told to find and equip an extra two ships. Ibid., p. 195.
22 BL Add. Ms. 7967, f. 8r.
23 Ibid. On 20 May the 41 ships originally ordered to be at Portsmouth were
redirected to Plymouth. (CCR 1323-1327, p. 186.) (It is possible that, in spite of the
identical number, this is not a reference to them, as also on 20 May Weymouth was told
it could reduce its number from ten to six [CCR 1323-1327, p. 187], which reduced the
total from 41 to 37, and at that time it seems that another 23 ships from other ports were
still expected at Plymouth. However, on balance the simple connection should
probably be accepted.)
24 BL Add. Ms. 7967, f. 8v.
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The earliest measures to recruit and assemble troops expressly to be taken to
Aquitaine were dated 4 June 1324. 25
 These ordered arrival at Plymouth by 8 July,
made no reference to Portsmouth, and were immediately followed on 5 June by orders
for ships to assemble on 24 June; they do not seem, therefore, to be related to those first
orders of 10 May requiring ships to be at both ports by 10 June. Although in theory it is
possible to envisage an intention to have ships waiting for nearly a month to embark the
troops as soon as they came to Plymouth, it seems more likely that a two week gap -
like that now planned, from 24 June to 8 July - would have been considered adequate.
Not until 8 August was there an order for any troops to report to Portsmouth, and this
required their arrival there by 27 August in a new and different operation.26
It may be that the 10 May instruction to assemble 41 transport ships at
Portsmouth by 10 June is evidence of a rapidly abandoned scheme. Together with the
question of what was the purpose of simultaneously allocating another smaller fleet to
Plymouth, from some ports as far away as Great Yarmouth, this may be early evidence
of the vacillating planning that bedevilled the conduct of the war of Saint Sardos. The
changes, described above, in numbers of ships required from individual ports, and in
responsibility for equipping them, suggest consequent management uncertainty.
The recruiting order of 4 June appointed commissioners in thirteen counties27
for the selection of 2,070 foot archers, to be marched to Plymouth by 8 July to go to
Aquitaine. Three commissioners were appointed to select 500 from Kent, Surrey and
Sussex combined. Elsewhere two were appointed per county. In Somerset and Dorset
one of the selectors was, unusually, the sheriff. The selections were to be made from
assemblies of potential recruits, organised by sheriffs of the counties at times and places
determined by the commissioners. One of each set of commissioners was named to
lead those selected to Plymouth. 28
 A week later, on 11 June, revised orders were issued
to the commissioners. Their contingents were to be marched first to various staging
points - Wells, Westminster, Winchester, Exeter and Dunstable - by 1 July (or in some
cases a day or so later). There they would be arrayed - inspected for both numbers and
equipment - and paid. They would then be marched on to Plymouth, in several
25 CPR 1321-1324, p. 424; Par!. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 658.
26 Parl. Writs Vol. LE, div. ii, pp. 670-1.
27 Essex, Kent, Surrey, Sussex, Somersetshire, Dorsetshire, Gloucestershire,
Hampshire, Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Berkshire and Wiltshire.
CPR 1321-1324, p. 424.
28 Par!. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 658.
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instances under a different leader. 29
 On 14 June still further changes were ordered. At
the staging points selections were to be made from each contingent, to a new reduced
total of 1,060 men. Those making the selection were to act by the advice of the sheriff,
except in the case of Gloucester, where the adviser was Robert de Sapy, keeper of the
castle of St. Briavel and of the Forest of Dean. Each selected contingent was then to go
to Plymouth under one of the selectors, nominated as the leader for the jouniey.30
These three sets of orders were issued within two weeks, on 4, 11 and 14 June.
They not only successively varied the instructions of their predecessor, they also, even
within this short space of time, often gave new responsibility to new men. For example,
on 4 June in Somerset and Dorset the sheriff and William de Fauconberge were told to
choose 330 foot archers, and de Fauconberge was to lead them to Plymouth. 31 On 14
June, de Fauconberge was told to take them to Exeter, but from there 100 Somerset men
chosen by John de Clyvedon and John de Lortye were to go to Plymouth under de
Lortye, and 70 chosen from the Dorset men by John Latymer and John Peverel were to
go under the latter.32
Seventeen individual commissioners were named in the 4 June orders, nineteen
in those of 14 June. Eleven of these were not in the 4 June list, while twelve of that list
have disappeared from the 14 June names. The decision of 11 June to insert staging
points into the march to Plymouth, to be reached a week before the final muster date,
would have had the practical benefits of facilitating payment of wages, 33
 and more
importantly gave an opportunity to correct any inadequacy of numbers or equipment.
On the other hand, the need also to make such wholesale changes in the allocation of
responsibilities does suggest, yet again, rushed planning and inadequate forethought.
Worse, the 11 June orders to go via the staging points still spoke of the original total of
2,070 men to be marched to Plymouth, only for the figure to be halved three days later.
29 CCR 1323-1327, pp. 199-200.
30 CPR 1321-1324, p. 430.
31 Ibid., p. 424.
32 Ibid., p. 430.
33 On 15 June Nicholas de Hugate 'receiver of the money to be paid for the
matters touching the duchy of Aquitaine' was ordered to have men at each of the staging
points to pay the usual wages 'to the footmen archers and to their conductors' when they
march to Plymouth.' CCR 1323-1327, pp. 123-4.
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The net result of these elements of this first plan to reinforce the duchy would
have been to have at Plymouth by the second week of July some 1,000 or more 34 foot
archers, and some 34 large ships. 34 ships were capable of transporting far more than
that number of foot, and of course many had been specially equipped to carry men-at-
arms and their horses as well.
On 16 July two appointments were made for this expedition. John de Segrave
the elder and Fulk Fitzvvarin were 'to be captains and leaders of the barons, knights,
men-at-arms, footmen and others for the duchy assembling at Plymouth'. 35
 This
demonstrates that a respectable body of cavalry was expected, though government
records do not show how this was being raised. One or two of the seventy or so
obtaining protections are recognisable as leaders of the foot archers. 36
 One possibility
could be that individuals would make contracts with the king, as John de Warenne, earl
of Surrey, did in March 1325. No general appeal or order to magnates and others owing
service had been made, there being as yet no 'war', since Charles de Valois did not
invade the duchy until early August. Hugate's account records payment of wages to
Segave, Fulk and many others from dates around the beginning of August; the
commencing date is described as when their horses were valued at Plympton in the
presence of Richard Damory, steward of the household, John de Felton, marshal of the
army and Nicholas Hugate, clerk.37
Also on 16 July John de Crombwell was appointed admiral of the fleet and
captain of the sailors going on the king's service to the duchy. 38
 This was an
appointment separate from the later major appointments, about August,39 of Robert
Bendyn as admiral of the fleet of the Cinque Ports and other ports to the west, and John
34 The earl of Arundel, justiciar of Wales, also was told to recruit and arm 100 or
200 footmen from South and West Wales to be taken to Plymouth by 8 July to go to
Aquitaine. (CCR 1323-1327, p. 113.) On the other hand, not all the archers finally
chosen to go to Plymouth actually came there. The sheriff of Gloucester was told on 3
August to arrest and imprison men from the Forest of Dean and Berkelehirnes who had
returned without licence. CCR 1323-1327, p. 205.
35 CPR 1324-1327, p. 5.
36 There are some 70 protections for named individuals explicitly described as
going to Aquitaine (or 'Gascony' or 'the duchy'), with dates from 10 June to 18 July.
CPR 1321-1324, p. 428 etc.; CPR 1324-1327, p. 3 etc..
37 BL Add. Ms. 7967, if. 30r et sqq..
38 Foedera, Vol. II, div. i, p. 562.
39 CPR 1324-1327, p. 11.
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de Sturmy as admiral for the fleet from the Thames northwards. It therefore indicates
that the forces assembling at this time, from mid-July 1324, at Plymouth were not
intended as the major expedition.
It is not easy to construct a description of confident, coordinated planning from
the orders issued in May and June. Those of 10 May for assembly of two small fleets
and for having ready the rest of the 40-ton ships were not accompanied by orders to levy
foot soldiers. The rapid abandonment of the collection of a fleet at Portsmouth and the
changes in orders to individual ports give an impression of ill-considered arrangements.
The postponements of assembly at Plymouth, on 5 June to 24 June, and then on 13 June
to 8 July, may have been partly determined by the failure of some ships to obey
instructions. 40
 However, the date for assembly of foot archers, 8 July, was set on 4
June, the day before the first postponing order for the small fleet, which suggests that
perhaps there was an intention to coordinate the two. If departure in early July was the
aim, it was badly missed. Hugate's accounts show not only that the cavalry was not
assembling at Plympton until the beginning of August, but also that Devery was paid
from 28 May until 8 August for his coordinating commission. 41
 Another entry refers to
the royal clerks William de Wetwang, Robert de Driffield and William de Hugate.
They had been assigned to Plymouth to see to the unloading of ships from Southampton
bringing victuals, and to the issuing of them to men-at-arms and foot, by order of the
lords of the treasury and the seneschal of the household, and were occupied in this as
late as August and September. 42
 This expedition from Plymouth eventually began to
board ship on 15 September 1324.43
 It carried John de Segrave and Fulk Fitzwarin,
commanders of the force assembling at Plymouth, and Nicholas Kiriel who was
designated on 14 June leader of the Kentish contingent to Plymouth. 44 Its preparation
took a lot longer than apparently originally intended.
In August larger-scale preparations for combatting the French threat were put in
hand, the seriousness of that threat now being obvious. Thus on 1 August the preamble
to the commissions of array issued for all counties 'pursuant to the late proclamation
40 Above, p. 86 n.18.
41 BL Add. Ms. 7967, f. 8v.
42 Ibid., f. 7v.
43 Ibid., f. lr.
44 Nicholas Hugate's letter to Hugh le Despenser. (War of Saint Sardos, ed. P.
Chaplais, pp. 59-60.) This gives the date of sailing as 18 September, not 15th as in his
accounts. (BL Add. Ms. 7967, f. lr.) A possible explanation may be that it took three or
four days for all the ships to be filled and then sail.
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and the statute of Winchester.. .in defence of the realm' included the explanation
'especially now that the king of France is gathering a great army against the king and the
duchy of Aquitaine.' 45 These commissions seem to have been primarily a census: they
required a return of the numbers of horse and foot to be armed with steel armour, and of
the residue of all fencible men. They were followed on 6 August by orders, to the same
commissioners, to see to the establishment of a force of a specific number of footmen in
each county, excluding the chief cities. A defined proportion of each force - about one-
fifth - was to have available better armour than specified in the Statute of Winchester.
The extra armour, provided at the expense of the commonalty of the county, was to be
kept by the towns. 46 Two features of the specific numbers are noteworthy. Each is a
multiple of twenty, the basic module of the organisation of foot. 47 More importantly,
the total comes to the round figure of 20,000. Obviously, therefore, the central
authority decided this first, and then allocated it between the counties.48
45 CPR 1324-1327, pp. 8-10.
46	 •Paymg for this equipment gave rise to some complaints. On 25 September the
Norfolk commissioners were told not to try to make the men of Blakeney who had
contributed to the cost of ships for the king's service contribute also to the cost of the
armour. (CCR 1323-1327, p. 225.) A similar order went to Devon on behalf of
Teignmouth. (Ibid., p. 233, dated 30 October.) In fact, on 19 September a general order
went to all the commissioners of 6 August. They were to restore to the towns money
they had levied with which to buy the extra arms themselves. Purveying of these arms
was to cease. In carrying out the array the commissioners were to associate with
themselves two men of each hundred, who were to subdivide the county's quota among
the hundreds. Men were to be chosen in each town, who were to assess the citizens and
buy arms and armour. (CPR 1324-1327, p. 29.) Powicke suggests that the changes of
19 September were not just administrative, but reflected discontent at 'the extension of
the obligation and the fact that it was at the expense of the people.' Military Obligation,
pp. 147-8.
47 As usual, the commissioners were to array the men in twenties and hundreds.
48 What the basis of allocation was is a matter for speculation. It is unlikely, of
course, in orders issued on 6 August, to have been based on returns asked for as recently
as 1 August. Records of previous arrays could perhaps have been used as one factor.
The 160 from Cumberland and 80 from Westmoreland no doubt reflect population size.
As two of the largest allocations were 1,040 each to Kent and Norfolk, it is possible that
another consideration may have been exposure to invasion from France.
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Except for Norfolk, with four commissioners, and Leicestershire and
Northamptonshire with three, two were named for each county. The arrangements did
not parallel shrieval organisation: Somerset and Dorset, like Shropshire and
Staffordshire, Surrey and Sussex, and the other twinned counties, were separated.
Yorkshire was sub-divided into its Ridings, Kent into East and West, and Lincoln into
Lindsey, Kesteven and Holland, each sub-division having two commissioners. Familiar
names reappear, experience like that of Thomas Ughtred of Yorkshire° being of
undoubted benefit in the task of arraying. However, a comparison with those
nominated to raise forces of foot archers a few weeks earlier, in the first half of June,
shows no particular pattern. In Hampshire John de Ticheborne and Edmund de Kendale
functioned on both occasions, as did Nicholas Gentil and John de Ifeld for Sussex.5°
Ralph Sauvage again in Kent, Philip de Aylesbury in Buckinghamshire and Walter
Gracelyn in Wiltshire had different associates in August. Alan de Boxhull, who in June
helped to select the men from Surrey and Sussex and led them to Plymouth, in August
was an arrayer for Dorset. To complete the comparison, three of the sets of recruiters of
4 June, those for Essex, Gloucestershire, and Oxfordshire and Berkshire, supplied no-
one to the arrayers of 1 and 6 August. Thus it is difficult to see any substantial
consistency or continuity in these arraying arrangements by counties, just as there is
very little in the personnel in the 4 and 14 June appointments. Although it is a general
observation that the crown was accustomed to use men of local standing for a variety of
purposes, this small degree of continuity seems likely to have been unnecessarily
inefficient.51
° in 1322 constable of Pickering castle, raising men in Yorkshire in March, in
June surveyor of the array in the East Riding, in July leading the East Riding levies
against the invading Scots, again an arrayer for Yorkshire in April 1323. CPR 1321-
1324, pp. 135, 97, 131, 192, 274.
50 In the 4 June orders they were associated with Roger de Bavent, and the three
of them recruited from Surrey and Kent as well.
51 It is not easy to see why there should have been such an ad hoc air about the
promulgated appointments, involving so many changes from those recently made.
Subsequently to the promulgation replacements were ordered where the original
nominee was unable to serve for such reasons as illness, old age or other duties (cf. the
changes to commissioners of array of 4 October [Pail. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 679] ),
but this does not adequately explain why new names appeared in the first place.
Avoiding over-loading particular individuals who might raise objections could possibly
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The intention of these orders of 6 August was to make the realm ready for
defence, not to assemble an army to go to Aquitaine. In preparation for that, writs of
military summons had gone out on 4 August to Thomas earl of Norfolk, marshal of
England, and other magnates, including eight earls. These asked the recipients to
prepare both horse and foot quanto potentius poteritis to be ready to set out with the
king for the defence of his kingdom, noting that the king of France had assembled a
large army to attack the duchy. They were to report what size of force they would
provide. 52
 On 28 July ports were told to send their ships to the king's service to
Portsmouth, for 27 August. 53
 For an army collected from the whole kingdom,
Portsmouth would presumably be a more appropriate mustering location than Plymouth.
Ports from the Thames north formed one fleet under John de Sturmy, and those from
the Thames west the other, under Robert Bendyn, possibly as much to inhibit trouble
between the rival seamen as for strategic purposes. These two 'captains and admirals'
received authority on 6 August to see to the selection of men for the ships, as did Robert
Bataille, a baron of the Cinque Ports, and Stephen de Padeham for the ships of
Winchelsea 'appointed for the king's service', on 8 August.54
The major cities had been excluded from the 6 August orders for the raising of
numbers of foot for defence. However, on 8 August nine of these cities 55 were asked in
fide et dilectione to raise foot themselves, but these men were not for defence: they
were to go to Portsmouth. They were to be there by 27 August, where the fleet would
be ready to sail. 56
 The total was only 800, but as in the case of the counties there was
an allocation of a specific number to each town, ranging from London's 300 to
Rochester's 20. Similarly, as for the counties, all allocations were multiples of twenty.
The raising of these men was to be undertaken not by specially appointed
commissioners, but by the towns' officials themselves, for example the mayor and
sheriffs of London.
be one reason, and explain why 'willing horses' like Thomas Ughtred and Ralph
Sauvage continued to be appointed.
52 Parl. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 663.
53 C61/36, m. 29.
54 CPR 1324-1327, p. 11.
55 London, Canterbury, Rochester, Winchester, Salisbury, Southwark,
Chichester, Oxford and Northampton. Pan. Writs, Vol. IL div. ii, pp. 690-1.
56 Ibid. It is worth noting that the ships and this admittedly small body of troops
were to be at the port at the same time, i.e. the plan was not to have the ships there first.
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Not for the first time, the timetable was very soon changed, 27 August for
reporting to Portsmouth becoming, on 20 August, 10 September. 57 This was followed
on 21 August by writs appointing commissioners to raise extra bodies of foot archers to
be at Portsmouth for the new date. 58
 A total of 900 were to be selected in Kent, Surrey
and Sussex, Hampshire and Gloucester. 59
 Again, the appointments show no particular
pattern. Neither James de Norton nor John de Scures, the sheriff, had been given
responsibility for recruiting in Hampshire in the June or early August arrangements.
Ralph Sauvage and Nicholas Gentil were appointed again for Kent and Surrey and
Sussex respectively, but with new associates.
On the other hand, William Tracy and Robert Seliman had jointly organised the
14 June selection of 200 foot archers in Gloucestershire, and, as then, William Tracy
was now to lead the men selected to Portsmouth. This reappointment could be argued
to show considerable tolerance on the part of the government, or possibly a shortage of
potential commissioners. The June selection of men from Gloucester had been badly
handled. Footmen, having received wages and arms from the towns, had failed to
report to Plymouth, and on 13 July the three responsible for selecting them - Tracy,
Seliman and Robert de Sapy — had been ordered to give 'the sheriff of Gloucester' the
names of the defaulters. 6° The sheriff was ordered to arrest and imprison them, 61 then
on 13 August to release them, provided they found mainpernors that they would now
report to Portsmouth for 27 August,62
 and finally on 18 August, to tell them the new
date, 10 September, to be there, and to rearrest any who refused to find mainpernors.63
As William Tracy had been responsible for leading them to Plymouth, and the sheriffs
authority had had to be brought in to deal with his failure, his appointment to take the
new levy of 300 to Portsmouth is surprising. In fact, on 7 September both William
57 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 671.
58 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 672-3.
59 The total was allocated in specific detail to each of the counties, but unusually
the allocations were all multiples not of twenty but of fifty. The figures were Kent 150,
Surrey and Sussex 250, Hampshire 200, and Gloucester 300.
60 CCR 1323-1327, p. 202.
61	 •
1101C1 p. 205 (3 August). Gloucester levies proved unreliable again in 1325.
The sheriff was told in April to arrest 108 men who had refused to be conscripted (Pail.
Writs, Vol. 11, div. ii, p. 711), and then to deal with 121 who had deserted from
Portsmouth after receiving their wages. Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 713.
62 CCR 1323-1327, p. 211.
63 Ibid., p. 215. But Tracy was the sheriff! PRO Lists and Indexes, Vol. IX, p.49.
95
Tracy and Robert Seliman were replaced, because they 'cannot attend to the business',
by Thomas le Botiller and William Walsh.64
By this time the muster date for the contingents of foot from the counties and
cities had already been postponed again, on 3 September, to 24 September. 65 On 17
September the muster was abandoned, the men being ordered to be kept in readiness to
defend England against possible invasion. 66
 On 21 September the town officials,
mayors, sheriffs, bailiffs and communities of London and forty-eight other places were
ordered to choose (if they had not already done so under previous orders!), and provide
arms for, specified numbers of foot. The arms were to be ready by 11 November, 'the
king desiring to make himself strong by land and sea to resist the king of France.'67
The earl of Kent surrendered La Reole and agreed the six month truce on 22
September 1324. 68 New preparations for a military recovery of the lost lands of the
duchy had therefore now to aim at March 1325.
The first steps sought to have men ready for service by Candlemas, 2 February,
anticipating embarkation on 17 March. The Irish magnates were written to on 30
October 1324, asking them - affectuose requirimus et rogamus - to have as many horse
and arms as seemed proper ready by that 2 February date. 69 On 17 November
commissioners were appointed for all English counties. Their orders were to array
knights, esquires other men-at-arms and all fencible men to be similarly ready. They
were also, with the assistance of the sheriff and the arrayers of foot, to find out what
knights, esquires and men-at-arms there were, and by whom they were retained. In a
revealing addition they were 'to spare no one nor take bribes as others have done.'7°
Though readiness by 2 February 1325 was the stated requirement, it is clear from
commissions of 23 December to many of the same men in certain counties that
embarkation on 17 March was intended: these recite 'their late appointment to array
men-at-arms to be at Portsmouth by mid-Lent Sunday (17 March) for embarkation to
Gas cony.'71
64 CPR 1324-1327, p. 27.
65 Pan. Writs, Vol. II, div ii, p. 673.
66 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 675.
67 CCR 1323-1327, p. 226. The London quota was 300, to be chosen and
provision made for their arms by the view of two citizens of each ward.
68 McKisack, Fourteenth Century, p. 109.
69 ParL Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 680-1.
7° CPR 1324-1327, pp. 53-5.
71 Ibid., pp. 77-8.
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A comparison of the appointments of 6 August with these of 17 November
shows, for the same counties, only nine among the forty-six named on 17 November. A
small random sample of the latter is evidence that they included men of considerable
experience in royal service. Matthew de Bassingbourn had been sheriff of Cambridge
and Huntingdon in 1318-9; William de Bayou and Roger Bavent had been knighted
with Edward in 1306; John Charnells had been overseas for the king in 1313; Thomas
de Pipe was an assessor of the subsidy in Staffordshire in 1322; Ralph Sauvage had
been sheriff of Kent in 1321-2; John Sutton had been a commissioner of array in
Yorkshire in 1314. 72
 It is possible, therefore, that it was recognised that this set of
commissions to deal with knights and esquires required men of greater weight than did
the arraying of foot.
In December orders for the assembly at Portsmouth on 17 March of a quantified
force of men-at-arms, archers, hobelars and foot were issued. On 22 December the
same commissioners of array appointed on 6 August to select 20,000 foot were, for
once in the obviously most efficient arrangement, to choose 5,000 from among them,
excluding Lancashire, Northumberland, Cumberland and Westmoreland. They were to
bring them to Portsmouth, being themselves also suitably armed. 73 Different
commissioners, for Lancashire and ten other counties, were to raise an additional 270
hobelars and 550 archers. 74
 Another 670 hobelars were requisitioned from ten more
counties,75
 via some of the same and some new commissioners. 76
 The 23 December
commissions referred to above went to the commissioners appointed on 17 November
in thirteen counties, now ordering the selection of 1,340 archers. They were also to
choose 135 men-at-arms not retained by, nor owing service to, anyone. Progress was to
be reported by 2 February, which thus seems to be a date on which a general assessment
may have been intended, allowing six weeks to correct any inadequacies. These orders
to thirty-four separate counties made it explicitly clear that the archers and hobelars
were to be recruited in addition to the 5,000 foot. Another set of orders of 23 December
72 Moor, Knights of Edward I, Vol. I, pp. 56, 63, 60, 195; Vol. IV, pp. 74, 217,
316.
73 Par!. Writs, Vol.11, div. ii, pp. 685-6. This time, however, the quotas per
county were not all multiples of twenty: some were for 250, one for 150 and one for 50.
74 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 684 (22 December).
75 including Northumberland, Cumberland and Westmoreland.
76 CPR 1324-1327, pp. 78-9 (23 December).
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to the 17 November commissioners in twenty-one counties was for 350 more men-at-
arms.
77
Altogether, the counties were thus to provide through commissioners 5,000 foot,
1,890 archers, 940 hobelars and 585 men-at-arms. The quotas for the men-at-arms
ranged from 5, for Rutland, to 60 for Yorkshire, suggesting a possibility that they had
been determined in the light of the returns asked for on 17 November.
To add to these numbers, the officials of forty-four towns were asked for a total
of 1,800-1,900 armed foot, 78
 the earl of Arundel, justiciar of Wales, was to provide 200
men-at-arms and 1,000 foot,79
 the bishop of Durham was asked to send as many men-at-
arms, hobelars and archers as possible, 8° and in an earlier request of 23 November the
earl of Chester, Edward the king's son, had been asked for 60 hobelars and 120
archers. 81
 To add to these variously conscripted men, all sheriffs were to issue a
proclamation seeking volunteers at defined rates of pay, 82
 and another offering
liberation from gaol and pardons to criminals who would find sureties that they would
go with the army from Portsmouth. 83
 On 7 January 1325 another proclamation by the
sheriffs summoned all pardoned rebels to fulfil their promise to serve when asked, by
reporting to Portsmouth for 17 March.84
Even without the unquantified numbers of volunteers, pardoned criminals,
pardoned rebels and the bishop of Durham's force, these arrangements were for an army
of over 11,500. Its recruiting was to have used a variety of administrators:
commissioners of array for foot from the counties, different commissioners for men-at-
arms, town officials, and the three 'palatine' powers the bishop of Durham, the earl of
77 Pan. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 688. This includes another 20 from Surrey and
Sussex, counties which were also in the list finding men-at-arms (20) and archers.
78 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 688-9. It is not clear in this how many were to come
from York, Beverly and Hull.
79 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 689.
80 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 690. He too was asked to report by 2 February how
many he would raise, adding to the evidence suggesting that this was a date for an
administrative review.
81 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 683.
82 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 690. Pay ranged from 2s per day for knights to 3d per
day for foot.
83 Ibid., Vol. II, dlv. ii, p. 690. 90 criminals were in the earl of Surrey's force.
E101/17/3.
84 Pan. Writs, Vol.	 p. 692.
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Chester and the justiciar of Wales. The English sheriffs' role was essentially that of
communication and support.
As well as all this, and whatever the Irish magnates would provide, there was, of
course, the service due from the English magnates. This was required in fide et
homagio by writs to Thomas, earl of Norfolk and marshal of England, and the others,
issued on 21 December. In writs of the same date all sheriffs were to proclaim that the
king intended to go to the duchy, and that all who owed service should muster in
person, with all their service, at Portsmouth on 17 March. 85 However, the magnates
persuaded the king that they were not given enough time to prepare properly, and on 17
February proclamations were issued proroguing the general embarkation to 17 May.86
This did not take place, the negotiations for a truce leading to a second prorogation on 1
May, to 2 August,87 and, with the treaty pending, to final cancellation of the muster on
10 July."
Though the large army envisaged by the orders of December 1324 was never
assembled, a few of the units were transported to the duchy, arriving at Bordeaux on 10
and 11 May in two fleets, one sailing from Portsmouth and the other from Harwich.
These units, totalling c.4,000 foot with c.300 men-at-arms, did not involve new
recruiting. The Harwich force was naturally taken from the levies of the eastern
counties, Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, and Hertfordshire, 89 together with 140 of the
Londoners, the other 160 going to Portsmouth. 9° John de Warenne, earl of Surrey, was
appointed captain of the force going from there. 91 He himself had contracted with the
king to go to the duchy with 100 men-at-arms, 92 and he had in addition some 200 more,
the respondents to a 20 February request to a long list of individuals to be at Portsmouth
to go with Surrey, mounted, armed and with as much force as possible.93
In Warenne's small army there were several contingents from Wales. The
instructions for their march to the port were issued in detail, showing that at this
management level at least confident planning was possible. 200 foot from North Wales
85 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 683.
86 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 696.
87 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 714.
88 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 723.
89 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 697.
9° Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 698.
91 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 711.
92 CPR 1324-1327, pp. 97-8.
93 Foedera, Vol. II, div. i, pp. 581-2.
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were to be at Bala on the Friday before mid-Lent, led there by the sheriffs, sub-sheriffs
and four of the best men of each of the three northern Welsh counties. There they were
to receive wages for two days, to take them to Shrewsbury for the Sunday. At
Shrewsbury they would be joined by another 330, and seven men-at-arms. Thence they
would be given wages for seven days for their march to Portsmouth, which was to be
via Hereford. 200 foot from South Wales were to be led by Rees ap Griffith and Sir
Roger Pikard, together with six men from the counties of Cardigan and Carmarthen and
'the stewardship'. At Hereford on the Tuesday there were to be another 250 foot and six
men-at-arms. 94
 Giles de Beauchamp and Alan de Cherleton 95
 were appointed to inspect
and array these levies (by inference at Hereford), and march them to Portsmouth, 'with
their sheriffs, sub-sheriffs, constables, and leaders, so that they shall neither do nor
receive any harm.'96
These details help to amplify what was probably generally involved in
assembling the muster after the commissions for recruiting were issued and the men
chosen. More 'leaders' than the commissioners themselves were needed, in addition to
the standard one constable per 100 foot (as well as one vintenar in each 20, though
these arrangements for the Welsh make no mention of vintenars, and some of the sub-
units were not in twenties). The inclusion of 'staging points' was noted in the 11 June
orders, at which points also inspection of the levies and payment of wages were to take
place. The time, defined admittedly by the number of days' pay, allowed for march
between these points - two days from Bala to Shrewsbury, another two from
Shrewsbury to Hereford, seven thence to Portsmouth - makes the rate fairly consistently
c. 20 miles per day. Finally, the concern for discipline during the march echoes the 11
July appointment of Richard Damory and Richard de Stapledon 'touching felonies.. .by
men-at-arms, mounted and on foot.. .coming to Plymouth to go on the king's service,'97
and the passage in the general orders of 9 July to the bishop of Exeter, the treasurer, and
Richard Damory, who were overseeing all arrangements for the passage from Plymouth,
94 CPR 1324-1327, p. 97.
95 Cherleton had been appointed on 22 December to select hobelars and archers
in Shropshire and Staffordshire.
96 Ibid., p. 96. Another commission of the same date, 26 February, appointed
Constantine de Mortimer and Richard de Perrers, respectively arrayers of 22 December
for Norfolk and Hertfordshire, to survey and array the footmen reporting to Harwich,
and hand them over to John de Stunny, the admiral of the fleet that would carry them to
Bordeaux. CPR 1324-1327, p. 99.
97 Ibid., p. 65.
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telling them to 'hear and determine complaints of trespasses and injuries among men
marching to Plymouth.'98
The fleets that transported these small armies to Bordeaux also carried arms and
much needed provisions and money. Chaplais' collection of documents contains many
complaining of shortage of vietuals, arms and provender for horses. 99 Organisation of
provisions was thus primarily directed at meeting the duchy's needs to supply the troops
already there and arriving at different times. Though supplies were sought also from
the Iberian peninsular, 100 most had to come from England.
The primary responsibility for organising the obtaining of supplies, and their
delivery to the ports, fell on the sheriffs. The victuals that had beeri unloaded at
Plymouth in August and September 1324 had been at the charge of the sheriff of
Hampshire. 1° 1 Sheriffs had to provide the equipment to prepare the ships summoned in
May 1324 to carry horses. In the Gascon Roll there is an instruction, dated 22
November 1324, to the barons of the exchequer to issue, under the treasury seal, orders
to all eounties for supplies of vietttals and materials of all soils for the expeditiori.102
Records relating to supplies for the duchy contain a series of references to the
work of sheriffs. The sheriff of Cambridgeshire in providing corn for the expedition
was not to take too much. 1 °3
 William Tracy, sheriff of Gloucester, was allowed
expenses for providing a range of foods, including the wages of several men with horses
and cans, the costs of the granar), and a man to reeeive arid look after deliveries, costs
of grinding corn, and portage to the river. /°4 The sheriffs of Yorkshire and
Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire sent supplies to Hull, of Northamptonshire and
Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire to King's Lynn, of Norfolk and Suffolk to King's
Lynn and Yarmouth, of Essex to Maldon and Colchester. 105 The work was not always
left entirely to the sheriffs and their men. The king's clerk Robert de Nottingham was
98 Ibid.
99 
e.g. War of Saint-Sardos, ed. P. Chaplais, pp. 83, 107, 125, 149.
100 letters of 30 September 1324 to Prince John of Biscay (CCR 1323-1327, p.
314) and 7 May 1325 to Alfonso king of Portugal (ibid., p. 364); mandate of 19
November 1324 to Nicholas Hugate to buy supplies in Spain (CPR 1324-1327, p. 52).
1 ° / BL Add. Ms. 7967, f. 8v.
102 C61/36, m. 21.
103 E101/17/4.
104 F101/17/4,
io5 F101/16/40.
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appointed in December 1324, in the place of Adam de Lymbergh, 1 °6 another king's clerk
who had previously had the task, to survey and accelerate purveyances in Yorkshire and
Lincolnshire for the passage to Gascony,' Also in December ; the admirals John le
Sturmy and Robert Bendyn were appointed to survey and accelerate the buying of the
victuals and other things 'ordered to be purveyed' for the expedition of the king's affairs
in Gascony. 1 °8
 What had been 'ordered to be purveyed' must have been quantified to the
purveyors, possibly by the treasury to which went the instruction of 22 November to
order purveyances in the counties, though the order to the Irish treasury that does give
quantities - 5,000 quarters of wheat and 1,000 of beans - is dated 24 October.1°9
The key links in the chain of organising supplies were the receivers of victuals
and arms 110
 at the ports. William de Oterhampton, king's clerk, held this post at
Portsmouth, at least by March 1325, when he had £5,000 to pay wages and freight
charges for what Robert 13enclyn's fleet was to transport. "
 He travelled with the fleet,
delivering to another king's clerk Nicholas Hugate, receiver at Bordeaux,
£20,441118/8, 112
 as well as the supplies of victuals and arms. The range of items113
106 He was assigned to superintend the receipt by Hugate at Bordeaux of money,
arms and victuals from William de Oterhampton, receiver at Portsmouth, and others.
C61/36, m. 6.
107 CPR 1324-1327, p. 64. His account adds Nottinghamshire to the two
counties. E101/16/36.
108 CPR 1324-1327, p. 62.
109 C61136, m. 22.
110 Among the arms for Gascony were springalds. A writ of aid of 28 December
1324 for the sheriff of Nottingham says he has been assigned to survey timber for
springalds and quarrels specifically for the expedition to Gascony. (CPR 1324-1327, p.
80.) In December 60 springalds and 7,000 quarrels were ordered by the king's council
to be made, to be ready by 2 February, the work being allocated to the sheriffs of
Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Lineohishire and London. (CCR 1323-1327, pp. 246-7.)
The orders say they are needed 'for the defence of the realm', not specifically for the
expedition to Gascony, though the recurrence of the 2 February date for readiness
suggests some connection.
111 Foedera, Vol. II, div. i, p. 595.
112 BL Add. M. 7967, f. 4t.
113 BL Add. Ms. 26891, f.. 77r: corn, rye, beans, peas, oats, flour, wine, carcases
of beef, bacons, salt; springalds, crossbows for one and for two feet, horse-shoes, nails,
sheaves of arrows, shields, spades,
102
gives an indication of the complexity of the work of the purveyors. William de
Kirkeby, another king's clerk, had the responsibility for organising the shipments by
John Stunny's northern fleet. Kirkeby was appointed on 16 February, with instructions
as to how he was to proceed. The sheriffs of the eastern counties delivered their
purveyanees to various ports, and Kirkeby was to superviSe the loading of the vietuals
by indentures between the masters of the ships of Sturmy's fleet and 'the keepers of the
said victuals', who were therefore presumably at the ports. He was to act under the
authority of Sturmy. 114
The vacillating intentions of the government in the war of Saint-Sardos
result in an appearance, particularly in the recruiting and assembly of troops, of order,
counter-order and confusion. Within this, however, it is possible to see the different
mechanisms for raising levies: commissioners of array for the counties appointed on an
ad hoc basis according to whether men-at-arms, hobelars, archers or foot were the
objective; established local officials for the foot from cities and towns. In general
cavalry was sought by direct resource to individuals, whether by request or by
invocation of faith and homage, or due service. The proclamation seeking volunteers
offered pay to all categories, from knights to foot. Levies of foot were usually marched
to the muster under the orders of one of the eOrtuniSsiOners, often having been
'reviewed' at designated intermediate points, where they received pay, arranged by
king's clerks, to take them to the muster. Management of this element of the
mobilization at least seems to have been planned in effective detail.
Sheriffs managed the major part of purveyance, seeing also to delivery of
provisions and other materials to king's clerks appointed IS receivers at the paris. These
clerks in turn saw to the loading of the ships, though the two admirals had over-all
authority.
Sea transport was obtained by orders direct to the port mayors and bailiffs, with
the authority of sheriffs having to be applied to urge response. In the assembly of the
first fleet at Plymouth the elerk John Devery had a cefitral coordinating role. In this, as
in the returns of numbers of armoured men to be made under the orders issued on 1
August, and the request to the magnates summoned on 4 August 1324 to prepare their
forces to say how many men they would provide, the explicit collection of numerical
information for planning purposes took place.
The deserlions by the Gletieestershire levies and the absectiding of ships front
Dorset and Devon demonstrated that acceptance of conscription was not universal.
114 CPR 1324=1327, p. 96.
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Warnings to conscriptors not to accept bribes 'as others have done' had to be made.
Discipline of troops on their way to the muster had lapses. By and large, however, such
incidents do not seem to have been a major problem.
In the administration of the war of Saint-Sardos the permanent local officials,
sheriffs, mayors and bailiffs, remained indispensable. The king's clerks were effectively
used to coordinate their logistical activity. The greatest failure of the government was
its inability to make realistic time-tables and secure adherence to them; though, once
more, any degree of management efficiency could hardly have been possible under, or
made up for, the vacillations of strategy and policy consequent upon the failure to wrest
the initiative from the French.
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CHAPTER 6
EDWARD HI AND SCOTLAND, 1336
From the time Edward ifi established his personal rule in 1330 until the beginning of
the wars with France in 1337, Scotland was his major preoccupation. In spite of a
series of substantial military actions he failed to bring Scotland under the same sort of
control as his grandfather Edward I had established over Wales. Perhaps the Scottish
sense of national identity fostered by Robed Bruce was to Sttotig; by 1313 Bruee 'had
behind him something like a united Scotland', and after Bannockburn he 'became
forthwith a national hero.° Scotland was larger than Wales, and further away from the
centre of English power. The resources and techniques necessary to maintain a
sufficiently large force in Scotland for a sufficiently long period - probably to be
measured in years rather than months - were considerable. as J. Campbell points out,
the cost of an army big enough to hold down the hostile population was much greater
than the revenue obtainable from the area. 2
 It is debatable whether, even without the
intervention of the French king, Edward could ever have succeeded.
Edward Balliol, Edward Dirs theoretical vassal king, was ignominiously expelled
in 1332, demonstrating the fundamental irrelevance of the victory of the 'disinherited' at
Dupplin Moor. Edward 11[ sought to re-establish English control by a series of
destructive invasions. The campaign of 1333, which won the battle of Halidofi Hill and
took Berwick, only temporarily reinstated Balliol. A rising, encouraged by Philip VI's
reception of David Bruce, expelled Balliol again in the autumn of 1334. The Roxburgh
campaign in the winter of 1334-1335 achieved nothing to alter the situation. In the
summer of 1335, against a background of increasing diplomatic difficulties with France,
Edward III's invasion with a great force Of some 15,000 men still failed to destroy
Scottish resistance. Whether failure was due to the too-early demobilization of the
1 McKisack, Fourteenth Century, pp. 33, 40.
2 'England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War in the Fourteenth Century', in J.
Hale, J. R. L. Highfield and B. Smalley, (eds.) Europe in the Late Middle Ages (London,
1965), p. 185.
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army (the English levies departed home from late August), 3 or to the defeat and death of
David Strathbogie at Culblean on 30 November 1335, or to the developing French
menace, the result was that '„,the last hope that the Balliol cause might stand upon its
own feet had been dispelled.
An uneasy truce from 22 October 5 was continued by a series of extensions, the
last of which, made on 18 March 1336, ultimately expired on 5 May. 6 Both sides had
expected, and probably intended, that hostilities would be resumed at any moment.
From the beginning of the year the English administration was making
preparations for defence. By orders dated 18 January archers were to be selected in
Derbyshire, Lancashire and the liberties of Richmond and Howden. Detailed
instructions were given as to who were to conduct the arrays, who were to bring the
various contingents to Berwick, and by when (early to mid-February 1336). The
appointees were given power to arrest and imprison archers who disobeyed them. This
was supported by the standard instructions to sheriffs, bailiffs and other ministers to
cooperate by assembling the men from whom the selection would be made, and by
receiving and imprisoning the disobedient.' Another order of 18 January to new East
Riding arrayers ordered them to arrest named sub-arrayers appointed by Thomas
Ughtred. Archers these sub-arrayers had been ordered to select had not yet set out. The
new arrayers were to re-array the archers, if necessary, and have them, properly armed,
at Northallerton by 30 January. There they were to be handed over, by indenture, to
Thomas Meltham. 8 He was appointed, in an order also of 18 January, to bring them to
Berwick by 4 February. 9 This failure by Ughtred's appointees had been reported by
UghtTed himself; the incident suggests that sub-arrayers were not rigorously supervised.
These arrangements show by their common dating that coordinated and detailed
planning took place, as would be expected. They also show that there must have been a
procedure for monitoring progress, and that it could include written documentation.
Although on 26 January, a week after these orders, the truce was extended to Easter, in
February much broader plans were made. They covered border defence, coastal
3 R. Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots. The Formative Years of a Military
Career 1327-1335 (Oxford, 1965), Appendix VI, p. 252.
4 Ibid., p. 236.
5 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 384.
6 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 410.
7 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 395.
8 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 393-4.
9 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 393-4.
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readiness to counter possible invasion, naval preparations, moves towards assembly of a
royal army at Berwick, and supplies. The instructions were almost all dated within one
week, again showing coordinated central planning.
For border defence, on 7 February Anthony de Lucy, justice of Lothian and
keeper of Berwick, 1 ° was told to array and prepare all then-at-arms, hobelars, archers
and others in Northumberland and Scottish lands. Robert de Clifford, Ranulph de
Dacre and Peter Tyliol had the same order for arraying the men of Cumberland and
Westmorland." These orders had a preamble warning that some Scots were preparing
to break the truce.
A coastal organisation to counter a possible sea-borne invasion was set up in
orders dated 10 February. Keepers of ports, the coast and maritime lands (extending six
miles inland) I2 were appointed covering the whole country by groups of counties I3 - for
example Hugh de Courtenay, earl of Devon, and Philip de Columbariis for Devon and
Cornwall: Robert de Insula, Roger de Kerdeston and Constantine de Mortimer for
Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire: Robert Fiw•Payn and John de
Clyvedon the elder for Somersetshire and Dorsetshire. 14 All magnates, prelates and
officials had to help in whatever was necessary to guard the coasts. Under the keepers
arrayers were nominated for each county. Acting together or separately they were to
array all fencible men, explicitly including knights and esquires, and see to them being
mounted and armed according to status. The mounted men were to be organised into
constabularies, and the foot into the standard 100's and 20's. Sheriffs had been ordered
to assemble men, in this case again expressly including knights, as required by the
arrayers or their deputies, for the array. In the event of an invasion the arrayers were to
conduct their contingents according to the orders of the keepers, or of deputies
appointed by them. 15
 (The nominated appointees Were assumed to appoint sub-arrayers
and deputies on their own authority; the problem of the dilatoriness of Thomas
Ughtred's Yorkshire sub-arrayers in January may suggest that this structure was not
necessarily efficient.) As part of these defence arrangements, the keepers of the coasts
were told to prepare signal fires on the hills.16
10 Cockayne, Complete Peerage, Vol. VIII, pp.250-2.
11 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 401, dated 7 February.
12 Hewitt, Organisation of War, pp. 6-7.
13 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, pp. 404-6.
14 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 404.
15 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 406-7,
16 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 406.
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A general instruction dated 16 February went to all sheriffs supplementing the
more specific arrangements. The sheriffs were to proclaim that, in view of the Scottish
threat, all men from 16 to 60 years old and able to fight, including knights and esquires,
should arm themselves as required by the Statute of Winchester.17
Naval preparations were put in hand with a.nother asserliOn that the Rots and
others were preparing arms and ships to attack the realm. A comprehensive series of
orders was issued. One set went to the barons of the Cinque Ports, sheriffs, mayors and
other officials, and ships' masters and mariners. They were told that the royal clerks
John de Wyndesore and Thomas de Gargrave, acting together or individually, were
assigned to arrest ships of 40 tons and over of the Cinque Nits and ports to
Southampton. Ships were to return to port, to be armed and double manned and ready
to go to sea about 17 March. Sailors and armed men were to be found for them in the
counties of Kent, Sussex and Hampshire. A report was to be made of the number of
ships, and men who failed to cooperate were to be arrested. William de Clinton,
constable of Dover and warden of the Cinque Ports, VvaS to Supervise and assist the
operation. 18
 This managerial structure can be summarised therefore as two agents of
the central government, supported by the authority of a major magnate, coordinating the
actions of local officials.
In a similar way, though without nomination of a powerful supervisor, Ambrose
de Novo Burgo and William de Werdale were appointed to requisition 40 ton ships
from Southampton westwards. Jacob de Kingston and Ralph de Wylinglia requisitioned
ships from the Thames and to the north 9
 in their case they presumably had the support
of the experienced Thomas Ughtred. He was now appointed captain and admiral of the
northern fleet, with power to discipline and punish, choose men for the ships and arrest
those who disobeyed. Sheriffs and other officials were ordered te assist hirn, and
17 CCR 13334 337, p. 647.
18 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, pp. 402-3.
19 These six, Wyndesore, Gargrave, Novo Burgo, Werdale, Kingston and
Wylinglia, were of course all royal clerks of considerable experience. Wyndesore had
been used in 1335 to requisition ships from the Cinque Ports; Gargrave had been a
purveyor in 1333; Novo Burgo had conducted a major survey of North Wales castles;
Werdale had requisitioned shipping, as had Kingston; Wylinglia had been a purveyor.
CCR 1333-1337, pp. 430, 51, 354, 414; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, p. 188;
CCR 1333-7, p. 255, respectively.
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imprison those arrested. These ships were also to be ready by mid-March. All these
writs were dated 10 February.2°
A detail of local procedure may perhaps be added from an account of another
survey of shipping, in which one of the clerks, William de Werdale, took part. A report
of a survey of shipping based at Holkham records that twelve named local men gave
Werdale and his colleague an account of the port's ships, including their burden, owners
and masters. 21
 For the government to obtain information about local circumstances
from a jury of locals in this way would be natura1,22
 and suggests that on occasions
when a specific number of ships was required from individual ports the allocation was
based, if possible, on reasonably reliable knowledge of their potential.
Two top naval appointments were also made on 10 April in obvious preparation
for a major campaign. Geoffrey de Say was made admiral of the fleet from the Thames
westward, 23
 and John de Norwico replaced Thomas Ughtred as admiral of the North,
the masters and sailors of the respective fleets being ordered to obey them. 24 As well as
having power to discipline and punish, John de Norwico was also authorised to impress
men to crew the fleet.25
Later, after the expiry of the truce, on 30 May Norwico received power to
requisition both greater and lesser ships, and crew and arm them. 26 On 6 June he was
told to release ships in King's Lynn that were loaded by merchants to take provisions to
the forces in Scotland,27
 and on 18 June to release Thomas de Melcheburne's ship
loaded with the victuals purveyed by William de Melcheburne. 28 These two incidents
perhaps arose from action taken by local officials simply following a general
instruction, as usual showing the need for managerial monitoring. Active management
20 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, pp. 403-4.
21 C4712125, m.18.
22 •just as 'The whole tradition of English finance, running back at least as far as
Domesday, was to base all taxes and dues on the sworn statements of men in the
neighborhood'. J. R. Strayer, Introduction' in EGov.atW, Vol. II, p. 37.
23 A writ of 20 April made it clear that his authority included the Cinque Ports.
Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 416.
24 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 415.
25 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 417, dated 22 April. On 5 May he had to be told not to
impress men from Norwich for the fleet, as Norwich was an inland town.
26 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 427.
27 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 427-8.
28 ibid., Vol. I, pp. 432-3.
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can also is seen in the warning to the officials of London of the king's displeasure at
their failure to provide the ships ordered for defence; they were told to have them ready
for the admiral's orders.29
As an additional naval measure the keepers of the ports and coasts of Wales
were empowered to recall all the ships of those ports and prepare them for war
service. 30
 This gave rise to a demand by the sailors for payment of wages before they
would sail: on 28 June the justiciars of North and South Wales were told to give them
money, not as wages but as expenses. 31
 In mid-July Geoffrey de Say was told to allow
the ships mustered at Portsmouth to return to their home ports, where they had to
remain and not leave without special permission.32
Assembly of a royal army at Berwick was initiated by orders dated 12 February.
As the (current) truce would be ending at Easter,. 31 March, the king announced his
intention to be at Berwick by 6 Apri1. 33
 He was therefore appointing men to choose
archers and hobelars, the latter with specified arms and armour, to be brought to
Berwick by that date. The totals came to 3,600 archers and 1,980 hobelars, allocated in
detail to each of the areas which were to supply the men. The allocations ranged from
Lancashire's 500 archers and 200 hobelars to 100 archers and 60 hobelars from
Leicestershire. Appointments of two or three conscriptors were made, with power to
arrest and imprison, for most of the seventeen counties involved, 34
 though there were a
few exceptions. 35
 In several cases major towns, like Doncaster, Beverley and
29 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 430, dated 10 June. On 5 July, however, at the request of John
Pulteney they were allowed not to equip the ships for war, though they were to remain
arrested. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 435-6.
30 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 427, dated 1 June.
31 Foedera, Vol. 1/, div. ii, p. 941.
32 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 438.
33 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 408.
34 The counties left out were mainly in the north-east, north-west and south-
west. However 200 hobelars were required from the bishop of Durham, and 100
hobelars and 300 archers from the earl of Chester: they are included in the totals. Rot.
Scot., Vol. I, pp. 408-9.
35 The exceptions were Lincolnshire with six, Lancashire with five, Surrey and
Sussex with three to cover both counties, and Yorkshire, where each of the three
Ridings had two. The number of conscriptors deemed necessary for each county was
not simply related to the number of soldiers required; for example only two, Nicholas
Langford and Roger Okoure, were to select 100 hobelars and 300 archers from
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Pontefract in Yorkshire, and Leicester, Gloucester and Hereford, were excluded from
this levy.
Some time must have been allowed for these instructions of 12 February to be
put into effect. Although five weeks later, on 18 March, the truce was extended (to 5
May), no counter-itiariding orders were issued, suggesting that the levies possibly had
not yet been made, let alone set off for Berwick. Also, in late March orders had to be
sent to various arrayers telling them not to take soldiers from specific towns which were
contributing men and ships. On 20 March the Lincolnshire conscriptors were told not
to take hobelars from Barton-on-Humber, as the town had supplied a hundred sailors
and others to Thomas Ughtred, the admiral of the North. Ughtred had testified to thiS to
the chancery, which indicates the existence of an effective system for administrative
communication via that office. 36 On 25 March the Gloucestershire conscriptors were
told not to take men from Bristol, because it was providing armed and manned ships.37
Even on 1 April the arrayers of Surrey and Sussex were reminded to observe the
privilege of Shoreham to provide and man ships, rather than to Supply haelarS and
archers;38 this one in particular reads rather as if no concrete action had yet been taken
by the arrayers.
What was presumably intended to be the final extension of the truce was made
on 18 March. From the last week of March onwards orders gave clear instructions for
the muster at nerwick. On 26 March Thomas Ughtred was appointed to choose 400
foot and 200 mounted archers, and bring them to Berwick by 20 Apri1. 39
 Some of the
conscriptors appointed on 12 February were to collect their quotas, and deliver 1,000
hobelars and 500 archers from them to Berwick by the same date. The rest of their men
were to be kept in readiness to go when surnmoned. 4° Those conscriptors who were not
Derbyshire, although three, Roger de Kerdeston, John de Loudham and Constantine de
Mortimer, were to pick 120 hobelars and 60 archers in Norfolk. Probably such factors
as availability of known able and experienced men, efficiency of local officials - who
were instructed to assist in the usual ways - and perhaps even geography and local
social conditions were taken into account.
36 Ibid.,Vol. I, p. 411. The order is warranted teste me ipso per consilium.
37 Ibid. Vol. I, p. 411.
38 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 414.
39 Tbid.,Vol. I, pp. 411-2, addressed to all sheriffs, officials and faithful men of
Yorkshire.
40 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 412, dated 27 March. The forces for 21 April were drawn
from the more northern counties, Yorkshire, Lancashire, Derbyshire and Lincolnshire,
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on this list were ordered to have their men arrayed and kept ready until required. 41 It
appears that arrival of the hobelars was of particular importance: in an order of 1 April
the Lincolnshire conscriptors were told to deliver their contingent to Walter de
Tirkingham who was to bring them to Berwick; the Lancashire 200 were to be brought
by Adam f3 anastre; and Thomas 'lighted himself was to see to the delivery of the 200
from the three Ridings.42
On 24 March an instruction was given to the treasury to pay sums ranging from
40 marks to £100 to twelve magnates about to go to Scotland, as wages for them and
the men-at-arms in their retinues. 43
 The twelve included Edward Balliol, styled king of
Scotland, and the earls of Warwick, Angus, Oxford and Buchan, as well as Henry of
Lancaster. On 7 April, declaring that in view of the Scots' intention to attack, a large
force, including the magnates and their retinues, other men-at-arms, hobelars, archers
and footmen, was needed for Scotland, Edward appointed Henry of Lancaster its
captain and leader. He was given power to judge and punish all men of the army, from
earls to footmen. Lancaster was put in command of the force being raised by Anthony
de Lucy in Northumberland and the Scottish lands under Lucy's authority, 44 and of that
of William de Bohun, already captain of the men-at-arms, hobelars, archers and foot of
Cumberland and Westmoreland. Two of the arrayers appointed on 7 February for those
counties were told to lead their arrayed men to William de Bohun 'to go in his
company' . 45
The actions put in hand on 10 February to requisition ships had been continuing,
as the excusing of Bristol and Barton-on-Humber from providing soldiers shows. Not
surprisingly, difficulties did occur; the authority of the sheriff had to be called in to
assist the masters of three ships on the king's service choose and embark sailors, 46 and
the mayor and bailiffs of Bristol had to be told to release some ships of the Cinque Ports
they had arrested, so that they could return to be equipped and armed for war. 47 This
as well as from Durham and Chester, possibly because they obviously were nearer and
so could arrive earlier. Except in the case of Durham, they were not the whole of the 12
February numbers.
41 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 413-4, dated 1 April.
42 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 413.
43 Foedera, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 935.
"Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 936.
45 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, pp. 415-6.
46 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 409, dated 3 March.
47 Foedera, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 933.
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incident throws some more light on how the requisitioning of ships for the fleets was
carried out. In this case, it was clearly the local officials, not the two central
government men, or the county sheriff, who caused the ships to be held in port. It also
shows that it was the responsibility of the ships' home ports to have them made ready,
with both the men and the sbeeessities' - arms, equipment and double tharibifig, as set
out in the 10 February orders" - for war. The sheriffs of London were told to release a
ship which they had arrested on its way to Gascony for wine, as the owner had provided
surety that it would return for service for the king. 49 Both incidents demonstrate that
the process of assembling naval forces was being actively monitored and managed.
The assembly of the levies of hobelars and archers at Berwick by 20 April also
did not go completely smoothly. The administration's response presents a similar
picture of corrective action. Though some of the 600 mounted and foot archers Thomas
Ughtred had been told on 26 March to select in Yorkshire had arrived, some had not. A
commission of three was set up on 4 May to enquire of Ughtred's sub-arrayers and the
sheriffs if all had been properly arrayed, if some had died, aiid who had refused to go.
The missing number were to be replaced and taken to Berwick. 5° That this failure to
execute instructions fully was not peculiar to those arrayers appointed by Ughtred is
shown by another order of the same date to the arrayers of Lancashire. Although wages
had been given to the men at Newcastle, some had refused to go on to Berwick. The
arrayers were to make up the numbers. 51 These two follow-up orders show that there
was a system of checking, which again seems to have been based on written
documentation, if a Leicester record is typical. In this Richard Edgebaston reported to
the chancery that the archers selected by himself and the two other arrayers appointed
on 12 February52 had been properly equipped and delivered, by indenture, to John de
Sigworth to be led to Berwick. 53 These incidents show that progress reports were being
sent to the chancery, and management action was taken on them, when necessary.
The truce formally expiring on 5 May, an invasion of Scotland being planned,
and the threat of attack by the Scots or their allies therefore presumably increased, the
realm was put on a war-footing.
48 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, pp. 402=3.
49 CCR 1333-1337, p. 657, dated 20 March.
50 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, pp. 418-9.
51 Ibid., p. 418.
52 Ibid., p. 408.
53 SC1139/29.
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All sheriffs were ordered on 4 May to proclaim a prohibition of tournaments and
jousts, unless special permission was obtained, that no knight or man-at-arms was to go
overseas without permission,54
 and (on 8 May) that no victuals or armour should go to
the king's enemies. 55
 On 6 May a virtual repeat of the comprehensive 10 February
arrangements for keepers Of the Wags WaS issued. Although there Were differences (iii
a few instances the number of arrayers per county was changed, and Rutland was
omitted from the list), in principle the system was exactly the same, including the
setting up of signal fires. The most significant differences were practical administrative
ones. The infirm were to be assessed to arms, and their substitutes arrayed. Most
importantly, a precise date, 24 June, was given for the array to be completed, and
detailed returns were required to be made 'to us'. These were to include numbers, and
the names of the millenars, centenars and vintenars whom the arrayers were instructed
to appoint to lead the 1,000's, 100's and 20's into which the men were to be organised. 56
Some of the orders' specific arrangements for the actual array help to fill in the
picture. The arrayers, or deputies appointed by two of them together, were to Set days
and places for the fencible men, including knights and esquires, of each viii to be
assembled. The assembly points were to be in the hundred or wapentake where the men
lived. The sheriffs were to see to their assembly at the times and places required.
Although the order to the three arrayers of Devon says explicitly that they, or two of
them, are to have come before them all the fencible men,57 the refereriee to the
nomination of deputies to set the dates suggests that such deputies might also carry out
the inspection too. Only seven weeks covered the time between the date of the orders
and the date by which returns had to be made: if the two arrayers for such counties as
Suffolk or Gloucestershire had had to inspect every array themselves, they could have
been fairly hard-pressed to cover the ground.
This series of arrangements in case of attack was augmented by the addition of
the counties of Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Warwickshire to the
10 February list,58
 and an order to the mayor, sheriffs and community of London to arm
to be ready to defend against the Scots and their allies when and as ordered. 59
 Array
54 CCR 1333=1337, p. 671.
55 Ibid., p. 675.
56 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, pp. 422-4.
57 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 422.
58 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 424, dated 6 May.
59 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 425, dated 12 May.
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was ordered for the Isle of Thanet, 6° and on 12 June the mayors and bailiffs of twenty-
nine towns were told to arm and be ready for defence. 61
 Lords of lands in south Wales
were to arm their men, munition castles and guard them night and day, as the Scots and
their allies were threatening. 62
 William de la Zouche de Mortimer and Gilbert Talbot
had been made captains of the Welsh arrays, 63
 with powers to arrest and imprison.64
The defence plans were followed by the summoning of 500 more soldiers to
Berwick by 24 June in preparation for the invasion of Scotland. 100 of the 120 hobelars
of Norfolk, ordered on 12 February to be arrayed and kept ready to move, were to be
brought to Berwick by one of the 12 February arrayers. The hobelars were first to have
been inspected and armed by tWO heW appointees, named in the order. 65 Another 460
archers from among those arrayed under the 12 February orders in Staffordshire,
Leicestershire, Shropshire and Northamptonshire were to be led to Berwick by suitable
men, whom the arrayers were to choose and depute for the purpose.66 The orders for
these two contingents were dated 20 May. Bringing this force of archers to a round
500, Richard de St. Licio and Stephen de Wyttelsford were told on 26 May to choose 40
archers, and someone to lead them from Rutland to Berwick.67
Some impatience over the delivery of these 500 is evident. On 10 June, only
two weeks after the date of the orders, another to the same recipients urged them in a
threatening tone to do what had been asked. 68 This, warranted per consilium, was
followed by another similarly threatening, dated 12 June, and warranted per ipsum
regem. 69 It included the same urging in relation to the Norfolk hobelars. Even as late
60 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 429, dated 10 June.
61 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 431-2. On 22 June King's King's Lynn and Southampton
were added. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 433.
62 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 433, dated 24 June. It is possible that the apparent increased
sense of urgency in this order reflected fear that there might be some sort of Welsh
rising.
63 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 430-1, dated 10 June.
64 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 435, dated 1 July.
65 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 425.
66 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 425-6.
67 Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 426-1. Perhaps this explains the omission of Rutland from
the 6 May list of counties making preparations for defence.
68 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 430.
69 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 431-2.
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as 27 June the two Staffordshire arrayers were written to again.70
 Recognition of the
need to pursue the carrying out of orders is also seen in the message to the keepers of
the coasts to hurry up the setting of the signal fires, of which they had been reminded on
6 May.71
The muster of these county levies in the north was accompanied by the assembly
of the retinues of men-at-arms of a number of magnates. All but two of those to whom
the treasurer had been told in March to make advances of money were recorded as in
pay during May. 72 Including the magnates themselves these retinues totalled some 429
men-at-arms in pay at that time. 73 Together with another five retinues also in pay in
May the total came to 501, by no means a particularly large army. Even the inclusion of
those who are recorded as in pay in broadly the next three months only adds about
300,74
 making a total of c.800. This compares with the figure of 2,480 men-at-arms in
the great army of 1335 as counted by Nicholson.75
The numbers of the county levies were similarly comparatively small. The total
actually summoned to Berwick before the end of June was 2,700. As has been seen, not
all of them had actually arrived. More were subsequently called for: Thomas Rokeby
the sheriff was assigned on 1 July to bring all fencible men from Yorkshire 76 (a task
which met refusals to obey, requiring more orders for action); 77 100 hobelars and 300
archers had been ordered from the city of Chester (though by 8 July they had not yet set
out,78 and were still being sought in August); 79 80 hobelars and 400 archers were
summoned from Suffolk on 26 July to be at Berwick as soon as possible8° (the order for
80 hobelars was cancelled on 22 August, £.100 of the money levied for their
maintenance being passed to the bailiffs of Great Yarmouth for ships); 81 200 foot from
70 Ibid., p. 434.
71 Ibid., p. 422; p. 428 dated 2 June.
72 BL Cotton Ms. Nero C.V111, ff. 240r, 241r. This account does not include
Edward Balliol, who was included in the March recipients.
73 This figure is the sum of the first number recorded in each case. Ibid..
74 Ibid., ff. 241, 242, 243. Comings and goings make the figures fluctuate.
75 Edward III and the Scots, Appendix IV, p. 250.
76 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 434.
77 Ibid., p. 439, dated 24 July.
78 Ibid., p. 436.
79 Ibid., p. 444.
80 Ibid., p. 440.
81 Ibid., p. 445.
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South Wales and 300 from North Wales were required by an order of 14 August.82
Even with these additions, the effective total of hobelars, archers and foot seems
unlikely to have reached much beyond 4,000, little more than one-third of the number
in the army of 1335. 83 The mobilization of 1336 was for a punitive expedition rather
than for an army of conquest.
Orders for the gathering of supplies for the expected resumption of war with
Scotland had been issued as part of the coordinated plans of the second week of
February. Two orders of 12 February were for supplies to go to the receiver of victuals
at Carlisle, Robert de Tybay, who was appointed on 10 February. 84 (He formally took
over resporisibili for the stores from 11 March.) 85 These orders went to officials (the
sheriff of Cumberland was to deliver 600 quarters of oats,86 the treasurer of Ireland was
to purvey and deliver by indenture 400 quarters of wheat)87
 and may have been only
routine arrangements for maintaining garrisons.
That of 13 February for supplies destined for Berwick seems both by its timing
and by the urgency of its wording - 'with all speed' - to be related specifically to the
forthcoming build-up of troops there. It used the merchant William de Melchebume as
an official purveyor, which included giving him authority to arrest and punish. Local
officials were instructed to assist him, and anyone deputed by him for the task of
acquiring the supplies. The order to him described in detail how he was to proceed. He
or his deputy was assigned to provide 1,000 varlets of torn and 1,000 varlets of oatg.
They were to be obtained as conveniently as possible, but also with as little loss to the
people as could be managed. He was to have some ground as quickly as possible and
the flour put into casks. These, with the rest of the corn and oats, he was to deliver to
the sheriff of Norfolk, by indenture. The sheriff was to send them on to the receiver at
Berwick, the cost of transport being allowed in the sheriffs account. Payinent for the
corn and oats would be made at the treasury on 27 May. Robert de Tong, receiver at
Berwick, was instructed to receive these supplies. 88 Five weeks later, on 22 March,
William de Melcheburne was told to send the flour, corn and oats to Berwickas soon as
82 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 441.
83 Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, pp. 250-255.
E101/20/3.
" Ibid.
CCR 1333-7, p. 548.
87 Ibid.
88 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 409.
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possible. 89 At this point in time, 22 March, levies were being ordered to Berwick for 20
April. Although this appears to echo J. R. Maddicott's comment that purveyance was
usually ordered one month before the campaign, 9° the actual order had been issued
several weeks earlier.
Several features of the administrative system can be seen in the order of
February. The use of a merchant to obtain the supplies may have been, as Maddicott
suggests, because merchants were likely to know better certainly than royal clerks, and
probably even than sheriffs, where provisions existed. 91 It was a more flexible
arrangement, as it did not need to specify quantities for individual counties, which
would have been necessary if sheriffs were the pufveyors. The colieerh that there
should be as little loss to the people as possible recognised that purveyance could bear
heavily on the peasants, and could give rise to unrest. The postponed payment was
convenient for royal finances, though it is not clear whether this was reimbursement for
payments Melcheburne was to make, or payment to those whose goods were taken. The
power given to Melcheburne to appoint deputies to make the purveyatices, though
necessary, involved giving authority outside both officials and the landed class who
normally, for example in arraying, exercised it. The use of the sheriff of Norfolk to
arrange the transport to Berwick reflected the probable East Anglian source of the grain.
The requirement to pass the supplies on by indenture, and the explicit order to Robert
de Tong to receive them, showed a practical grasp of the value of reciprocal
communication for administrative effectiveness and control. The obvious importance
of whenever possible recording the movement of supplies for armed forces, which in
any age are likely to be operating in conditions that make accounting difficult, was
recognised in other instances also by explicitly requiring the taking of receipts or
delivery by indenture.92
89 Ibid., p.411.
90 The English Peasantry, p. 24.
91 Ibid., p. 54.
92 e.g. instruction to Robert de Tong to deliver £40 of victuals to John de Stirling
for him and his garrison by indenture (Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 407); to give 40 marks worth
of victuals to Michael de Wynes for him and his company as a gift from the king,
obtaining a receipt (ibid., Vol. I, p. 411); to supply £50 of victuals to John de Stirling,
obtaining a letter of receipt (ibid., Vol. I, p. 413); to release cross-bows, bows and
arrows to John Stirling, constable of Edinburgh castle, by indenture. Ibid., Vol. I, p.
438.
118
Final administration of supplies for the forces in Scotland centred on the
receivers of the king's victuals. The most important of these was the king's clerk Robert
de Tong, receiver at Berwick. Although his post was usually described as keeper of
victuals, in fact it involved a wide variety of supplies. These can be seen in his account
covering the period from 30 September 1336.93
He was responsible for receiving and dispersing provisions; the account lists
corn, oats, malt, flour, peas, wine, salt, salmon and other fish. He also held some stocks
of weapons, bows and sheaves of arrows, though these were described as left from the
preceding year. There were stocks of coal, Spanish iron, planks, boards of different
sizes, spars of fir, and oars made of ash. Spin, 2,028 horseshoes and 8,400 tails for
them were recorded, as well as a catch-all category utensis.
Though the suppliers - purveyors, merchants or sheriffs - usually accounted for
the delivery costs, the receiver arranged unloading and the hire of stores, granaries and
cellars, and paid storekeepers. Robert de Tong's account included payment for men to
measure wheat, moving it to mills to be ground, and siftirig the flour. He 6rgaiiised the
carriage of supplies to castles and the army, and to others, 94
 paying freightage and for
armed guards to look after the safety of the materials. Besides what is shown in this
account, there are a variety of illustrations in the records of the logistical role of the
receiver of victuals. Robert de Tong was told to send supplies by sea to the constable of
the castle of Couper in Fife; 95
 he was told to have the best corn ground into flour; 96 he
was to receive ten cartloads of iron to be bought by the sheriff of Derby and forwarded
from Hull? he was even appointed to purvey £100 of victuals. 98 The king's receiver of
victuals' essential role was to be responsible for the handling of supplies from their
arrival at his port.
Mobilization of men, shipping and supplies having been broadly achieved, the
actual campaign of 1336 in Scotland, such as it was, took place from July. Its conduct
necessitated further administrative arrangements to keep the army supplied ,
 with both
93 E101/20/4.
94 For example, in January he was ordered to give 20 marks worth of victuals to
Countess Alice , a cask of wine and ten quarters of corn to Countess Joan, and other
victuals to the countess of Fife. Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 399.
95 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 409.
96 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 409.
97 CCR 1333-1337, p. 548.
98 Ibid., p. 607.
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provisions and men. The later development of the threat from French naval forces led
to more and intensified action to assemble shipping and to be ready to defend the coast.
An account of what was done to meet these on-going needs may augment the picture of
the nature of the active management involved.
On 3 June the merchants William de Melcheburne and Eudo de Stoke were
ordered to purvey speedily 1,000 quarters of wheat, 1,000 of oats and 500 of peas and
beans in the eastern counties (Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire,
Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire and Bedfordshire), again without specification of how
much in each;99 on 15 June the king's clerk, Robert de Emeldon, was appointed to
purvey wheat and wine in Hampshire; 1 °° on 12 July two sheriffs were told to buy
supplies and send them to Scotland. lcu The purveying of supplies, at least in war-time,
could be carried out by a variety of routes.
The two sheriffs were those of Somerset, Walter de Rodeneye, and
Gloucestershire, Richard de Foxcote. Their instructions contained some illuminating
details. The materials they were to provide were specified in total, though not
subdivided: enough corn to make 30 barrels of flour; 40 casks of wine: 60 quarters of
oats; 24 bacons; 2,000 horse-shoes and nails for them. Payment was to be from the
issues of their bailiwicks, to ensure speed. They were to arrest two ships, from Bristol
or elsewhere in their shires, and equip them as warships, including double manning
them, and arrest another two to transport the giipplieS. Thomas Cross, one of the king's
senior clerks, 102 or someone deputed by him, was to supervise this, and pay the crews
99 CPR 1334-1338, p. 273. A later order, dated 14 July, assigned these two, with
Thomas de Melcheburne, to buy provisions to the value of 5,000 marks. The purchases
were to be made according to the formula 'as conveniently as possible and with as little
damage as possible to the people', by the testimony of the sheriffs. Payment was to be
with the king's money, and details of the transactions were to be sent to the treasury by
Christmas.(Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 438.) However, this assiotterit was eatieelled later.
Ibid., Vol. I, p. 457, dated 3 October.
1c1° Ibid., Vol. I, p. 274. He was to keep it in store, for which the sheriff of
Hampshire was to hire houses, until told what to do with it. It would be paid for in
October. In fact on 14 July he was told to deliver £.100 worth of the victuals in his
custody to the masters of the ships in Geoffrey de Say's fleet (CCR 1333-1337, p. 598),
and again on 6 August. Ibid., p. 604.
101 not.IC Scot., Vol. I, pp. 436-7.
102 Cross was keeper of the great wardrobe. Tout, Chapters, Vol. III, p. 87.
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and guards for the supplies. 103 The transports and their armed escort were to sail as
soon as possible via the coast of Ireland to Scotland. The sheriffs were to make
indentures with Cross for the supplies, including the prices and the time of the ships'
sailing. These instructions were matched with others of the same date to Irish officials,
telling them Thomas Cross was to obtain in Ireland 200 quarters of corn, 100 of oats, 10
casks of wine, and certain other victuals. The corn was to be ground into flour and put
in barrels. Two ships were to be prepared as warships, and two others chosen as
transports for these supplies. The four were to sail for Scotland with the four from
Bristo1. 104
 A month later, on 14 August, Thomas Cross was told to deliver these
supplies to Ayr OS SOCth ag possible. These arrangements for supplies from Somerset,
Gloucestershire and Ireland, spelt out in such detail, and including over-all supervision
by one of the royal clerks, are evidence of a competent administration confident of the
managerial skill of Thomas Cross.
The need at this time for urgent delivery of provisions to the army in Scotland
was demonstrated by two other orders. Orie, dated 13 August, wa g to the sheriffs of
fourteen counties, including Yorkshire in the north, Essex in the east, Hampshire in the
south, Cornwall in the south-west, Gloucestershire in the west, and Nottinghamshire as
the only landlocked one. They were to proclaim in ports and other places that
merchants with victuals they wished to sell should go to Stirling or Perth to the army;
they would be paid in full, and 4uickly. 1 °5
 The other, dated 20 August, appointed
Robert de Tong and John de Thyngden to buy as quickly as possible 1,000 quarters of
corn and 1,000 of oats in Northumberland and elsewhere, and send them to receivers of
victuals in Scotland, by indenture. 106
 By the autumn supplies of food for the army in
Scotland were running very short, not surprisingly in view of the activities of both sides.
Robert de Tong and John de Thyngden were told on 15 September to load whatever
they had ready on to ships, to be provided by the mayors and bailiffs of Berwick and
Newcastle, and collect the rest and send it as soon as possible, as men were leaving the
1133 E35814/5.
104 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 437. By 30 August the ships were still in port. The
mayor of Bristol was told to pay the sailors, tell the sheriff of Gloucester the cost, and
the town would be reimbursed. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 449.
105 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 441.
106 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 444. Payment would be made at the treasury on 2 November.
The supplies should be obtained in ways that did as little harm to the people as possible.
Sheriffs and bailiffs were to be involved.
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army because of lack of victuals. 107
 The bishop of Durham was told on 20 October to
provide from his liberty 1,000 quarters of corn and 1,000 of oats and deliver them to the
receiver at Newcastle, as the army was short of food. 1 °8 Though this was giving rise to
complaints, he was told on 28 November that the supplies were still required. 1 °9 These
dates perhaps give some indication of how long it might take for supplies to be
obtained: indeed, if Robert de Tong had accumulated a worthwhile quantity in the three
weeks that had elapsed, he would have done well. The reference to desertions due to
shortage of food underlines the difficulty of keeping even an only moderately sized
force supplied, when it could not rely on living off the land.
In Scotland what military action there was in the campaign of 1336 had taken
place during July and August. Edward ifi himself left Newcastle for the north on 14
June, 11° dashed from Perth to the relief of Lochindorb in mid-July, by the end of August
had completed a foray of destruction, 111 and was back at Perth. He returned to England
for the council at Nottingham, held during September and October. In October he
returned to Scotland, to Stirling and then to Bothwell, staying there until December,
when he was back in England.112
It was noted above that 501 men-at-arms in retinues were in pay in May, and
that over the next three months that covered the campaign there were only
approximately another 300. About 100 of these were recorded under the heading
'knights of the king's household', coming into pay on dates after 14 June; 113 85 were the
retinue of the king's brother John de Eltham, in pay from departure from Newcastle on
28 July; 114 another 80 or so were in retinues of leaders described as in the king's
comitiva. 115 The numbers in individual retinues fluctuated; for instance William de
107 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 453.
108 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 465.
109 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 471.
BL Cotton Ms. Nero C.VIII, f. 241r.
111 The area round Aberdeen in particular was laid waste. J. Sumption sees this
as deliberate destruction of a possible landing place for the large French army of
invasion that was being planned. Hundred Years War, pp. 161-2.
112 E.
 W.
 M. Balfour-Melville, Edward III and David II, Historical Association
Pamphlet G27 (London, 1954).
113 in Cotton Ms. Nero C. VIII, if. 242r, 242v.
114 Ibid., f. 240r. Eltham died in September, according to this entry.
iis ibid., if. 241r, 241v.
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Montacute's was under twenty in June, but up to 58 in mid-August, 116
 though none of
the others showed such a variation, either absolutely or proportionately. Overall,
however, the retinues that were in pay in May declined in total after September. Almost
all of those categorised under knights of the household left by 10 December. 117 Thus
the size of the force of men-at-arms in the army reflected the presence or absence of the
king himself.
No general calls for more hobelars or archers were made during the summer,
though before the end of August Yorkshire, Chester, Suffolk and Wales had been
ordered to send men. 118 In October there were renewed demands for the Welsh 119 and
the men from Chester 12° to be delivered. Some new additions to the army were also
required. The Lancashire arrayers were to deliver 100 more archers to Berwick,
keeping their remaining 100 in readiness; 121
 the Staffordshire arrayers were to deliver
150 archers, keeping their remaining 50 ready to go, 122
 and another 540 archers, 80
from each of the Yorkshire Ridings, and the rest in units of 50 from different counties,
were to be chosen by arrayers, with someone to bring therri t6 Berwick: 23
 All these
were to be at Berwick by 1 November. The need to complain about the non-arrival of
the Welsh and the men from Chester shows the continuing unreliability of the system,
and the need for its active management.
In the middle of August a French fleet, collected for a possible crusade, was
known to have been moved from the Mediterranean t6 Brittany and Normandy. On 16
August both admirals were ordered to recall and arm their fleets, to deal with the threat
from the French galleys. 124 The order also told them to stop the quarrelling between the
Great Yarmouth and Cinque Ports men, a persistent problem. 125
 Local officials were
116 Ibid., f. 241r.
"7 Ibid., ff. 242r, 242v.
" 8 Above, p. 116.
119 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 462-3.
120 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 458.
121 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 456, dated 1 October. Their original 12 February quota was
500, of vvilom 300 had been required by the order of 27 March.
122 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 457, dated 3 October.
123 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 462.
124 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 442.
125 The rivalry between the ports wa g go bad that the two admirals had been told,
in effect, to keep the fleets apart, and the two sets of ports to send three or four of their
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necessary to implement the order to reassemble the fleets; the sheriffs of Cornwall,
Devon and Hampshire and the mayor of Bristol were ordered to proclaim that the de-
arrested ships were to sail to Geoffrey de Say off Sandwich to face the French
galleys. 126 In Hampshire particular arrangements existed. With the sheriff, John de
Sure, the clerk Robert de Eiteldoti and Roger Norman were told on 4 SOptetilber to
supervise the arming and crewing of the ships of Southampton, Portsmouth and the Isle
of Wight and send them to the admira1. 127 Naval defences were increased further by an
order of 18 August to the justiciar, chancellor and treasurer of Ireland to prepare, arm
and crew ships to go with other ships of the fleets to seek out the French galleys. 128 On
28 August the mayor of London, with three other eiti2eris, was to see to the arming of
three ships at the expense of the merchants, by the advice of John de Pulteney. This
was not to be at the expense of the 'middling' people, other merchants or foreigners.129
As usual, willingness to be conscripted was not universal. On 20 August John
de Norwico and Edmund de Grimsby were told to investigate, by the sworn evidence of
honest and lawful men of Norfolk and Suffolk, which arrested Ships went elgewhere,
and why. The report was to be made to the chancery. 13° On 6 September John de
Scures and Roger Norman were told to establish what arrested ships within their area
departed, who the owners and masters were, and seize their goods. Similar seizure was
authorised for John de Norwico, acting this time with Simon de Drayton, against the
recalcitrant of Norfolk and Suffolk. 131 These were rapid responses to disobedience, and
evidence of determined management.
The war at sea intensified in the autumn. On 2 October, with the preamble that
enemy fleets were attacking ships in ports and at sea, powerful commissions of men of
weight were appointed to arrest all ships suitable for war. William de Clinton, warden
of the Cinque Ports in SbeceSsiOn to Ralph Basset of Drayiori, Basset hirdself, a loyal
men to appear before the chancellor and others of the council for mediation. CCR 1333=-
1337, p. 693.
126 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 446, dated 24 August.
127 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 450.
128 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 442.
129 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 447. This looks as if Pulteney, one of the richest, was
organising a group of others to carry the cost.
130 Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 444-5.
131 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 451.
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and much used servant of Edward II as well as of Edward 111, 132
 and Sir Richard Talbot
were responsible for the ports from the Thames westward, including the Cinque Ports.
Sir William de Deyncourt, Sir John de Ros and Sir Humphrey de Littlebury were
responsible for ports from the Thames north. The arrested ships were to be prepared for
war, and crewed with mariners, crossbow-men and archers, and put to sea. 133
 An
incident at Boston may throw some doubt on the generalisation suggested earlier, that it
was the local officials who took the steps to arrest ships. The sailors of three ships
refused to sail for lack of victuals, and the mayor and bailiffs were told to supply them.
The ships were described as having been arrested by William de Deyncourt and John de
Ros.134
Arrangements had had to be made for provisioning the fleets recalled by the
order of 16 August. On 20 August the admiral, Geoffrey de Say, was authorised to
requisition victuals for his fleet in the southern and western coastal counties from Kent
to Gloucestershire, that is, the areas from which his ships came. Payment would be
made to those from whom the supplies were requisitimed by indentures to be presented
at the treasury on 11 November. 135
 Presumably relying on this authority, the masters of
a number of ships of the Cinque Ports were told to obtain provisions as instructed by de
Say, notifying the nature and price of what they took, for payment on that date.136
Robert de Emeldon, the clerk purveying in Hampshire, had been told earlier to provide
victuals for this fleet. Again, on 4 September, he was given instructions to deliver
provisions that he had bought by the advice of the sheriff of Hampshire, to the masters
of ships arrested from ports in that county. He and the sheriff were to decide on the
132 Under Edward II he had been constable of various castles, seized Kenilworth
castle for the king on the forfeiture of Thomas of Lancaster, been steward of Aquitaine,
and governor of the Channel Islands. Under Edward 111 he was justiciar of North
Wales. (Cockayne, Complete Peerage, Vol. II, pp. 2-3.) In August 1335 he personally
communicated the king's wishes to the magnates of five counties. CPR 1334-1338, p.
207.
133 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, pp. 456-7.
134 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 466, dated 24 October. On the other hand, this might only
mean 'on the authority of or 'by order of.
135 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 443-4. The barons of the Cinque Ports and the sheriffs of
nine counties, mostly along the south coast, but - according to the text - with the
addition of Lancashire, were told to assist. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 445.
136 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 446, dated 26 August.
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quantity.' 37
 On 25 August the sheriff of Kent was told to purvey 100 marks worth of
victuals and deliver them to de Say for the men of his fleet. 138 On 22 August the sheriff
of Norfolk and Suffolk received instructions to buy and supply corn and other victuals,
as ordered by the northern admiral, John de Norwico. He was to pay for them from the
issues of his bailiwick, or if there was not enough money, payment was to be made by
assignments on the treasury, on the same 11 November date as for de Say's debts.139
Taken together, these various orders, most issued within a few days of the order
to reassemble the fleets, indicate that the victualling of the fleets was under the general
authority of the admirals; that the victuals would be obtained locally, with the
cooperation of and sometimes via local officials; and that it seems that royal clerks did
not play a very important part. The provisions bought and stored in Hampshire appear
to be an isolated instance of prior central collection of supplies. For this fleet there was
naturally no organisation analogous to the receivers of the king's victuals; the ships went
from their home ports to assemble at sea.
The arrival of the French fleet in the Channel also led to another issue of orders.
to prepare for defence against invasion. As the French ships were at Brittany, Hugh de
Courtenay, earl of Devon and keeper of its coast and ports, received orders dated 18
August to guard the ports and be ready in case of attack. Yet again the importance of
setting up signal fires was stressed. Courtenay was to make regular reports 'to us1.14°
Warnings of the possible threat to Scotland and England from the arrival of the Frerioh
fleets went also to the earl of Chester and the bishop of Durham, requiring them to array
forces in case of attack.'"
On 27 August all officials and arrayers in twenty-five counties were told to be
ready with their men to follow the orders of the magnate appointed to be in charge of
the defence of their county. Eight magnates were named for these responsibilities:
William de Clinton; the earls of Hereford, Surrey, Devon, Arundel and Norfolk;
William de Ros and Thomas Wake de Lidell. William de Clinton, eoristable of Dover
castle, had responsibility only for Kent, and Arundel only for Hampshire. The earl of
Norfolk, marshal of England, was responsible for the east from Norfolk to Essex,
137 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 450.
138 CCR 1333-1337, p. 607.
139 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 445.
140 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 443. This order was warranted per consilium: it seems,
however, reasonable to guess that, like reports for which the chancery was specified as
the recipient, his reports would go there.
141 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 443, also on 18 August.
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including Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire, Hertfordshire and Middlesex. 142 This set
up a basic structure of command. It was followed by an order of 13 September,
covering the same twenty-five counties, for the keepers of the coasts to compel all who
owed service to protect the coasts to accept their duties.143
following the decisions at the council held at Nottingham an order was issued
dated 3 October for an array of knights, esquires and others on a comprehensive scale.
It covered all the counties of England, except Cumberland, Westmoreland,
Northumberland and the palatinates of Durham and Chester. From assemblies
organised as usual by the sheriffs, the arrayers and the deputies they appointed were to
ensure that there Was a defined number of men in each counfy armed and ready for
defence. The men were to have sufficient victuals for three weeks, and carts to carry
them. The total envisaged came to 83,400 men, to which would be added another 2,588
required of the towns by another order of the same date. The arrayers were to report
their action by 11 November. 144 This was, of course, only an array for defence, though
the inclusion of specific numbers and the references to provisions and carts made it
seem purposeful. It was, however, cancelled on 8 November, and the arrayers told to
return what money they had taken.145
This survey of the more important administrative aspects of military and naval
mobilization in 1336 suggests several points about its management. It is particularly
evident that there was coordinated planning of the several aspects of the initial
mobilization, shown by the close correspondence of the dates of the relevant writs.
Men-at-arms came mostly in the retinues of the magnates, and from the king's
household, so there was here little opportunity for active government management. On
the other hand, levies of hobelars and archers, called from some counties for the
expedition into Scotland via the arrayers and their deputies, did not always arrive in the
numbers and timing required. Such failures brought quite rapid corrective responses,
based it seems on a system requiring written reports to the chancery. King's clerks
continued at first to play an important part in supervising the action of port officials in
142 Ibid.,a.,a Vol. I, pp. 446.7.
143 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 453.
144 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 459-61. The writ was warranted per ipsum regem. The
requirement to report was expressed as ad certificandum nos: presumably the reports
were intended to go to the chancery, not to the king himself.
145 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 469.
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the collection of the fleets. Later the two admirals had an increasing role in this. As
with the raising of levies, disobedience to orders met with firm action.
As far as the army was concerned, the initial obtaining of supplies of foodstuffs
was by several routes, but merchants appointed as purveyors were increasingly
important. The reeeiVers of victuals played the major role in holding and distributing
supplies. No corresponding organisation to the receivers of victuals existed for the
fleets, for which victuals were obtained under the authority of the admirals, though the
ships' home ports had responsibility for equipping them for war.
Perhaps the most significant feature is the evidence of recognition of the need to
monitor performance and react quickly to actual or impending failure, and of the ability
to do so.
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CHAPTER 7
CRECY AND CALAIS
The themes of this chapter will be the mobilization of the army that fought the battle of
Crecy, and its maintenance during the siege of Calais. How far the English expedition
was planned with such major strategic intentions must be doubtful; the plan may well
have been simply 'to march eastward to effect a junction with the advancing Flemings.'1
Edward conflict With Philip de Valois, his 'adversary of Franee', 2 embraced, in
addition to his theoretical claim to the French throne, the urgent defence of Gascony,
opportunist intervention in Brittany and aggressive Flemish alliances. All three theatres
involved English armed forces, though naturally the army led by the king himself to
land at St. Vaast La Hogue on 12 July 1346 was much the largest.
The Truce of Malestroit of January 1343 was no more than that - a truce: there
can be little doubt that Edward envisaged a resumption of war, and on a larger scale.
The papacy-led conference at Avignon that lasted from October 1344 to February 1345
had no chance of bringing peace between England and France, as the English
ambassadors' instructions were to insist on Edward's claim to the French throne.3
Though he did not formally renounce the truce until the middle of Julie 1345,
preparations for war had begun well in advance. The evidence is that systematic
planning took place.
In October 13444
 commissioners were appointed to find by inquisition the
names of those with holdings yielding defined levels 5
 of yearly net income of land and
rent; religious holding by fee of the church were excluded. The tertirng
 show that this
was not a precise assessment such as might be made for purposes of taxation, but a
categorisation to establish the military resource available. 6 In most cases three
1 McKisack, Fourteenth Century, p. 133.
2 Foedera, Vol. ifi, div. i, p. 110, and passim.
3 Sumption, Hundred Years War, pp. 441-4.
4 CPR 1343-1345, pp. 414-6.
5 100s., £10, £25, £50, 100 marks, £100, £150, £200, and so on to £1,000 and
upwards. Ibid.
6 e.g. C4712/41 (5): the 'value' against each name is given as exactly one of the
set levels.
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appointments, two of them knights, were made for each county. The counties were
taken separately, even where the shrieval organisation, as with Surrey and Sussex,
paired them. 7 The survey covered only the midland and southern counties, and
excluded Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire and the north. 8 Presumably the intention was to
leave the north to hold off the SOB, while the attack on Ranee drew on the rest of the
country. Returns from this census were required by Epiphany, 6 January 1345.
In a follow-up order of 9 January,9 a number of higher-ranking appointees were
to inform themselves of the names of holders of lands of annual value up to £1,000 and
more in the counties in the October list. 10 They were to report their action by Sunday
mid-Lent, 6 March. They included such magnates as Richard Fitzalan earl of Arundel,
Hugh de Courtenay earl of Devon, and Thomas de Beauchamp, earl of Warwick. 11 For
the most part the counties were still covered individually, though Arundel had
responsibility for Surrey, Sussex and Hampshire, and, with John de Leybum and John
Lestrange, for Shropshire as well. The important aspect of this order was its preamble,
explicitly defining its purpose. Because of the threats from the French and the Scots, it
was necessary for the king 'to have the armed power of the realm in readiness'.
Therefore, 'with the advice and assent of the prelates, nobles and others,' he ordained
that holders of land should be assessed to arms by the value scale set out for the earlier
October inquisition. The specific levels of military obligation were defined in this
7 Smaller units - Rutland and the three divisions of Lincolnshire - have two
names each. Middlesex, Somerset, Staffordshire and Devon have four. CPR 1343-
1345, pp. 414-416.
8 Powicke, Military Obligation, p. 196, says '...the measure of 1344 was to
apply to the whole country', though these northern areas were not in the list of counties
for which commissioners were appointed.
9 CPR 1343-1345, p. 427.
10 One exception is Nottinghamshire, not in the October list, but, with
Lincolnshire, allocated to John Darcy le pere in January. Bedfordshire is in the October
list, but not in the January One. Ibid.
11 J
 
is not easy to see a pattern in these appointments, except that they include
men of higher rank. For instance, though Arundel had sole responsibility for three
shires, he shared responsibility for Shropshire with two other men. The earl of
Warwick shared responsibility for Warwickshire with the knight William de Lucy, and
for Leicestershire with the knight William Motoun. Gerard de firaybrok had sole
responsibility for Bedfordshire, but Gloucestershire was allocated to Thomas de
Berkeley and Thomas de Bradeston. Ibid.
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order of 9 January 1345. They were expressed not only as a requirement to serve in
person but also as a requirement of those with £50 and above to provide soldiers as well
as serve. 12 They were now being imposed and related simply to wealth. It is also
noteworthy that from the lowest category, the 100s. land-holder (who was to be
assessed to arms as a mounted archer) up, all categories Were to be, or be aiid provide, a
mounted man or men.
These October and January actions describe what appears as deliberate
preparation for planning and managing mobilization. Detailed information on potential
was gathered first, over some ten weeks, by specially appointed commissioners, two-
thirds of whom were knights. This was centralised. Immediately it was ready theft 6f
higher ranlc, 13 including six earls, had to make themselves aware of it. Presumably they
were to use their standing and authority to make the potential suppliers of soldiers in
turn aware and accepting of their new specific obligations; the requirement to report
what had been done would not only act as a stimulus to action but also provide valuable
information as to the resources available.
How detailed and useful this information was can be seen in many later entries
in the Treaty rolls. Several instances 14 show that the information was not fully accurate,
and could be successfully challenged. On 18 July 1346 the sheriff of Northamptonshire
was told not to require Thomas de la More to provide one hobelar, because, though 'in
the roll under the Great Seal sent to you' he was assessed to find one hobelar, witness to
the council by trustworthy men had established that he did not have 100s. of land in the
county. 15 Change to the level of assessment was not only by way of reduction. The
sheriff of Essex was told to make the knight Walter Eygoce provide one man-at-arms,
one hobelar and one archer, though in the roll he had been wrongly assessed at just the
hobelar and archer. 16 This indicates that the information on the specific Obligation of
named individual holders of land in each county was recorded and sent to local officials
in written form. They could also use it to make sure the obligation was fulfilled: 7 In
12 Powicke, Military Obligation, pp. 194-5, discusses the precedents.
13 In only one county, Cornwall, was the task given explicitly to the sheriff,
Henry de Tredewy. CPR 1343-1345, p. 427.
14 Crecy and Calais from the Public Records, ed. G. Wrottesley (London, 1898),
e.g. pp. 142, 149, 151, 153.
15 C76/23, m. 25d.
16 C76/22, m. 17, dated 9 April 1346.
17 For instance, the sheriff of Suffolk was charged to warn the men 'named in a
roll lately sent to him' to find the men-at-arms, hobelars and archers assessed upon them
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Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire some of those whose wealth made them liable to
assessment to arms failed to present themselves before the arrayers. The coroners of
those counties, provided with a roll containing the names of the malingerers, were
ordered to make them appear, so that the supervisors of that array, Richard de la Vache
and the clerk Walter Power, could make them either serve Or find substitutes.18
It is possible that the results of the October 1344 inquisition were also used to
assess fines accepted instead of personal service. On 31 March 1346 supervisors of
array, for all the counties of the January 1345 list except Nottinghamshire, Devon and
Cornwall (but including Bedfordshire), were told to treat and agree such fines with
those assessed for men-at-arms and hobelars but wishing to commute service. The fites
were to be set habita consideratione ad terras, tenementa, bona et catalla sua ac onera
eis incumbentes, 19 phraseology roughly reminiscent of the instructions to the
commissioners of October 1344.
As Powicke observes, surviving returns 'give a convincing demonstration of the
thoroughness of the commissioners: 2° Further, the fact that the results, recorded in all
for their lands (CPR 1345-1348, p. 59). On 26 February 1346 the sheriffs of Devon and
Shropshire were told to inform the king of all holders of land of the various values
'which [they] had not done, though all other sheriffs came at the day appointed', to warn
the holders of their military obligations, and array them at once so they would be at
Portsmouth on the Sunday in mid-Lent, 26 March (C76/22, m. 2). This might appear to
imply that the returns from the 1344 sure)' were in the sheriffs' hand .nd riOt centrally
assembled even as late as 1346. Read together with the references to changes in
assessment on the information of 'trustworthy men' it is arguable that the reporting by
the sheriffs referred to was essentially an updating of the returns. In E. M. Thompson's
edition of Murimuth reference is made, under 1346, to assessment to arms on the basis
of wealth: ...in Quadrage,i'ima.fecit inquiri de valáre terrarum et itddition, id` de
quolibet habente centum solidos in redditus unum sagittarum haberet trans mare cum
ipso etc.. (Adae Murimuth Continuatio Chronicarum [1303-1347], ed. E. M. Thompson
[London, 1889], p. 192.) Quadragesima was 5 March, which is not obviously
reconcilable with the 26 February orders to the two sheriffs. However, given the 9
January 1345 date of the first mention of this scale of military obligation, Mutimuth
could be seen to supporting the proposition that this 1346 action was an up-dating of the
records.
18 C76/22, m. 17.
19 Foedera, Vol. 111, div. i, pp. 77-8.
2° Military Obligation; p. 196:
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their detai1,21
 were available and used must surely be seen as evidence of a management
system that recognised the value of precise information. This information facilitated
mobilization of the expeditionary annies of 1345 and 1346, and probably the sustained
reinforcement in 1346 and 1347 of the army besieging Calais. The obligations
originally imposed were theoretically for defence, and so only 'a revision of the Statute
of Winchester',22 but they were successfully extended in 1346 (in spite of objections that
it was a new imposition)23 to provide men for service overseas.
From February 1345 more preparations for attacking France were made. The
Dover authorities were to apply a prohibition on the export of horses, obviously a
critical military resource. They were also not to allow men-at-arms to go ahroad.24
Overseas expeditions required maritime organisation: Richard earl Arundel was
appointed admiral of the West on 23 February. Robert Ufford earl of Suffolk had been
admiral of the North from 15 June 1344. 25
 This appointment was repeated on 14 March
1345.26
21 e.g. C4712141 (3) (which is set out by the county's hundreds), or C4712141 (5).
With similar precision, returns of arrays name archers and which are the vintenars,
name centenars, and define the arms possessed by each individual - e.g. C47/2158 (18).
At least one such return, that of the sheriff of Rutland (C47/2/34 [5]), is set out in a
clear and organised form, listing the thirty archers he has selected in three neatly written
columns often. All this is supporting evidence of well-ordered administration.
22 Povvicke, Military Obligation, p. 197.
23 'Finally it became clear in the course of the summer [1346] that instead of this
being a means of raising men for the royal expedition it was turning into a form of
taxation as individuals and towns commuted their assessed obligation for money
fines.. .The opposition to this is evident in the chronicles.. .and in the parliament roll.'
Harriss, King, Parliament and Public Finance, p. 392. Murimuth says ...quod videbatur
toti regno valde grave, et antea nun quam visum, et maxime ad transeundum extra
regnum. Continuatio, ed. E. M. Thompson, p. 192.
24 This prohibition did not apply to horses of under 60s. value, or for personal
transport. (Foedera, Vol. HI, div. i, p. 30, dated 20 Febniaty.) After his appoiiitttiettt
as admiral of the West, the earl of Arundel was given instructions not to allow barons or
men-at-arms to leave the realm without special licence. C76/20, m. 35, dated 25
February.
25 CCR 1343-1346, p. 315.
26 C76/20, m. 35.
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Though Henry of Lancaster, earl of Derby, was apparently not formally
appointed captain and the king's lieutenant in Gascony until 10 May, 27 in February
arrayers were being told to provide him with soldiers. Orders of 25 February appointed
three arrayers to find 125 foot-archers in Staffordshire, four to find 125 in Derbyshire,
and four for 125 in Lancashire. M usual, the arrayers received authority to arrest those
who resisted their orders, and for two or three - but not one on his own - to act for all.
The Prince of Wales was to appoint three arrayers to select another 125 foot archers28
and have them ready to go with the earl of Derby.29 He was also to provide 500
Welshmen, 250 from North and 250 from South Wales. Half were to be armed with
bows and half with lances. 3° It is noticeable that this elemetit of the foree to go with
Henry earl of Derby to Gascony was not mounted, and was drawn from areas not only
apparently having connections with him, but also outside the October 1344 survey.
The first orders for sea transport for the 1345 reinforcement of Gascony were
made on 1 March. The admiral of the West was to have at Bristol by the octave of
Easter, 3 April, enough ships to carry the troops of Ralph Bum Stafford, seneschal of
Gascony. 31 The ships, thirteen32 of 40 tons burden, were to be handed over to two of
the king's sergeants-at-arms. The latter were to receive them, and arrange for them to
be equipped with gang-planks and hurdles so they could transport horses. The sheriffs
of Somerset and Gloucestershire were to provide the equipment.33
General instructions to have shipping available were given on 8 and 10 March.
Ships and barges were to be at their ports, ready to sail at the king's charge, by the
octave of Easter. To see to this four men, including a sergeant-at-arms, were named as
deputies for the admiral of the West, and three for the admiral of the North. 34 Reginald
de Donyngton, a king's clerk, was appointed lieutenant to Ufford, admiral of the North,
27 Foedera, Vol. ifi, div. i, p. 37.
28 C76/20, m. 34.
29 His officials encountered difficulties, servants of the queen impeding the
collection of these archers. The queen was required to halt this obstruction. Ibid., m.
20, dated 26 May
30 Ibid., m. 34.
31 It seems that Stafford went earlier than and separately from the troops, as a
ship was to be at Dartmouth for him by Palm Sunday. C76/20, m. 33.
32 Fourteen, according to Murimuth. Continuatio, ed. E. M. Thompson, p. 164.
33 Later, on 2 May responsibility for six ships was given to the sheriff of
Gloucester, and for the other seven to the sheriff of Somerset. C76120, m. 33.
34 C76/20, m. 34.
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to see to the arrest of ships in ports from King's Lynn to Berwick. The sheriffs of the
counties of the eastern sea-board and the mayors and bailiffs of the ports were
instructed to obey and assist the admirals and the others in requisitioning ships.35
Though formal over-all powers to requisition and equip ships and apply sanctions to the
uncooperative - imprisonment in the Tower 36 - were given to the admirals, the
responsibility for the actual work lay with the appointed deputies, usually members of
the central royal entourage. The role of local officials was to support - possibly as
much not to obstruct - them.
The assembly of the levies for the earl of Derby's force was fixed for 14 May, at
Southampton. The arrayers for Staffordshire, Derbyshire and Lancashire were told On
13 March to array their quotas now, if they had not already done so, and deliver them to
Southampton themselves. 37 The similar order for the Prince of Wales' Welshmen was
dated 8 Apri1. 38 The sheriff of Sussex was told that he was to provide gang-planks and
hurdles for 25 ships, the sheriff of Hampshire for 25, and the sheriff of Wiltshire for 20,
a total of 70 ships due at Southampton by Sunday three weeks after Easter, 17 Apri1.39
This then became 247 ships to be at Southampton by the vigil of Pentecost, 14 May,
100 to be supplied with their equipment from Sussex, 100 from Hampshire and the
remaining 47 from Wiltshire. 40 The sheriff of Sussex and his men encountered violent
opposition in their task, and he was told to take and imprison those resisting hiM.41
The expedition's departure was delayed by contrary winds. Not until 11 Ririe
were the sheriffs of London told to proclaim that Derby's horses were now being loaded
at Southampton, and all who were to go with him should hasten there. 42 This passage
probably illustrates the problems of coordinating muster and transport, and the
problems of keeping even an only moderately sized force together in a period of
inaction. In fact Derby did not complete disembarkation at Bordeaux Until 9 Augtist.43
35 Ibid., m. 33.
36 ibid.
37 Ibid., m. 32.
38 ibid.
39 Ibid., m. 31, dated 10 March.
40 Ibid. The entry in the roll gives no explanation for, or reconciliation of, these
numbers. Sumption, Hundred Years War, p. 457, says Derby's fleet was 'more than 150
ships'.
41 C76/20, m. 24, dated 18 April.
42 Foedera, Vol. 111, div. i, p. 44.
43 SUMptiOIA, Hundred Years War, p. 463.
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Two smaller expeditions sailed in June. Sir Thomas Ferrers took about 100 men
to Guernsey." The larger was that of William de Bohm, earl of Northampton, to
Brittany. He had been named captain and the king's lieutenant in France and Brittany
on 24 April:45 The terms under which he undertook this role were set out in the
indenture of 27 April between the earl arid the king. The king was to be told of all
prisoners worth a ransom of £500, with right of first refusal. Northampton was to be
paid wages and 'regard' for himself and his force quarterly while he remained in
Brittany. His horses were to be valued for restor de chevaux by the king's clerk. The
king was to provide shipping, equipped to carry horses, for both the passage to France
and the return thence. Some ships were to remain with the earl at the kirig's charge: one
of the king's clerks was to see to this. Northampton could leave Brittany if not paid
promptly at the beginning of each quarter.46
Hugh de Courtenay, earl of Devon, contributed men to go with Northampton's
force. On 16 April the admiral of the West was told to provide sufficient shipping at
Dartmouth, as determined by Courieriay, to transport hi then and their horses, the
sheriff of Devon supplying the necessary gang-planks and hurdles. 47 Protections dated
17 May were issued for Northampton and some seventy others, and for John de Vere,
earl of Oxford, and another fifty about to go with him, on 23 May. 48 On 4 June the
mayor and sheriffs of London were told to proclaim that all men-at-arms, archers and
others going with Northampton to t3rittany should be at -Portsmouth" by 6 or 1 June,
ready to embark. 5° By 11 June he had sailed with some 500 men.51
This Brittany expedition, therefore, seems to have been a contract amiy52
recruited by the earls of Northampton and Devon themselves, without recourse to royal
" Ibid., p. 459.
45 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 37.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., Vol. ifi, div. I, p. 35; C76/20, m. 26.
48 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, pp. 38-40.
49 Demonstrating the problems arising from the passage of groups of soldiers on
their way to ports, on 7 May commissioners had been appointed to look into trespasses
committed both by and against men on their way to Portsmouth. CPR 1345-M48, p.
113.
50 Foedera, Vol. HI, div. i, p. 42.
51 Sumption, Hundred Years War, p. 458.
52 The origins and the development of contracting for raising armies are
discussed in Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, pp. 88-100, Cf. A. E Prince; 'The
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administration, that is, without troops raised by commissions of array and selection; the
royal organisation was used to provide shipping, and of course the finance.
The fourth expeditionary force assembled in 1345 was that of the king himself,
which sailed for Sluys at the end of June, returning by 26 July after the death of Van
Artevelde. For this expedition also the army's muster date VMS Set as the vigil of
Pentecost, 14 May, and the port as Sandwich. The officials of the Cinque Ports were,
on 14 March, told to send their service there by the Monday after Ascension, 9 May.53
On 20 March instructions were given for the muster. 1,000 Welshmen, half
archers and half armed with lances, were to be sent by the Prince of Wales. 160 archers
were to be provided by the mayor and sheriffs of London, who were to depute leaders fa
take them to Sandwich. 54 With the same date, 20 March, selection was ordered of
1,940 archers across 28 counties. 55 All were to be at Sandwich by the general muster
date, 14 May. The archers were to be chosen by the sheriff or the arrayer from some
7,000 described as previously arrayed. 56 A report of the names of those chosen was to
be made to the chancery. Detailed allocations were made to each county, but exhibit no
proportional pattern: for example 70 were to come from Suffolk's original 200, 50 from
Worcestershire's 240, 40 from Somerset's 320, 100 from Shropshire's 140. 57 Then,
almost three weeks later, 'to relieve the people as much as possible', which may suggest
that there had been some grumbling, the quotas for London and most of the counties
were reduced, in total by almost exactly One half, to 80 from Loridori and 975 from the
counties. In the majority of cases the new figure was an exact half, though
Indenture System under Edward DT in J. G. Edwards, V. H. Galbraith, E. F. Jacob (eds.)
Historical Essays in Honour of James Tait (Manchester, 1993), pp. 283-297.
33 C76120, m. 31.
54 Ibid. A following order of 31 March warned the aldermen of London to assist
the arrayers and not impede them (Ibid.). If this reflected the jealous guarding of their
privileges by town officials, it was perhaps repeated, successfidly, by Cambridge, whose
mayor and bailiffs were given permission to select their nine of the county's 60
themselves. Ibid., m. 28, dated 8 April.
55 C76/20, m. 30.
56 This substantial array seems, from the identity of county numbers, to be that
ordered on 13 May 1344. The preamble to that said it was necessary because Philip de
Valois was acting contrary to the truce. (C76/19, m. 14.) It included more counties -
e.g. Lancashire - than those now providing the 1,940 archers.
57 C76/20, m. 30.
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Oxfordshire's, Warwickshire's and Somerset's were not changed. 58 The date for arrival
at Sandwich remained 14 May; a report was to be made a week before, the Sunday after
Ascension, 8 May. The archers not sent under these reduced quotas were nevertheless
to be kept in readiness.
These two orders, with their detailed numbers, show that the administration of
planning could be very precise. There seems to be no way of knowing, at this distance
in time, whether the non-mathematical relationship between the detailed breakdowns of
the 1,940 and of the c.7,000 was haphazard, or - more probably - the result of awareness
of varying local circumstances. However, the subsequent halving, both in total and in
detail (with few but what look like deliberate exceptions) does have the clear
appearance of administration done simply and efficiently by use of records. This is
supported by the near coincidence of the order in which the counties were named.
Effective administration is obviously facilitated by the keeping of coherent records.
The requirement to make a report a week before the task was due for completion
provided both an effective ineentive to officials to perform, and an ooiity for
central management to keep track of progress.
In the event the muster was postponed, first on 25 April to the octave of Holy
Trinity, 29 May,59
 and again, on 20 May, in angry sounding orders demanding delivery
of the county archers by two weeks of Holy Trinity, to 5 June. This date was given to
the special force of 50 mounted archers raised it Shropshire, Woreestershire and
Herefordshire by the king's valettus, as the king's bodyg-uard. 6° Delivery of the Prince of
Wales' 1,000 Welshmen was urged, impatience being recognisable in the order that
'without delay report should be made of their names and the action taken: 61 clearly,
progress was monitored. Inevitably, during April and May new arrangements had to be
made to replace some originally designated arrayers, or leaders appointed to take the
men to Sandwich. There would, of course, have been a variety of good reasons for this
having to be done: however, where, as in the case of Guy de St.Clare, an arrayer for
Huntingdonshire, the man appointed to see to recruits for the king's force mustering at
58 Ibid., m. 29, dated 8 April.
59 Ibid., m. 27, prior reporting being now required by 14 May.
6° Ibid.
61 Ibid., m. 22. Another entry in the roll is addressed to the Leicestershire
arrayers: vos gesseritis...tepide et negligente. It continues ...eodem modo mandatum est
singulis arrationibus sagittorum usque Sandwichum ducendorum mutatis mutanalis sub
eandem datam. Ibid.
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Sandwich had actually gone with John de Vere, earl of Oxford, to Brittany, 62
 there may
be evidence of the looseness of administrative control inherent in dependence on ad hoc
appointments. New men were needed for Gloucestershire, Herefordshire, Norfolk,
Suffolk, Hampshire, Essex and Derbyshire as wel1.63
Just as the halving of the quotas of archers may have indicated a degree of
unwillingness to be conscripted, there is concrete evidence of temporarily successful
resistance. The halved quota for Thomas Pichard and the sheriff, William de Radenore,
to find in Herefordshire was 40. Even so, they were so impeded that the quota was not
produced in time. This resulted in an angry remonstrance dated 6 June, accompanied
by orders to arrest and imprison those Who had been rebellious, and to proceed tO raise
the required number and have them ready to go when and where they would be told.64
The government reaction at least demonstrated what may have been even an immediate
response, if the remonstrance dated 6 June was occasioned by the failure to meet the 5
June date for the muster. The impression of an administration watching the progress of
its plans closely is supported by the 1 June instruction to Rees ap riffith, the leader of
the Welshmen, to bring his men quickly to Sandwich.65
The ordinance of January 1345 had laid on individuals the obligation to provide
themselves with defined arms and armour according to their assessment. It was the
royal government's responsibility to secure an adequate replacement supply of bows,
arrows and bowstrings, the armament that had become the critically effective English
resource. The Tower of London was the central arsenal for them, where the king's clerk
Robert de Mildenhall, keeper of the privy wardrobe situated at the Tower66 had
responsibility for holding the accumulated supply. In orders dated 20 March sheriffs of
some twenty counties and London were each allocated specific quantities of bows,
sheaves of arrows and bowstrings, to be obtained and delivered to the Tower by the
vigil of Pentecost, 14 May. The totals came to 3,300 bows, 8,040 sheaves and 20,000
bowstrings, defined quantities which Robert de Mildenhall was told to expect. 67 This
procedure showed the continued importance of the sheriffs' role in the obtaining of
supplies. It would also not only give Mildenhall time to make any necessary
administrative and physical arrangements for receipt and storage of the weapons, but
62 Ibid., m. 26.
63 Ibid., mm. 20, 28, 26.
64 Ibid., m. 7.
65 Ibid., m. 17.
66 Tout, Chapters, Vol. IV, pp. 442, 450-1.
67 C76/20, mm. 31, 26, dated 25 March.
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would in addition set up a means of checking that the sheriffs had carried out their
instructions. As with the mustering of the county and Welsh levies, the management of
mobilization employed deliberate monitoring arrangements.
The date of 14 May for the delivery of the bows, the same as, at that point in
time, the date for the earl of Derby's free to be at Seltithapiptoh mid the kihg's at
Sandwich, points to an intentionally coordinated set of plans. In planning terms, the
operations directed respectively at Gascony, Brittany and Flanders did succeed, in so far
as all three expeditions left England roughly - except for the delays to that to Gascony
caused by contrary winds - within a few weeks of the original date, and on the intended
scale.
Defence of Gascony and intervention in the peninsula of Brittany in the far west
were on their own unlikely to make a major impact on the balance of strength between
Philip de Valois and Edward ifi. Nor could the latter's brief foray to Sluys with a force
of perhaps a couple of thousand, which was sent to its homes on his return, to await
further orders,68 have done more thati draw attentiori to the continuation of England's
Flemish connection. If Philip VI's position was to be destabilised a much more
substantial effort was needed.69
This must have been the intention even at the beginning of July 1345. As the
king sailed for Sluys, orders dated 4 July went to the earl of Devon and a long list of
individual barons, bannerets, knights and esquires, over 300 in all. They were to be
with their retinues equis et armis et hominibus bene munitis by the feast of St.Laurence,
10 August, at a location to be told to them, ready to cross with the king, at his wages.7°
This was followed on 3 August by instructions to the sheriffs covering all counties
except Yorkshire and the north, to proclaim that all barons, bannerets, knights and
esquires between the ages of 16 and 60 should arm themselves according to their status
and be prepared to go on the king's service.71
68
et dedit omnibus licentiam ad propria remeandi, quousque esset aliud
ordinatum. Murimuth, Continuatio, ed. E. M. Thompson, p. 170.
69 Perhaps Edward genuinely intended to depose Philip and himself become
king of France: perhaps he only intended to use that threat as a bargaining counter to
obtain a secure hold on Gascony: perhaps he thought there might be a possibility of
recovering Normandy as well. Whatever his aims may have been, halting the sustained
growth of the centralising power of the French crown and its consequences for the
English hold on Gascony necessitated major action.
70 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, pp. 50-53.
71 Ibid., p. 55.
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These two 'warning orders' made ready men-at-arms for mobilization. A date
and port for embarkation must have been decided upon during August. On 28 August
Richard earl of Arundel, admiral of the West, was told that the king had ordered a
passage with a powerful force to sail three weeks from the feast of St.Michael, i.e. 20
October. Arundel was therefore to requisition all ships Of thirty tOrig
 and above lit peons
of his admiralty to be at Portsmouth by the octave of St. Michael, 7 October. The same
order went to the admiral of the North, to the admirals' lieutenants Philip de Witton and
Reginald de Donyngton, and to Robert Flambard, who was to cover London's ships.72
Securities for appearance at Portsmouth could be taken if the ships wished meanwhile
to go elsewhere to trade, the chancery being notified of them. 73
 These general orders
were supported by instructions to officials to obey Witton and Donyngton and their
deputies. 74
 The town officials of the east coast ports from Newcastle to Maldon had
already been told on 26 August to obey Donyngton and the king's sergeant-at-arms
Richard de Cortenhale, and the bishop of Durham received similar instructions dated 31
August. 75
 Perhaps to show that the arresting of ships would be enforced, Or 29 August
commissions were appointed covering most coastal counties. These were to find out,
by the sworn evidence of lawful men, the names of ship-owners, masters and sailors
who had broken their arrest (presumably for the June and July sailings), had stayed in
their home ports, or had returned without licence. 76
 For the current operation a number
of individuals were given authority to take sailors and others as neeessary for crews,
with power to arrest men who refused to be taken. 77
 Some named men refused to be
taken for the king's galley by its master, and the sheriff of Kent was told to arrest and
imprison them.78
Orders to assemble an army for the proposed departure on 20 October were also
issued on 28 August. The mayor and sheriffs of London were to find 320 archers and
choose men to bring them to the muster; once again, the aldermen were told to assist
and obey the arrayers. 79
 The mayor and sheriffs of London,8° like sheriffs and arrayers
72 A later order of 8 September associated Richard Attwood with him. C76121,
m. 7.
73 Foedera, Vol. HI, div. i, p. 57.
74 C76121, m. 10, dated 28 August
75 Ibid., m. 8d.
76 Ibid., m. 11d.
77 ibid., mm. 12, 10, 7, 6.
78 Ibid., m. 9d, dated 1 September.
79 Ibid., m. 8d.
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in the counties, 81
 were reminded of the 3 August proclamation relating to men-at-arms
and that the date of the passage was fixed as 20 October. They were to identify all not
in retinues82
 and warn them to be at Portsmouth by then. 83 The Prince of Wales was to
select 4,000 Welshmen, as before half archers and half with lances, and appoint men to
lead them to Portsmouth. 84
 Sheriffs and arrayers in the counties below Trent were
allocated in detail a total of 3,700 archers to be selected, provided with bows and
arrows, and brought to Portsmouth by 20 October. 85 The sheriffs of Lancashire and
Staffordshire had to proclaim that all with pardons in return for a promise to serve
should be at Portsmouth by 7 October, or they would have the pardons revoked.86
Miring September minor orders were issued, appointing more arrayers in some
counties, defining individual responsibility for leading recruits to Portsmouth,
recognising - again - the privileges of Cambridge to array its own men. At this time
these orders still envisaged the 20 October date for departure. However, on 29
September all arrayers were told that that date was no longer possible, because the ships
were not ready. Arrayers and leaders should therefore not bring their rneri 10
Portsmouth, but keep them ready for a new summons, and tell the chancery how many
men-at-arms and archers they had. 87
A good deal of light might be thrown on the practicalities of assembling a fleet
for the transport of men-at-arms, archers, horses and supplies if it could be discerned
why the ships for this expedition could not be ready in tinie. 88
 It Would, of eourse, have
80 Ibid., m. 12d.
81 Ibid., m. 8.
82 Anyone claiming to be already in a retinue was to show a letter proving it.
Names of men-at-arms not in retinues were to be reported by 29 September. C76/21, m.
8.
83 Ibid., m. 9.
84 He had also been required to select 100 archers in Cheshire in an order of 26
August. Ibid., m. 10.
85 Ibid., m. 9. The arrayers for the archers were also responsible, with the
sheriffs, for the census of men-at-arms not in retinues.
86 CCR 1343-1346, p. 650.
87 C76/21, mm. 4, 4d.
88 This assumes that unreadiness of ships was the real reason, and not just an
excuse to conceal other problems.
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been a much larger expedition, at probably well over 10,000, 89 than any of the others,
and so would have needed a correspondingly larger fleet. Because merchant ships had
to be modified to carry horses, there may have been too much pressure on labour and
materials. Probably there had not been enough thought given to calculating how many
would be needed, though this might be a little surprising given the precise numbers
recorded in advance for the transport of Lord Stafford's men and Henry of Lancaster's
force. Possibly the time allowed between the decision to requisition ships and the
embarkation was not enough for the numbers involved. Stafford only needed 40 ships:
these were apparently ready within the five weeks between 1 March and 3 April.
Almost eleven weeks were allowed between the 8 March order for all ships to make
themselves available for the earl of Derby, and his planned sailing date of 14 May in the
247 he was to use. About the same notice applied to Edward's sailing from Sandwich.
Only seven-and-a-half weeks was now allowed between the 28 August orders to collect
ships and the intended 20 October embarkation. Also there were five times as many
men as in the earlier instances. When Edward did eventually sail, with a Three
admittedly probably even larger than that available in 1345, Thomas Hog's edition of
Murimuth's chronicle described his ships as numbering 1,500.9°
The employment of ships to take armies to Brittany, Gascony, the Channel
Islands and Flanders in the preceding three or four months would not have made the
concentration at Portsmouth of the much larger number now needed any easier. The 29
August appointments to identify disobedient ships involved in those earlier operations
may have reflected the consequent 'disorder'. In sum, the cancellation of the
embarkation because shipping was not available has probably to be seen as the result of
administrative inability to forecast and handle the scale and complexity of the task.
89 4,000 Welshmen, 3,700 archers, plus retinues and men-at-arms not in
retinues. Ayton puts the figure at 14,000. A. Ayton, 'The English Army and the
Normandy Campaign of 1346', in D. Bates and A. Curry (eds, England and Normandy
in the Middle Ages (London, 1994), p. 268.
9° ...cum milk quingentis navihus et amplius. Adami kurimuthensis Chronica
Sui Temporis, ed. T. Hog (London, 1846), p. 164. Thompson's edition has 750 - ...ita
quod in fine mensis Junii habuit ibidem, secundum aestimationem, septingenti et
quinquaginta naves magnas et parvas. (Continuatio, p. 198.) If Ayton's estimate that
the army at La Hogue numbered c. 14,000 is about right, 750 great and small ships may
seem aii under-estithate. Mother chronicler says ...rex Edwardus trarisfittavit in
Normanniam cum mule .c. magnis navibus et .v.c. minoribus navibus. Knighton's
Chronicle, ed. G. H. Martin (Oxford, 1995) p. 54.
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The date for mounting a major expedition from Portsmouth was merely
postponed. The authorities involved in collecting shipping of 30 tons and above 91
 were
told on 22 October that it was now required to be at Portsmouth by the quindene of the
Purification, 17 February. Ships could meanwhile give securities to return there by then
if they wished to sail: as usual the chancery was to be told the tiames. 92 Though PO
doubt the long gap, some sixteen weeks, was mainly because the winter months
intervened, it did allow more time for ships to be made ready. On 26 October two
sergeants-at-arms, Walter de Hanleye and Griffin de Cadwallader, were appointed to
secure more 30-ton ships from the ports from Chester to Carlisle and Chester to
Chepstow respectively, to be at Portsmouth by 17 Febthaty. 93 This, taken with later
orders to requisition smaller ships, could support the view that the reason for
abandoning the 20 October date was simply that there were not enough ships, rather
than that they were not yet adapted for transport of horses. Two more sergeants-at-arms
were named on 1 January to arrest 30-ton ships in the Cinque Ports, Kent and Sussex,
and have them also prepared and at Portsmouth by 17 February. 94 On 7 January
Bartholomew de Burghersh, warden of the Cinque Ports, and Philip de Witton were told
to have all 30-ton ships ready to be at Portsmouth for then. The names and the number
of ships were to be reported to the chancery by 2 February.95
91 These were the two admirals, their lieutenants Donyngton and Witton,
Flambard and Attwood covering London, Thomas de Melcheburn and William de
Nottingham in Flanders, the seneschal of Gascony and the constable and mayor of
Bordeaux, who had all been told at one time or another to supply ships.
92 C76/21, m. 4.
93 Ibid., m. 5.
94 Ibid., m. 2. A point of some interest in these and previous arrangements for
requisitioning ships is the frequency with which the royal agents were sergeants-at-
arms. Tout describes the sergeants-at-arms as forming 'a little standingS force of
cavalry', numbering twenty in the ordinance of 1279, and thirty in 1318. 'Each of these
troopers was a personage of importance.' (Chapters, Vol. 171, p. 135.) Later he refers to
'the ubiquitous activities of the king's sergeants-at-arms, who collected loans and taxes,
impressed men and ships, served on local commissions, and in all sorts of ways
interfered with the course of local administration and justice' under Richard 11. (Ibid.,
Vol. IV, p. 44.) Perhaps under the war-like Edward IQ soldiers of the household were
increasingly likely to be used as emissaries of the central administration in the same
way as the kings clerks.
95 C76/21, m. 1.
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At this point the embarkation was still planned for 1 March, the date given in 12
November orders to the arrayers of Somerset to have their men-at-arms and archers at
Portsmouth. 96 They were told that if they had not yet selected the archers, they should
now do so, and report the names of both men-at-arms and archers to the chancery by 2
February. The arrayers had had their task certainly since August, when the muster date
was 20 October. The possibility that by mid-November they had not made the selection
throws an interesting light on how long it could take. 1 March was still seen as the
muster date as late as 3 January, when the sheriff of Lancashire was told to tell those
with conditional pardons to be at Portsmouth then, and to imprison any still at home
after that date.97
The muster was soon changed to mid-Lent Sunday, 26 March. On 20 January
the sheriffs of all counties citra Trent were told to proclaim the new date, 98 though
orders dated 28 January to two sergeants-at-arms collecting ships from ports between
King's Lynn and Berwick still maintained the 17 February ship assembly date. 99 On 20
February, however, Flambard and Attwood, seeing to the ships from London and the
mouth of the Thames, were told to have them at Portsmouth by 26 March.1°°
Surviving records do not state a reason for the postponement from 1 to 26
March. A possibility may be that it had been decided to increase the size of the
expedition, and more time was needed. So far it had appeared that the force was to be
made up from the contingents originally planned for October. Now, on 10 February,
substantial reinforcements were ordered. With a preamble describing the threat from
Philip de Valois to the English kingdom and language, London and another 143 towns
were told to supply some 1,750 anned men, with 100 more men-at-arms from London,
to be at Portsmouth by mid-Lent Sunday, 26 March.1°1
This date too had to be abandoned, because storms had dispersed the fleet. The
sheriffs of the counties citra Trent were told on 5 March to proclaim the new date, the
quindene of Easter, 1 May, for all troops to come to Portsmouth. 1 °2 More ships, those
of 20 tons and above, were requisitioned for Palm Sunday, 9 April. Power for this was
96 Ibid., m. 4.
97 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 66.
98 Ibid., p. 67.
99 C76/22, m. 1.
Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 70.
101 C76/22, m. 3.
102 ibid., m. 5.
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given to the admirals and their lieutenants on 8 March:" and to Gawain Corder and
Robert de Bayldon, sergeants-at-arms, on 10 March, 1 °4 Donyngton's orders of 8 March
were to have the 20-ton ships from ports from King's Lynn to Berwick at Orwell by
Easter, 16 April, and at Portsmouth two weeks later 105 20-ton ships requisitioned in
Devon and Cornwall were to be at Portsmouth by 1 May. 106 On 18 March an order was
given to all those arresting ships to include vessels of 10 and 12 tons, and have them at
Portsmouth by 9 April, except for those with furthest to come, which were to be there
by 24 Apri1. 107 These successive orders for more and more ships, in the requisitioning
and administrative organisation of which the kings sergeants-at-arms played an
increasingly important part, suggest strongly that it Was the quantitative planning of
transport needs that was the weakest link. It is significant that none of the orders
quoted specified a precise number of ships.
This contrasts with the detailed numbers of soldiers of various types allocated to
counties and towns. Perhaps partly because the changes of the date for muster might
have caused some confusion, very detailed Order, dated 28 March, were given to
achieve the 1 May date for assembly of the army. 108 That date was confirmed.
Counties were arranged in fourteen groups. For each individual county a town and
specific day were defined for the sheriff to assemble all the men-at-arms, hobelars and
archers who had been arrayed. There they were to come before supervisors nominated
two, three, four or five for each group of counties. The days were those around Palm
Sunday. Confirmation of the names and numbers and of action taken was to be
delivered by Easter, 16 April. Every set of supervisors included a clerk, presumably to
make the returns. The men were to be at Portsmouth by 1 May. Any who were
incapable of serving were to provide substitutes. The whole gives the impression of an
administrative scheme carefully thought out, practical, with built-in moiiitoririg and
therefore susceptible of effective management.
Within a month slippage of the programme had to be acknowledged. On 20
April the sheriffs of the counties citra Trent were to proclaim that the king would
embark on 1 May, and all men-at-arms and others should be at Portsmouth within
103 Ibid., m. 2.
1 °4 Ibid., m. 5.
105 Ibid., m. 7.
106 Ibid., dated 10 March.
ica Ibid., m. 5d.
108	 m. 15.
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fifteen days of then. 109 The same requirement was made of the Prince of Wales'
Welshmen and the 100 Chester archers, if they had not yet been selected this must be
done without delay. 110 Eventually not even the 16 May was met; as the king did not
embark until 28 June. Even then he was delayed by contrary winds. He at last reached
Normandy at St.Vaast la Hogue on 12 July 046.111
That this was so much later than his original intention was the result of several
factors. It seems fair to judge that a part in the delays was played by inadequacies of
the operation of the recruiting process itself. Though there had to be some adjustments
of quotas 112 and of obligations, 113 these were not on a scale or of a frequency to have
such a niaterial effect as to necessitate additional and time-consuming arrangements. It
is also arguable that some tardiness in the ultimate arrival of units could have been
contributed to by the 'order, counter-order, disorder' caused by the various
postponements. However, the references to making the selections 'if they had not
already been made' suggest that promptness could not be assumed. The complaint of
the Leicestershire arrayers' negligence and ltike-warmriess 114 underlines the point. On
109	 • 1
mot. m. 16d.
110 Ibid., m. 18.
111 Sumption, Hundred Years War, p. 500.
112 Between 3 and 24 March 1346 fourteen towns were allowed reduced quotas.
(C76/22, m. 6d.) In May more paid fines. Towns whose quotas were reduced usually
paid 5 marks per man for those they still provided. (CFR 1337-1347, pp. 501-2.) Towns
which were excused meeting any of their quota usually paid sums, described as for the
expenses of armed men, at the same rate. Bristol paid 200 marks for 40, Coventry £50
for 15, but most payments were for only one or two men. Ibid., p. 503.
113 Although arrangements had to be made to guard the coasts they are unlikely
to have had much impact on the raising of the expeditionary forces. The decision by the
council that all holding land within six leagues of the sea should stay there to .defend the
coast if necessary, and not be compelled to supply men for passage overseas, was
described in September 1346 as 'recent'. (C76/23, m. 18d.) It should not have had much
bearing on the 1345 recruiting. In August 1346 the sheriff of Kent was told to leave the
men of Rochester to guard the coast (C76/23 ht. 16d), Well after the Creey army had
sailed. A scare of threats to the east coast in the previous year may have been more
relevant. On 10 March the men of Holdemess were told to stay to guard the coast, and
appointments were made in Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Leicestershire and Rutland
to array all fencible men to be ready in case of invasion. C 76/22, m. 10.
114 Above, p. 138 it 61.
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the other hand, these episodes in themselves show that the central administration
recognised the need to keep a close watch on things. The 28 March 1346 nomination of
supervisors of the arrays could be seen as an expression of this.115
There does not seem to be evidence that there was failure to collect and have
available sufficient supplies of provisions Or artfiS. The ehrmieler Hear), Knighton
speaks of the great quantity of material collected: Eodem tempore rex Edwardus fecit
con gregare frumentum, brasium, avenas, bacones, et carnes bovinas salsas, vina,
equos, et alia guerre necessaria, ad magnam summam. 116 Murimuth's complaint about
the rapacity of the king's purveyors in 1346 is supporting witness to the intensity of their
activity bona sua, scilicet bladd, fcenunz, literam, 61)6', bOves, ducas et gallinas, Carnes
et pisces, et quic quid mandi potuit, capientes, imo potius rapientes, nihilque
solventes. 117 Both describe the wide range of provisions needed and collected, while
Murimuth's words record the resentment aroused at the difficulty of obtaining payment
for what was taken.
The key officials in the provisioning of the assembling armies were the sheriffs
and their staffs on the one hand, and the receiver of victuals, William de Kelleseye, and
his deputies on the other. An account of some of his receipts during 1346 gives a fair
picture of the activity involved. 118 His deputy at Hull acknowledged by indenture with
the sheriff of Yorkshire receipt of 80 barrels containing 520 quarters of flour, 610
quarters of oats, 15 bacons and 91 quarters and 2 bushels of beans and peas. The sheriff
of Essex and Hertfordshire produced flour, beef, bacons, carcases of sheep. He charged
also for buying barrels for the flour and for men's wages for preparing them, for new
seals, carts for carriage to Chelmsford and transport on to Maldon, costs of water
transport to London and of loading on to ships in the port of London, warehousing at
Chelmsford and a man to guard the stare. Kellesley's deputies At Hull and Boston
received supplies from the sheriff of Lincolnshire; from Boston they were sent to
Portsmouth. Sheriffs received many orders to obtain and deliver supplies. In February
1346 the sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk was told to buy 20 lasts of herrings, at a
115 The process of raising levies could involve five categories of organiser -
sheriffs and their officials to arrange the assembly of potential recruits, axrayers to
check their readiness, electores to choose individuals, supervisors to monitor the
process, and leaders to march those chosen to the muster.
116 Knighton's Chronicle, ed. G. H. Martin, p. 54.
"7 Chronica, ed. T. Hog, p. 163. A corresponding passage does liOt appear
ed. E. M. Thompson.Contivatio,
E101/25/16.
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reasonable price, and the sheriff of Lincolnshire to buy 20,000 stockfish. 119 The sheriff
of Somerset and Dorset was to obtain a long list of specified quantities of different
foods, as well as 40 cart loads of iron, 200 iron horse-shoes and 2,000 nails and deliver
them to Corfe castle, paying for them with the king's money, or if this did not suffice,
with tallies. While it may be that all this was destined not for the army but for the
maintenance of the castle, the amount of detail is impressive. 120 Sometimes a sheriff
had to be urged to meet his order: on 28 March the sheriff of Cambridge was told to
provide 61 barrels of flour at King's Lynn for William de Kelleseye's deputy, and on 15
April he received a command to be quick about it. 121 A comprehensive order of 9
January defined specific quantities of victuals to be obtained by sheriffs covering twelve
counties from London and Kent to Somerset, Dorset and Worcestershire. Where a
sheriff had two counties, like Surrey and Sussex, he was told how much of each
foodstuff he was to take from each county. The quantities were given in round figures,
as in Kent 200 quarters of corn, 300 bacons, 20 carcases of salted beef and so on. The
supplies were to be delivered to the receivers of victuals at the ports, and by a defined
date, the feast of St. John the Baptist, 24 June. The over-all picture is therefore one of
administration conceived and consequent orders issued in considerable detail. Whether
the sheriffs were able to deliver their precise allocations must be very doubtful: sheriffs'
administrative accounts usually record less rounded-figure quantities. 122 Collecting the
totals often involved a very large number of small lots. The parliculars of account of
the sheriff of Kent for 110 bacons records the names of many individuals who provided
one or two each. 123
 An indenture between the sheriff of Lincolnshire and the collector
119 C76/22, m. 1.
120 ibid., m. 2.
121 Ibid., mm. 17, 19.
122
e.g. Kent: 100 quarters of corn, but 112 of oats and 120 bacons
(E101/566/20); Oxford and Berkshire: 210 quarters 2 bushells of corn, 144 bacons, 83
sheep (E101/582/16). On the other hand, John de Roche the sheriff of Wiltshire did
deliver to Gilbert de Chishill, receiver of victuals, 200 quarters of corn. (E101/593/25.)
The details of this record give another illustration of what the sheriff had to do to make
the purveyances. He had two men riding round for fourteen days to buy the wheat and
supervise its carriage from various places to Salisbury: 100 quarters were moved in
special carts, 50 in 18 it and 50 in 25. He had a triari and a clerk at the granary at
Salisbury, and two men to measure the wheat. Then there was the carriage to
Southampton to arrange.
123 E101/566/20.
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for the county, concerning creditors of the king for wheat whom the sheriff had paid, is
set out by areas. In Lindsey 23 individuals were paid for 67 quarters, elsewhere 26
provided 49 (some as little as half a quarter), 16 provided 38 and so on. 124 A
Bedfordshire list has 83 names of people from whom 132 quarters of corn had been
taken. 125 These numbers show that obtaining the supplies, let alone keeping such
voluminous records, must have been a complex and protracted task. They also show
that it must have affected many poor men, making Murimuth's complaint
understandable. Nevertheless, the operation seems to have been adequately efficient, in
that there was sufficient to victual the ships for two weeks' sailing. 126
Sheriffs also organised the obtaining of bows, sheaves of arrows and bow-
strings, 127 and equipment for requisitioned ships. 128 In the cases of these supplies they
made the delivery to the keeper of the wardrobe at the Tower of London, and to the
ports, respectively, as has been noted earlier; here too there is little evidence of
slackness.
The management of the administration for the expeditions of 1345 and mid-
1346 did not exhibit any abnormal weaknesses in recruiting, assembling or provisioning
them. The census of October 1344 and the subsequent assessment to arms gave a solid
base, in terms of recorded information of potential, for the recruiting. Purveyance
provoked the usual, and often justified, popular objeetions, 129 but also does not Seem,
given the absence of government complaints of shortages, to have failed to produce the
supplies. Sea transport for the first expeditions of 1345 presented no problems. It was
only when a many times larger army was to be moved that they became serious. They
may have been the consequence of inability to allow for the problems of collecting and
calculating what would be suffieient maritime transport fOr Stieh a large overseas
124 E101/568/9.
125 E101/25/14.
126 : '...the length of the passage to Gascony' (Sumption, Hundred Years War, p.
497). 'It took five days to rest the army, disembark the horses and discharge the
enormous quantity of stores from the ships.' Ibid., p. 502.
127e.g. E101/571/21, E101/552/19.
128 e.g. E 101/585/24 - cables; E 101/585/25 - cables and hurdles.
129 in MayD   1345 Richard Talbot, steward of the household, was commissioned as
justice to investigate complaints that the sheriffs of several counties had leaned heavily
on the poor, and taken, or even extorted, bribes from the wealthy to be spared. CPR
134.5-1348,p. 113.
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expedition. In particular, though the general policy was, sensibly, to have the necessary
shipping arrive at the port of embarkation a week or more before the final muster date,
insufficient time was allowed. The cost, in terms of disorder and local disruption as
well as money and provisions, of keeping an army of several thousands waiting would
be great. At least the adthinistration was able to know in sufficient time that shipping
would not be available, so that it was able to postpone the army's assembly, as it did in •
September 1345 and January 1346. There is also unsurprising evidence that, when
eventually fleet and army were simultaneously ready, the embarkation involved the
planned allocation of specific ships to specific units. Murimuth says that the king -
presumably not necessarily in person, but by implication therefore the 'central
command' - called the officers together, gave them pay due and for the next two weeks,
and told them to board the ships assigned to them. 13° The need for such administrative
arrangements is obvious. While it would be very interesting to know who actually
made them, the only hint seems to be that it might have been the royal clerks who
would probably have dealt with the pay, for which purpose they would have had to have
the necessary information as to numbers in each unit.
Edward III did land a formidable force in Normandy, win a dramatic victory at
Crecy, and proceed to besiege and eventually to take Calais, where the first English
soldiers arrived on 4 September. Maintenance of the siege produced another set of
problems for administrative management to solve.
As Sumption observes, Calais was not to be taken by stomi, but would have to
be starved into surrender - '...an immediate assault on the town walls was out of the
question. The English did not attempt it. Instead, they began to make methodical
preparations for what was clearly expected to be a long siege.' 131
 A besieged town had
two possibilities for successful defence. It could have a relieving army drive off its
attackers; alternatively it could outlast them in ability to feed itself, while they
exhausted the supplies obtainable from the countryside around. The French defeat at
Crecy, and their failures in the south-west, meant that the first was militarily and
politically extremely unlikely for some while at best. The issue therefore would depend
on whether the 'ample stores' 132 which Calais contained could be augmented, and
130 Continuatio, ed. E. M. Thompson, p. 198: Et convocans omnes milites
arm atos et architenentes, tam Anglicos quam Wallenses, solvit eis vadia temporis
et pro quindena firtura; praecipiens eis naves assignatas festinater intrare,praeteriti
131 Hundred Years War, p. 537.
122 Ibid., p.535.
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whether, conversely, Edward's large army could be kept supplied with provisions that
would have to be brought to it. Supply of victuals was the crux of the matter, as
Murimuth recognised, writing. ...dominus rex noster cum suo exercitu villam de Caleys
obsidere incepit. Versus quem locum venerunt sibi victualia de Anglia per mare. Quod
percipierdeS inimici, vdriertait xx. qUinqUe gdiledd latent& et treS hUvës dé Anglia Urid
cum aliis parvis nay/bus victualia portantibus destruxerunt. 133 He adds ... dominus rex
Angliae continuavit obsidionem apud Caleys; et venerunt sibi victual/a, tam de Anglia
quam de Flandria, competenter, 134 In turn delivery of these supplies depended,
completely on the part of the French, and importantly for the English too, 135 on
command of the sea, or at least on ability not to be denied passage.
During July 1346 much of the concern of the English government had been
directed at protecting coasts against anticipated French raids. 136 In August, however,
urgent and detailed arrangements were put in hand to assemble a fleet at Winchelsea by
the Sunday after Ascension, 20 August. 100 great ships with double crews were to be
eollected from south coast ports, including the Isle of Wight, by Philip de Witt,
assisted by Gilbert de Chishill, John de Baddely and William de Horwicke. The latter
three were each allocated ports along a defined length of the coast. 80 more were to
come from the east coast from Hull south, collected by two sergeants-at-arms, Philip de
Barton and John Woline. Another sergeant-at-arms, John Dale, with Nicholas Pyke and
Robert Wygan, Was tO take ships in the port of London, and Thomas Spigurnel those
from the Cinque Ports. This order was dated 5 August, giving theoretically only two
133 Continuatio, ed. E. M. Thompson, p. 217.
134 ibid., p. 218.
135 'Most supplies were brought overland from Flanders via Gravelines....But
surprisingly large quantities came by sea from England.' Sumption, Hundred Years
War, p. 537.
136 Keepers for Southampton and the coast to the New Forest were appointed;
instructions were given to the keeper of the Isle of Wight to array all ranks for defence
(C76/23, in. 25); the bailiffs of Great Yarmouth were told to arm their shipping against
enemy galleys; the admirals of North and West, their lieutenants and the ports in their
admiralties were told the keepers of the coasts were to array men; Kent was warned of
the threat from galleys, arid to array arid arm iteit, arid atit ships (ibid., it. 24d); the
sheriff of Surrey was told to let Hastings have 80 archers to help guard the town (ibid.,
m. 22d), and with others to array fencible men and report to the chancery by 15 August.
Ibid., m. 22.
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weeks for its completion. 137
 William de Radenhall and Thomas de Drayton of
Yarmouth were given power to arrest and seize the possessions of any disobeying the
officials assigned to collect the ships, and were also to accelerate the process of
collection. 138 An order of 13 August gave others power to impress men from the south-
east ports of Winchelsea, Hastings, Rye, Pevensey, Romney and Hythe for crews.'39
It seems safe to assume that this fleet was to carry reinforcements, rather than
just provisions, to France. Sheriffs of 17 counties and of London had been ordered on
26 July to array, arm and have ready some 1,230 archers. Specific numbers were
required from each county by 13 August. 14° On 8 August they were told that the
soldiers were needed Urgently, and to appoint meii to lead therri (in thost oases) to
Canterbury by 20 August. The sheriffs were to provide the appropriate, defined,
number of days' pay from the issues of the county. 141 They were also to proclaim that
all who wished to come to the king should be at Canterbury by 20 August and that the
king would provide ships for a prompt passage. (This followed up an order of 3 August
to all sheriffs to proclaim that all men-at-arms, hobelars and archers and others who
wished to aid the king should prepare themselves with arms and equipment. )142 By an
order dated three days later, 11 August, the sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk was told to
have his quota of 180 archers at Orwell, not Canterbury as previously intended. From
Orwell they were to go by sea to Winchelsea, where the fleet was assembling. They
were to be there by the Wednesday after Assumption, 16 August. 143 The same date for
arrival at Sandwich was given for 100 archers out of 300 arrayed and equipped by
Roger de Hopwell, lieutenant of the justiciar of North Wales. The instructions, dated 8
August, for their payment and that of the knight who was to lead them, Sir William de
Brerton, included the order that they should travel as quickly as possible and by long
137 Ibid., m. 21.
138 Ibid., m. 20, dated 6 August.
139 Ibid., m. 21.
140 Ibid., m. 22.
141 Ibid., m. 21. The sheriff of Middlesex was to send his archers to London;
supervisors to take them to Canterbury would be provided by the council. The archers
from Surrey and Sussex were to go to Winchelsea, as were those from Somerset and
Dorset, who were to go via Southampton. In this order Hampshire and Wiltshire were
included, though they were not in the instructions of 26 July. Kent and London, on the
Other hand, were egoluded.
142 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 88.
143 C76/23, m. 19.
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marches, as the day for the passage would be soon. 144 This apparently short amount of
time, coupled with the rapid change of intention, suggests that these August plans were
being made in a hurry. The 20 August orders to the sheriffs of Surrey and Sussex and
Kent reinforce this interpretation. They were to proclaim that, as the army was
assembling at Winchelsea, all fishermen and bakers should bring their produce there, to
be sold at a reasonable price. 145 If the muster had been planned long in advance such
arrangements for food supplies would probably have been made earlier.
Thus, before the battle of Crecy had been fought, the administration in England
was making ready to deliver modest reinforcements to Edward's army. At the point in
time - the first week of August - when the orders for the assemblies of the fleet and the
troops were being issued Edward was moving inland towards Paris. It therefore seems
unlikely that a place for their landing could yet have been set. 146 What is
administratively interesting about these orders is that it was usually the English sheriffs
who were given responsibility for seeing to the delivery of the contingents to the ports,
and choosing the men to conduct them from their counties; this rhay have been
necessary because of the absence in France of notables who would usually have
received commissions to array. Another - or possibly additional - reason may have been
144 Black Prince's Register, Vol. I, pp. 13-14. The original order to have forces
of archers ready to leave for the war had been given to Hopwell more than a month
earlier; on 8 July he was told that, if he had not already done so, he was to have the 300
archers from Chester and Flint equipped and ready and a man-at-arms appointed to be
their leader, by 13 July. A similar order went to Roger Trumwyn to array 200 archers
from North Wales. The prince would send someone to whom they should be delivered.
Ibid., p. 7.
145 C76/23, m. 19d.
146 Sumption suggests that '...the reinforcements and supplies from England
...should have been waiting off the shore' when Despenser's detachment took the port of
Le Crotoy on 24 August. (Hundred Years War, p. 525) This is just about consistent with
the setting of the date of 20 August for the muster at Winchelsea, but would have
required a most unusual efficiency in response to timing of plans, as well as no bad luck
with weather. Moreover, Edward did not begin to move back from Poissy, only some
15 miles from Paris, towards the north-east until 16 August. This, even allowing for the
probability that the decision to retreat had been taken earlier, could hardly have given
enough time to communicate with the council in England and determine a place and
-approximate date for a rendezvous.
154
that urgency did not give time for ad hoc appointments to be made, and the established
administrative resource had therefore to be used.
As soon as the siege of Calais had begun the supply of provisions to the army
had to be assured. It is possible to infer from the passages from Murimuth quoted
earlier that the first such arrangements were for supplies to come from England, which
would be natural. As early as 6 September proclamations were ordered to this effect.
There must have been very rapid communication from the kirig's army, and probably iti
fact an earlier decision to concentrate on Calais. The order went to officials of twenty-
nine towns from Newcastle-upon-Tyne south, the bishop of Durham, the lieutenant of
the constable of Dover, the warden of the Cinque Ports, and all sheriffs. The
proclamations said that the army was now besieging Calais, and in need of provisions.
All merchants and others with victuals to Sell Should take them to the army. Besides
foodstuffs such as flour, bread, meat, fish, ale and wine the proclamation listed bows,
arrows and bowstrings as well. Prompt payment was promised. 147
 Merchants were not
necessarily left to find their own transport; on 9 September sergeants-at-arms and others
were appointed to take ships from Southampton and the south and west, and from
London, expressly to carry food supplies to Ca1ais. 148 At this stage, therefore, it appears
that royal purveyance was not the first resort for supplies.
On 18 September six sheriffs were told to buy enough corn to be ground to
provide specified numbers of barrels of flour, totalling over 100, and despatch them to
Calais 'to those we depute to receive them.' 149 In mid-September the Black Prince's
officials were ordered to make purveyances of various supplies for the prince and his
men. On 12 September Hugh de Ellesmere was told to obtain wheat, taking carriage for
it; on the 15th Hemy Fleming was told to deliver to the bearer of the order carts which
had come from Cornwall; on 17th Thomas de Sandwich, the prince's scullery man, was
told to purvey fuel; on 20th the messenger Dagenet was told to have threshed 200
quarters of wheat (but keep the flour until Christmas); OA 21st the prince's clerk and
receiver of victuals at Chester was told to buy 100 beasts at the Michaelmas fair and
provide men to help drive them to London. 15° (It is not explicit that all this was
intended for the besieging army, though references to 'the prince and his men where he
now is' imply it in some cases.)
147 C76/23, m. 17d; Foedera, Vol. ifi, div. i, p. 90.
148 C76/23, m. 15.
149 Ibid., m. 18.
150 Black Prince's Register, Vol. I, pp. 16, 18, 19.
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Supplies were on their way to Calais in the first two weeks of the siege. By 18
September arrangements were having to be made to protect the transport ships, which
were already being attacked by enemy galleys. On that date Hugh de Audeley, earl of
Gloucester, and the Prior of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem were told to bring
men to protect the ships. John de Moleyris was ordered to collect as many men as he
could and bring them to Sandwich to go to sea. 151 Alan de Killum and Thomas de
llynchele were told to take all sea-going ships of the Thames and have them at
Sandwich as soon as possible, because the French were intercepting supplies for the
army. Three sergeants-at-arms were assigned to take ships from the north-east coast
ports. 152
 A fleet was to be collected at Orwell, sea-going ships and barges from the
mouth of the Thames to King's Lynn being requisitioned by Thomas de Melcheburne,
Thomas de Drayton and John Dale, sergeant-at-arms, under an order dated 18
September. 153 To provide armed men to man this fleet the sheriff of Norfolk was to
proclaim that soldiers who wished to take the king's wages should report to Orwell by
25 September. 154 Thomas de Stayning and his deputies were ordered to collect men-at-
arms, armed men (armati) and archers from the towns and other places in Surrey and
Sussex. They were to be at Sandwich by Monday 25 September to guard ships. 155
 This
flurry of responses to a dangerous and apparently unexpected situation indicates that the
council had administrative resources capable of immediate and effective response,
though it does not speak well of its ability to anticipate the eriemys action. It also
illustrates, again, the confidence with which the crown could command the maritime
strength of the realm.
Besides the threat to their supplies, the besiegers had to guard against the
possibility that Philip VI could raise an army to relieve Calais. This he attempted to do,
issuing orders for a muster at Compiegne for 1 October. Though in practice it came to
nothing, the English were aware of the intention, and reinforcements were summoned
from England. 15 October was set as the date, and Sandwich as the port, for the
assembly of soldiers and ships. A batch of orders for men-at-arms, armed men and
archers was issued on 3 October. John earl of Kent was appointed their captain and
leader, told to collect as many men-at-arms and others as possible, and oily to bring
151 C76/23, m. 18; Foedera, Vol. In, div. i, p. 91.
ln C76/23, m. 17.
155 ibid., m. 16.
154 jbid., m. 14d, dated 20 September.
155 ibid., m. 18, dated 20 September.
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horses necessary for transport; 156 war-horses were not needed for a defensive battle in
the marshy land around Calais, and leaving them behind would presumably simplify the
task of providing shipping. A number of individuals, including Reginald de Grey,
William Botiller de Wemme, Marie de St. Pol countess of Pembroke and a score of
others, were required to provide defined numbers of men -at-arms and archers, totalling
over 200 and 400 respectively. Philip de Thame, Prior of the Hospital of St. John of
Jerusalem, was asked for 100 men-at-arms and as many archers as possible. 306 armed
men were to be provided by the officials of London and another fifteen towns. Sheriffs
of twenty-six counties were to array, choose, and arm another 446 archers. 157 These
were to be at Sandwich by 15 October. The sheriffs of all the eoithties eitra Trent Were
to proclaim that all men-at-arms, armed men and archers were to be at Sandwich for 15
October, and that horses were not required.I58
This set of orders shows that only about half of this particular force was to be
raised through levies by officials - mayors, town bailiffs and sheriffs. 159 The small
numbers allocated in many cases are surprising. Four te•WriS Were asked for only SiX
armati each, Worcestershire, Middlesex and Hampshire for only twelve archers. From
the central point of view, dealing administratively with a greater number of small units
is inefficient. It may have been judged necessary either because availability of man-
power was over-stretched, or because the urgency of the need did not allow individual
Officials time to assemble larger numbers each. Whatever the reasons, the degree of
detail required a functioning bureaucracy equipped with records.
A week after the orders for the reinforcements, other orders put in hand
arrangements to provide transport at Sandwich. Though these were addressed to the
two admirals, the task of raising shipping was as usual given to named and experienced
156 ib•la m. 14.
157 Ibid., m. 13. As with the officials of each town, each sheriff was given a
defined quota. The counties were those along the south coast, and in the south-east,
East Anglia and the midlands. Requirements for men-at-arms and archers from
individuals were mostly, like the total, for two archers per man -at-arms. On what basis
the particular individuals were summoned is not discernible. It would not have been
unreasonable, in view of the gap of only two weeks between the order and the muster,
for some account to have been taken of how long it might take to reach Sandwich. The
exclusion of Devon and Cornwall from the county levies would be consistent with that.
158 Ibid., it. 13d.
159 The earl of Kent and Philip de Thame having been asked to collect not a
defined number of archers but as many as possible, a precise count is impossible.
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servants of the crown, deputed to cover defined sets of ports. Thomas Spigurnel and
Robert Monnieux, a sergeant-at-arms, were allocated to take ships of 20 tons and
upwards from ports from London to Shoreham. Gilbert de Chishill was to take ships
from 40 tons upwards from Shoreham to Lymington, including the Isle of Wight, and
William de Ategang and John Dale, gergearit-at-arms, ships from 60 tons upwards from
the Thames to King's Lynn. The preamble to these orders made it clear that their
occasion was the need to transport reinforcements to meet the threat from 'Philip de
Valois' and his projected new army. 160
Although that purpose was not explicitly stated, it could be possible that earlier
urgent orders for men from WaleS had the same Origin. 161 On 12th September Thomas
de Ferrers, justiciar of North Wales, and the justiciar of South Wales or his lieutenant,
were told to raise 200 Welsh each, half armed with lances and half with bows. They
were to have them at Dover by respectively 30 September and 7 October, as the Black
Prince had need of them at Calais. 162 On 18 September three more small groups were
summoned to Dover, in terms indicating some urgency. 163 Orders to provide transport
to France for 200 Welsh were given to the mayor and bailiffs of Sandwich and Dover on
11 October,' day after the orders to raise ships for the English reinforcements
summoned for 15 October.
Those reinforcements did not sail on that date, as can be seen from the dates of
later orders. On 24 October William de Dephant and Williatn Porter were told to
provide enough ships, from the mouth of the Thames, for the troops and supplies of the
Prior of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem. 165 On 6 November an order went to the
160 C76/23, m. 14, dated 10 October.
161 The orders for the French muster at Compiegne were made on 9 September
(Sumption, Hundred Years War, p. 539), and might have been quickly known to
Edward.
162 Black Prince's Register, Vol. I, p. 14. Ferrers seems to have aroused the
prince's anger earlier, as this order told him to spare no-one for gift or favour, and not to
be as tardy as on a previous occasion. Perhaps because of this, the sheriff of Flint, in
which county the archers were to be found by Ferrers, was ordered to take part in their
choosing. (Ibid.) One of the prince's clerks was assigned to arrange for their pay, and to
buy greet and White cloth for their uniforms, which they would be given at Loridoii.
Ibid., dated 14 September.
1631-bid., p 18.
164 C76/23, m. 13d.
165 Ibid., m. 12d.
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Prior and to the earl of Huntington, and another to the 100 London armed men, to come
to Calais as soon as possible. 166 Reginald de Grey was still in England at the end of
November, when he and many others were given a new date, 18 December, to be at
Sandwich. 167 In fact, by this time the threat of a French relieving army had evaporated.
On 27 October Philip VI disbanded those Who had arrived at Cofripiege; the Genoese
and French galleys were laid up at the end of the month.168
During November a number of small boats were collected from the Cinque Ports
and the two admiralties. 169 Quantities of ladders were supplied via the sheriffs of Kent,
Surrey and Sussex, and Norfolk and Suffolk. 17° The boats and ladders were taken to
Calais for attacks on the town walls. The collection of the boats and their delivery was
organised by the men who usually dealt with naval matters, Thomas de Drayton,
William de Redenhall, Thomas Spigurnel and Philip de Witton. Carpenters being
needed, presumably for the equipment and machines to be used against the walls, one of
the king's clerks, Walter de Weston, was authorised to impress 40, with their assistants,
from counties in the south-east. They were te, be ready in Loridori by 16 November, to
go to Calais. F71
 This attempt to break Calais's defences failed, and Edward reverted to
the strategy of maintaining the siege and starving out the defenders.
This required not only a regular supply of food to the English army, but also the
maintenance of its strength through new drafts, partly compensating for losses through
disease and desertion. The latter was a constant problem, leading to frequent orders to
officials in England to take punitive action against men returning without permission.172
166 Ibid., m. 11.
167 Ibid., m. 7.
168 Sumption, Hundred Years War, p. 555.
169 C76123, m. 9.
170	 A.,ia m. 10.
171 Ibid., m. 8.
172 As early as 20 August the sheriff of Kent was told to arrest archers who had
taken wages and then returned without licence. (Ibid., m. 15d.) On 12 September the
officials of Southampton and many other towns, the constable of Dover and the sheriff
of Kent, were to arrest deserters and confiscate their possessions, reporting their names,
county and retinue to the chancery. (fbid., mm. 18d, lid). Kent was obviously the most
accessible part of England for deserters, and its sheriff received similar instructions to
arrest them, in October and again in December. (Ibid., mm. 8d, 7d.) Even the sheriff of
Flint was told to arrest and seize the lands and goods of any who returned without
licence. Black Prince's Register, Vol. I, p. 21.
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The next substantial assembly for movement to Calais was set for 27 November
at Sandwich for William de Clinton, earl of Huntingdon, and the Prior of the Hospital of
St. John, and their men, and the 100 London armed men. 173 Transport was to be in the
60-ton ships from the Cinque Ports. 174 More reinforcements were ordered up on 30
November, to be ready tO embark from Satidwich by 18 December. To enure transport
would be available, the clerk John de Watenhull was appointed supervisor of the
shipping at Sandwich and neighbouring ports, and told to report on numbers and
carrying capacity to the counci1. 175 The reinforcements sought included some 1,000
Welsh under Rees ap Griffith, specified units of men-at-arms and archers from a
number of individuals, including Reginald de Grey alid the earls of Gloucester,
Hereford and Devon, 184 armati from 14 towns and the 446 archers raised by sheriffs in
nineteen counties. 176 The orders were repeated on 8 December, this time with more
urgency, saying that if the 18 December date could not be met for the total required
from each, they should come day by day and as soon as possible. 177
 In the case of the
1,000 Welsh this appears to have been not soon at all: under the date 12 April 1347
there is an order to Rees ap Griffith to bring 1,000 Welsh to Winchelsea by the day after
Ascension, 11 May.178
As Murimuth observed, there came to the king at Calais ...victualia, tam de
Anglia quam de Flandria, competenter. In November the sheriffs of nineteen counties
were told to send quantities of flour, allocated specifically to each sheriff, to Calais via
Hull, London and King's Lynn . 179
 The king's clerk Gilbert de Chishill and others were
to obtain wine at various ports. I8° John de Coventry was to buy 100 beef cattle, 500 pigs
173 C76/23, m. 11.
174 Ibid., m. 10, dated 14 November, addressed to Thomas Spigui-nel, Master
John de Kermond and John Tybom.
175 Ibid., m. 7, dated 12 December.
176 Ibid., mm. 8, 7.
177 Ibid., m. 6. It is indicative perhaps of the variations between what was asked
and what actually happened that the earl of Huntington, who had been asked on 6
November to come as soon as possible, and then on 12 November to be at Sandwich by
the 27th, was asked on 8 December to come on 18th. or as soon as possible after. Ibid.,
m. 5.
178 C76/24, m. 15.
179 C76/23, m. 9.
180 Ibid., m. 8.
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and 1,000 sheep across several south-east counties. 181 The sheriff of Hampshire sent
hay, and the sheriff of Norfolk hay and oats. 182 The sheriff of Cambridge provided
boats to take the victuals to the ports of King's Lynn or Great Yarmouth, and the
admiral of the North shipping to take them thence to Calais. 183 The sheriffs of London
supplied boats for victuals obtained by the sheriff of Essex. 184 The December records
of Walter de Wetwang, keeper of the wardrobe, show the expenses of various esquires
(valetti) and sergeants-at-arms of the household engaged in organising delivery of
supplies - salt, oats, arrows, wine, charcoal - to Calais. 185 All this was in addition to the
'private sector' response of merchants to the 6 September proclamation encouraging
them to bring provisions. No doubt that response was intensified by the prohibition in
October of export of corn except to the army. 186
Provisioning the army during its siege of Calais was not a matter of
accumulating a supply dump, but one of maintaining a reasonably steady flow. After
the first weeks, and the need to arm and protect the cross-channel ships had been
recognised, this appears to have been achieved, importantly through the over-land route
from Flanders. The main contribution of the English administration can probably be
said to have been in ensuring the availability of shipping, at which it seems to have
become increasingly experienced and efficient
Although nothing had come of the French attempt in October 1346 to raise a
relieving army, Philip VI tried again in the spring of 1347. This intention was, not
surprisingly, known to the English, and the flow of orders for reinforcements was
maintained and the numbers called for increased. The earl of Kildare and seven other
Irish magnates were summoned on 26 January, to bring with them 110 men-at-arms and
170 hobelars to London by Easter, 1 April, or within the following week. 187 In another
181 thid.
182 Ibid., m. 7.
181 ibid., m. 5.
184 Ibid.
185 E403/339, mm. 24, 27.
186 Foedera, Vol. DI, div. i, p. 92. This limited export to Calais under an order
dated 25 October. Export was extended to Gascony and Flanders on 30 October.
C76/23, m. 12d.
187 C76/24, m. 36. The order to them was accompanied by another of the same
date to the chief officials of Ireland, the justice, Walter de Birmingham (or his
lieutenant), the chancellor and treasurer, with a preamble including the statement that
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illustration of active management the earl and the others were reminded on 7 March of
what was asked of them. 188 On 19 February Walter de Warwick, sergeant-at-arms, and
John atte Forde were told to deliver 200 archers from Somerset and Dorset to Calais as
soon as possible. 189 These were part of a large-scale levy of over 4,000 archers from
twenty-nine counties who Were. to be ready by Easter, 1 April. The task was given to
the sheriff and a number of others, two, three or four in each county. 19° The arrayers
were to report action to the chancery by Palm Sunday, 25 March. 191 On 26 February
lords of various Welsh lands were told to have 3,200 men ready by Easter, half armed
with lances and half with bows. Englishmen resident in Wales should not be included.
Rather unusually, the order for the 400 from the Prince of Wales' lands of South Wales
named the centenars to be in charge. 192 This writ is referred to in an entry in the Black
Prince's Register telling Roger Tromwyn, lieutenant of the justice of North Wales, to
array and choose 1,200 men in accordance with its instructions. 193
 In what appear as
levies to be made on the prince's own authority Tromwyn and the sheriff of Flint were
each to raise 100 men, and send them to the prince at Calais by Palm Sunday, 25
March. Payment of their 16 days' wages to Calais would be made by the chamberlain of
North Wales. 194 In an order of the same date, 6 March, Sir Thomas Danyers was to
come to the prince according to his retainer, also by Palm Sunday, bringing 100 of the
best archers he could find. Their pay to Calais would come from the chamberlain of
Chester. 195
Philip de Valois was gathering an army, to urge those summoned to make haste. The
treasurer was to pay their expenses as far as London. Ibid.
188 Ibid., m. 30.
189 ibid., m. 35.
190 Lincolnshire was given nine, presumably reflecting its three sub-divisions
rather than the number of archers, which was only 200, the same as in several other
cases.
191 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, pp. 107-8; C76124, m. 28.
192 C76124, m. 32.
193 Black Prince's Register, Vol. I, p. 52, dated 8 March. Another entry dated 6
March records, with a few differences, most of the other detailed quotas of the 26
February order. Ibid., pp. 55-6.
194 Ibid., p. 49.
195 Ibid., p. 50. John de Brunham, the prince's clerk, was told to provide pay and
clothing for them and pay for Sir Thomas for 14 days (and for the men raised by the
sheriff of Flint, for 15 days). He was to certify what he had paid out to both the prince's
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In general these arrangements for levies made in February and early March
might be regarded as preparing to meet an anticipated move by the French. Then 'Philip
VI took the Oriflamme at St. Denis on 18 March 1347. He had intended to have his
army ready by the end of April and announced his intention of marching against the
English early in May.' 196 There followed a series of orders to English magnates. On 31
March Robert de Morley was requested to come to Sandwich with his retinue and as
many others as he could supply, by the week after Easter, i.e. by 8 April; the same order
went to the Prior of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem. 197
 On 12 April John de
Audeley was told to bring his retinue and as many more as possible to Sandwich by
Ascension, 10 May. 198 In what has all the air of great urgency, on 14 May Henry of
Lancaster earl of Derby, the earls of Oxford, Pembroke, Gloucester, Hereford, Devon
and Surrey and some thirty other magnates were ordered to come to Calais by
Pentecost, 20 May, without waiting for transport for their horses. 199 The Black Prince's
Register, too, under the dates of 17 Maym and 22 May,201 records summonses to many
others to come with all haste with their men-at-arms, the latter entry being prefaced
with the statement that the French intended battle. It is interesting that these
summonses of magnates and their retinues were not accompanied by orders for new
levies. Perhaps the perceived urgency of arrival of reinforcements meant that the
process of array and selection would have taken too long to be useful, especially as such
additional conscription might well arouse opposition. Magnates' retinues, on the other
hand, in effect constituted a sort of standing army, with the advantages of immediate
availability and, probably, greater military value.
council in London and the prince's treasurer of the wardrobe at Calais. (Ibid.) These
detailed arrangements for pay, in which the number of days for each contingent was
precisely defined, and the source of the money was determined by each .contingent's
origin, are evidence of the good administrative control exercised by the officials of a
great magnate.
196 Sumption, Hundred Years War, p. 560.
197 C76124, m. 18. If he could not come in person he was to appoint someone to
lead his men.
198 Ibid., m. 16.
199 FOedera, Vol. III, div. 1, p. 120.
200 Black Prince's' Register, Vol. I, p. 80.
201 ibid. , p. 81.
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Corresponding orders for transport were issued in April and May. The earl of
Pembroke was to be provided with ships for his crossing: 202 ships were ordered for the
passage of the king's son John,203 and for the men and horses of the retinue of John
Darcy le fils.2°4
However, though there was a little skirmishing, rio battle took place. Edward's
force, '...the largest army that England sent overseas before the end of the sixteenth
century',205 numbering probably some 26,000,206 and in prepared defensive positions,
was far too strong to be attacked. Starvation decided the issue, and on 3 August Calais
surrendered. Its ability to be supplied had been ended in April by the English naval
activity and particularly the capture of the Rysbank, closing the harbour. The besiegers
had continued to receive their supplies from Flanders and England competenter, as
Murimuth said.
Various supplies from England were organised by the sheriffs. The sheriff of
Hampshire had to provide oats and peas and send them to Calais via Isle of Wight
ports;207 the sheriff of Kent was to buy 200 quarters of corn from the issues of the
county and send them via the valettus Robert de Nottingham;208 the sheriff of Lincoln
had to send 30 barrels of flour via Boston to the receiver of vietbals at Calai g;209 on 10
April over 250 barrels of flour were required from nine sheriffs, each given a specified
quota, to be sent via various ports, London, Boston, King's Lynn and Hull; 210 the sheriff
of Somerset and Dorset was told to provide corn, beans and oats. 211 Towards the end of
the siege, on 23 July, merchants were again encouraged by proclamation to bring
202 C76/24, m. 14, dated 25 April.
203 Ibid., m. 12, dated 28 April.
204 Ibid., m. 10, dated 15 May.
205 Sumption, Hundred Years War, p. 578.
206 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, pp. 117-8, suggests that such figures
represent the numbers present at one time or another, not simultaneously. The same
view is taken by Ayton, 'The English Army and the Normandy Campaign of 1346', in
England and Normandy in the Middle Ages, p. 267.
207 C76/24, m. 36, dated 30 January.
208 Ibid., tri. 31, dated 22 February.
209 Ibid., m. 29, dated 14 March.
210 Ibid., m. 17. A separate order of the same date to the sheriff of
Nottinghamshire and Derby told him to send his quota, with that from the sheriff of
Warwickshire, to the receiver of victuals at Hull. Ibid., m. 16.
211 Ibid., m. 11, dated 30 April.
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victuals to Calais. 212 It seems that the English army's supplies must have been more
than adequate; the receiver of victuals, William de Kellesey, sold off surpluses at Hull
and King's Lynn in October.213
For the king's household itself supplies seem to have been bought separately.
The king's servientes John de Coventry and Thomas de Weryaton obtained meat and
fish specifically for the household, 214 and William de Allerton, valettus, a variety of
things. 215 The Prince of Wales' servant John de Skirbek had to buy 100 barrels of wine
'for the prince'.216
Adequate shipping was a necessity, not only to intercept French provisions
intended for Calais, but primarily for transport of men and supplies. The council set
about this in a systematic way. On 15 February officials of thirty-two ports were told to
send men with knowledge of the state and availability of ships of each port to
Westminster, for 7 March. Richard earl of Arundel, admiral of the West, or his
lieutenant Philip de Witton, Robert de Ufford earl of Suffolk, admiral of the North, and
the bailiffs of ports from Newcastle to Bristol were to arrest all sea-going ships and
have them ready in their ports, as transport was needed.217
With the agreement of prelates and magnates it was decided also to create a
fighting fleet of 120 great ships, 60 from each admiralty, manned with 60 armed sailors
and 20 good archers. It was intended that it should be at Sandwich on 2 April. On 15
March the officials of ports were told how many ships they were to supply. London's
quota was two, Dartmouth's six, suggesting that quotas might have been allocated in the
light of detailed information. 218
 The constable of Dover and the sheriffs of the counties
in which the ports were, were told to help progress the obtaining of the ships. 219 The
timing proved over-optimistic, not for the first time. On 5 April the admirals were told
that there were complaints that Ships Were being sought front places incapable of
providing them. They should cease this, and also make places neighbouring the ports
actually supplying ships, help. 220
 On 10 April a vigorous remonstrance went to officials
212 Foedera, Vol. a div. i, p. 129.
211 E101/25/15. Some had putrified in the ships.
214 C76124, m. 20.
215 Ibid., m. 19.
216 fllack Prince's Register, Vol. I, p. 31.
211 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, pp. 105-6: C 76/24, m. 34d.
218 C76/24, m. 23.
219 ibid., dated 16 March.
220 ibid., m. 17; Foedera, Vol. 111, div. i, p. 115.
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of ports that were trying to avoid supplying their quota. 221 Even on 16 May London and
other ports had to be told, if their contributions were not yet ready, to crew and victual
them and have them join the fleet at sea by 1 June.222
As far as transport for men and provisions was concerned, many orders seem to
indicate that the admirals were expected to provide shipping in an ad hoc way. The
admiral of the West was to see to ships taking supplies from the Isle of Wight and
Hampshire; 223 the admiral of the North was told to provide ships at Boston to carry 30
barrels of flour to Calais, 224 and to release one or two ships to transport hay; 225
 the
admiral of the West was to let the earl of Pembroke have ships for his crossing at a port
to be determined by Pembroke,226 and to provide ships to take victuals to Gasootiy;227 he
or his lieutenant in Dover and Sandwich was to let the king's sergeant-at-arms Thomas
de Ferriby have enough ships for the passage of Henry of Lancaster. 228 Other officials
were similarly involved. The constable of Dover was to tell the ships that would
transport the earl of Huntingdon to return for other magnates as soon as he had
disembarked; 229 the clerk Philip de Weston was to crew and victual ships froth the
Thames and send them to Calais; 23° John Dale, sergeant-at-arms, Stephen de Padiham
and William Walketale were to find ships for the passage of the king's son John, 231 for
which the sheriffs of London were to victual ships and send them to Sandwich; 232 the
mayor and bailiffs of Dover and Sandwich were to provide transport for the men of the
retinue of the earl of Northampton as they arrived.'
The English administration's logistical role in the siege of Calais might be
summarised as ensuring the availability of shipping, maintaining some sort of supply of
victuals, and responding to demands for reinforcements. English successes in south-
n•••••
221 C76124, m. 14.
222 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 120.
225 C76/24, m. 35, dated 24 February.
224 Ibid., m. 29, dated 15 March.
225 Ibid., m. 21, dated 26 March.
226 jbid., m. 14, dated 25 April.
221 Ibid., m. 11, dated 1 May.
228 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 121, dated 19 May.
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west France, and the nagging pressure of Flemish attacks, had effectively nullified any
French effort to relieve Calais by force. The capture of the town was, however,
essentially dependent not on military brilliance but on logistical perseverance. Because
of the sustained nature of the effort required it is less surprising therefore that much of
the action te• obtain provisions, and a good proportion of that to levy arehers and arniati,
was in the hands of permanent officials: possibly, also, a fair number of local notables
were with the army in France. 234 In the potential military crises of October 1346 and,
particularly, May 1347 the summoning of lords and their augmented retinues carried the
air of greatest urgency, demonstrating the critical importance of this resource. Finally,
even if the assembly of the special fleet of 120 ships did not proeeed as planned, it does
appear that any delays in arrival of troops during the siege were not due to non-
availability of shipping.
A necessary requirement for effective management of the detail of complex
operations is availability and use of reliable information: the survey in October 1344
was a deliberate step to establish the basis for that. The results were carefully recorded,
and communicated to those who would need them, as were many subsequent reports.
There were many instances in which an order for executive action to be completed by a
specified date was accompanied by an instruction to report what was being done, by a
date in advance of the completion date. This shows that there was a proper
understanding of the need not to assume that everything would go according to plan,
which is evidence of experienced and competent management. Remonstrances for
failure to perform tasks on time show that the explicit arrangements to make monitoring
possible were utilised.
Ultimately the embarkation of the army for Normandy took place months later
than originally intended. This was partly due to administrative failure to have enough
transport available, though that was more a matter of initial quantified planning than of
the subsequent carrying out of plans. This apart, it seems fair to judge that the active
management of the mobilization for these campaigns was, for its time, a deliberate and
234 N. Saul estimates that towards half of Gloucestershire knights = 17 out of 35=
45 - were at the siege. Knights and Esquires: the Gloucestershire Gentry in the
Fourteenth Century (Oxford, 1981), p. 51.
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successful user of carefully collected information. This was channelled through the
chancery, and thus available to a decision-making council seemingly justifiably
confident in its ability to command the realm's resources for the war.
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CHAPTER 8
THE REIMS CAMPAIGN, 1359-1360
Victory at Crecy and the capture of Calais naturally invest the mobilization of resources
for the campaign of 1346-1347 with the aura of a successful operation. The feature that
was least efficiently managed was timing: what had been planned originally as
embarkation in October 1345 eventually took place at the end of June 1346. The
discussion in the previous chapter has suggested that there were varying reasons for the
several postponements - first not enough ships were requisitioned, then (probably) the
decision to increase the size of the expedition resulted in the need to find still more
ships, then there were storms and, finally, unfavourable winds. The last two were
unavoidable; the first two suggest inadequacy in the management of coordinated
planning. Arrangements for what became the Reims campaign of 1359-1360 presented
the same challenge - to plan and manage coordination of the different elements of the
mobilization.
The defeat of the French and the capture of King John at Poitiers had put
Edward Ia in an apparently overwhelmingly powerful negotiating position. Le
Patourel, in 'The Treaty of Bretigny 1360 1 , 1 points out that the so-called 'first treaty of
London' of May 1358, with its seemingly moderate terms, was not a final peace treaty.
It only defined the conditions, which included a large ransom, for John's release. When
the first instalment of that ransom was not paid by the due date, 1 November 1358,
preliminary orders for preparations for a renewed attack on France were issued.
The order for gathering ships was dated 6 December 1358. 2 Sandwich would be
the embarkation port, where a transport fleet was to be assembled by Palm Sunday, 14
April 1359. This did not breach the truce agreed in 1357 and due to expire on 9 April
1359. Embarkation in the spring also avoided the problems of crossing and
campaigning in winter. The date of the order for ships allowed over four months for
gathering them; perhaps the experience of having to postpone the Crecy expedition
because of shortage of shipping was remembered.
1 J. Le Patourel, Feudal Empires, Norman and Plantagenet (London, 1984), Ch.
XIII.
2 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 412; C76136, m. 5.
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The detailed instructions went to Guy de Bryan, admiral of the West, and Robert
de Morle, admiral of the North. The instructions did not specify how many ships were
required, but they did define the scope of requisitioning: ships of 76 tons burden and
below. All such ships of the ports of each admiralty, whether in port or at sea, were to
be made to give security via the owners and masters that they Would be at Sandwich by
14 April. The admirals were to cause to be proclaimed defined rates of payment per
horse carried (though nothing was said with regard to other passengers). 3 Certain
towns and ports had already been ordered to make barges for the army's crossing. The
two admirals were to warn their officials and communities that those barges as well
must be at Sandwich by 14 Apri1.4
Practical and managerially efficient arrangements were made to ensure the
carrying out of the instructions. As regards the barges, the admirals had been sent not
only lists of the relevant towns and ports but also the number of barges ordered from
each. To arrest shipping four royal sergeants-at-arms (Thomas Durant, Thomas Dantre,
Walter de Harewell and Michael de Grendon) were assigned to Gay de Bryari and five
(Richard de Cortenhale, William de Imworth, William de Wode, John de Haddon and
John Mayn) to Robert de Morle. They were to operate under the orders of the
admirals. 5 A separate communication dated 8 December to sheriffs, mayors, and
owners, masters and sailors of ships, ordered them to obey and assist these individually
named sergeants-at-arms. 6 The latter were to go to all the ports to arrest the ships arid
take the securities for appearance at Sandwich. They had powers to arrest and imprison
all who disobeyed. Cortenhale and Imworth covered the ports from the Thames to
King's Lynn, William de Wode and John de Haddon those from Hull to Berwick, and
John de Haddon with John Mayn, 7 those from King's Lynn to Hull. A comprehensive
report of the action taken was to be made by 27 January, tinder the seal of the admirals.8
3 Did this possibly recognise the cost of adapting ships to carry horses?
4 The communities were to be told that, if their barges were not yet ready, they
should rectify this. (Ibid.). Therefore it seems obvious that a renewal of the war and the
sending of an army to France had been expected - if not actually intended - and
planning was already in hand.
5 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 412.
6 ibid.
7 Mayn is, for some reason, not mentioned in the other order, only in that of 8
December (Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 413 - and C76/36, m. 5): No similar sub-
division of areas is recorded for the western admiralty.
8 Order of 6 Decemb r to the admirals. Poedera,Vol. IT, &v. i, p. 412.
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The report was to contain the number of ships arrested, their ports, the names of their
masters (but not of their owners), the security taken, and from whom. It was also to
report the dates of the proclamation and of the warnings, presumably about the rates of
pay for carriage, and about delivery of the barges, respectively. It is interesting that the
actual preparation of the reports seems to have been the responsibility of the sergeants-
at-arms; the 8 December order to sheriffs and others, telling them to co-operate with
Thomas Durant and his colleagues, said explicitly that the latter had been ordered to
report to the chancery (as usual) by 27 January.
Several aspects of these arrangements are noteworthy. The sergeants-at-arms
were the central resource applied to local action. The chancery Was the commuriication
centre. The information to be reported to it was such as to make possible follow-up
action; the number of arrested ships would permit an assessment of whether enough
would be available, or the tonnage criterion needed to be changed. Telling the owners
and masters that the report contained their names and the security they had given would
both allow sanctions against defaulters, and more importantly be a discouragement
against default. The requirement for the report to be made about half-way between the
beginning of the process and the final assembly date allowed time for corrective action.
In all, the administration seems to have had a clear and firm grasp of how to manage the
operation.
Supplies of bows and sheaves of arrows, 3,300 and 2,000 respectively, for the
war with France were to be obtained and delivered by indenture to William de
Rothwell, keeper of the privy wardrobe at the Tower, by 7 April. This was to be done
by the sheriffs of various counties, specific quotas being allocated to each. They were
to pay for them out of the issues of their counties.9
On 12 January, arrayers were appointed for 28 counties to seleet 2,600 archers.
This was described as both for the French expedition and for the necessary defence of
England, presumably as propaganda to make the array more palatable. 1° Four, or more
rarely three, arrayers were named for each county, one always being the sheriff. The
defined quotas were to be chosen by 31 March, and equipped at the cost of the county
with one suit of clothes, bows, arrows, knives, and appropriate arms. They were to be
ready to come to the muster, also at the cost of the county, when summoned, and to go
thence at the king's wages. There is a clear indication in the wording of the instructions
that, though the arrayers had authority to arrest and commit the disobedient to prison, it
9 Ibid., Vol. Di, div.i, p. 414, dated 2 January.
10 Ibid., Vol. III, div. i, pp. 415-6.
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was the sheriff who had responsibility for keeping them imprisoned. 11 The deliberate
inclusion of the sheriffs in each commission of array looks like a clear and sensible
policy of integrating the permanent local authority with the ad hoc appointees.
Also on 12 January, and for the same two declared purposes, the French
expedition and defence, a total of 1,7M South-Welsh foot, two-thirds archers and one-
third with lances, were ordered to be chosen. The order went to a list of lords with
holdings in Wales, giving each a defined quota to have ready by the same 31 March
date. 12 The Prince of Wales' lands in North Wales were to provide another 830. 13 In an
apparently separate levy the lieutenant of the justice of Chester and the chamberlain
were to choose, equip and have 300 archers ready to go, as the prince was misidering
crossing with a strong force. 14 The mayor and sheriffs of London were told to select,
clothe and equip 200 archers. 15 Later, on 14 February, arrayers, again including the
sheriff; were appointed to array, clothe and equip 200 archers from Lincolnshire. 16 Four
smiths (fabros) and forty miners were to be chosen from the Forest of Dean and
Gloucestershire, to be ready to go when summoned; security was to be taken from them
that they would not leave the county. 17 These were also presumably for the expedition,
though the text only says ad proficiscendum in obsequium nostrum.
Modifications of the original orders show that the raising of levies was still in
progress during March. On 8 March the arrayers for Oxfordshire were told to reduce
the city's quota to fifteen, as its mayor had pleaded that the original quota was too
large: 18 on 16 March the arrayers of Lincolnshire were told to allow the city to select the
11 Ibid., Vol. III, div. i, p. 415: Et tu, praefate vicomes, omnes illos, quos vos,
vel aliquis vestrum...arestaveritis, vel arestaverit, in prisonis nostris salvo custodiri
faciatis.
12 Ibid., Vol. III, div. i, p. 416. The individual quotas ranged from Roger
Mortimer's 500 to John de Warre's 10: another illustration of detailed planning.
13 C76/36, m. 2.
14 Black Prince's Register, Vol. HI, p. 331, dated 1 March. This order makes
arrangements for leaders for these archers, naming Robert de Legh for those from
Macclesfield, and instructing the lieutenant and chamberlain to choose leaders for the
rest from knights of the county 'who are going with the Prince'.
15 C76136, m. 2.
16 C76137, m. 21. Lincolnshire was not among the counties listed on 12 January.
17 Foedera, Vol. HI, div. i, p. 417, in an order dated 1 February to Guy de Bryan,
keeper of the Forest and four named miners:
18 The county's full quota, 100, was still to be raised. C76137, m. 20.
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individuals itself: 19 as late as 23 March - ten weeks from the original order's date - the
Hampshire arrayers were told not to take any men from Portsmouth.2°
Presumably because a muster date had not been set, the Treaty rolls do not show
orders for the accumulation of provisions specifically for the expedition to France. Four
entries around the end of 1358 refer to supplies for Calais, but should probably be seen
as only routine maintenance for the town and garrison, not preparations for the
imminent arrival of an army. 21 Nor is there evidence, for example by the issue of
protections, of arrangements for the assembly of men-at-arms from retinues of
magnates.22
In the event this expedition planned for early 1359 did not sail. The truce WaS
extended to 24 June and new negotiations with King John took place. These concluded
with what Delachenal calls the 'second treaty of London'. 23 Edward III was to receive
extensive territorial gains and a huge ransom of 4,000,000 crowns, in return for giving
up his claim to the French throne. This treaty was, as Le Patourel describes it,
'preposterous'. 24 He suggests it was negotiated by Jolut as a delaying tactic to give the
Dauphin time to strengthen his position. Certainly it was something France could not
accept, and it was rejected by the Estates General at the end of May. Edward therefore
19 The quota was to be 'reasonably' assessed by the arrayers.
20 Ibid., m. 19. Two other ports supplying shipping, Great Yarmouth and King's
Lynn, were also excused the levy of archers. (CCR 1354-1360, p. 555, dated 25
February.) These decisions seem more like after-thoughts, possibly in response to
protests from important individual ports, rather than a general policy of not levying
soldiers from ports supplying ships.
21 C76136, m. 6: John de Middleton and John Broke to find in Kent ships to take
400 quarters of corn for the victualling of Calais (20 November); Thomas Dantre and
John le Clerk to take ships from Southampton to transport corn and other supplies (3
December); the sheriff of Kent to deliver to ports corn bought for Calais (8 December);
enough ships to early 640 quarters of corn to be requisitioned. ibid., m. 1, 20 January.
22 The reference in the Black Prince's Register to knights of the county 'who are
going with the prince' does indicate that preliminary preparations for cavalry were
made. Above, p. 172 n.14.
23 R. Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V (5 vols., Paris, 1909), Vol. II, p. 80.
24 Feudal Empires, p. O.
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determined to invade France to achieve his aims by military means, saying according to
Jean le Bel qu'il y demourroit tant qu'il auroit fin de guerre ou paix a son honneur.25
According to Henry Knighton Edward's intention was originally to cross to
France on 8 September, ad Nativitatem Beate Marie. 26 The orders for the assembly of
the fleet at Sandwich were dated 6 June. That to Guy de Ryan defined the arrival date
there as in Quindena Nativitatis Sancti Johannis Baptistae, 27 i.e. two weeks from 24
June, 8 July. Keeping shipping tied up until 8 September at least, some nine weeks,
seems rather cautious administratively, and expensive for the ship-owners; a decade
later the Commons were complaining about ships being arrested for that length of
time. 28 It is therefore possible that when the order was issued on 6 June an earlier
embarkation was envisaged. This is considered below in the context of the orders for
troops.
The orders for collecting a fleet, assigning sergeants-at-arms to carry out the
arresting of ships and taking of securities, and ordering officials and owners, masters
and sailors of ships to obey them, were in essentially the same terms as those of 6
December. There were some differences. The date for assembly at Sandwich was, of
course, now 8 July. The date for the report to the chancery was to be made within the
preceding fortnight (citra Quindenam praedictam). A new sergeant-at-arms, John de
Ellerton, replaced William de Imworth and John de Haddon. Significantly there was no
upper limit on the size of sea-going ships to be requisitioned. A follow-up
communication to the admirals dated 16 June - only ten days after the original order -
reiterated the urgency of providing shipping;29
 this adds to the argument that 8
September may not have been the originally intended date for embarkation.
Manning ships sometimes required impressment of sailors if their original crews
had disappeared. Masters of seventeen named vessels were given power to choose and
25 Chronique de Jean le Be!, ed. J. Viard and E. Deprez (2 vols., Paris, 1904),
Vol. II, p. 287.
26 Knighton Chronicle, ed. G. H. Martin, p. 168.
27 Foedera, Vol. 11E, div. i, p. 428.
28 J. W. Sherborne, 'The Hundred Years War. The English Navy: Shipping and
Manpower 1369-1389', Past and PreSent, XXXVII (1967), p. 164.
29 C76137, m. 13.
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place on their craft defined numbers ranging from 28 to 100, to stay there at the king's
wages. 30
The admirals' role seems to have been not merely to organise assembly of
shipping to Sandwich, but also to allocate it to other needs: since they had been told to
requisition all sea-going ships, theOretieally at least there Would be 'wile available
without their permission. The admiral of the North was told to supply eleven ships
from east coast ports for the Prince of Wales' officers to send supplies to Sandwich; 31 he
had to provide single ships for Roger de la Warre, Edward le Despenser and John de
Willoughby. 32 The admiral of the West had to provide ten ships, with a guard of
archers, for the passage of the seneschal of Gascony and the constable of Bordeaux.33
On 6 August he, or his lieutenant at Sandwich, was told to find two ships to escort
vessels carrying grain to Calais, which was in urgent need of supplies. 34 By and large it
appears that the administration was effective in mobilizing naval resources and applying
them to its purposes.
An instruction dated 15 May had told the Devon arrayers to earieel the array of'
their 60 archers, 35 which might suggest that the resumption of the war was not
immediately expected: the French Estates General had not yet met and rejected the
'preposterous' treaty. Other administrative actions, however, show that preparations
continued. Peremptory letters, dated 16 May, to the sheriffs who had been told at the
beginning of January to buy and deliver arrows by 7 April, admonished them for failure
- de quo non inmerito commovemur. It ordered them to deliver their original quotas by
9 June, and substantial further quantities by 22 July. With the same date, 16 May, and
the preamble pro expeditione nostrae Franciae, six more sheriffs were told to buy and
deliver to the Tower another 4,000 sheaves. 36 The administration's failure to complain
30 Foedera, Vol. ifi, div. i, p. 428, dating one 7 June and the rest 18 July. In
C76137, m. 13, all are dated 7 June. A separate authority to the bailiff of Lemyngton to
take sailors for the king's barge is dated 18 July,
31 ibid.
32 Ibid., dated 20 and 27 July.
33 Ibid., m. 12, dated 12 July.
34 Ibid., m. 8.
" Ibid., m. 16.
36 Ibid., m. 17. The sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk was given the alternative of
paying £25 into the treasury by 5 June, for the buying of arrows. The reference to the
French expedition may only have been a clerk repeating a previous formula, but if not it
looks like a revelation of intent even at that date.
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earlier about the non-delivery of the first quotas may have been due to the agreement to
extend the truce. Nevertheless it does illustrate the point that management could not
assume that all would go according to plan.
By the beginning of June the decision to mount an invasion must have been
taken, though the first orders to attayers of the county levies did riot yet speci a date
for the muster of the whole army. These orders, dated 1 June, only named the date by
which the men were to be ready to move. Fifteen of the counties told to provide levies
in the January order, and Lincolnshire, which had been added in February, were to have
their men ready by 14 July to be led to the king. Another twelve counties were told to
have their men ready by 22 July. 37 Devon's atrayers were told ori 6 June that, though
they had been notified of cancellation in May, new information meant that the array
was reinstated. 38 Their men too were to be ready by the earlier date, 14 July. The
counties given that earlier date, 14 July, were those furthest away from Sandwich. The
same point applied to the dates for London's contingent and the two from Wales:
London's readiness date was 22 July, whereas that for the Welsh was the 14th. 39 This
would give the more distant counties approximately enough time for their levies' arrival
to coincide with that of the levies from those nearer Sandwich (assuming that the orders
to set off would be received simultaneously). This shows that plans for assembling this
section of the army were deliberately coordinated.
The new orders to the county arrayers nominated which Of them wag to bring the
men to the king, an indication of their serious intent. They contained a militarily
important change. The archers, required explicitly for the expedition to France, were
now to be mounted, but still at the cost of the county. In what must have been a
necessary compensation the numbers were substantially reduced, to 990, compared with
the former 2,800 (2,600 plus Lincolnshire's 200). The orders giving the new quotas
repeated the original January figures. In both cases the quota was a multiple of ten,
demonstrating that (though no doubt bearing in mind general local circumstances) it
had been administratively determined. In broad terms original quotas were reduced by
two-thirds, for example all five 60's becoming 20, and all 120's 40, suggesting the same
point. Wholly unsurprisingly, it is clear that records were kept arid used. This 'me-
third mounted' formula was not applied to the London levy. The mayor, sheriffs and
aldermen of the city were told that, as a consequence of the news (presumably that the
French had rejected the treaty) mounted archers were required for France. They were
37 Ibid., mm. 16, 15.
38	 •
m. 16.
39 Ibid., m. 15, all dated 1 June.
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therefore to select 150 archers from the original 200 or others, to be supplied with
horses as well as to be armed at the city's expense.°
The foot soldiers to be brought from Wales were also reduced in number, but as
they did not have to be provided with horses a higher proportion of the original levies
was required. The South Wales lands were now to send 930, about half the first number,
and North Wales a still higher proportion, 515 compared with 830. 41 Specific new
figures, stated as in the case of the English counties together with the previous quota,
were defined for each lord of the land in question. The Welsh were still to be two-
thirds archers and one-third armed with lances. The order giving the new numbers was
dated 1 fune and was followed by one dated 5 June appointing 11.ees ap Cififfith to
supervise the array of 1,060 (sic) men from South Wales, replace any considered
inadequate, organise them into 100's and 20's, and have them ready by 4 July to be led
by either himself or by appointments he was to make, to the king. 42 Two of the king's
clerks were appointed to pay the wages of the Welshmen for their march to Sandwich,
and to see to their accommodation, victualling and everything necessary for their safe
arrival. Hugo Young's appointmemt, for those from North Wales, was dated 28 July,
and Walter de Derby's for the South Welsh 3 August. 43 In these arrangements still no
date was given for arriving at Sandwich.
The June orders for having the county levies ready are parallelled in the Black
Prince's Register. An order dated 10 June was for 50 archers to be ready by 1 August to
go when summoned.44 On 28 June the chamberlain of North Wales was told to warn
knights, esquires, 400 Chester archers and 50 Welsh 'who are going with the Prince to
the war' to be ready to come when summoned. In this case an arrival date was
specified: they were to be with the prince at Northbourne near Sandwich by 15
August.45
As this order to be at Sandwich by 15 August is dated in June, it may be that 15
August was about the date originally intended for the general muster. It would have
given the nearer English counties three weeks from their levies' readiness date, though it
would still have meant the fleet would have been actually waiting at Sandwich for some
40 Ibid. The Londoners in the event paid £500 for remission of this obligation.
CPR 1358-1360, p. 256, dated 3 August.
41 C76/37, m. 15.
42 Ibid., m. 14.
43 Ibid.
44 Black Prince's Register, Vol. III, p. 347.
45 Mid., p.350.
177
five weeks, and 'under arrest' still longer. Two entries in the Close rolls seem to support
this timing. On 26 June the sheriffs of Kent, Sussex and Essex were told to deliver a
total of thirty gangways and 3,000 hurdles to Sandwich by 1 August for the shipment of
horses for the passage. 46 On 22 July ships arrested for the passage in certain east coast
ports were to be allowed to sail with cargoes of wool, provided they gave 8iireties to be
at Sandwich by 15 August.° These could be consistent with an embarkation intention
for mid-August
If, as Knighton seems to imply, 8 September was from the start the date intended
for the army to embark, the first orders for the fleet to be at Sandwich by 8 July seem as
has been said unnecessarily early, especially if equipment to enable them to transport
horses was not going to be ordered until the end of June, and then only for delivery by 1
August. Similarly, if embarkation was to be 8 September, assembly of the army as early
as around 15 August - the date implied by the Black Prince's order - would mean
keeping thousands of idle soldiers paid, fed and under some sort of control for three
weeks. There are several indications, however, that postponements of what were the
original plans did have to be made. The Black Prince's Register records an order dated
25 July to the lieutenant of the justice of Chester. He was to issue a proclamation and
warning for all knights, esquires and archers 'who are retained with the Prince for the
war' that although they had been told to be at Northbourne within three days of
Assumption, i.e. by 18 August, they were now to be there by 24 August. The lieutenant
was to set off by 10 August at the latest.48
Then, dated 16 August, the chamberlain of Chester was to tell eight knights and
their esquires, who had been retained by the Prince specifically for the war, together
with 400 chosen archers, to be at Sandwich by 5 September at the latest. 49 This could
be consistent with a new, 8 September, embarkation date. Significantly, on 4 August
the county arrayers were told to deliver their mounted archers, by indenture, to a named
leader, one of the arrayers, to bring them to Sandwich by 30 August; and this order was
prefaced by the statement that it was necessary to accelerate the passage of the army -
passagium nostrum praedictum volumus, prow' expedit, accelelari. 5° Taken together,
46 CCR 1354-1360, p. 564. This is matched by an instruction dated 6 August to
the bailiffs at Sandwich to receive these gangways and hurdles from the three sheriffs
by indenture. C76137, m. 4.
47 CCR 1354-1360, p. 574.
48 Black Prince's Register, Vol. ifi, p. 354.
49 Ibid., p. 347.
50 C76137, m. 7.
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these orders for ships and soldiers with their varying arrival dates suggest that originally
in June, and still in July, an earlier sailing may have been intended. Things had not
progressed as rapidly as had been hoped, and in August it was recognised that one in
September would have to be accepted: this was the one Knighton recorded. If this
interpretation is correct it left& to indicate that the ability of the administration to
assess how long it would take for a major expeditionary army to assemble was, even at
this date, very limited. Perhaps the fact that the whole process had begun in January
and then been interrupted led to over-optimism about the speed with which it could,
with changes, be re-commenced. More probably, as will be discussed later, the reason
for the postponements may have lain in the nature of the make-up of the ekpedition.
In addition to fighting units, the army needed the equivalent of engineers and
sappers. Miners from the Forest of Dean had been included in the earlier conscriptions;
now, in July, other specialists were to be summoned as well. Fifty carpenters were to
be chosen from London and seven counties in the south-east and assembled at
Westminster by 16 August, ready to go to Sandwich. Thirty masons were to come from
the same areas, plus Gloucestershire, Oxfordshire and Worcestershire. Twenty-five
smiths were to be selected by Andrew le Fevre of the Tower of London, and four
farriers by Thomas le Ferrour, a sergeant of the king's household. 51 The date, 16
August, by which these groups were to be ready to set off suggests that by the time of
this order, 10 July, it was recognised that the army's sailing could not be before the end
of August.
The bulk of the army mobilized for the Reims campaign of 1359-60 was not
formed from these levies from the counties and Wales, but from the retinues (usually
referred to as companies in the records) 52 of the magnates and others: Andrew Ayton
counts nearly 400 such retinues. 53 Some members of a magnate's retinue would be
serving in it by virtue of existing obligations, 54 while others would be contracted
51 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 431. The order, dated 10 July, to choose the
carpenters (not from fees of the church) was to William Herlond, the king's carpenter,
John Berholte and John Havering. John de Sporle and Robert de Wenlynburgh chose
the masons.
52 
e.g. C76/38, mm. 17-18, recording protections, refer to the unit six times as
retinentia and nineteen times -AS cOmitivez.
53 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 268.
54 Such obligations could be set out in an indenture; 'The services it specified
could be intended to last for the life of the retainer and, if so, they were generally for
peace as well as war. But they could be for a more limited period, in most cases for a
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specifically for this campaign. For example, the knight John de Hide was one of a
number of the Prince of Wales' bachelors 'whom the Prince has retained for the war for
one year from St Peter's Chains.'55 To the extent that such specific ad hoc agreements
were essential to the construction of each company, this crucially important element of
the army was one that depended on volunteers who 'negotiated' their service.
Mobilizing an army dependent on retinues formed in this way therefore
depended on the making of essentially voluntary contracts between parties at one
remove from the central authority. This must have presented the latter with complex
problems of planning, and much uncertainty. Indeed this factor may well have been the
reason for the difficulty in setting a date for the embarkation.
It would therefore have been illuminating to be able to know the dates on which
commitments to serve in the forthcoming campaign were made betweeh the edptairis of
retinues and the crown, and whether they included a date for muster. In 1359 those
commitments were not set out in written contracts, because this was an expedition led
by the king himself; the office of the wardrobe was with the king and available to deal
with the administration of pay, so there was consequently no need for formal contracts
for leaders of companies to be Supplied with sums with which to pay their nien.56
Therefore evidence as to when commitments might have been made must be sought
elsewhere.
Some indications can, arguably, be deduced from the dates of letters of
protection for members of various indentured retinues. 'Indentures customarily
stipulated that letters of protection and of general attorney should be granted;... The
procedure was as follows. A captain wrote to the chancellor.. .asking him to make out
letters of protection for the members of his retinue, whose names were speeified.' 57 The
date of issue of protections thus would usually be several days, probably a few weeks,
after the captain of a retinue had made his agreements with his recruits and with the
king. Therefore they give an indication of the timing of those agreements.
Protections for the Prince of Wales' company were of various dates. Only four
were earlier than 20 August, and those look like a special ease, three being for three
campaign or for a portion of a year.' J. M. W. Bean, From Lord to Patron. Lordship in
Late Medieval England (Manchester, 1989), p. 13.
55 Black Prince's Register, Vol. ifi, p. 356.
56 'Thus contracts were not needed for the great 1346-7 army, or for that of 1359,
though there were no doubt informal understandings between the king and his main
captains.' Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 93.
57 Prince, 'Indenture System', p. 287.
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members of one family. 58 That for John de Hide was dated 20 August, like the
majority. He was, as noted above, retained for the war for one year from St Peter's
Chains, from 1 August; and earlier, dated 11 July, he was recorded as excused the first
payment of a fine, so that he could go to the war with the Prince.59
Early in July, therefore, the captain of the greatest retinue (after the king's
household) was, at the least, negotiating with recruits specifically for this expedition, so
he was himself by then, presumably, already committed to it. 6° It might be expected
that a request from the Black Prince for the issue of protections for members of his
retinue would receive priority of treatment. Protections for members of other retinues
having an earlier date than those for his retainers will suggest that the captairis of those
retinues had made their own agreements for service earlier than the prince had made
his. They therefore may have been made before early July. Supporting evidence for
such early commitments can be argued to come both from the dates of protections and
from the record of their retinues coming into pay from the wardrobe before the Black
Prince's company. Two rnembers of the retinue of Ralph earl Stafford had protectioris
dated 7 and 8 August; 61 Stafford's company came into pay from 26 August. 62 A
member of the earl of Richmond's retinue had a protection dated 16 August:63
Richmond's company was paid from 30 August. Brocas1
 company was paid from
22 August:65 Oliver his son and Bernard Brocas, members of it, had protections dated
15 August.66 Most protections for members of the Prince of Wales' company were
dated later than these, 20 August, and it was not in pay until 2 September; 67 probably,
therefore, the commitments of those other companies were being made before his.
Thus there is reason to believe that contracts for the forthcoming expedition
were being made during June and July, which would be consistent with the rejection of
the 'second treaty of London' at the end of May. This might have led to too sanguine a
58 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 443.
59 Ibid., Vol. DI, div. i, p. 353.
60 As he required service from 1 August, it might be argued that he was at that
time expecting to sail not too long after that.
61 Foedera, Vol. DI, div. i, pp. 439, 440.
62 William Farley's wardrobe account, E101/393/11, f. 80.
63 Foedera, Vol. DI, div. i, p. 442.
64 E101/393/11, f. 79.
65 Ibid., f. 82d.
66 Foedera, Vol. fa, div. i, p. 440.
67 1O1/9I11f. 79.
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hope that a sailing in August would be viable. The accuracy of chroniclers, particularly
in attributing actual words to people, has to be treated with caution, but Jean le Bel's
account, in which the news of the French rejection of the treaty leads the furious
Edward to say that, before August was over, he would come powerfully to France 68 also
suggests that 8 September may not have been Edwardig choice from the begimiitig.
Additional support for the view that Edward ifi had hoped to launch the
campaign during August exists in the timing of recruitment of continental units. 'At the
beginning of a campaign it was usual to issue proclamations offering inducements to all
and sundry to serve in the wars.' 69 The issuing in early June of the orders for the county
levies and the Welsh makes it most likely that some such proclamation had been made
about the same time, though possibly, as in those orders, only urgency rather than a
specific date for the muster may have been communicated. As Le Bel says, it was well
known in martial circles, including particularly the Low Countries and the Empire, that
Edward wanted soldiers for an imminent campaign: Celle renommee issi par tous pays,
en Alemaigne, en Brabant, en Haynau, siques chevaliers et eSeuierS sé donnnenderent
pourveir de chevaux, de harnes, et de tous habillements de guerre. 7° Farley's accounts
record many men with names like Siffrid van Shoufelde, Henry van Werenwig, Hans
Cifoos,71
 and for none of these is there recorded payment for passage or repassage of
horses, which is as would be expected for men joining the army at Calais from
continental homes. They came into pay from dates in July and before the middle of
August; 72 it is very arguable that they were taken on at those dates to be available to
reinforce an English army intended to land during August.
Le Bel described what must be seen as a consequence of the administrative and
planning failure to determine, or even to know, when the expedition would be able to
sail. Many of these continental volunteers waited at Calais for several weeks, having
been told repeatedly that the king was coming. When he did not, they had to sell their
horses and go home impoverished: Edward is said to have sent messages, after he had
eventually landed at Calais, to tell them he had not enough money to meet their
demands, and anyway had brought enough men with him.73
68 Above, p. 174, n. 25.
69 Prince, 'Indenture System', p. 290.
70 Chronique de Jean Le Bel, ed. J. Viard, Vol. II, p. 290.
71 E101/393/11, if. 92-97.
72 The earliest is Siffrid van Shonfeld, who with his eleven companions was in
pay from 1 July. Ibid., if. 92, 92d, 93
73 Chronique de Jean Le Bel, ed. J. Viard, Vol. II, pp. 290, 295.
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The initial date for service of a retinue was the day its first members arrived at
the assembly port. 74 Assuming this applied in 1359, it can be inferred from the dates in
Farley's accounts from which retinues were paid, that the bulk of them arrived between
the middle of August and the end of September. An approximate count of the bigger
units, all of which are recorded in the first dozen membranes of vadid guerrae, ghowS
that during the two weeks of the first half of September there were over half such
arrivals, and during the second half of that month about a quarter of them. Any hope of
coming 'powerfully to France' before the end of August must soon have been
abandoned. Even the 8 September date in Knighton's chronicle would not have been
realistic without Henry of Laneaster's six bantierets, 90 knights, 486 esquires and 423
archers, who were not in the wardrobe's pay until 20 September," let alone without the
companies that arrived still later.
According to Farley's account the 'engineers and sappers' - masons, miners and
carpenters - were only in pay from 16, 10 and 19 September respectively. 76 This was
about a month later than they were to have been ready at Westminster to set off to
Sandwich, and though the date might have been due to delay in assembling them, it
could have been a sensible administrative decision not to summon them and incur their
cost until it could be seen that the fighting units were likely to have arrived. Another
large group of conscripts, c.1,000 men from North Wales, were not in Fancy's account
until 23 September,77 though they were to have been ready to set off by 14 July. The
500 from South Wales only appear from 10 November. 78 In an army in which the men-
at-arms and mounted archers were the critical force it Would be similarly proper not to
summon these large numbers of foot, relatively inexpensive though they were
financially (but logistically not in terms of provisioning) until the former were
assembled. Interestingly, ten units of 100 archers and one of 40, 79 described as from
74 Sherbome, 'Indentured Retinues', p. 719.
75 E101/393/11, f. 79d.
76 Ibid., f. 116.
77 Ibid., f. 115d. They were under the orders of Owyn de Charleton and
included ten constables, ten standard-bearers, ten 'proclaimers', and fifty vintenars. The
figures of 1,000 from North and 500 from South Wales are the reverse of those taken
from C76137, m. 15! (Above, p. 177.)
78 E101/393/11, f. 115d.
79 Ibid., ff. 115, 115d.
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various counties and presumably therefore mounted, are recorded as paid from dates
between 17 August and 12 September.8°
The foregoing account of the process of mobilizing the whole army that
eventually crossed to Calais with Edward DI on 28 October 81 does not present a picture
of a suocessfully planned and executed programme. Even though some groundwork
was laid at the beginning of the year, it was still almost five months from the 1 June
orders for mounted archers from the counties before the expedition sailed. The
summoning of the transport fleet to Sandwich for early July, together with other
evidence, suggests that at first a crossing in August was intended. The soldiers and
support elements that were obtained by conscription would have been able to meet gueh
a date, given the dates by which they were to be ready to set off: indeed some did,
proving that the 4 August order to them to be at Sandwich by the end of the month was
practicable. It appears to have been the slower arrivals of the retinues, for which
agreements had first to be entered into with the retinues' captains, who would also have
to make their own agreements with their men, that caused the delays and oorisequent
postponements. The fact that these arrivals were also spread over several weeks must
have made planning even more hazardous. Perhaps, as would be sensible, the final
orders for the Welsh and the masons, miners and carpenters to come to Sandwich were
delayed until it appeared that the bulk of the retinues would have arrived; that arrival
was something over which the king's administrators seemed to have uncertain, indeed
not much, control.
What is particularly surprising is the apparent absence of any general
promulgation of a date for the muster or for embarkation, both at this time and in the
orders issued at the beginning of the year. Was this a recognition of that uncertainty?
The arrangements made for providing the shipping, incltiding the speoially
ordered barges and the equipment to adapt ships to carry horses, have already been
described. Besides the English vessels the transport fleet was augmented by ships hired
from Flanders; protections were issued for them dated 26 August. 82 The result, as
80 Another 40 archers, these being from the king's household, were paid from 29
September. Ibid., m. 115.
81 C76138, m. 5: Hic transferavit Rex cum exercitu suo ad partes Franciae
videlicet xxviii Ottobri...
82 Foedera, Vol. DI, div. i, p. 445. The provision of these ships was ... pro
competéntifrettO eis inde solvendO.
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recounted by John of Reading, was the assembly at Sandwich of an impressive fleet -
terrifica classis - numbering over 1100 vessels.83
There is nevertheless some indication that there was inadequate transport for the
crossing; and as K. Fowler suggests, the sending of Henry of Lancaster in advance of the
rest of the army on 1 October, to deal with the problems caused by the foreign troops
waiting impatiently at Calais, also reduced the pressure on shipping 84 - provided that
Lancaster's ships returned to Sandwich.
Both the men-at-arms and the archers in the expedition were mounted; their
horses, together with those needed for the c. 1,000 baggage carts (according to Thomas
Walsingham), 85 must have strained the fleet's capacity. The promulgation of standard
rates of payment for the carriage of horses, even in December 1358 before the decision
that archers were to be mounted, may have been a recognition by the administration that
this would be a problem that might be expensively exploited by ships' masters. Ayton,
estimating that the army included almost 3,000 men-at-arms and 5,000 mounted
archers, assesses the number of horses needed for them as some 16,000, 86 and animals
for the baggage would add to this. Though the bulk of the horses would be carried in
the ships requisitioned by royal officers, Farley's accounts show payments to some
captains for 'passage' to Calais of stated numbers of horses." Ayton argues that these
payments, 25 in number in 1359, had to be made when transport was not in the royal
fleet, in which case they are persuasive evidence that its capacity was inadequate.
Further, Ayton counts not only payments for passage of a total of 4,471 horses,
but also payments for 'repassage' from France of 10,861. 88
 In most instances the
83 Chronica Johannis de Reading et Anonymi Cantuarensis 1316=1364, ed. J.
Tait (Manchester, 1914), p. 132.
84 K. Fowler, The King's Lieutenant. Henry of Grosmont, First Duke of
Lancaster 1310-1361 (London, 1969), p. 201.
85 Chronicon Angliae 1328-1388 Auctore Monacho Quodam Sancti Albani, ed.
E. M. Thompson (London, 1874), p. 40. Aecordirig to Jean le Bel it was said that
Edward had 6,000 carts brought from England. Chronique de Jean le Be!, ed. J. Viard,
Vol. II, p. 299.
86 Knights and Warhorses, p. 268.
87 
e.g. to the Prince of Wales for 1369 horses. E101/393/11, f. 79.
88 Knights and Warhorses, p. 268. The Black Prince, for example, was paid for
repassage of 2,114 horses, compared with passage of 1,369.
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recipients of payment for repassage had not had to be paid for passage. 89 These
payments for repassage most probably represent the fact that the return to England at
the end of the campaign would, for many, have to be in hired ships, not in vessels
requisitioned for royal service. The fleet assembled at Sandwich in autumn 1359 would
have dispersed by May OK and there are no records of orders to assemble a fleet at
Calais for the return. Payments for passage to France could therefore also be seen to be
for transport in ships other than those in the requisitioned fleet, and evidence that the
latter's capacity had to be substantially supplemented. 4,471 horses must have needed a
lot of ships.9°
Supplies for the expedition had to be organised, particularly the equipment for
the militarily essential archers. The orders to sheriffs to obtain and deliver increased
quantities of bows and sheaves of arrows to William de Rothwell at the Tower of
London by 22 July have already been described. On 1 July he was told to pack into
chests and deliver all his bows, arrows, bowstrings and winches for cross-bows to
Sandwich, to Henry de Sneyth, clerk of the privy wardrobe of the hou8ehold. 91 Supplies
had to continue to be supplied for the army when it was in France. On 8 November,
with the preamble that large quantities of bows and arrows were needed quickly for the
expedition, sheriffs of many counties in the south and midlands, and Yorkshire as well,
were told to buy a total of 1,200 bows and 12,000 sheaves of well-sharpened arrows and
deliver them by 7 December. As if recognising that it might be impracticable in the
time, they were told that if they could not do this, they should pay sums of money
calculated at the rate of £7/1/8 per 100 sheaves into the Treasury by the same date pro
tot arcubus & sagittis providendis. 92 As in either case the money was to come from the
issues of the sheriffs bailiwick, and the total sum only about £1,000, it is clear this was
not just a cash-collecting device. The money alternative was given probably because
there was manufacturing capacity, particularly at the Tower, that might be able to make
the bows and arrows more quickly than the sheriffs could obtain them. In fact all but
89 A rough count gives a total of some 300 individuals receiving payments for
repassage only. (E101/393/11, if. 112, 112d, 113 etc.) Many of these are to people
clearly not captains of retinues, but men on their own.
9° A risky calculation suggests 200 ships of average capacity; e.g. if two horses
required as much space as five armed men, and the 1,100 ships were about enough for
c. 16,000 horses and c. 12,000 men, on average each would accommodate about 20
horses or 50 men.
91 CCR 1354-1360, p. 574.
92 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 454.
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six of the twenty-one sheriffs were ordered on 24 February to deliver the money by
Easter so that William de Rothwell could be reimbursed for those he had had to buy.93
Taken together with the failure of the sheriffs to deliver in April the weapons ordered in
January, this suggests that they were not expected to be a reliable mechanism,94
especially when speed wag required. The Black Prince's Register gives evidence of an
analogous experience: on 16 February the chamberlain of Chester had to be urged to
proceed to obtain bows and arrows he had been told on 26 December to deliver as soon
as possible.95
Supplies of food had also to be available. A key figure for this would be the
receiver of the king's victuals, and On 13 July the king's clerk Richard de Skydeby was
appointed to be receiver and keeper of the victuals 'brought to Sandwich and elsewhere
for the king's passage'. 96 Although substantial quantities of provisions must have been
required from mid-August until the end of October as the various elements of the army
assembled, orders to officials to buy or supply provisions do not seem to be recorded
during that time. The focus for obtaining and delivery of victuals seems to have been
the opposite side of the Channel, and the means private commercial enterprise. On 18
October, before the king had crossed, the mayor and sheriffs of London, the warden of
the Cinque Ports and all the ports of both admiralties were ordered to proclaim that all
who wished should take victuals to Harfleur in Normandy: its officers would assist the
king and the army with provisions. 97 In November English port officials were told that
merchants of Flanders were to be treated as friends in return for their kindness in
bringing food to the army after its crossing. 98 In December licences were granted to
merchants to take various foodstuffs to Flanders and other places 'to make their profit'.99
93 CCR 1360=1364, pp. 10-11.
94 This point is made by Hewitt, Organisation of War, p. 69.
95 Black Prince's Register, Vol. DI, pp. 379,380.
96 CPR 1358-1361, p. 243.
97 CCR 1354-1360, p. 658.
98 Ibid., p. 662.
99 CPR 1358-1361, p. 312, dated 11-19 December. Supplying Calais from
England was a regular arrangement; whether licences dated 16 October and 2 and 3
November to take wine and victuals there (C76/38, m. 7) were specifically related to
provisioning the army cannot be known.
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After the army had left England John Pledour and Richard Catoriis" were
appointed to purvey specific quantities of various victuals from specific counties, by
tallies redeemable at the treasury at Easter. The supplies were to be delivered to ports
at the king's charge. They were described as being obtained for defence as well as for
Calais and the army in France." Ralph de Kesteven, clerk, and Thomas Staple,
sergeant-at-arms, were given authority to take various victuals from ships or granaries
in various ports, and arrest ships to take these urgently needed supplies to Calais."
Walter de Kelby was given the same authority for other ports." In January the sheriffs
of Northamptonshire, and Cambridge and Huntingdon, were to buy bacons for Calais. 1°4
In certain circumstances, therefore, supply of victuals still involved officially conducted
action. 1 °5
 Once the army was on the march in France, of course, it would have to live
largely off the land. In the train of carts were carried hand-mills, ovens, leather boats
from which to fish, and hunting equipment, to enable this to be done. K6 Thomas
Walsingham says the army was divided into three columns propter victualta.107
Presumably this was so as to spread the foraging, for which preparation had thus been
made as the expedition was being mobilized in England.
The mobilization of the force to cross the Channel was followed by
arrangements to mobilize the able-bodied manpower of the country to resist a possible
enemy invasion. The first set of orders, dated 3 October, appointed arrayers, usually
four or five per county, for thirry counties. They were to array all men between 16 and
100 In an order dated 1 February 1359 ‘Rayline Pletouf (sic) is referred to as
'Chief Purveyor of Wheat', and 'Richard Catour" (sic) as one of three purveyors under
him. (CCR 1354-1360, p. 544.) It therefore seems likely that these are the same men.
" C76 38, m. 6, dated 2 November.
1 °2 Ibid., m. 1, dated 13 January,. A few days later. 23 January, they and the
mayor and bailiffs of King's Lynn were told to de-arrest corn and malt, as three
merchants had undertaken to purvey defined quantities of variou.s supplies as soon as
possible, for delivery to the king's appointees to be taken to France. CCR 1354-1360, p.
607.
103 C76 38, tn. 1. Later, on 20 February he as told to release corn and malt
that was going bad, for merchants to sell. CCR 1360-1364„ pp. 94-95.
104 C76 38, m. 3.
105 In an apparently analaclous arrangement Henry of Lancaster assigned William
Tubb of Leicester to acquire 500 quarters of corn to be taken via King's Lynn to Calais
for the sustenance of the army. Ibid., m. 4, dated 12 November.
106 Chronzque tie Jean le Be!, ed. J. Viard, Vol. IL p. 299.
107 Chrome:on Anglitie, ed. E. M. Thompson, p. 40.
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60, see that they were armed according to the Statute of Winchester, organise the
mounted into constabularies and the foot into 100's and 20's, and have them prepared to
go against any enemy attacking their county. Signal beacons were to be set up to warn
of attack. The arrayers were to report numbers and the details of the array to the
chancery by 30 November. A fitial section, perhaps indicating coricerri not to cause
premature disruption, said that the men arrayed were not to be made to leave the
hundred where they lived before the whole county was summoned to meet an
invasion. 108
 The next set of orders, dated 16 November and originating from the
council, went further. 109 These orders included six more counties, 110 added more
arrayers for each eotinty, 111 and made it clear that the array did riot stop at the f15 level
of the Statute of Winchester but was to include everyone except those with the king. It
required those well off, but too infirm to serve in person, to be assessed by the arrayers
to provide money for arms for others who could not afford their own, and for the
expenses of defence arrangements. The report to the chancery was to be made by 28
January, and include how many of the arrayed men were able to go outside their own
county if needed. Sheriffs were being told to cooperate and, as usual, imprison the
recalcitrant.112
The order's detail is remarkable. Its explicit reference to its purpose of
correcting the inadequacy of the earlier order, which it said was noticed by members of
the council, is evidence of a watchful administration. In addition to the appointments of
arrayers directly by the council for the counties and London, Henry of Lancaster for his
duchy, the Prince of Wales for Wales and Cheshire, the bishop for Durhani, arid the
warden, Roger Mortimer earl of March, for the Cinque Ports and Dover, were to issue
similar commissions.' /3 Thus the whole kingdom was included.
108 Foedera, Vol. III, div. I, pp. 449-450
1 °9 Ibid., Vol. LH, div. i, pp. 455-458.
110 Cumberland, Westmoreland, Northumberland, Cornwall, Middlesex and
Shropshire.
111 Sometimes as many as four, or in the case of Yorkshire, instead of the
original four for each Riding, naming an extraordinary c. 140 wapentake by wapentake!
112 The order also included the minutiae of administrative issues, e.g. how to
deal with individuals with holdings in several counties.
113 CPR 1358-1361, pp. 324-5. The Black Prince's Register, Vol. DI, pp. 375-
377, records his itiStftiCtiOtiS to his settior officials to act according to the king's writ,
which is included in the Register with its date of 16 November, though the date
apparently associated with the entry is October.
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These general arrangements were reinforced for certain counties by writs to five
magnates to supervise the arrays and correct any defaults. I14 The bishop of Durham, the
earl of Angus and Ralph Nevill covered Yorkshire. Hugh de Courtenay, earl of Devon,
saw to Devon, and the earl of Arundel to Sussex, Surrey and Hampshire, which would
look like the taking of Special preCautiOn8 for the Coat, Were it iiOt that Shropshire was
in the latter's list, and no such appointment was made for Kent. 115 This intention to
mobilize the whole able-bodied male population, at least in terms of preparedness, was
not an operation whose progress could be taken for granted. Writs dated 10 February
went to the arrayers of almost all counties complaining that the task was not completed,
dont nous sumes tresmal paiez et esmuz grantement, and ordering them to apply
themselves to it with toute votre peine et diligence. They were to report by 20 April,
and preferably earlier. All the details of the conduct of the array were repeated, with
the further clarification that it was to include knights. This suggests there had at least
uncertainty about this, and possibly resistance to it.
At this time, February, the council was, correctly, anticipating that a Frerich
landing was imminent. Regional meetings with emissaries of the council were called at
which delegates were to treat with them for raising money for the expenses of
defence. 116 On 3 March, the French being known to be at sea, the arrayers of coastal
counties were ordered to summon their men and take them to the coast. Neighbouring
counties' arrays were to stand by to assist. Ports Were to array their frieri and See that
ships were drawn up away from the sea for safety. 117 The archbishop of Canterbury was
put in charge of the array and defence of Kent on 9 March.118
In spite of all these preparations, a French raid in considerable force successfully
took and sacked Winchelsea on 15 March.' 19 It was however only a raid, not a full
scale invasion. The arrangements for mobilization against invasion were therefore not
114 CPR 1358=1361, p. 324, dated 18 November.
115 Perhaps it was assumed that the warden of the Cinque Ports would see to that
vulnerable shore; later the archbishop of Canterbury was given this responsibility.
116 Foedera, Vol. III div. i, pp. 468-469, dated 10 and 12 February. The nature
of the grants made by these regional assemblies is discussed in Harriss, King,
Parliament, and Public Finance, pp. 347-8, 396-400.
117 Ibid., Vol. 111 div. i, pp. 471-2.
118 CPR 1358-1361, p. 411.
119 Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V, Vol. II, p. 181.
190
really put to the test, but they were used to provide armed men 12° for the fleet hastily
collected I21 to go to sea against possible further attacks.
The preparations for the campaign of 1359-60 produced what contemporary
chronicles saw as a militarily impressive expedition. Its failure to achieve Edward
more grandiose political objectives was partly due to the Fabian strategy of the
Dauphin, and perhaps arguably to the expedition's late timing. If Edward had been able
to cross with his whole army in early September, and even more if such a crossing had
been made in August, as may have been his original idea, he might have been more
successful. The French goverment would have had less time to deal with it internal
difficulties, Reims might have been less well prepared to resist the siege, and weather
would have been more favourable for campaigning in autumn than in winter. These
points probably apply with even more force to an expedition that might have been
mounted at the beginning of 1359, had the negotiations over the 'second treaty of
London' not intervened.
From this point of view the postponements and delays in departure that seem to
have affected the expedition had considerable significance. The problems seem to have
arisen from the administration's inability to apply precise scheduling criteria - and
possibly also quantified logistical planning - to an army mobilized primarily from
retinues that were formed by subordinate and essentially voluntary COntractS.
This (admittedly crucial) aspect apart, the management of mobilization for the
Reims campaign was on the whole well organised. It does not appear that failure to
assemble shipping in time in broadly sufficient quantity was the primary problem. As
120 e.g. CCR 1360=1364, pp. 9-10, dated 18 March. Arrayers in south-eastern
counties and the mayor and sheriffs of London were told to have specific quotas at
London by 23 March, to go to sea. They were to have wages paid for fourteen days, the
money for which was to be borrowed and repaid from the tenth and fifteenth granted for
defence. The arrayers of midland counties were to bring soldiers to various towns by 4
April, to set off two days later to the sea WI join Ships. They were to send servants ahead
to obtain victuals to vision the ships. Ibid., p. 16, dated 26 March.
121 Foedera, Vol. El, div. i, p. 476, dated 15 March, the very day of the raid.
This orders Robert de Causton and John de Wesenham to requisition, arm and vision
ships from the Thames northwards. Another order, dated 19 March, summons English
ships from ports in Flanders. (Ibid. p. 478.) John Pavely, Prior of the Hospital of St.
John in England, was appointed captain and leader of the fleet. Ibid. p. 479, dated 26
March.
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T. J. Runyan says 'A naval force could be created and assembled in less time than a
military force.' 122 This aspect of mobilization was efficiently managed. Arrangements
began in good time, included clear allocation of responsibilities, and made provision for
intermediate monitoring and correction of problems; they did not give rise to the sort of
administrative complaints of tardiness that were justifiably levelled at the sheriffs over
supplies of arrows, though in this also there was managerial action that shows
monitoring of performance and correction of problems. The orders for having the
county levies of archers ready by dates in mid-July allowed a workable margin for an
August embarkation, and took account of the different journey times needed. The
changes to quotas when it was decided that the coin* archers should be mounted
clearly used recorded numbers, and there do not seem to have been complaints of the
reduced quotas not being fulfilled. Information was channelled through the chancery,
and used. The conscription of the miners and other craftsmen, and the dates for their
arrival at the port, as in the case of Welsh, seem to have been deliberately delayed as
the magnates' retinues' failure to arrive in time for all. August of September sailing
became obvious. In all these respects - other than the planning of timing for a contract
army of retinues - mobilization was, in 1359, effectively managed.
122 T. J. Runyan, 'Ships and Mariners in Later Medieval England', Journal of
British Studies, XVI (1977), p. 2.
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CHAPTER 9
ANALYSIS
Introduction
Chapters 2-8 looked at the management of the administration of eight of the many
mobilizations under the three Edwards. Their occasions ranged from suppression of an
unexpected, sudden, localised rebellion in 1282, to a deliberate, planned attempt to
obtain the French crown by force in 1359. Though such different situations affected
how the government set about its task, the fundamental issues involved iii thariageirient
of a mobilization were necessarily constant. When there was no standing army
'preparation of forces for active service" required the recruitment and collection at a
mustering point of armed men, transport and supplies, in numbers, quantities and with
the timing planned as appropriate for the particular occasion.
This analysis has those main themes: recruitment, transport, supplies, and
planning. Within them issues such as organisational structure, use of records, authority
and sanctions, effectiveness, and coordination, will recur and overlap. The particular
focus of attention is, however, how the day-to-day practicalities were monitored and
progressed: that is, how the active management2 of the interrelated processes was
carried out.
The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries are a period in which historians have
seen substantial, and even revolutionary, changes in the conduct of war. There were
technical changes in arms and consequently in tactics. 3 At least as importantly, changes
took place in the scale and duration of conflicts, with lasting consequences for state
activity. The importance of these na8 naturally led tc particular emphasis on Mein in
historical accounts. They are seen as giving rise to, and arising from, significant social
and political developments. The growth of the importance of parliament, due partly to
the crown's need to raise taxes to finance the increasing duration and consequent cost of
The Concise Oxford Dictionary's helpful definition of mobilization.
2 Colloquially, 'management' might be defined as 'seeing that things get done'.
3 Above, pp. 7-8.
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these wars, draws attention to their constitutional consequences. 4 The Edwardian wars
have been intensively studied in the context of the declining use of the formal summons
of the feudal servicium debitum, and its eventual replacement by the raising of armies
by contracts for indentured retinues, 5 which related to changes in the nature of social
structures. Though the absolute numbers of men actively involved in the campaigns
may not have been critical in relation to the size of the population, the economic effects
of their withdrawal from productive activity, of the need to supply them, and of the
wars themselves, is a central theme of some studies. 6 These major issues, let alone the
dominating subject of the military aspects 7 of strategies, campaigns, battles and tactics
often relegate the day-to-day manAgerftent of the initial mobilization to incidental
comment.
Though that day-to-day management tends to be more or less taken for granted,
it is, nevertheless, an essential part of such large-scale and complex operations. The
more efficiently management ensures that orders and plans are carried out, the less
likely it is to be noticed; conversely, inadequate management can handicap, sometimes
critically, ambitious strategies as well as more modest plans. Edwardian mobilizations
were substantial undertakings, requiring a number of different tasks to be performed,
over wide areas, involving large numbers of people, and with a need for coordinated, or
at least congruent, achievement. To be successful, therefore, they had to be actively
managed, not merely put in motion. How this was done was one expression of the
nature and techniques of English medieval government; its examination is potentially of
some value to the history of the period.
The method used has been to examine each of the eight chosen mobilizations as
a separate case study. It has been adopted particularly in order to facilitate observation
of the interrelation of the various tasks involved. The efficiency with which each task
was carried out would have an effect on the others, and so on the mobilization itself - as
well as sometimes on the subsequent campaign. The chronology of the aftarigemerits
for each mobilization is of especial interest, both in respect of the timing of the issuing
4 e.g. Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance; Harris, King, Parliament and
Public Finance.
5 Prestwich, 'Cavalry Service'; Powicke, Military Obligation; Lewis, 'Last
Summons of the English Feudal Levy'.
6 e.g. in particular Maddicott, The English Peasantry; Postan, 'The Costs of the
Hundred Years War', pp. 34-53.
7 The military aspects of the Edwardian wars are discussed at length in the
works referred to in Ch. 1, e.g. nn. 3 - 8.
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of the centre's instructions to its officials and appointees, and in what can be discerned
of the timing of the latter's consequent action, and its results. The first can paint a
picture of the degree and coherence of the government's planning. The second, looked
at in relation to the original orders, can provide a commentary on the government's
ability to plan realistically, to control and to manage. Taking each mobilizatiori as a
separate study helps to place these matters in their relationship to each other.
These case studies are used to describe the practical steps the government took
to try to ensure that its orders were obeyed, to monitor progress, and to correct failures
or adapt plans if things were going wrong: as Maddicott8 and Kaeuper9 have described,
many actions unintended by government were taken by its agents.
This chapter discusses in turn the management of the recruitment of soldiers, the
provision of transport, and the organisation of supply. It concludes with examination of
the government's management of the problems of integrating these in terms of the
planning and coordination of mobilizations.
The concluding chapter will consider the detailed management techniques and
resources used in mobilization in a more general context, in relation to the operation of
English medieval government in other fields.
Recruitment
Some element of quantification of the size of the army is a first and necessary
component of the planning of a mobilization. In reaction to a defensive emergency this
could take the basic form of calling out in the threatened areas all men able to bear
arms, as in the early stages of the Welsh rebellion in 1282, 10 in 1322, when orders were
issued to array all men betweeri 16 and 60 years old to be ready 10 defend the Scottish
march, 11 or in the preparations for defence of maritime lands in 1359. 12 Recruitment
for an offensive war, on the other hand, required more detailed and selective planning.
How this operated is most clearly seen in the arrangements for raising levies of foot,
and later of mounted archers, from counties and towns.
8 The English Peasantry.
9 Kaeuper, War, Justice and Public Order.
1 ° Above, p. 27.
11 Above, p. 70.
12 Above, p. 188.
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The individual numbers ordered to be found in each county sometimes added up
to a very round figure. This indicates that, often, a total to be conscripted had been
determined, and quotas then assigned to those nominated to raise the levies: 13 in May
1301, 12,000 foot were ordered to be raised, 14 and in June 1322, 10,000; 15
 in February
1345, 500 archers were wanted for Henry of Lancaster's expedition to GaseOtly.16
other occasions the totals were less obviously rounded: in February 1336 Edward
asked for 3,600 archers (and 1980 hobelars), 17 and in January 1359 for 2,600. 18
 For the
Bannockburn campaign 21,540 foot were summoned. 19 The proposed array of March
1322 was for 27,900 men to go to Newcastle, and 11,000 to go to Carlisle. 20 Such
numbers indicate that it was not just a matter of taking a large round figure, and roughly
subdividing it: the allocations to individual counties and towns had to relate sensibly
and fairly to their ability to produce their quota, or the process would fail. The
allocation of specific numbers to each of nine cities in 1324 21
 is one instance of
severa1. 22
 A writ of April 1322 appears implicitly to claim that the very detailed
breakdown of the 10,000 Welsh summoned had taken account of cOmparably detailed
knowledge of local circumstances.23
The existence and use of the recorded detail that would make such planning
possible is attested by an administrative instruction of August 1314. This described
how a local array and selection of men was to be managed. 24 The references to
recorded information on who should have attended the array, who failed to attend, who
13	 •This could also apply to preparatory defensive arrangements; orders in 1336,
made when the French crusade fleet was transferred to the Channel, defined numbers
for each county and town involved. (Above, p. 127). In August 1324 a defence force
totalling 20,000 was to be formed, a specific number being required in each county.
Above, p. 92.
14 Above, p. 48.
15 Above, p. 75.
16 Above, p. 134.
17 Above, p. 110.
18 Above, p. 171.
19 Above, p. 59, n. 49.
20 Above, p. 63, but these may not have been intended seriously. Above, p. 70.
21 Above, p. 94.
22 
e.g. above, pp. 98 5
 137, 153.
23 Above, p. 71.
24 Above, p. 64.
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were selected, and who were to lead them to the muster are particularly significant: they
demonstrate both that the information was accessible, and that it was intended that it
should be used for the systematic management and monitoring of this array. The
arrangements were obviously practical and potentially efficient; they probably therefore
represented established and well-tried practice. Further, there seems to be little reason
why they should not have been followed in the future.25
There are many ingthneeS of both the recording and the use of statistics for
military purposes in these eight case studies. In 1322 the commissioners supervising
the raising of one man from each viii had to report the number of vills;26 in 1324
commissioners were appointed to make a return of the number of fencible men
available for defence; 27 a census of holders of land of defined values ordered in 1344
was subsequently used to determine military- obligations; 28 in June 1359, when qu6taS
were changed from foot to mounted archers, they were reduced by a mathematically
constant proportion29
 - implying again the existence and use of recorded quantified
information.
Taken together, these observations present a picture of an administration that
recognised the value of collecting, being equipped with, and using recorded, quantified
and quite detailed information. Though it would surely be wrong to attribute rigorous
accuracy to that information, its existence would have provided a basis for planning and
managing the mobilization of armies.
The administrative mechanisms for collecting foot soldiers varied. For Edward
I's first Welsh war in 1277 recruitment was not carried out by any systematic use of
temporary or permanent officials. Morris records the employment of several types of
agent - 'troopers of the royal household', at least one sheriff, the constable for the king at
Builth, the steward of Abergavenny, and others. 3° Similarly, probably because the
second war in 1282 also was not in origin a pre-planned offensive, the management of
the mobilization of levies of foot appears rather as a series of ad hoc arrangements.
25 In 1359 orders to lords of a number of lands in Wales specified how many
men each was to raise: the detail into which the central administration was able to go is
striking. C76/36, m. 2.
26 Above, p. 73.
27 Above, p. 92.
28 Above, pp. 129-133.
29 Above, p. 17.
30 Welsh Wars, pp. 125, 128, 131-2.
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Knights of the household were certainly sent to raise specific numbers of foot. These
were chosen from assemblies organised on the knights' instructions as to time and place
by permanent local officials. 31 At least one sheriff, Henry du Lee of Lancashire, was
required to collect and deliver a specific number of men. 32 The sheriffs' responsibility
for finding and delivering auxiliary Workmen, the tree-fellers and others so imporlarit to
campaigning in Wales, also shows that they and their staffs were the major
organisational resource, though increasingly royal clerks were required to supervise
them.33
The preparations made in 1301 for the king's army34 mustering at Berwick did
have a systematic stfueture, and what appears to have beeri an in-built proVisiOit for
managing the mobilization. The commissioners of array who were appointed included
a royal clerk35 in each team; these clerks were then involved in subsequent, very
necessary,36 investigative commissions. 37 The arrangements constituted a coherent
scheme. All the appointments were issued at once; a total of men to be recruited was
defined; the number of arrayers for each county Was broadly related to the size of its
quota - in three cases of under 1,000 per county just the sheriff and the clerk, for larger
numbers two commissioners and the clerk. The structure of commissioners of array,
with the sheriffs acting in local executive support, set the basic operational pattern,
though at this time some sheriffs were also nominated as arrayers. The immediate and
subsequent roles of the clerks are particularly iritereSting in that they indicate deliberate
provision for managerial monitoring. The same operational pattern continued in the
mustering of footmen for the Bannockburn campaign. In March 1314 arrayers were
appointed to raise men from six counties and Chester, and the sheriffs were told to
assist these 'choosers and leaders'. 38 In April the sheriffs of those counties, with a royal
31 Above, p. 37.
32 ibid.
33 Above, p. 38.
34 Footmen for the Prince of Wales's army at Carlisle were collected by another,
slightly later, and rather less precise, set of orders. Above, pp. 50-51.
35 Some of the clerks named are recorded as being paid for conducting men
there. Above, p. 49.
36 There was a substantial difference between the numbers sought - 12,000 - and
the number - c. 7,000 - actually obtained. Above, p. 50.
37 Above, p. 4.
38 Rot. Scot. Vol. I, pp. 120a-120b.
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clerk, were themselves to select additional men, 39 In May the sheriffs were told to see
to the delivery of the totals. 4° In this mobilization, therefore, the sheriffs' role remained
central. Similarly, for Edward II's invasion of Scotland in 1322, at first two or more
arrayers were appointed per county, the sheriff being one of them in some cases, and
local officials, bailiffs and sheriffs, were ordered to assist the arrayers.41
Subsequently in May 1322 these recruiting arrangements were cancelled and
replaced by parliament's grant of one armed and armoured man from each vill. 42 This
involved some new elements. Commissioners, of whom six were sheriffs, were
appointed for all the counties,43 but unusually shires paired according to their
shrievalties were given separate arrayers. The commissioners' ekperises were to be paid
by the king, not the viii or county; as this point was made explicitly, it therefore
probably implies that this was not normal practice, and was perhaps a way of preventing
corruption.
The force raised in this unusual way was then augmented by soldiers supplied by
towns, Ireland, and Wales, and Via a new levy from counties; the OOftlinissiOriers of
array for these county levies included only three sheriffs. 44 The trend towards placing
the authority and ultimate responsibility for raising the county levies on specially
appointed commissioners, rather than on the sheriffs, continued in the first
appointments for the War of Saint-Sardos, 45 though as usual sheriffs organised the
assemblies from which the recruits were chosen. Sheriffs also advised the
commissioners when subsequent orders required only a proportion of them to be sent on
to Plymouth. 46 In early August more commissioners were appointed to make a return of
the number of fencible men available for defence, and then to select 20,000 footmen,
with a specific number in each county. Structurally, like the arrangements for
collecting the one man per viii, the scheme dealt separately with individual cotuities
39 Ibid., pp. 124a-124b
40 Ibid., p. 127. The wording of the writ was 'exasperes, festines & compellast.
41 Above, p. 63.
42 Above, p. 73.
43 The bishop of Durham organised the levy in his palatinate. (Par!. Writs, Vol.
II, div. ii, p. 575.)
44 Nicholas Gentil of Surrey and Sussex, John Haward of Norfolk and Suffolk,
and John Darcy of Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. (Pan. Writs, Vol II, div. ii, pp.
578-579.)
45 The appointments included only one sheriff
46 Above, p. 89.
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even when pairs had one sheriff for both. 47 When commissioners were appointed to
raise 900 foot from four of the counties, to go to France, only one sheriff, Hampshire's,
was included, and that by name, not by office, among the arrayers, This appears to be
the culmination of a process, begun by Edward I, of placing steadily increasing reliance
on specially appointed commissioners, to the ultimate exclusion of sheriffs, for the
supervisory management of the raising of county levies.
Edward lifs arrangements in 1336, both for offensive war with Scotland and for
defence in case of a French landing, followed this system. For the Scottish campaign,
the recruitment of archers and hobelars from the counties was put in the hands of
arrayers, who were given power to arrest and imprison the disobedient. For defetice,
magnates were appointed as keepers of the maritime lands, and under them arrayers to
see to the array, arranged by sheriffs and local officials as instructed by the arrayers;48
when these arrangements were effectively repeated in May, the arrayers were required
to make detailed reports not only of total numbers, but also of the names of the
millenars, centenars and vinteriars chosen to lead the various units, a mewls of
facilitating a managerial follow-up investigation if necessary. 49 Thus in 1336 the
sheriffs' role in relation to the levying of foot was limited to administrative support of
the commissioners of array. This seems to have been a development that evolved, not
one instituted all at once.
It was reversed in the arrangements made in 1345. In March the sheriff was
once again, but now systematically, included as one of the two or three in each county
selecting men for Edward fiTs expedition to Sluys: probably the reason for this was that
those selected were to be paid out of the issues of the county. The inclusion was clearly
on an ex officio basis, as the order appointing the selectors referred to him not by name
but as 'the sheriff. 50 Similarly, the arrangements made at the erid of the year for 3,700
47 This writ was accompanied at the same time by an order to a long list of
magnates, including eight earls and the marshal of England, to prepare both horse and
foot for defence, in view of the French threat to the duchy, and, again, to report what
size of force they would provide. These schemes provide another instance of the
collection of quantified information. Above, p. 94.
48 Above, p. 107. The atrayers were also to gee to the OrgailigatiOid of all ferieible
men into units of specified sizes
49 Above, p. 114.
50 C76120, m. 30.
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archers from several counties again included 'the sheriff (sic) in the three or more
arrayers appointed per county.51
These orders had given dates for the muster which had subsequently, for various
reasons, been postponed. In March 1346 a firm date, 1 May, was set for the passage,
and new and detailed administrative arrangements were made for coordination of the
assembly of all the county levies already chosen. 52 Powerful teams of supervisors53
(each team responsible for one or more counties) would make sure all was in order.
The writ defined the places and dates for the men to come before the supervisors;
sheriffs, as usual, were responsible for assembling the selected soldiers. A report was to
be made via the clerk who was one of the team. These orders demonstrate that the
administration was aware of what was necessary for effective control, monitoring and
management.
During Edward's campaign in France reinforcements of archers and other foot
were repeatedly summoned from England. In almost every case permanent local
officials were involved in raising them. As far as those of the towns and the justiciars
of Wales were concerned, this was long-established practice; unusually, in Julym
 and
October 134655 the sheriffs alone did the recruiting in the counties. The reasons for
placing the responsibility on the sheriffs on these occasions could have been both that
the numbers were not large, so the sheriffs' own staff would be sufficient, and probably
that as only a short time was allowed between the date of the order and the required
delivery of the men, the simpler the recruiting structure the better. 56 When in February
1346 twenty-nine counties were to provide some 4,000 archers, and the men needed
only to be ready by Easter, teams of arrayers were appointed, though each included the
appropriate sheriff 57 The inclusion of the sheriff in each team of arrayers continued in
January 1359, in preparation for the expedition to France.58
51 C76121, m. 9.
52 Above, p. 146.
53 For example, Richard Talbot, seneschal of the household was included in one,
and John Darcy le Pere in another. C76/22, m. 15.
54 Above, p. 153.
55 Above, p. 157.
56 In July the order was dated 26th. for 1,230 men from seventeen counties and
London to be ready by 13 August. On 3 October twenty-six counties were told to
produce 446 archers by 15 October! Above, pp.156-7.
57 Above, p. 162.
58 Above, p. 171.
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This survey of the administrative mechanism for collecting foot soldiers has
shown that throughout the sheriffs, their staffs and local officials were essential to the
assembly of the potential county recruits. Responsibility for overseeing the process and
the selection seems to have been given increasingly to the specially appointed
commissioners during the first half of out period. Reasons for this development could
have included reduction of the risk of local connections resulting in corruption of the
selection process, and, possibly, the additional advantage of having the selection
controlled by increasingly experienced commissioners, concerned only with military
considerations.
In 1345 and 1359 the sheriffs were integrated again, but now systematically, into
the mobilization process. This could be read as recognition of the need to have a more
tightly organised administrative machine. Two other observations support the view that
the government was sensitive to such considerations. In 1359, while orders gave all the
arrayers the usual authority to arrest the recalcitrant, the sheriffs were explicitly told it
was their responsibility to imprison those arrested. 59 Though it might be questioned
why that particular order should have to be made so firmly at this time (as if, perhaps,
previously the sheriffs had not easily accepted that duty?) it could be seen as an alert
administration closing a loop-hole sometimes exploitable by sheriffs in response to
pressure or bribes. Also in 1359, when the orders for defensive arrays issued in October
were repeated and elaborated in November, this second set of orders went into great
detail as to how the scheme was to be operated (they said that some points were made
because members of the council had recognised inadequacies in the earlier writs).60
The integration of the permanent local officials with the temporary commissioners of
array in the structure was important to its effectiveness. This suggests that by this time
the government had a good grasp of the practicalities and problems involved in its
management of mobilization, and was dealing with them.
Those problems were substantial: in particular, numbers mustered sometimes
fell well short of intention. The levy of 1301, which should have produced 12,000 men,
yielded, according to the pay records, only some 7,000, with large variations in the
shortfalls in different counties. 61 Over 20,000 were summoned for the Bannockburn
59 Above, p. 172, and n. 11.
60 Above, p. 189. It is interesting to speculate that this could have been the
result of feed-back from the an-ayers, for which the six weeks between the first and
second promulgations could have given sufficient time.
61 Above, p. 49.
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campaign, but only some 15,000 appeared. 62 In 1322 the county foot ordered up in May
should have numbered 10,000, but only 4,000 were in pay at the end of July. 63 Nor
were dates met; in 1336 not all the 2,700 foot summoned to be at Berwick by June had
arrived in time: 64
 1,000 Welsh sent for in November 1345 had to be summoned again in
April 1346. 65
 Though some of the failures might be put down to changes of plans and
consequent conflicting orders, as in 1322,66 others were due to inability to deal
effectively with the unwillingness of men to be conscripted, 67 or the tendency to
desert,68
 and sometimes with levies' simple refusal to do as ordered. 69 Additionally,
putting extra strain on management, there was the long time necessary for the whole
process - appointment of sub-arrayers by the arrayers; 7° preliminary liaison between the
arrayers and the sheriffs to determine times and places for assemblies of potential
recruits; the summoning of those assemblies; the selection itself, including inspection of
weapons; organisation into nominal twenties and hundreds; nomination of vintenars and
centenars; choice of those who were to lead the recruits to the muster, if this had been
left to the eotnmissioners 71 - even before the march began. If the levies were required
to be ready to set off, but only on receipt of a later order, there would be further delays
while the selected men were reassembled. Changes of arrayer during such a lengthy
process,72 for varieties of reasons,73 would not be conducive to efficient management.
Inevitably some arrayers would be less than zealous and efficient. 74 Nor was it was
possible to rely entirely on the honesty of those appointed to manage the raising of the
levies. It is not surprising, therefore, that the centre had on occasion to urge completion
62 Above, p. 59.
63 Above, p. 75.
64 Above, p. 116.
65 Above, p. 160.
66 Above, pp. 75-6.
67 Above, pp. 113, 139
68 Above, p. 95.
69 Above, p. 113.
70 This was standard practice. e.g. above, p. 106.
71 Alternatively leaders would be named by the original orders. e.g. above, p. 88.
72 Above, pp. 89, 08.
73 The case of Guy de St. Clare seems to show loose central administration.
Above, pp. 138-9.
74 The Leicestershire arrayers in 1346 were told 'vas gesseritis,„tepide et
negligente'. Above, p. 138, n. 61.
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of instructions if that had not already taken place, the phraseology used indicating some
lack of information and therefore of contro1.75
Nevertheless, the repeated admonitions to sheriffs and others not to take
bribes,76 show favour, or give in to pressure, 77 in finding men for military service
demonstrate that the government was aware of malpractice, and did try to prevent it.
The failure to deliver the numbers sent for in 1301 was clearly regarded as due to
dishonesty; in a rapid reaction teams of investigators were appointed to enquire into the
taking of bribes by the arrayers78 and to punish deserters. Even though this was after
the event, it is evidence of management awareness which must have been based on
early availability of information, for which it seems likely the inclusion of the same
royal clerks in the teams of arrayers and of investigators was responsible. 79 In 1336
there were many instances of recognition of the necessity to maintain pressure on
commissioners of array. 8° Other evidence of a central administration aware not only of
failure to meet dates for delivery of men, but also of the value of urging performance so
that failure would not occur, can be seen in 1345: 81 the general array for defence that
was set up at the end of 1359 required a report by the end of January, and on 10
February writs went to the arrayers of most counties complaining of their dilatoriness.82
Thus the government in its management of recruiting of levies from the counties did
make efforts to correct, and to anticipate, endemic inadequacies.
The recruiting of heavy cavalry - mounted men-at-arms, as distinct from
hobelars - depended much less than that of footmen on administrative structures.
Consequently it generally involved no detailed governmental action to monitor and
progress assembly of the forces summoned. Indeed, bureaucratic management would
have been inappropriate, and probably unacceptable, for an obligation to military
service which was derived originally from personal feudal relationships.
The first obvious difference, from the point of view of the managerial process, is
that evidence of initial central determination of the specific number to be sought is rare.
75 Above, pp. 96, 135.
76 Above, p. 96.
77 Above, p. 38.
78 Might it be significant that many sheriffs were among the arrayers?
79 Above, p. 48.
80 Above, pp. 106, 115.
81 Above, p. 138.
82 Above, pp. 189, 190.
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There do exist two records of a number being considered before any summons was
issued. The first is the council's memorandum, printed in Chaplais' collection of
documents relating to the War of Saint-Sardos as 'Advice given by English prelates and
magnates on the King's [Edward II's] proposed expedition to Gascony', suggesting a
meyns que mille hommes darmes. 83 The second is the memorandum, 84 the 'Scheme in
1341' described by M. Prestwich, which '...sets out the forces to be provided by the royal
household, and gives details of the retinues of various magnates.'" Neither was
implemented, so that they do not provide a picture of how the actual mobilization of a
pre-determined number might have been attempted; nevertheless, they are evidence
that, as would be expected, some broad consideration of the size of cavalry forces could
take place.
Without the change from 'obligation' to 'pay and contract', setting - let alone
meeting - a reliably precise target would be an administratively horrendous task. The
size of the force that would be produced by the summons of the servicium debitum is
unlikely to have been knowable in advance with accuracy. Uncertainties about
obligations would be compounded, for example, by the accepted option of replacing
one knight by two sergeants, or by the independent decisions of some to bring more
than their formal obligation. The 40-day limit on obligatory service, after which some
might stay on for pay, others stay voluntarily and unpaid, and others depart, would also
make quantitative planning uncertain. The later development of armies raised by
quantified and timed contracts, and fully paid, should theoretically have helped to
reduce these difficulties. 86 Also, of course, any planning to be able to meet the cost of
a paid army necessitated planning its size; this was an explicit part of the 'Scheme in
1341'
Facilitating planning might have been one of the considerations leading to
Edward I's request of April 1282 to a chosen list to serve at wages, but even this defined
no numbers, asking only that each respondent should come cum equis et armis
decentiori et meliori modo quo poteritis. 87 In 1301 the 'request' formula was used again,
83 War of Saint-Sardos, ed. P. Chaplais, p. 89.
84 C47/2133.
85 M. Prestwich, 'English Armies in the Early Stages of the Hundred Years War',
p. 102.
86 
as well as 'producing discipline and ... subordination of commands.' Morris,
Welsh Wars, p. 68.
87 Above, p. 27; Foedera, Vol. I, div. ii, p. 603.
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without reference to pay or to numbers. 88 Other deliberately unquantified requests for
cavalry were made: in 1314 to the Irish magnates;89 in 1322, to the English magnates
and, via the sheriffs, for all not already in retinues; 9° and in 1324, to magnates, in the
phrase quanto potentius poteritis. On this occasion at least, they were to report what
size of force they would provide. Though this suggests that this was not known, at least
not accurately, and possibly not at all, at the time, it also, of course, shows that the
government recognised the value of quantitative information.91
It is significant, then, that the 'Scheme in 1341' did name the size of the retinues
expected to be brought by individuals. If the king's administration now had such
knowledge, even if it was inexact, it could aim at an approximate number of men-at-
arms by deciding which particular retinues to summon. The moderately sized army92
that was raised in 1336 seems to exemplify this. In addition to the knights of the
household, the retinue of the king's brother and the retinues of others in the king's
comitiva, there were only another fifteen retinues listed in the pay reconds. 93 The
retinues of some 300 barons and lesser nobility provided the much larger number of
men-at-arms for the Crecy campaign. 94 As reinforcements were called up for the siege
of Calais some individual lords were even asked to provide specific numbers of men-at-
arms, which presumably was based on some reasonable view of their potential to
deliver them95 (though later urgent orders sought retinues and as many more men as
possible). is therefore a case that the administration did acquire some idea of
the military potential of lords' retinues. Because recorded quantified objectives for the
mobilizations of heavy cavalry do not exist, unlike those for mobilizations of
conscripted foot, they are not susceptible to judgements as to their effectiveness in
terms of government management. Nor were they carried out by specially appointed
government agents or officials, being dependent on the action of the military tenants
delivering their due service, and later of the barons and others bringing their established
88 Above, p. 43.
89 Above, p. 58.
90 Above, p. 62.
91 Above, p. 94.
92 Above, p. 116.
93 Above, pp. 112, 116.
94 Above, p. 140.
95 Above, p. 157.
96 Above, p. 163.
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retinues, or specially raised indentured companies. Such magnates would not have
taken kindly to supervision of their response to a call to arms.
The administrative mechanism for summoning these units was usually a direct
communication to their leader, defining the date and place of the muster, as in 1282,
1301, 1314 and 1322. 97 In March 1322 this was supplemented by a proclamation
through the sheriffs that everyone who owed service should present it at the muster.98
In June 1322, somewhat unusually, the sheriffs were involved more fully, being
required not only to proclaim that all mounted men-at-arms not in retinues should come
to the king, but also to pass the order directly to individuals, and even report their
names. 99 Similar action was taken in 1345. 100 There was, in fact, an instance in 1282 of
certain sheriffs acting directly to recruit knights; 101 but otherwise, in general, the
organisation of mobilizing the heavy cavalry involved neither permanent officials nor
specially appointed arrayers. (Arrayers appointed in 1336 to make the realm ready for
defence were given authority over knights as well as other fencible men in the event of
a sea-borne invasion, 102 but this would be a reactive response, not a preparatory
mobilization.)
Mobilization of the heavy cavalry was thus not a process under the day-to-day
administrative control of the royal government Once the individuals who would
constitute this element of the army had been told the date and place of the muster, they
were themselves responsible for meeting that timing; what 'management' there was, was
essentially ex post facto, in that it consisted of recording the various dates of arrival so
that pay could begin and horses could be valued. 103 The size of the following each
leader would bring was, subject to a minimum figure related to his feudal obligation,
determined by him, not by an instruction from the king - until, of course, the practice of
contracting for a specific number was used.
Contracts included, as well as numbers of men and rates of pay, the duration of
service (as in the case of the Black Prince's retainer of Sir John de Hide 'for the war for
one year). 104
 They thus facilitated not only the making of some financial planning (an
97 Above, pp. 27, 43, 55, 62.
98 Above, p. 62.
99 Above, p. 77.
100
Above, p. 140.
101
Above, p. 38.
102
Above, p. 107.
103
Above, p. 90.
104 
Above, p. 180.
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integral part of the 'Scheme in 1341') but also more confident undertaking of prolonged
campaigns. As far as the management of the initial mobilization is concerned, however,
it was suggested in Chapter 8 that the problem of controlling the timing of the assembly
of all the independently contracted retinues was too much for the administration in
1359, with arguably fatal consequences for the success of the campaign.
Perhaps the development of raising whole armies, rather than merely minor,
'non-royal', expeditions such as Northampton's in 1345, 105
 by contracting for indentured
retinues, should be seen as primarily an evolutionary consequence of the need to plan
and manage the increased scale and duration of wars fought overseas.
Transport
Transport on land for the soldiers themselves was not an issue for government. Men
walked, or rode their own horses, or used mounts provided by a levy on the local
community. 1 °6 What needed action was provision of the large number of carts to carry
the army's provisions, and its equipment. 1 °7 This was an essential requirement, not only
to facilitate the collection of bulk supplies at the muster, but also to form the baggage
train that accompanied the army on campaign. The scale of the need is suggested by
Jean le Bel's report that Edward Reims expedition in 1359 was accompanied by
6,000 carts brought from England; even the more credible figure of 1,000 given by
Thomas Walsingham is impressive. 108
It seems a reasonable assumption that units, both the levies of foot and the lords'
retinues, would use their own carts (and pack-horses) on the way to the muster.
Marching or riding encumbered with heavy arms and armour would be unnecessarily
105 Above, p. 136.
106 'In addition to the burden of wages, the counties might be expected to provide
other things: in particular arms and armour, horses and victualsthe local communities
had an ancient duty to support their representatives, at least within the county.'
Powicke, Military Obligation, p. 200.
107 M well as provisions, arms and armour the baggage train would have to carry
the sort of equipment needed for an army living off the land - hand-mills, ovens,
hunting equipment and even leather boats from which to fish (above, p. 188) - other
cooking utensils, tents and so on. Thus many carts were needed.
1 °8 Above, p. 185 and n. 85. The Vita Edwardi Secundi says the wagon train that
left Berwick in 1314 stretched for twenty leagues. Above, p. 57.
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slow and inefficient: a peasant agricultural economy would have carts available.The
defensive array ordered in October 1336 provides supporting evidence for this
assumption; it required that the forces made ready in each county should have with
them provisions for three weeks, and carts to carry them, but said nothing about
supplying the carts.1"
The collection of a 'supply dump' of victuals for the assembling army from
supplies brought by merchants or by the king's purveyors necessitated making
arrangements for safe and sufficient carriage. This was usually the sheriffs'
responsibility: in 1282 they were told to ensure that there was a regular arrival of carts
carrying provisions at the bases, Chester and Rhuddlan, and to arrest anyone interfering
with those bringing supplies to the army;"° in 1324 the sheriff of Gloucester paid the
wages of men with horses and carts; 111 in 1346 the sheriff of Essex bought carts to
transport provisions.112
Sheriffs bought carts to be delivered at the muster, with horses and drivers, to
form part of the baggage train. The most important source for obtaining these was
ecclesiastical establishments. In anticipation of being turned to, in 1282 many sought
and obtained protections against having not only their stocks of food but also their
horses and carts requisitioned; 113 certain abbots and priors were told directly to send all
their carts to Chester. 114
 In 1314 an order went to abbots and priors giving the king's
clerk Nicholas de Tykehull authority to requisition horses, underlining how important a
source of draft animals for land transport the ecclesiastical establishments were. 115 In
1301 and 1314 116
 specific numbers of carts were allocated to be purchased by
individual sheriffs. Though it is not possible to tell what the bases of calculation for the
total, or for the allocations, were, the order in 1314 did specify for each sheriff how
many carts requiring four or eight draft animals he was to provide, and by which of
109 Above, p. 127. The order cancelling it did instruct the arrayers to return any
they had taken, which might imply that they could have used it to supplementmoney
equipment including carts.
,
110 Above, p. 32.
111 Above, p. 101.
112 Above, P. 148.
113 Above, p. 32.
114 Above, p. 32. '...as the king greatly needs carriage for victuals to him and his
with him in his army of Wales.' CVChR, p. 277.subjects 
115 Above, pp. 55-6.
116 Above, pp. 51, 57.
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various dates they were to be at Bervvick. 117 These details, and the appointment of royal
clerks to oversee the operation, indicate a considered, informed and managed plan; it is
unlikely to have been the only one.
The mobilization of ships and sailors was necessary to carry supplies, to
transport armies and to form fighting fleets.
Carriage of supplies by sea was arranged in several ways. It would often be in
the merchants' own ships, in which case government action was merely to issue
protections for them, as in 1282 and 1322. 118 Protections issued in 1282 for named
shippers bringing victuals supplied by the keepers of the bishopric of Winchester119
imply that these ships were hired, not requisitioned. As with inland deliveries, sheriffs
were sometimes made responsible for shipment by sea of provisions bought by the
king's purveyors, for example in 1301 and 1347. 120 Sheriffs accounted for freightage of
supplies to Newcastle in 1322. 121 The warden of the Cinque Ports arranged transport of
supplies purveyed in France in 1282. 122 In 1314 the king's merchant Anthony Pessagno
arranged shipment himself for his purchases, 123 and in 1322 royal clerks supervised
transport of purveyances made by English sheriffs. 124 When the siege of Calais began
in September 1346, royal sergeants-at-arms requisitioned ships to bring provisions to
the besiegers, 125
 and in November the admiral of the North had to make ships available
to carry supplies from the east coast ports. 126
 In 1359 the admiral of the West provided
an escort for ships bringing grain to Calais, and the admiral of the North made ships
available to take the Prince of Wales's supplies to Sandwich. 127
 Thus the carriage of
supplies by sea was managed mostly piecemeal, and via a variety of different ad hoc
authorities, though by 1359 it seems to have been centralised under the two admirals.
The war-time collection and control of the realm's maritime resources was increasingly,
"7 Rot. Scot. Vol. I, p. 127.
118 Above, pp. 31, 67, 79.
119 Above, p. 28.
120 Above, pp. 47, 160.
121 BL Stowe Ms. 553, if. 40r, 44r.
122 Above, p. 29.
123 Above, p. 56.
124 Above, p. 67.
125 Above, p. 155.
126 Above, P. 161.
127 Above, p. 175.
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certainly from 1345, exercised under the authority of these two officials, via members
of the central administration specially appointed to act under their orders. 128
More systematically managed arrangements were necessary to assemble fleets to
transport armies. Keeping soldiers waiting too long at the port risked desertions,
shortage of food and disorder, and it would have been militarily foolish for an
expedition to arrive overseas in penny numbers.
When forces from Ireland had to be brought across for campaigns in Scotland
shipping was arranged by the crown. In 1301 orders went to officials of ports in Ireland
and England, including the Cinque Ports, to send specific numbers of ships to Dublin.
Other officials, the sheriffs of the ports' counties, the warden of the Cinque Ports, and
nominated individuals, were given responsibility for ensuring that the orders were
obeyed. 129 In 1314 Irish foot archers were to be transported in John of Argyle's fleet.
The treasurer of Ireland was to provide ships for the magnates, 13° and port officials were
told to send ships; two royal clerks were also told to requisition, crew and arm some.131
Local port officials were told in 1322 to send as many ships as possible, and an
experienced royal clerk was to coordinate the action. 132 This was the basic structure -
direct orders to local port officials to provide ships, with central government agents
given a supervising role.
This structure continued for the armies sent to France. The allocations of
responsibilities in the various orders of May 1324 describe coordinated management by
the government. Ports, each told to provide a specific number of ships, had to report
names of the ships and of their masters. Sheriffs were made responsible for providing
the equipment necessary to enable horses to be carried. The scale of manning for ships
was defined. A royal clerk, supervising the whole process, was to check the capacities
of the ships, and report their names, ports, masters and crew numbers - the latter so that
victualling could be arranged. He was also to report any officials who failed to
128 Above, pp. 134, 170, 175.
129 Above, pp. 43-4. The ships of the fleet ordered to Dublin for 4 June were,
like others summoned to Berwick, primarily intended to support the armies
campaigning from Carlisle and Berwick respectively, but it must be likely that they
were also to bring the Irish to the muster ordered for 24 June at Carlisle.
130 Above, p. 58.
131 Above, p. 57.
132 This did not raise enough shipping, and the Irish justiciar was told to
summon more from Irish ports, Above, pp. 71-2.
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cooperate. 133 Subsequent vacillations of intention during the War of Saint-Sardos,
requiring changes of action enforced by sheriffs, reflected inadequacies of strategic
direction, not of the management of shipping; the basic procedure for this was now
established, detailed and effective.
In 1145 general orders were issued for all ports to have their ships ready to sail
at the king's charge. Overall authority now lay clearly with the two admirals, with
supervision of the action of the port officials by their deputies. Transport to take
Stafford's force to Gascony was provided from the ships under the control of the
admiral of the West, in a calculated and coordinated arrangement. He was told to
deliver thirteen vessels of 40 tons to two of the king's sergeants-at-arms, who arranged
for their equipping to carry horses, the necessary material being supplied by two
sheriffs. 134 He also provided ships for the earl of Devon's force, part of Northampton's
expedition to Brittany; 135 the earl of Devon determined the number needed. 247 ships
were assembled for the earl of Derby's small army sent to Gascony. 136 This, like the
other sea-borne expeditions of the first half of 1345, including Edward Mrs to Sluys,
seems to have had no problems as far as the availability of sufficient ships was
concerned. The management of their provision, both in apparently deliberately
calculated numbers and in timing, has therefore to be seen as efficient and successful.
However, the sailing of the great army planned for 20 October had to be
postponed, the reason given being that the ships were not ready. 137
 Orders to the
admirals and their deputies, and to Robert Flambard for London, to requisition all 30
ton ships to be at Portsmouth by 7 October, had been issued at the end of August. The
postponing order was dated 29 September, so that - assuming that the fact that the ships
were not ready really was the reason for the postponement - the administration must
have been receiving and interpreting information on the progress of the requisitioning,
and taking appropriate action based on a conclusion that the 7 October date would not
be met. The date of the postponing order is evidence of good management information
and its use: the order had to be issued in time to prevent the assembly of the large army
that would otherwise have been kept waiting. The discussion in Chapter ' 7 of the
possible reasons why arrangements for transport had failed 138 concludes that it was
133 Above, pp. 84-5.
134 Above, p. 134.
135 Above, p. 136.
136 Above, P
. 
135
131 Above, p. 142.
138 Above, pp. 142-3.
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most probably because not enough ships could be assembled, in the relatively short time
allowed, to accommodate the unusually large army being raised. This is supported by
the subsequent issue of orders for more and more ships, including those of 20 and as
little as 10 tons burden. 139 An air of increasing urgency, rather than of calm planning, is
given by these later orders. Probably the use of sergeants-at-arms to see to the
requisitioning signalled the government's need, as usual, for more rapid and reliable
action than the port authorities might produce. In the event, however, the expedition
was provided with sufficient ships to carry men, horses, equipment and ample initial
provisions to France; management of the process had ultimately been effective.
Before the army had fought the battle of Crecy, and afterwards, especially
during the siege of Calais, the English administration was organising transport for
reinforcements to go to France. The way it was managed assumed that all shipping
continued to be available for the king's service. Assembling a fleet was a matter of
assigning to each nominated emissary of the central government, often a sergeant-at-
arms, a number of ships of defined size to be collected, usually, from ports along a
particular stretch of coast. 14° The men requisitioning the ships were sometimes told to
make transport available for particular units of reinforcements, like those of the earl of
Pembroke, the king's son John, or John Darcy. It is, unfortunately, not possible to see
how this was done: 141 it would have thrown more light on how the detailed use of the
requisitioned shipping was organised, and by whom. When the army embarked in .Tune
1346 particular units were assigned to specific ships, not left to make their own
arrangements, so that it is clear that use of the transports was being deliberately
managed. 142 That there was management control is also proved by the appointment in
December 1346 of a king's clerk to supervise the shipping at Sandwich, and report
numbers and capacity to the council, and by the summons to Westminster in February
1347 of knowledgeable men from 32 ports to report on the state and availability of the
ports' ships. The successful conclusion to the siege of Calais was due in no small part
to the ability of the council to manage efficiently the utilisation of the realm's ships.
This was demonstrated again in the plans for renewal of war with France in
early 1359. Ample time, some four months, was allowed to assemble the necessary
transports at Sandwich. A report, to the chancery, on numbers available was required
139 Above, p. 146.
140 Above, pp. 152, 158.
141 Was it, for instance, by sending ships from their home ports, or by allocating
from those already assembled at the embarkation ports?ships 
142 Above, p. 151.
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well before the assembly date, thus giving time, if necessary, to extend the range of
ships - initially limited to those of 76 tons and under - to be requisitioned. The reports
also had to give details of the ships' names, their ports, their masters, and the security
given, by whom, as guarantee of appearance. Thus, by implying effective punishment
for disobedience, default would be inhibited. Responsibility for arresting the ships,
imprisoning the uncooperative, taking the securities and making the reports was given
to teams of sergeants-at-arms, working of course under the authority of the two
admirals, whose seal was required on the reports.143
This set of arrangements therefore defined the task, assigned direct
responsibilities, set up senior control (the admirals), collected intermediate information
so that progress could be followed-up, facilitated application of sanctions, and allowed
enough time for execution. It demonstrates very competent management.
The extension of the truce meant that the expedition for which these plans were
made did not take place. The assembly of transport for the sailing in the autumn was
organised in essentially the same way, 144
 though there is evidence that some units had
had to make their own arrangements for shipping (for which the crown nevertheless
paid). The fleet was said to have numbered 1,100 vessels, an indication of the size of
the management task that had been accomplished. 145 An additional point suggesting
that use of maritime resources was by now very well managed is that there are several
instances of requirements for ships for particular purposes being met via the two
admirals, not by separate orders to other officers.' procedure would contribute to
maintaining logistical control.
Fighting, as distinct from transport, fleets were needed, sometimes as support for
the army, sometimes to face naval threats from the enemy. For the campaigns in Wales
little more than the feudal service of the Cinque Ports was used, primarily to secure
control of Anglesey. 147 The two fleets raised to support the Berwick and Carlisle
armies in 1301 were summoned by orders direct to the ports' officials. The orders
specified how many ships each had to supply, which indicates knowledge of the ports'
capacities. A number of different authorities were made responsible for expe- diting the
deliveries, the sheriffs of the counties along the south coast for ports in their counties,
the warden of the Cinque Ports for them, the constable of Bristol castle and the bailiff
143 Above, pp. 170-1.
144 Above, p. 174.
145 Above, p. 185.
146 Above, p. 175.
141 Above, p. 33.
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of Haverford for those towns, and nominated individuals for the east coast ports sending
ships to Berwick.148
In 1322 ships were raised to support the army, and then to counter the threat
from Flemish ships, almost entirely by direct requests to the ports; 149 there appear to
have been no appointments to supervise their action. The fleets summoned during the
War of Saint-Sardos were primarily to transport intended expeditions to Gascony, but it
is interesting that, as was described earlier, orders direct to port officials were this time
accompanied by others nominating clerks to supervise and coordinate their preparation.
In early 1336 responsibility for mobilizing ships - preparing them for active service -
was again that of centrally appointed individuals, royal clerks, who were to see to the
arrest of vessels, and ensure they were crewed, armed and ready to go to sea. 15° The
port officials continued to have to take the action. 151 Later the admiral of the North was
given power to requisition more ships, though how this was to be exercised is not
described; the keepers of the coasts of Wales were to recall ships of their ports and
prepare them for war service, and when the rrench crusade fleet came north, the
justiciar, treasurer and chancellor of Ireland were told to provide ships to go with the
main fleets to face the galleys. 152 In the late autumn, when the enemy were attacking
ports and ships at sea, six magnates, including the warden of the Cinque Ports and
Ralph Basset of Drayton, were appointed to requisition all ships suitable for war. 153 The
usual order to all officials to assist and obey them indicates that their role must have
been to enforce action in detail by the ports' officers.
It is clear that the crown could assume that, in principle, it could call on all the
maritime resources of the kingdom, whether for transporting supplies or soldiers, or for
naval warfare. Once the order had been made that ports should have their ships ready to
be summoned, it seems a fleet could be quickly gathered, if orders of August 1346 were
at all realistic, simply by sending agents to collect them. Those orders, dated 5 August,
appointed nine men, including several sergeants-at-arms, to requisition 100 great ships
from allocated stretches of coast, to be at Winchelsea by 20 August. This, coupled with
related empowerments to impress crews, and two appointments with powers to arrest
148 Above, p. 44.
149 Above, pp. 79-80. The exception was an order to the sheriff of Norfolk and
raise five ships. Ibid.Suffolk to
150 Above, p.108.
151 Above, p. 110.
152 Above, p. 124.
153 Above, pp. 124-5.
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the disobedient, 154
 implies that the administration had confidence in its ability to
manage rapid mobilization of the country's shipping. While this fleet was primarily
intended to carry reinforcements to France, the requirement that the ships should be
double manned suggests that it was expected they might have to defend themselves.
Once the siege of Calais had begun, and the trench were attacking ships carrying
supplies to the besiegers, similar arrangements were made to provide escorts. Orders to
collect ships, those from the north to be concentrated at Orwell and those from the
south at Sandwich, were dated 18 September; orders to have soldiers to go on them said
the men should be at the two ports by 25 September; 155 the ships were obviously
expected to be there very quickly.
In the absence of records of complaints that these two urgent plans had not been
met, it might be assumed that the confidence expressed in the timing was not
misplaced; perhaps the fact that the need was to defend other shipping made
cooperation more willing. On the other hand, a plan agreed by the prelates and
magnates to form a fleet of 120 great fighting ships by 2 April 1347, orders for which
were dated 15 March, gave rise to considerable difficulties. Port officials had been
given specific quotas, and sheriffs of their counties told to expedite progress, but as late
as 16 May London and other ports had still not supplied their ships. 156 Though it might
be tempting to attribute this managerial failure to the change from specially appointed
'progress chasers' to reliance on sheriffs, other reasons could be that the ports saw the
need as much less urgent, or that by now the enormous demands on shipping had nearly
exhausted resources.
This survey of mobilizations of fleets for battle has shown that they came to be
managed in the same way as transport fleets were collected, by using a small number of
reliable and often very experienced agents of central government - frequently clerks,
and later sergeants-at-arms - to supervise and coordinate the action of port officials to
arrest and equip the ships of their own port. The terminology of later orders to these
agents seems to imply that the action to arrest the ships was taken by them themselves,
but in spite of the reference in 1336 to Boston ships as 'arrested by Sir William de
Deyncourt and Sir John de Ros', 157
 this must be doubtful in view of purely practical
considerations of time and distance. In another incident in 1336 the Bristol officials
were told to release ships of the Cinque Ports so that they could return home to be
154 Above, pp. 152-3.
155 Above, p. 156.
156 Above, p. 166.
151 Above, p. 125 and n. 133.
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equipped for war; 158 it would be surprising if it were not a general rule that the
responsibility for that too was that of ships' home ports.
Those organising the requisitioning of ships were routinely given power to arrest
and imprison any who disobeyed their orders. Nevertheless, disobedience and resistance
did take place in various ways, but were not allowed to pass unnoticed or unpunished.
Commissioners were appointed in 1302 to deal with those who had failed to supply
ships the year before: in 1314 the mayor and bailiffs of Southampton had to be told to
make good the inadequate equipment of their ships; in 1324 masters of a number of
ships simply put to sea before they could be taken, and were to be punished. 159 In 1336
the sheriff had to support the masters of ships exercising the instruction to impress
crews, the London officials had to be reprimanded for failure to provide their ships,
Welsh sailors refused to sail unless paid first, and ships from East Anglia that had been
arrested sailed away, so commissioners were ordered to find out their names and
confiscate the goods of their owners and masters.16°
These and other recorded instances 161 are no doubt only some of many that took
place; but they show that the authorities were aware of what was happening, and taking
appropriate action.
The general picture is of an administration exercising successful managerial
control, increasingly centralised under the two admirals, of the mobilization of the
realm's ships for the various purposes of war.
Supplies
Writing on the arrangements for supplying armies mobilized for expeditions under
Edward ifi, Hewitt comments 'It is not known that any were delayed for lack of
victuals: 162 This is, of course, not to imply that the supply aspect of mobilization was,
or could have been, managed with rigorous and precise calculation. The arrangements
for victualling castles in Scotland described by M. Prestwieh 163 do establish that
military administration had definite standards for calculating requirements per man.
158 Above, p. 112.
159 Above, pp. 44, 58, 86.
160 Above, pp. 112, 110, 124.
161 Above, pp. 44, 57-8.
162 Organisation of War, p. 51.
10 Prestwich, 'Victualling Estimates', pp. 536-543.
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Similarly, illustrating mathematical calculation of total needs, in 1324 the king's clerk
John Devery, who was overseeing the preparation of ships, had to report crew numbers
to the chancery 'for the better purveyance of their victuals'. However,However, established
castle garrisons and ships' crews, and consequently their needs, would be precisely
quantifiable in a way that those of a forthcoming muster of the army would not be. The
inherent uncertainty of the total number that would report to the muster would in itself
have made accuracy impossible. Moreover, assembly of the force would be spread over
some weeks and at an uncertain rate. The earlier arrivals had to be fed while they were
waiting for the rest to appear, and often the whole army while it waited for a delayed
outward march or embarkation; the timing of the latter in particular could involve much
uncertainty, because of its dependence on collection of enough ships, let alone a fair
wind. Nevertheless, it was obviously essential that there should be a supply dump of
provisions available.
Thus the management of supply for a planned mobilization had the problem of
providing for an uncertain number of men for an uncertain amount of time,
compounded by the risk of deterioration of perishable commodities. 165 In logistical
terms the administration had also to try to take into account the actual geographical
availability of foodstuffs and means of transporting them, and how long collection and
movement would take. Only approximate knowledge of these matters, derived
presumably largely from previous experience, would exist: nevertheless, quantified
plans must have been made, since instructions to purveyors necessarily had to define
how much of each foodstuff they were to obtain. Hewitt described the process as 'Some
rough estimate of total needs is made and county contributions to achieve this aggregate
are worked out.'166
The supply of food to the armies as they were being mobilized did not depend
solely on official purveyance, though it is not possible to suggest what proportion might
have been contributed by this route. 167 Proclamations regularly encouraged merchants
164 Above, p. 85.
165 Nicholas Hugate reported that 200 quarters of wheat sent to Bordeaux in
1324 had perished, and another 100 quarters were in poor condition. (War of Saint-
Sardos, ed. P. Chaplais, p. 108.) In 1346 William Kellesley sold supplies that had
become unfit for consumption. Hewitt, Organisation of War, pp. 57-8
166 Organisation of War, p. 53.
167 Hewitt records that between 1347 and 1361 some 90% of various foods
received at Calais were from purveyance (Organisation of War, p. 61), but this was a
special case and so not necessarily typical.
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to bring provisions for sale to the place where armies were mustering. 168
Encouragement could be quite forceful, as when, in 1283, sheriffs were to report the
names of merchants who failed to heed the proclamation to bring victuals to sell to the
army, 169
 or, in 1301, orders to officials told them to 'induce and require' merchants to
bring provisions to Skinburness. 17° Also, there seems to be no evidence that the royal
government assumed responsibility for ensuring availability of supplies to units as they
journeyed to the muster, other than to restrict markets 171 or to discourage profiteering
by those who sold victuals to soldiers en route, 172 The order in 1336 that levies to be
raised for defence should provide themselves with three weeks' provisions 173 illustrates
a similar principle. It must therefore be fairly certain that soldiers arrived at the muster
bringing some provisions with them. 174
In practice, it is nevertheless probable that a good proportion of food supplies
for the mobilizing armies was usually obtained by purveyance, that is to say, through
compulsory purchase. In many instances arranging the 'executive' action was the
responsibility of the permanent officials - the justiciar in Ireland, the seneschal of
Gascony, the constable of Bordeaux, 175 and the English sheriffs - but the orders
specifying how much of the various items was to obtained, and where, tended to be
directed to specially appointed agents from the centre. 176 It is, however, interesting that
when in 1314 the merchant Anthony Pessagno was assigned to buy wheat and victuals
in nine counties through buyers he nominated, quotas were not specified for the
individual counties in which he was to operate; 177
 the previous orders to clerks, which
had specified how much was to be found in each of five of the counties, 178 were
168 Above, pp. 29, 47, 52, 65.
169 Above, p. 39.
170 Above, p. 47.
171 Above, p. 29.
172 Organisation of War, p. 45.
173 Above, p. 127.
174 prestwich, Armies and Warfare, pp. 258-259, illustrates this.
175 Above, pp. 28, 29, 65, and the bishop of Durham or the Prince of Wales in
their Palatinates.
176 Above, pp. 29, 31, 44-5.
171 12- ot. Scot. Vol. I, p. 117.
178 Ibid., p. 114b
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cancelled. 179
 Pessagno and his buyers were not restricted in detail as to where to buy
the provisions, because they were not acting through local officials. This is supported
by the instructions in 1336 to the merchant William de Melchebume to purvey 'as
conveniently as possible' quantities of corn and oats, but without limitations as to
where. In June, with Eudo de Stoke, he was to buy more supplies, this time in a
specified list of counties, but again without definition as to how much in each. 18° Using
merchants rather than sheriffs as purveyors avoided the need to subdivide the total
quota by areas - since of course a sheriff would only work within his own shire - and
was therefore a much more simple and, importantly, more flexible arrangement.
When royal clerks or other officials were appointed to purvey supplies, it would
appear that their role was essentially that of managing - that is to say monitoring and
urging on - the process. In 1301 county communities were told that instructions related
to the quantities they were to provide would be given by named pairs of a royal clerk
and a Icnight. 181 The arrangement that associated individual clerks with more than one
knight and county suggests that the clerks were to supemise rather than act exectitively.
The two sent to Ireland were explicitly to supervise the purveying, 182 as were the clerks
named in 1322 when sheriffs were collecting supplies for the army mustering at
Newcastle. The phrase describing the work for which two clerks were paid - videre
provisiones predictas et eos festinare - neatly sums up their managerial function, 183 as it
does that of the clerk Robert de Nottingham, appointed in 1324 to survey and accelerate
purveyances for the Gascony expedition. 184 Such supervision was not limited to royal
clerks; sergeants-at-arms, the king's pantler, 185 even the two admirals (presumably not in
person, but through staff) 186 could have this task.
179 Ibid., p. 122b. The clerks were ordered to return to the owners what had
been taken, as supplies were being obtained by other means.
180 Above, pp. 117, 120.
181 Above, pp. 44-5. Because the Articuli Super Cartas of 1300 had limited
purveyance to the needs of the royal household, large-scale supplies for the army had to
be 'negotiated', rather than be obtained by simply sending writs to sheriffs ordering them
to purvey the quantities required. As Prestwich observes, the negotiated quantities
were what the government had wanted. War, Politics and Finance, p. 132.
182 Above, p. 45.
183 Above, p. 67.
184 Above, PP. 101-2.
18 5 Above, p. 31.
186 Above, p. 102.
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There is not much more than occasional evidence of the extent or degree of
success with which such purveyance for victualling was actively managed - that is to
say, whether action was taken to correct failures to produce individual, let alone total,
quotas, either in quantity or to a timetable.
Delivery dates were sometimes specified, as in 1282, 1301, 1314, 1322, or
1346, 187
 but of course circumstances could alternatively require that delivery should be
imPlicitly188 or explicitly 'as soon as possible'. 189 In 1301 and 1322 the orders for
Purveyance specified as the delivery date for supplies the same date as was set for the
muster, 19° and in 1314 the order of 1 April required delivery by 2 June, one week
before.191
Though other instances do not show the same explicit evidence of matched
dates for both muster and delivery of supplies, the often close correspondence between
the issue dates of the two sets of orders 192 strongly suggests that coordinated planning
took place, as would be expected.
By comparison with the pressure put on arrayers to deliver their levies , there is
in the records a lack of corresponding remonstrances to purveyors of victuals. 193 While
187 Above, pp. 28, 45, 56, 149.
188 Above, p. 155.
189 Above, pp. 28, 117.
190 Above, pp. 45, 67.
19 ' Above, p. 56.
192
Issue dates
Order for Muster Order for Purveyance
14/2/1301 (p. 43)
1/3/1301	 (p. 44)
1/3/1301 (p. 44)
24/3/1314 (p. 58) 1/4/1314 (p.56)
25/3/1322 (p. 61) 24/3/1322 (p. 67)
1/4/1322 (p.68)
30/10/1324 (p. 96) 24/10/1324 (p. 102)
17/11/1324 (p. 96) 22/11/1324 (p.101)
, 12/2/1336 (p.110) 12/2/1336 (p.117)
193 The message dated 15 April 1346 urging the sheriff of Cambridge to deliver
barrels of flour he had to obtain can hardly be due to his dilatoriness: the order to obtain
the flour was only dated 28 March, (Above, p, 149.) With similar timing the sheriffs
ordered on 24 March 1322 to deliver their quotas by 13 June received a reminder dated
14 April, but this merely urged them to be diligent in their purveying. (CPR 1221-1124,
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it is possible that this was because their performance was vastly more efficient, it is still
rather surprising, whether it implies efficiency, or unconcern on the part of the
government; though Maddicott, in a section on purveyance, does suggest that 'The
central government had no means of ensuring that its orders were carried out in the
shires.'194
In the same paper Maddicott describes the timing of orders for purveyance as
usually about one month before the campaign. 195 It is possible to point to instances in
which the time between the issue date of the orders for purveyance, and that of the
actual muster of the army, is a good deal greater, at some three months. Orders in 1282
to the keepers of the bishopric of Winchester to deliver supplies to Chester by 8 July
were dated 10 Apri1. 196 In 1301 the muster was to be on 24 June; orders for purveyance
were dated 1 March. 197 The muster date for the Bannockburn campaign was 10 June
1314; though the first orders for purveyance were dated 10 March, for delivery by 7
Apri1, 198 they were cancelled and replaced by others dated 1 April ordering delivery by
2 June. For Edward Scottish campaign of 1322 the army was to assemble by 13
June (later postponed to 24 July): orders for supplies from English counties, Ireland and
Gascony were issued on 24 March and 1 Apri1. 199
 It is ironic that this campaign, in
spite of the postponement of the muster, proved to be one in which shortage of food
supplies was a major problem. Though this was particularly disastrous during the
campaign, one chronicler implied scarcity even at its outset. 2w Why this might have
happened is not clear. Perhaps the mis-match between the quantities ordered for
Berwick and Carlisle respectively, and the numbers of men originally destined
(theoretically) for the two musters, is evidence of disorderly planning, confused by
p. 94). The merchant William de Melcheburne's buying authority was dated 13
February 1336: on 22 March he was urged to deliver the supplies as soon as possible.
Above, p. 117-8.
194 The English Peasantiy , p. 29.
195 Ibid., p. 24.
196 Above, p. 28. Protection for the shippers was dated 15 June, which seems
consistent with the three months' schedule being achieved.
197 Above, p. 44.
198 Above, pp. 55-6.
199 Above, pp. 61, 67, 68.
200 Above, p. 79. The postponement was of course not because of supply issues,
but the consequence of recruiting changes agreed at the York parliament in May.
Above, p. 73.
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political considerations. 201 Nevertheless, with the possible exception of 1322, an
initial shortage of victuals at the beginning of Edwardian campaigns seems not to have
been a problem. Probably the combination of levies and retinues arriving with their
own supplies, merchants responding to encouragement to bring their produce, and
official purveyance of victuals over several weeks before the muster, resulted in
sufficient food to avoid trouble from men unlikely to expect generous feeding.
The arrangements for collecting purveyed supplies and moving them into store
at the places where the armies were to assemble were generally the responsibility of the
sheriffs and the 'receivers and keepers of the king's victuals'. 202 The latter had a very
important function. Although there were occasions when they were named as
purveyors,203 their work was primarily administrative: the receipt, storage and dispersal
of supplies. 204 They were based at the main supply bases, like James de Dalilegh at
Carlisle in 1301, Henry de Shirokes at Newcastle in 1322, Robert de Tong at Berwick
and Robert de Tybay at Carlisle in 1336, or at the ports, as with William de
Oterhampton at Portsmouth and Nicholas de Hugate at Bordeaux in 1324, 205 William de
Kellesey 'in the county of Southampton and other counties' 206 in 1346, and Richard de
Skydeby at Sandwich in 1359. 207 The receivers at the main bases had deputies at what
are best described as the 'feeder ports', for example Hull, King's Lynn or London,208
even for Scottish wars transport of bulk commodities by sea being easier, and - subject
to weather and enemy interception (which was probably an important factor in 1322) -
faster than by land. Inland water transport was similarly the preferred method of
movement to the ports from collection warehouses, to which the supplies would have
been brought by pack-horses and carts. 209
 Arrangements for this collection and
movement were regularly made the responsibility of the sheriffs.210
201 Above, p. 69.
202 These officials are sometimes described as receivers, sometimes as keepers,
and sometimes as 'receiver and keeper.' Above, p. 187.
203 Above, pp. 78, 119.
204 Above, p. 119.
205 Above, pp. 45, 79, 117, 102.
206 E101/25/16, m 2.
201 Above, p. 187.
208 Above, p, 148.
209 Above, p. 161.
210 Above, pp. 56, 67, 101, 148-9, 161.
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While the physical aspects of the logistics of collection and delivery of supplies
of provisions are easily described,211
 it is not so clear how, or rather whether, the
operation was managed, in the sense of being monitored and controlled. Goods
delivered by the sheriffs to the main or subsidiary receivers of victuals were of course
recorded by detailed indentures. 212 Theoretically, if these had been quickly and
progressively assembled centrally, they could have made such management possible,
but as the purpose of these indentures was primarily accounting, not logistical, it seems
unlikely that this took place. 213 Reference has been made above to the role of clerks in
211 Hewitt gives a comprehensive account. Organisation of War, pp. 53-55.
212 Above, p.148. E101/25/16, recording receipts by William de Kellesey in
typical example.1346, is a
213 There were instances of messages to accelerate deliveries, but considering
how close their dating was to the original order - two-and-a-half, three and five weeks -
they do not read as if they were occasioned by knowledge of slow work by the
purveyors; in two cases no delivery date, only haste, had been specified originally, and
the other merely urged diligence. (Above, n. 193.)
This might just possibly not apply to that to the merchant William de
Melcheburne in 1336: in this case the original order to him to buy the supplies had also
contained a warning to the receiver of victuals at Berwick to receive them (above, p.
117). The date of the order to accelerate delivery (22 March) was only four weeks
before the current date, 20 April, for the muster, so the receiver, worried that the
supplies might not arrive in time, might have complained that they had not appeared.
Although delivery instructions to purveyors sometimes only named the town to which
the supplies were to go, (e.g. 'for the use of our armies assembling at Berwick and
Carlisle' [CPR 1292-1301, pp. 578-9] they often added 'to our receiver' (e.g. receptori
nostri [Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 117]; 'for delivery to the king's receiver of stock' [CPR
1321-1324, pp. 93-94]), and occasionally named him (e.g. CCR 1333-1337, p. 548).
These forms of words do not, of course, of themselves prove that the receiver was told
of the existence of the order, administratively sensible though that would have been. It
is, however, possible to point to cases in which one official was ordered to deliver
supplies to another, who, the deliverer's instructions said explicitly, had been told to
accept them. Robert de Tong was to send supplies from his stores at Berwick to Stirling
castle, whose constable mandatus est ut victualia praedicta recipiat (Rot. Scot., Vol. I,
p. 465); Richard de la Pole was to deliver wine to the receiver of victuals Cu!
mandavimus quod illa vina a vobis recipiat (ibid); the receiver at Berwick was told to
expect a delivery of iron (above, p. 119); the keeper of the privy wardrobe at the Tower
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supervising and hastening delivery of supplies. In 1301 teams of sheriffs and clerks
were appointed explicitly to collect purveyed supplies and deliver them to Berwick;
although in 1314 the merchant Anthony Pessagrio's assignment was to deliver as well as
buy, in different orders of 1314 sheriffs had to see to deliveries, but under the apparent
supervision by the view and witness') of royal clerks. 214 In 1322, again, clerks
supervised the sheriffs' actions, 215 and in 1324 other officials were appointed to survey
the purveying. 216
It seems obvious that these 'supervising clerks would have to keep themselves
informed of how things were being progressed by the sheriffs with whom they were
associated, and thus put at least informal pressure on the sheriffs. There is, however,
only a little evidence that if problems were being encountered, the central authority -
presumably the council - would be told and a decision sought. In 1301 the knight and
clerk appointed to purvey supplies in Essex reported that the people wanted to deliver
what was required only to the tax collectors, so as to be more sure of payment. This
would have meant delays, and the request was refused (though a reduced quota was
conceded). 217 In 1336 the bishop of Durham was told that, in spite of complaints, his
full quota of corn and oats had to be delivered 218 (though the wardrobe would pay
was given notice of supplies of archers' equipment ordered to be sent to him (above, p.
139). Taken together, these references suggest a case can be made that the arrangements
for movement of supplies could often include warning the recipients that the goods
were on the way. In the case of the receivers of victuals at the main supply bases in
particular, this would enable them to report late delivery. (It would also have the
practical advantage of enabling them to make some arrangements for availability of
storage for perishable foodstuffs likely to arrive in bulk.)
A practice that orders to obtain supplies were accompanied by a simultaneous
warning to the receivers to expect them - whether by a specific date or not - would be
an example of another good and effective managerial procedure.
214 Above, p. 57.
215 Above, p. 67.
216 Above, pp. 101-2,
211 Above, p. 46. The reduction was not very great - from 500 quarters of wheat,
500 of oats, and 20 of malt, to 1,000 of wheat.
218 Above, p. 122.
225
reasonable costs, including carriage). 219
 It would be dangerous to infer from such
evidence that an overall progressive count was being kept centrally on the totality of the
purveyances, though it may be possible to draw the lesser conclusion that the centre
would be informed of potentially significant failures, and take appropriate action.
Orders for official purveyance, and for proclamations directing merchants in
general to bring supplies of victuals for sale, show account being taken of geography, as
would be expected. The proclamations ordered in April 1282 defined for each county
involved the geographically appropriate market to which merchants should go. 22° When
one of the armies was mustering at Carlisle, that was the destination of purveyances
from Ireland,22I and for merchants from south coast towns, while those from the east
were directed to Newcastle. 222 In 1336 William de Melcheburne and Eudo de Stoke
bought supplies in eastern counties for the army at Berwick, while supplies for the
receiver at Carlisle were to come from Ireland and Cumberland. 223 For armies going to,
or in, France such discrimination was naturally inappropriate, though the northern
counties, with the occasional exception of Yorkshire, 224 were not required to meet
purveyances. This, however, was as much to do with the effects of the troubles with
Scotland as with any geographical considerations. It is difficult to make an argument
that there was any general policy of rotating demands, the same counties being involved
several times; indeed, in 1346 seven out of eight called upon in September were
included again in Novetnber.225
Though writs would say, quite sincerely, that there should be as little loss to the
people as could be managed, 226 the management of the supply of food for the armies
naturally put the armies' needs first.
The central government's involvement in managing the supply of military
weaponry in bulk did not include personal armour or what Hewitt categorises as cutting
weapons - 'knives, lances, spears, swords' , 227 Henry ITs Assize of Arms of 1181 and
subsequent related modifications had established that it was accepted as the
219 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 471.
220 Above, p. 29.
221 Above, p. 69.
222 Above, pp. 67-8.
223 Above, p. 117.
224 Above, p. 148.
225 c76/23, mm.18, 9.
226 Above, p, 117.
227 Organisation of War, p, 63.
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responsibility of the individual and the county to ensure that men were equipped with
these weapons. Government activity was directed to providing the large engines of war
and the materials necessary to make them, particularly iron and timber, and, at the other
end of the scale, trying to ensure the armies' supplies of items used up in large numbers
- nails, horseshoes, bowstaves, bows, bowstrings, 228 arrows, quarrels.
Stocks of these weapons were usually held centrally, as Hewitt describes,
particularly at the Tower. 229
 Some indication of the scale may be inferred from the
order during the Welsh war of 1282 to the king's clerk William de Perton (who was
probably at Chester), to send the king the 12,000 quarrels 'in his keeping'.23°
New supplies of bows, arrows and quarrels were obtained by the sheriffs, who
would receive instructions to buy specific quantities and, usually, deliver them to the
Tower to the keeper of the privy wardrobe there. 231
 Orders of 20 March 1345 were
spelt out in detail to each sheriff, defining which was to obtain bows, sheaves of arrows
or bowstrings, and how many. 232 Orders for selection of archers had the same date; 233 it
is tempting to suggest that the buying orders might have been calculated in relation to
the number of archers (after presumably taking into account existing stocks). If this
were so, taken together with the knowledge of potential sources implied by the detail of
the orders to the sheriffs, it would suggest the existence of a well-managed planning
system, but this may be unlikely, given the absence of other evidence.
The equipment ordered on 20 March 1345 was to be delivered by 14 May. In
1359 sheriffs were told on 2 January to supply quotas of bows and arrows to the Tower
by 7 Apri1, 234 but in spite of the greater length of time allowed they failed to do so. This
may have been due to misunderstanding arising from the extension of the truce with
France, but the king's clear expression of anger indicates that, even if the original
228 Winches for crossbows were also supplied, at least in 1359. (Above, p.186.)
Springalds were among the supplies delivered to Nicholas Hugate at Bordeaux in 1325.
Above, p, 102, n.113,
229 Organisation of War, p. 65-73.
230 Above, p. 33. At the beginning of that war Gregory de Rokesley, keeper of
the exchange in London had been told to have 4,000 quarrels made and delivered to the
barons of the Cinque Ports (Foedera, Vol. I div. 11, p. 604); perhaps stocks had already
been concentrated conveniently near Wales.
231 Above, pp. 139, 171.
232 C76/20, in. 31.
233 Above, p. 137.
234 Above, p. 171.
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planning was well-managed, subsequent administration was not, at least on this
occasion.235
Unlike most orders for purveyance of victuals, orders to sheriffs to buy these
weapons did not involve clerks as supervisors of the process; the possible administrative
confusion in 1359 may underline both the need for such supervision, and the clerks'
value as administrators. (Later in February, 1360 fifteen out of twenty-one sheriffs were
unable to provide their quotas of bows and arrows in the time required, though as they
had only been given four weeks it was not surprising.)236
Of course armies needed a wide range of equipment as well as weaponry; the
lists of stores held at Berwick in 1336, and those delivered to Nicholas Hugate in 1325,
illustrate what the receivers had to handle. 237
 The arrangements for obtaining these
items varied. Horseshoes and nails were to be bought by Walter le rerrour (described
as valettus) in 1314, by two sheriffs under the supervision of a clerk in 1336, and by a
sheriff in 1346. 238 The latter was also told to obtain cartloads of iron, as was the sheriff
of Derby in 1336. 239 The Derbyshire iron was to be sent via Hull to the receiver at
Berwick, who was told to expect it; similar advance notice of incoming supplies of
archers' equipment was given to Robert de Mildenhall at the Tower in 1345.240
The basic arrangements for the supplies and equipment needed for war-time
shipping have been described above, in the section on transport. Immediate
responsibility for making vessels ready for their tasks rested with the officials of their
home ports,241 though supervision by royal clerks or sergeants-at-arms, and sometimes
pressure from sheriffs,242 was necessary.
235 Above, p. 175.
236 Instead they had to send the money they would have spent on the equipment
to the treasury, to reimburse the keeper of the privy wardrobe at the Tower for his
expenses in providing them. (Above, p. 187.) Probably there was a general shortage;
the Black Prince's chamberlain also received a message urging speedy delivery at about
the same time . Ibid.
237 Above, pp. 119, 102 n.113.
238 Above, pp. 56, 120, 149.
239 Above, p. 119.
240 Above, p. 139.
241 Above, pp. 57, 71, 79-80, 84, 86, 108.
242 Above, p. 85.
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Equipment, gang-planks and hurdles and the materials for making them, to
adapt merchant ships to carry horses, was supplied by sheriffs, again under the
coordinating management of clerks or sergeants-at-arms.243
The victualling of ships summoned to naval service appears in the early years of
this period to be left implicitly to their home ports - in so far as the orders for them were
addressed direct to the ports' officials as in 1301, 1314, and 1322; 2" in 1336, in the
case of Boston, this was explicit. 245 It may not always, however, have been the practice.
The requirement that the clerk John Devery, overseeing the requisitioning of ships in
1324, should report crew numbers to the treasury or chancery Tor the more precise
payment thereof and better purveyance of their victuals in tirne f246 implies something
more than mere accounting, but exactly what is difficult to see. Contemporary accounts
of various sheriffs for equipping ships include construction materials, but not
provisionS.247
In August 1336 authority for requisitioning victuals for the fleets was given to
the two admirals, Geoffrey de Say and John de Norwico. 248 This may have been an
innovation, or possibly an order making explicit something previously not so clear. In
1324 admirals were given power to select crews, 249 but without explicit mention of
requisition of victuals; nor, earlier, in 1336, did John de Norwico's authority to
requisition, crew and arm ships specify victualling them. 25° Although the admirals'
explicit authority to victual ships was applied through various channels - ships' masters,
sheriffs, and one king's clerk - in 1336, 251
 in 1345 admirals' general powers to
requisition ships and have them ready to sail from their home ports once more did not
make particular reference to provisioning them. 252 It seems therefore that victualling
ships remained the responsibility of the officials of their home ports, under the
supervision of admirals' deputies and others. The situation in August 1336 may have
243 Above, pp. 84, 87, 134.
244 Above, pp. 43, 57, 71.
245 Above, p. 125.
246 Above, p. 85.
247 Above, p. 87.
248 Above, p. 125.
249 Above, p. 94.
250 Above, p. 109.
251 Above, pp, 125-6.
252 Above, pp. 134-5.
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been that the urgency of reassembling the fleets to meet the threat of the French
galleys253 required special action.
The management of the processes of arranging supplies for these campaigns can
not be described as rigorous; perhaps it did not need to be, given that the timings of
arrival and departure of armies and fleets were themselves subject to margins of error.
Nevertheless, as is to be expected, the government was aware that it was necessary to
do more than just issue often quite detailed orders to permanent local officials. It had
available, and used, its central staff - particularly the royal clerks and sergeants-at-arms
- for the additional supervision, progress-chasing and coordination that was needed.
Planning
The timings of the mobilizations of the armies studied in Chapters 2-8 were determined
by differing circumstances: the need to react at once to the Welsh revolt in 1282; the
French threat to Gascony in 1324; the anticipated expiry of the truces with Scotland in
May 1301 and May 1336, and of the truce with France in March 1325 (and in April
1359); 254 the commitment to surrender Stirling if it was not relieved by mid-summer
1314; the French rejection of the 'second treaty of London' in May 1359. In 1322
Edward II only set about raising the army to invade Scotland when he had overcome his
opponents in England; Edward III had already determined on continuing the war with
France in spite of the truce of Malestroit, 255 though he did not renounce it until June
1345. The planning of the mobilizations reflected their origins.
Obviously, in 1282 immediate action rather than advance planning was
undertaken. Within a couple of weeks regional commanders were named, cavalry
summoned, agents and orders for gathering a flow of supplies sent out, and preparation
of naval support put in hand.256
In 1301, with knowledge of the May date for expiry of the truce, early planning
could take place. Some four months' notice was given of the date of the muster, 24
June, for cavalry, ships and supplies to come together, by orders issued within a few
253 Above, p. 123.
254 This was overtaken by the negotiations leading to the 'second treaty of
Above, p. 173.London'
255 moKisack, Fourteenth Century , p.131.
256 Above, pp. 26-7, 28, 34.
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days of each other. 257
 It is interesting also that, later, orders for county levies of foot
went out with the same date, 12 May, as orders for the purchase of a large number of
carts, both levies and carts to be at the muster by 24 June. 258 This adds to the picture of
different elements of mobilization being considered together, and therefore of
coordinated planning.
The same coordination can be seen in 1314 in the orders preparing the army to
relieve Stirling, for which the muster date was set as 10 June. Magnates having been
summoned, on 23 December, to present their service then, writs dated from 22 March to
1 April called for ships, and for levies from the counties, Wales and Ireland, and
appointed purveyors for supplies. 259 In 1322 a series of orders dated 24 and 25 March
were for infantry, cavalry, supplies and ships. 26° In 1336, at a point when the truce was
due to expire at Easter (in March it was extended to 5 May), writs dated from 10 to 13
February ordered defensive schemes, summoned ships, and appointed arrayers for
hobelars and archers to be brought to Berwick.261
The clear picture of coordinated planning thus visible in the mobilizations of
1282, 1301, 1314, 1322 and 1336 tends to be obscured in the 'on and off nature of the
preparations for expeditions during the War of Saint-Sardos. Nevertheless, it can still
be seen in the aborted arrangements for an embarkation on 27 August 1324,262
 and in
those for the similarly postponed and ultimately cancelled one originally set for 17
March 1325. The musters called for 14 May 1345 for both Henry of Lancaster's
expedition to Gascony and Edward Ill's to Sluys were planned in a group of orders with
a wider spread of dates; but even here those for ships and men for Lancaster were issued
between 8 and 13 March, and those for Edward's force between 14 and 20 March.263
Originally 20 October 1345 was the embarkation date for what later became the 'Crecy'
campaign; the orders for ships and men were both dated 28 August. 264 Preparations for
resumption of war in 1359 came in two stages, the first (in orders of 6 December 1358
257 Above, pp. 43-6.
258 Above, pp. 47, 51.
259 Above, pp. 55, 57, 58, 56-7.
260 Above, pp. 61, 62, 67, 80.
261 Above, pp. 107, 108-9, 110.
262 Shipping was ordered up on 28 July, a preparatory 'census' of available
soldiers on 1 August, the magnates' retinues on 4 August, selection of ships' crews on 6
August, and infantry on 8 August. Above, pp. 94, 91-2, 94.
263 Above, pp. 134-5, 137.
264 Above, p. 141.
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for ships, 2 January for armaments, and 12 January for soldiers) being interrupted by
new negotiations. The second, following the French rejection of the new treaty in May,
began with orders on 1 June to have the Welsh and county levies ready to march, and on
6 June for raising a fleet to be at Sandwich by 8 July.265
It would, of course, have been surprising if such coordinated planning had not
taken place, but it is reassuring to have so much evidence that it did. Similarly, it is
possible to see the considerable extent to which arrangements were made for orders to
be followed up, and plans altered if necessary - that is, how much 'management' took
place.
The preceding sections on the purveyance of victuals and, particularly, the
assembly of shipping, have referred to numerous instances of the appointment of royal
clerks and sergeants-at-arms to supervise and progress executive action by permanent
local officials. In itself this establishes that the government recognised the necessity for
such 'managerial' activity; it is arguable that the development of the practice of
appointing commissioners of array, whose role could be described as originally to
arrange and manage the actions of sheriffs, bailiffs and their staffs, makes the same
point.266
There is also the frequency with which writs ordering action to mobilize armies
and fleets included the requirement for reports. In 1301 the warden had to report when
the ships of the Cinque Ports were ready to sail; in 1322 sheriffs had to report the names
of bannerets and other men-at-arms they had summoned; in 1336 detailed reports were
required of numbers of ships, and of action taken to implement defence plans.267
Sometimes interim reports had to be made on progress towards completion of orders, as
by 2 February 1325 in respect of the muster on 17 March; by 8 May 1345 for the muster
on 14 May; by 16 April 1346 for the muster on 1 May; by 25 March 1347 for readiness
of archers by Easter (1 April); by 27 January 1359 on action to assemble a fleet by 14
Apre.268I	 Though the need to make reports might in itself encourage the completion of
tasks, the government could use them to pursue inadequate performance: it must be
265 Above, pp. 169, 171-2, 176, 174. However, possibly because of the
apparently uncertain and unpredictable dates of arrival at Sandwich of the contracted
retinues, there does not seem to have been a more precise or coordinated plan for the
Reims campaign. Above, p. 184.
266 The role of the clerks associated with sheriffs in the raising of levies in 1301
can be seen in the same light. Above, pp. 47-8.
267 Above, pp. 43, 77, 108, 114.
268 Above, pp. 97, 138, 146, 162, 170.
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fairly certain that the strong remonstrance of 10 February 1360 was occasioned by what
was learned from the reports required by 28 January of the lack of progress of defensive
arrangements. 269
In several cases it was explicitly stated that the reports were to be made to the
chancery,27° which by this time could be said to be acting as the general secretariat of
the counci1;271 thus there was at least the potential for not only following up individual
cases of actual or potential failure, but also, admittedly rarely, for the taking of major
decisions on the basis of a general view of the progress being made.
That failures were not left unnoticed is shown by the investigative commissions
of 1101, the order in 1324 to arrest the disappearing Gloucester footmen, the complaint
of the delayed departure of Yorkshire archers in January 1336, the appointment of three
commissioners in March 1336 to find out why some more had not arrived, or the rapid
remonstrance of 6 June 1345 to Herefordshire arrayers because their men were late.272
Reminders to arrayers and others of the dates by which their tasks were to be completed
were also issued. On 10 June 1336 some were impatiently pressed to deliver their men
by the muster date of 24 June; those made responsible on 26 May 1336 for setting up
signal fires were urged on 2 June to do so; the leader of Welsh levies was reminded on
1 June 1345 to deliver them quickly to the muster at Sandwich; in March 1347 Irish
magnates were again told of the urgency of bringing their forces to London by 1
Apri1. 273 Instances of major changes to plans, clearly made because of knowledge of
the inadequate progress of key elements, occurred in 1345 and 1346. In 1345 the
successive postponements in April (to 29 May) and then in May (to 5 June) of the
muster originally ordered for 14 May were obviously due to the anticipated late arrivals
of county levies; in 1346 the cancelling in September of the embarkation due on 20
269
	
p. 190.
270 e.g. arrayers in 1345; admirals' deputies taking security from ships in August
1345; arrayers in March 1347; sergeants-at-arms in January 1359 and again before 8
July; arrayers for defence in November 1359 and January 1360. (Above, pp. 137, 141,
162, 171, 174, 189.) The 1336 report to the chancellor by the Leicestershire arrayer that
his selected archers had been duly passed on, by indenture, to be led to Berwick,
possibly illustrates the terms in which such reports were made. Above, p. 113.
271 J. F. Baldwin, The King's Council in England during the Middle Ages
(Oxford, 1913), p. 230.
272 Above, pp. 48, 95, 106, 113, 139.
273 Above, pp. 115, 116, 139, 161-2.
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October was explicitly attributed to knowledge that the ships would not be ready in
time."4
Postponements of dates for muster and for the embarkation of expeditions were
of course commonplace during these wars. They were, however, usually not due to
administrative failure to monitor and progress the orders for mobilization. Various
other circumstances could give rise to the delays: political considerations (as probably
in the case of the negotiations for the levy of one man per vill in 1324, 275 the changing
diplomatic situation in 1324 and 1325; military decisions to increase the size of the
army, and simple adverse weather in 1346; 276 the problems arising from dependence on
contract retinues in 1359 with their erratic arrival pattern.277
The mobilization of armies under the three Edwards did not find the royal
governments without understanding of the need to manage as well as simply issue
orders. They had and used appropriate techniques, such as the use of records,
coordinated planning, the appointment of reliable agents to supervise and progress
action, the requirement for reports to a communications centre. With them they could
at least try to ensure that orders were obeyed, monitor progress, and apply corrective
measures when necessary - that is, to manage the processes of mobilization.
	•••n•nn•••
274 Above, pp. 138, 142.
275 Above, p. 70.
276 Above, p. 145.
271 Above, p. 183.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
The records of mobilizations described and analysed in the preceding chapters have
shown that Maddicott's comment, 'The central government had no means of ensuring
that its orders were carried out in the shires', 1 should not be taken to mean the centre
made no attempt to follow up the execution of its instructions by managerial action.
The central government whose management of mobilization has been studied
was that of the king. The king's council - as the word makes clear - was in origin, and
under Henry III still was, 'a group of advisers; from the formal and constitutional point
of view it did not act' . 2 An executive council was 'the outcome of the developments,
political, military, administrative and judicial, of the reign of Edward I'• 3 It had
acquired its executive powers because of the practical necessity of handling
increasingly complex administration. The core of the council therefore usually
consisted of the judicial and administrative officials. It was supplemented by barons
particularly when the importance of the issues to be considered made this necessary.4
Their presence reflected the continuance of the idea that the tenants-in-chief were the
king's most appropriate counsellors.5
Military mobilizations were not only great administrative undertakings;
politically, they required the king to enlist the cooperation of the major magnates.
They would be included in the council with which the king consulted when he decided
upon mobilization for war, and thus would be in a position to influence strategic
decisions as to numbers and titning. 6 The consequential detailed plans would be
worked out by the household and departmental staff, and receive at least tacit approval
1 The English Peasantry, p. 29.
2 B. Wilkinson, Studies in the Constitutional History of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Centuries, third edn. (Manchester, 1952), p. 118.
3 Ibid., p. 121.
4 Ibid., p. 136, perhaps in much the same way as the executive directors of a
company are reinforced by externally influential non-executives when take-overs or
acquisitions are concerned.
5 Baldwin, The King's Council in England, p. 460.
6 e.g. the 'Advice given by English prelates and magnates on the King's
proposed expedition to Gascony', War of Saint-Sardos, ed. P. Chaplais p. 89.
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from the king or council. Implementation of these plans required the issuing of orders
to many individuals, spelling out what action was required of each. The orders were
sent out principally by the chancery. 7 In his chapter 'The Chancery' in The English
Government at Work, 8 Wilkinson quotes a letter of Edward DI of 1335. It authorised
the council to have letters (summoning the magnates to Newcastle on the feast of the
Trinity) made in the chancery and brought to the king to be sealed, the decision that
they ought to be so summoned having been made originally by the counci1. 9 That letter
illustrates three points central to mobilization: the recognised and necessary authority
of the king, the strategic planning role of the council, and the function of the chancery
in communicating administrative instructions.
Mobilizing armies for war was a task that was inherently more demanding of
government's managerial efficiency, particularly in terms of timing, than were most
other administrative functions of the medieval state. The delivery of justice, organised
largely on the basis of the regular sessions of courts, could take place without 'dead-
lines'. Delayed collection of taxes, though payment into the exchequer was theoretically
due by specified dates, 1 ° would be neither disastrous nor unusual. Levying of customs
charges on exports was a continuous process, 11 as was, in a very different field, the
maintenance of law and order. By contrast, final plans for the muster of the army or the
assembly of a fleet had to specify a completion date. The possibility of actually
achieving it depended in the first case on its being based on roughly realistic knowledge
of logistical considerations. These included such matters as how long particular tasks
would take, distances and the time needed to cover them, and numbers of men or ships
locally available. Without such information the detailed orders to individuals could
prove to be impracticable. Fulfilment of the plans also depended on the ability of the
government to supervise and monitor the action of the recipients of those orders, keep
track of the progress of the whole operation, and take corrective action when necessary.
7 'Many of the letters as we find them in the close rolls and patent rolls
are.. .marked with attestations such as per regem et cons ilium, per consilium, per
petitionem de consilio, per privatum sigillum, etc... .An act in which the council
evidently participated is warranted by the king, or by privy seal; whether an order is
marked by authority of the king and council or simply by council seems to be a matter
of indifference.' J. F. Baldwin, 'The King's Council', in EGov.at W, Vol. I, p. 157.
8 Vol. I, pp. 162-205.
9 Ibid., p.180.
10 C. Johnson, 'The Collectors of Lay Taxes' in EGov.atW, Vol. II, p. 214.
11 R. L. Baker, The English Customs Service 1307-1343. A Study of Medieval
Administration (Philadelphia, 1961), p. 6.
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In these respects mobilization necessitated particularly deliberate planning and,
especially, management.
In attempting to judge the overall degree of success or failure of the
management of these mobilizations it is not the outcome of the subsequent campaign
that is the critical factor to be considered. Edward H's disastrous defeat at
Bannockburn does not nullify the fact that a large army of both horse and foot had been
mobilized in time to be able to reach Stirling before it was due to be surrendered.12
Nor is it the wisdom of the original strategic policy, or the consequences of variations
resulting from new political or diplomatic circumstances, that should determine
conclusions about the efficiency of the management of the detailed administration. The
War of Saint Sardos illustrates how vacillating royal decision-making could create an
unfair picture of administrative confusion.°
The more relevant issues are these. Were plans for mobilizations realistic and
practicable as a result of being based on reliable information? Was there a mechanism
to transmit knowledge of how their implementation was progressing, to the king and the
council? Was effective use made of such knowledge? Were sufficient arrangements
made to supervise the detailed executive action? Was the net result of the government's
management that plans were adequately, even if not completely, fulfilled?
Quantitative Practicality of Plans
There is little reason to believe that the sizes of the armies, or of the contingents
allocated to individual counties or towns, were generally out of scale compared with
practical possibility. In 1322 Edward H originally asked for nearly 40,000 men from the
county levies, which would have been a very heavy demand; but that scheme,
abandoned in return for agreement to the levy of one specially equipped man from each
vill, appears in fact to have been intended only as a bargaining counter. 14 An array
ordered in 1336 envisaged some 86,000 men; it was specifically for defence, and
moreover was very quickly cancelled. 15
 The often quite substantial short-falls,
described in Chapter 9, between intended and actual numbers in the county levies16
reflect inefficiencies in the system, but do not necessarily invalidate the conclusion that
the numbers were viable: none of the campaigns for which mobilization has been
12 Above, p. 60,
13 Above, p. 104.
14 Above, pp. 69-70.
15 Above, p. 127.
16 Above, pp. 202-3.
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discussed was aborted for lack of sufficient force. Nor, apart from resistance arising
from a natural disinclination to be conscripted for military service, is there any
significant evidence that there were justified complaints that the numbers sought were
an unbearable burden. The reduction in the size of the levies for the expedition to Sluys
in spring 1345 had a preamble that said it was 'to relieve the people as much as
possible', which might appear to imply that the original figures were excessive. It was,
however, a reduction from only 1,940 archers (to 1,055), to be drawn from over a score
of counties. 17 Both numbers were small compared with those required on many other
occasions. The occasions when arrayers were told not to take soldiers from towns
supplying ships or sailors /8 imply a government willingness not to be unreasonable in
its attitude (especially in relation to established practices).
In general, demands on individual areas and towns appear to have been
realistic, practicable and acceptable. They must therefore have been planned on the
basis on quite detailed information.
Planning Information
Written records were essential to provide a practicable basis for planning. As M. T.
Clanchy describes, over centuries documents proliferated, and became recognised -
slowly - as desirable records. 19 'Making documents for administrative use, keeping
them as records, and using them again for reference were three distinct stages of
development which did not automatically and immediately follow from each other.'2°
It is not possible to prove that the planners of these Edwardian mobilizations did
explicitly use the recorded information of previous arrays to determine their allocations
for the next. Accounts of the sort of discussions that must have taken place, or the
reasons that must have been advanced for whatever was proposed, are not preserved.
What do still exist in profusion - and therefore were available, even if not easily
accessible, at the time - are the conclusions: the orders for conscription of specified
numbers of men, or ships, from named places. It would be very surprising if
experienced administrators took no account of, at least, the records of what had
previously been tried, and to what extent it had been successful, even if the latter was
only known approximately. The order to ports to provide a specific number of ships
17 Above, p. 138.
18 Above, p. 111.
19 'Documents do not automatically become records.' M. T. Clanchy, From
Memory to Written Record 1066-1307, second edn. (London, 1993), p. 145.
20 Ibid., p.154.
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each in 1324 implies an already held view of their individual capacities. 21
 In 1336 a
king's clerk collected information from the jurors of Holkham on that port's vessels,22
and in 1347 representatives of 32 ports were called to Westminster to report on the
availability of shipping. 23 There were several indications of the intention to have
figures on which plans could be based. In 1316 the N'omina Villarum survey was made
in preparation for the proposed levy of one man per vill. 24 The census of 1344 was
carried out expressly to provide information on the 'armed power of the realm'. 25
 There
were a good number of examples of the administration requiring quantified returns
from commissioners of array. 26 These are practices that add to the case for seeing the
government as increasingly concerned to be able to base its quantitative planning of
mobilization on hard facts, and fairly effectively doing so.
Another field in which it would have been obviously desirable for government
planning to be based on reliable numerical information was finance. Making budget
forecasts to relate income and expenditure does not, however, seem to have been a
process central to medieval government. Michael Prestwich makes the point that, at
least under Edward I, there is no evidence of serious budgeting, in which future
estimated expenditure was compared with probable income. 27 E. B. Fryde's study of
Edward III's attempts to finance his activities in the the Netherlands in 1338-1340
reveals a hopeless failure to relate commitments to realistic expectation of revenue.28
Calculations of military expenditure were tnade, 29 but were not related to anticipated
revenues. As J. R. Strayer writes `...even when the government had discovered more or
less adequate sources of revenue it was never able to collect as much as might have
been expected' because it 'lacked both information and personnel.' 3° Until 1334
individuals' liability to taxes on moveables was made by the sub-assessors on the sworn
information of township juries, the results being then enrolled, one part to be used by
21 Above, p. 84.
22 Above, p. 109.
23 Above, p. 165.
24 H. M. Jewell, English Local Administration in the Middle Ages (Newton
Abbot, 1972), p. 88.
25 CPR 1343-1345, p. 427.
26 Above, p. 197.
27 Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, p. 204.
28 E. B. Fryde, Studies in Medieval Trade and Finance (London, 1983), Ch. VII.
29 Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, p. 204. The 'Scheme in 1341' worked
out the cost of the forces assumed over 40 days, and of the transport fleet, and outlined
how it might be met from an ad hoc levy on wool. Prestwich, 'Scheme in 1341', p. 102.
30 Strayer, 'Introduction', in EGov.at W, Vol. II, p. 4.
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the collectors and the other kept by the chief taxers. 31 Judging that the information was
becoming increasingly unreliable, in 1334 the government negotiated with each
community a lump sum, which the community allocated to individuals, and which
could be continued to be, and was, used thereafter as the base liability. 32 This could be
seen as an example of recognition of the planning value of having reliable information -
though it was, also, a confession of the limits of the government's power and resources
to collect it.
Progress Reports
Effective management required not only that detailed instructions for mobilization
should be based, as far as possible, on reliable information as to what was practicable,
but also that the centre should know how well the process was going, in case plans
needed to be changed. There is both explicit and implicit evidence that reports were
sought by and made to the central authority. In many cases they were to be specifically
to 'the chancery';33 in others, which sought a report 'to the king', 34 they would
presumably have followed the same route, the chancery being the centre of out-going
and in-coming administrative communication.
Reports could have different purposes. Some were intended simply to record
that the action had been taken, for example that a proclamation had been made, 35
 or that
comprehensive arrangements for coastal defence had been completed. 36 The mere
requirement in the original order for such reports could act as a spur to performance,
besides enabling progress to be monitored as they were received. More effective still for
the management of the mobilization would be orders that sought interim reports on
progress towards completion of tasks. These not only acted as reminders, and
encouraged timely action by the official reminded, but also, most valuably, could allow
time for reassessment of the original plan if it seemed that was likely to become
necessary. In 1283 sheriffs who had been told to assist in the collection of workmen,
corn, and transport for it, had to report completion of their tasks, though only by the day
31 Johnson, 'The Collectors of Lay Taxes' in ECov.atW, Vol, II, p. 205.
32 Strayer,`Introduction', in EGov.atW, Vol. II, p. 19.
33 Above, p. 233.
34 Above, p. 38.
35 Above, p. 39.
36 Above, p. 114.
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before the final date. 37 In 1322 ports, told to provide ships to bring troops from Ireland,
had to report to the king's clerk Alexander le Conyers, who was supervising all the
arrangements, what they were doing to meet the order. 38 In 1325 a progress report on
the selection of archers and men-at-arms for a muster on 17 March was to be made by 2
February. 39 In 1345 a report on selection of men who were to be at Sandwich by 14
May was to be made by 8 May. 4° In 1346 details, including names and the number of
men., of action for the muster on 1 May, were to be reported by 16 April. 41 in 1359,
when plans were for a transport fleet to be assembled by 14 April, very detailed reports
were required by 27 January.42
The record of the chancery being told in 1136 that a levy in Leicester had been
successfully raised, and the men passed on to be led to the muster, with an indenture
recording the transfer, 43 suggests the possible existence of an almost routine procedure
capable of being used for monitoring progress. It may be significant that an exchange
of indentures, like that recording the handing on of responsibility for those Leicester
archers from the arrayer to the next 'office?, also took place between East Riding
arrayers and Thomas Meltham, who was to take the men on to Berwick. 44 These might
be surviving examples of a fairly general practice, which it would be in the interest of
arrayers to observe for their own protection, in case of subsequent desertions or delays,
and consequent royal anger. If so, the system would have had the potential to keep the
centre very well informed. Even if confirmation of the hand-over was not always sent to
the chancery, the existence of such a procedure would facilitate later investigations to
punish deserters: both considerations might be illustrated by the problems in 1324 of
dealing with the disappearing Gloucestershire levy.45
Reports have not only to be required: they have to be seen and used. There is
ample evidence that in the management of mobilizations this took place. Reports were
seen and used to give rise both to detailed corrective action, and on occasion to major
changes to plans. It is, of course, unlikely that each and every report would be
37 Above, pp. 38-9.
38 Above, p. 71.
39 Above, p. 97.
40 Above, p. 138.
41 Above, p. 146.
42 Above, p. 170.
43 Above, p. 113.
44 Above, p, 106.
45 Above, p. 95.
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considered by the council or the king. How they were processed can only be guessed.
Probably the chancery clerks would draw the chancellor's attention to evidence of
impending failure to meet particular objectives, so that he could take, or seek from the
council or king, authority for issuing new orders. For example, in 1336 the
administration was aware of deficiencies in numbers delivered by certain array ers, who
were ordered to make them good. 46 Reports of some sort must have been the origin of
a realisation that orders were necessary to accelerate the performance of tasks already
allocated. In 1336 impatient writs, dated 10 and 12 June, successively urged the
completion of arrays authorised two or three weeks previously. As those June writs
were warranted the first per consilium and the subsequent one per ipsum regem they are
strong evidence that progress was being actively monitored, or at least reported, at the
highest leve1. 47 It is clear from the postponement of the embarkation planned for 20
October, announced on 29 September 1345 with the explanation that shipping would
not be ready,48 that a running count must have been being kept of the prospective
amount of transport capacity. Action in 1314 to correct slow delivery of ships seems to
make the same point. 49 Reports also implied and facilitated the punishment of
disobedience to orders. Though it was not stated explicitly that the inclusion of clerks
in the commissions of array in 1301 was so that they could quickly provide returns of
short-falls of men, the arrangements for the subsequent investigations make it seem
probable. 5° Reports were certainly made of the names of the masters, and sometimes of
the owners, of ships requisitioned for fleets, or of those giving sureties for their later
appearance. 51 In 1283 sheriffs reported the names of merchants who declined to bring
victuals for sale to the army. 52 In the order of 1314 for local arrays, even the names of
individuals who were listed among those who should have attended, but were absent,
were to be enrolled and sent to the council or chancery. 53 Though the latter two
processes could only work as a deterrent to future disobedience, taking the names of the
ship' masters might inhibit some from flouting the arrest of their vessel; management
action to discourage that would be more useful than later punishment. These are some
46 Above, p. 113.
47 Above, p. 115.
48 Above, p. 142.
49 Above, p. 57.
5° Above, p. 49
51 Above, p. 85.
52 Above, p. 40.
53 Above, p. 64
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of the observations from the mobilizations surveyed that demonstrate that the
government was accustomed to react - sometimes very quickly - to what was revealed
by the reports it was receiving.
There were limits to the amount and timely availability of those reports. The
number of references to selection of troops to be made 'if that had not already taken
place'54 shows that the administration was aware that its information was by no means
complete. Quite apart from the matter of whether comprehensive reports were actually
sent, or even always sought, there was the time it would take for them to be delivered.
Such time-lags were inevitable, even in the relatively urgent circumstances of
mobilization. In the context of other centrally ordered but locally executed
administrative action the government's ability to know that things were happening as it
intended, and react quickly if they were not, must have been even more restricted.
Mobilizations, with their requirement for action to a time-table with a
completion date, made reports necessary in a way that most other state functions did
not. It would be wrong to suggest that the long-established twice-yearly accounting at
the exchequer by sheriffs was any more than a very distantly analogous example of
recognition that efficient administration involves keeping track of on-going
performance. The exchequer's collection in 1354-5 of four returns of the rate of income
from customs was not a monitoring procedure, but a device to facilitate more reliable
assignment of that revenue to repayment of debt. 55 Mobilization may have been a
special case, but it does show that the goverment could and did employ practical
managerial techniques to try to keep in touch with how its activities were progressing.
Supervision
An obvious arrangement aimed at ensuring that a large number of agents, to whom
detailed action has been assigned, do carry it out, is to appoint others with a watching or
supervisory brief. The accounts of the raising of county levies in preceding chapters
have emphasised that permanent local officials played an essential part throughout the
period. 56 The practice of giving the ultimate responsibility to special commissioners
only increased gradually. At first they were appointed just in some counties, while
54 Above, p. 204.
55 W. M. Ormrod, Edward III's Government of England c. 1346-1356
(University of Oxford D. Phil. thesis, 1984), p. 302.
56 Above, p. 202.
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sheriffs continued to have the responsibility in others. 57 The practice was extended
slowly until it became the normal, though not always the universa1, 58 rule. This
suggests that the development could be seen as originally an administrative and
managerial measure to deal with particular local circumstances requiring a supervisory
arrangement, rather than as a deliberate and general policy with a new purpose (to have
selection made by military 'experts'). The fact that the commissioners of array named in
the list of appointments would appoint sub-arrayers59 strengthens the argument for
seeing the named commissioners not so much as militarily expert individuals who had
to carry out the arrays in person, but more as managers responsible for seeing that the
work was done and the selected levies led to the tritister.6°
The same point - that a managerial structure evolved, somewhat erratically,
because of recognition of the need to supervise local action - can also be demonstrated
in respect of the mobilization of fleets (except that the 'supervisors', very few in
number, could not sail with the ships requisitioned from each port). The detailed action
to arrest, equip and provision ships continued to be taken by the authorities of their
home ports. 61 Though the orders for this went directly to the port officials, in 1301
appointments were made expressly to expedite their performance. Among those
appointed were some sheriffs. 62 In 1314 supervision of assembly of the fleet was made
the responsibility of two royal clerks, with sheriffs merely acting to support them. 63 In
April 1322 the clerk Alexander le Conyers had a similar coordinating role for western
ports.64 For assembly of an eastern fleet in that year there was no general appointment
to supervise the ports, though two sheriffs were deputed to raise ships from some
towns. 65 In 1324 two clerks exercised responsibility for supervising local officials,
with supporting action by sheriffs: ports received the orders to provide ships, but were
vigorously monitored. 66 In 1336 royal clerks covered the requisitioning, in the south-
57 Above, p. 47-8.
58 Above, p. 153.
59 Above, pp. 106, 104.
60 Arrayers appointed in 1314 were referred to as 'choosers and leaders'. Rot.
Scot., Vol. I, p. 120b.
61 Above, p.108.
62 Above, p. 44.
63 Above, p. 57.
64 Above, p. 71.
65 Above, p. 80.
66 Above, pp, 84-5,
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east under the supervision of the warden of the Cinque Ports.° In March 1345, in a
further organisational development, over-all responsibility for mobilizing naval
resources was placed on the two admirals, under whom teams of royal clerks and
sergeants-at-arms managed the executive action. This structure continued in August, in
October 1346 and in 1359.68
In this way the management of the assembling of fleets, made up essentially of
requisitioned merchant ships, was developed ultimately into a clear and effective
hierarchical structure bringing the operation under close central control. It had begun,
however, in an ad hoc way that showed the government recognised the need to
supervise the action of local officials. The number of ports being much smaller than the
number of vills, and therefore fewer supervisors being needed, it was possible for the
latter to be largely government employees - royal clerks and sergeants-at-arms - and
therefore able to be particularly objective in their local dealings.
Arrangements for supplies, particularly of victuals, for the armies and fleets
developed no such systematic structure, either for action or for its supervision. There
were, of course, many instances when members of the central administration were given
an explicitly supervisory responsibility in relation to the local officials who were seeing
to the actual purveyance. 69 In other cases it is not clear whether the former's role was
fundamentally supervisory, or actually executive. 70 In 134671 numbers of sheriffs were
instructed to obtain and deliver supplies, without any associated nomination of royal
clerks or sergeants-at-arms to 'view and witness' their action. In 1336 some purveyance
was put in the hands of merchants who operated across shrieval boundaries, with power
to appoint deputies. 72 This seems to imply that, though sheriffs and bailiffs were told to
assist them, the purveying would not necessarily be done by these permanent officials.
Appointments were, therefore, not consistently made to monitor the performance of
those responsible for obtaining supplies. This may be an indication that a precise
67 Above, p. 108.
68 Above, pp. 134, 141, 158, 170.
69 Above, pp. 44, 67, 101-2, 120.
70
e.g. the instructions to John de Maidenstone, who was to be supplied by the
sheriffs with staff to assist him (above, p. 29), and the same to the king's pantler. Above,
p.31.
71 Above, pp. 155, 164.
72 Above, pp. 117, 120. These merchants were to raise the supplies across
several counties; this is another reason for believing that the government did not have
detailed knowledge of local availability.
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quantity of government-organised supplies was not seen to be a critical factor in a
mobilization, for the reasons suggested in Chapter 9. 73 Such an attitude could also
explain the infrequency of records of government criticism of the quantities obtained
compared with what had been sought. The variations in the way purveyances were
made, and in the extent to which local action was supervised, add to the general picture
of managerial arrangements being made in ad hoc response to circumstances.
The urgency inherent in effecting a mobilization encouraged the central
government to make use of managerial techniques, such as the requirement for reports
and the imposition of supervisory arrangements, to ensure the satisfactory performance
of the existing permanent officials. The desirability of this may have reflected in part
reservations about these officials' objectivity in relation to imposing extra burdens on
the communities in which they had to continue to live. To a greater extent, looked at
from a managerial point of view, it may have recognised that the carrying out of a major
task outside their routine and regular responsibilities, risked a conflict of priorities in
which the requirements of the mobilization might not always be put first. It is possible
to see the commissioners of array, king's clerks and sergeants-at-arms in their varying
temporary roles in relation to the permanent local officials, as closely comparable with
those special appointments today called 'progress chasers' - expressed in the fourteenth-
century in the instruction videre provisiones predictas et eas festinare74 - and an
illustration of the government's recognition of the need for active and realistic
management.
From supervision of officials to privatisation
In the fourteenth century the role of the sheriff and his staff as the local factotum on
behalf of the central government of the king was already in decline. W. A. Morris saw
this as happening more than a hundred years earlier. 75 By 1327 escheators dealt with
the 'feudal' work, keepers of royal manors with estate management, and collectors of
subsidies with newer taxes. Keepers of the peace had a role in the fields of justice and
policing. 76 These developments can be said to have one thing in common: they were all
examples of dividing the responsibilities of the sheriff and allocating individual tasks
73 Above, p. 223.
74 E1011556/9.
75 W. A. Morris, The Medieval English Sheriff to 1300 (Manchester, 1927), p.
72.
76 H. M. Cam, 'Shire Officials: Coroners, Constables and Bailiffs', in EGov.atW,
Vol. HI, p. 143.
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to specialists. The constitutionally and organisationally significant point is that, as
Helen Cam pointed out, the specialists had contacts with the central government that
were outside the sheriff's control." As has been seen, one expression of this was that,
though the executive action for the conscription of levies from towns and counties
remained in the hands of local officials throughout this period, they usually had to carry
it out under the managerial control of commissioners of array appointed by and
responsible to the central government. A still further departure from dependence on the
permanent administrative structure of sheriffs, town bailiffs and their staffs was very
evident in the mobilization of the expedition for the Reims campaign in 1359.
A substantial part of this army was assembled and brought to the war without
the involvement of either local officials or agents appointed by the central government.
In response to the Scottish wars the military importance of mounted archers had been
established; in 1335, in the army of 13,000-15,000 men there were c. 3,500 mounted
archers, of whom only 1,095 were in retinues. 78 The census of 1344 that assessed
holders of land to arms according to their wealth, required them not only to serve, but
also to provide defined additional men, all to be mounted. 79 This must have accelerated
the trend to mixed retinues, combining mounted archers with men-at-arms. In 1359, the
account of the keeper of the wardrobe, William Farley, for the wages paid to retinues in
the Reims campaign,8° shows that this time substantial numbers of mounted archers -
some 3,800 - were included in them. 81 This figure compares with now only 1,140
mounted archers to be levied in the traditional way from English arrays, with another c.
1,000 Welsh foot archers and c. 500 Welsh armed with lances, for that campaign.82
Mobilization of the most important element of the retinues, the magnates,
knights and esquires who were the elite men-at-arms, for the armies of Edward I,
Edward II, and Edward HI's in 1327, depended on the response of those individually
summoned to come with their servicium debitum, and on their responses to requests in
such unquantified terms as cum equis et armis decentiori et meliori modo quo poteritis,
or quanto potentius poteritis. 83 Thus those summoned in these ways did not have to
meet instructions to bring a specific size of following with them, which put limits on
" Ibid.
78 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, pp. 12-13.
79 Above, p. 131.
E101/393/11, pp. 79 et sqq..
81 Archers are included in the retinues of Englishmen; it is interesting that the
many 'foreign' knights whose names appear from page 91 on do not have archers with
them. Ibid.
82 Above, pp. 176-7.
83 Above, p. 206.
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the possibility of quantitative government planning. The terms in which requests were
put - e.g vos rogamus...in fide homagio et ligeancia quibus nobis tenemini in 1333 84 -
expressed an ethos that precluded active bureaucratic management of the mobilization
of this element of the army.
Following the census of 1344, on 4 July 1345 some 300 individuals had been
ordered to have their retinues ready by 10 August. 85 The government should therefore
have been able to estimate, on the basis of the census, with some accuracy how great a
force would be raised, which indeed had been the census's explicit purpose. The
government could also monitor whether individuals' required obligation had been
fulfilled. If it had not, action could be taken via the appropriate sheriff, as in the case of
the Essex knight Walter Eygoce.86
Enforcement of this form of military obligation, however, aroused opposition,
which resulted in a promise in 1352 that it was not intended as a precedent. 87 No
formal order is recorded for the preparation and assembly of retinues of cavalry for the
Reims campaign. It must therefore be assumed that they came as the result of
commitments entered into by their captains.
Debate about the origins of the development of formal systems of retaining
places considerable weight on managerial and administrative considerations,
particularly 'the need for magnates to acquire the service of highly professional estate
managers and other servants', in a way 'which enabled the lords to obtain service
without the concomitant liabilities involved in feudal tenure'. 88 A temporary payment
out of revenue is often a more prudent method of purchase than is alienation of capital.
Formal contracts with the crown for military service were similarly designed originally
to meet administrative needs, being 'normally made for service away from the king's
side'," because the officials of the household were not there to deal with
administration. In 1294, for example, when magnates led forces in Gascony, 'It made
sense to pay these great men large sums.., so avoiding the bureaucratic complexities
involved in payment of wages to a large number of men on a regular basis.' 9° When the
king and the household were with the army, 'indentures for war' between the crown and
leaders of retinues were not needed to deal with the administration of pay. It is
84 Foedera, Vol. II, div, ii, p. 855.
85 Above, p. 140.
86 Above, p. 131.
87 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 80.
88 Ibid., p. 89.
89 Ibid., p. 92.
9° Ibid., p. 91.
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therefore not surprising that A. E. Prince found no evidence of 'formal written
indentures' for Englishmen in the Flemish expeditions of 1338-1340, and that written
indentures for Crecy were 'not extant'. 91 The same absence of indentures with the
crown applies to the army of 1359. 92
 This did not necessarily mean that the captains'
retinues themselves did not include men recruited by means of formal indentures
specifically for the campaign - certainly the Black Prince's retinue did in 1359 93 - as
well as others serving under longer term agreements.
In the absence of records, it is not possible to know whether the 'informal
understandings' Prestwich assumes existed between Edward and the leaders of each
retinue in 1359 94 defined specified numbers and categories of soldiers to be brought to
the army. If they did (which seems probable in view of the practice when contracts
were made for service where the king was not present) reliance on retinues of a defined
size and composition should have facilitated more secure quantitative planning.95
Possibly this influenced the decision to halve the numbers of archers to be selected from
the counties; to limit the number to c. 1,000 for a campaign to seize the French crown
strongly implies confident expectation that a sufficient number more would be available
from other sources. 96 In so far as the terms of agreements by which captains formed
their retinues could include a commitment to serve for a specific period, 97 additional
certainty in planning could have been obtained. Most valuably, this 'privatisation' of
the recruiting of archers into the armed retinues of lords and experienced captains must
have had the advantage of introducing some greater element of willing participation,
and of military expertise, among both the recruiters and the recruited. It was still the
case, of course, that the archers included in the retinues were essentially conscripts, not
volunteers: 98 the Black Prince's instructions to his officials in 1359 were that archers
should be 'chosen, tested and arrayed', 99 and tested and arrayed 'without sparing
any'. 100
91 Prince, 'Indenture System', pp. 287-8.
92 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 11.
93 Above, p. 178.
94 Armies and Warfare, p. 93.
95 In 1337, when an army was being collected for Scotland, in the absence of
the king, a list was drawn up of soldiers available for the Scotch war; N. B. Lewis
described this as a rare example of a preliminary estimate of a projected force. 'The
Recruitment and Organization of a Contract Army', pp. 6-7.
96 Above, p. 176.
97 like Sir John de Hide. Above, p. 180.
98 M. Hicks, Bastard Feudalism, (London, 1995), pp. 91-2.
99 Black Prince's Register, Vol. lH, p. 331.
100 Ibid., p. 347.
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Beyond these considerations it is not easy to suggest that, at least in the Reims
campaign of 1359, formation of a major part of the army on the basis of retinues, rather
than of levies, had made the management of its mobilization easier or more efficient.
The absence of evidence that a date for the muster of the army was set makes it
impossible to say that the meeting of a timetable was either facilitated or hindered. Nor
is there any recorded basis for a comparison of the total numbers delivered with some
government target. The only evidence is qualitative rather than quantitative: Jean le Be!
wrote that Edward sent away continental volunteers, saying not only that he could not
afford them, but also that he had brought enough men with him. 101
The important change in the government's attitude to management of the
mobilization, was that now apparently it was content that not only the heavy cavalry but
also the majority of the mounted archers should be recruited, organised and brought to
the army independently of the royal administration's managerial control. A substantial
part of the process of mobilization could be said to have been 'privatised'.
A Military Revolution?
Can this development in the method of managing the mobilization - apparent reliance
on mixed retinues provided by 'private' individuals rather than government appointees -
be seen as in some way part of general changes in the nature of the organisation and
conduct of war - as one expression of a 'military revolution'?
Superficially, the increased combination of archers and men-at-arms in retinues
in 1359 might appear to reflect battlefield considerations - particularly the tactics in
which the two types of soldier were organised in mutually supporting formations.1°2
Without more understanding than is currently available of how retinues of widely
different sizes and composition 103
 might have been integrated and reorganised when
battle was imminent, that interpretation is difficult to sustain. Of course, that the bulk of
the archers should be mounted rather than foot soldiers was appropriate for the mobile
campaign that Edward intended (though his move on Reims was only achieved at an
average of six miles per day): 1 °4 while in battle both archers and men-at-arms fought
dismounted, horses were still needed for subsequent pursuit or flight.
101 Above, p. 182.
102 Prestwich, Armies and Watfare, p. 336.
1' For example, in 1359 the earl of Richmond's retinue included 2 bannerets,
35 knights, 162 esquires and 200 archers. Thomas de Berkeley's was 3 esquires and 4
archers. E101/393/11, ff. 79r, 82v.
104 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 190.
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Inclusion of archers in every retinue does not seem, however, to have been an
essential element of military retinues in 1359. The English units included mounted
archers, but even the larger non-English ones - like Arnold van Enfelswe's, with ten
esquires or Michael van Convy's, with two knights and thirty-two esquires - did not.105
The 1,140 mounted archers to be provided by the county arrayers were, obviously, not
recruited as part of a policy of deliberately employing only units of men-at-arms and
archers integrated for tactical reasons (if that were what the purpose of the mixed
retinue was suggested to be). Inclusion of mounted archers in the English retinues
might have been an implicit and evolving, rather than explicit and calculated, response
to the theory and practice of mid-fourteenth-century tactical developments, but it is not
easy to argue that the mixed retinue must be seen as a consequence, let alone a
necessary condition, of the way English armies would now be drawn up for battle, or
therefore as an expression of a military revolution. 106
Arguments for seeing a military revolution in the fourteenth-century changes in
warfare include more than the change in tactics. That change itself, coupled with the
increasing duration of campaigns fought, as far English armies were concerned, abroad,
meant that effectiveness required more explicitly professional soldiers. Professionalism
had to be expressed in military skills, acceptance of discipline, and in commitment to
longer continuity of service than the traditional feudal 'forty days'.
Conscription by permanent local officials, whether acting on their own, or
supervised by commissioners of array, could not be a reliable way of forming forces of
that professional nature from the population at large, in a short time. The militarily
successful and, for many, profitable wars of the preceding years must have left a legacy
of experienced and even enthusiastic 'other ranks' who were available to be used. It
was beyond the government's managerial resources to know who and where they were,
let alone recruit them specifically; that knowledge was with the men themselves, and
those who had previously campaigned alongside them. The practice of leaving it to the
leaders of other expeditions, those operating without the presence of the king and the
household administration, to contract to raise and provide specified numbers was well
established. It cannot have been difficult, in 1358-9, for the government to ask the
magnates, and the captains of previous campaigns, what following they would bring to a
royally-led army. Those who were asked had politically little choice but to respond
positively, and anyway, like others quickly aware of the intended expedition, would do
so with alacrity, especially given how fresh would be the memory of the spectacular
105 E101/393/11, ff. 91v, 92r.
106 Is it possible to see the addition of more archers as in part a less expensive
way of appearing at the muster with a numerous and impressive following?
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success (and profit) of the Black Prince at Poitiers only two or three years earlier. Their
responses would enable the government to know that a large number of probably
experienced archers would accompany the men-at-arms in the retinues.
It remains, nevertheless, difficult to see the mobilization in 1359 as one
deliberately conceived as a process relying on contracts for mixed retinues. The mere
fact that about a quarter of the army was raised by levies from the counties, the towns
and Wales argues against that view. Nor can the argument be sustained by reference to
theoretically improved planning and management considerations. The ambiguity and
uncertainty surrounding Edward's intended date for crossing l°7 could even have been a
consequence of the government's exclusion from the process of managing the
collection and arrival of a large proportion of the expedition - particularly its inability to
monitor their progress and pursue incipient failure.
On the other hand, heavy cavalry had always been mobilized more or less
successfully without detailed official management. There was no reason to refuse the
proffers of mixed retinues, which had been in existence for decades. In 1359 traditional
conscription was still undertaken. The government's mobilization for the Reims
campaign has the appearance of a pragmatic combination of convenient practices.
Limits to government's resources
There is, of course, nothing particularly surprising or unusual in pragmatism as a
response to the need to handle the management of increasingly complex objectives:
Edwardian governments had to use the means that were available. Kaeuper made the
crucial point: '... the rulers of England created a centralised government before they
created a bureaucracy. 1108 As the demands on government increased, it needed more
agents to deal with them, but it could not yet afford to employ enough as paid, and
therefore dependent, servants. As with mobilization, it was willing to make increasing
use of subjects as executive managers, even though this involved augmenting the
influence of particular social classes.
A vely important field in which demands grew, was that of responsibility for
administering justice, and maintaining law and order. 'The late thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries witnessed a great expansion in the quantity of business, and the
107 Above, pp. 177-179.
108 War, Justice and Public Order, p. 282.
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range of social classes, accommodated in the royal courts.'1°9 Society increasingly
110
recognised that an effective national system of law was desirable, even though many
of its members continued to behave lawlessly. B. A. Hanawalt characterised the
fourteeenth century as one in which men readily turned to crime as an instrument of
conflict resolution: homicide was common, with jurors often willing to acquit; there
was widespread theft of property when food was short; all classes were involved in
crime; the criminal law was regularly used as a weapon of social conflict. 111
 Social
stability was disturbed both by natural crises - famine early in the century and then
plague - and by what might be called the by-products of a period of war: returning
soldiers habituated to violence and pillage, the corruption and dishonesty apparently
inevitably associated with supplying armies, and the periodic preoccupation of rulers
with external conflict rather than its internal elimination. Whether because there was an
increasing amount of disorder, or an increasing general intolerance of it (or both), there
was pressure for counter-action, which the central goverment was expected to provide.
Its response was 'a period of much judicial experimentation and
improvisation,' 112
 as it attempted to find effective means to deliver royal justice in the
shires. The unwieldy general eyres were abandoned because their omnicompetence
meant they became over-loaded. While much of their civil and criminal work was
carried out by regular assizes and gaol delivery, 113 commissions of oyer and terminer
and trailbaston were essentially 'short term and mainly reactive expedients'. 114 An
important element of the eventual solution came with the development of the powers of
the keepers and justices of the peace, 115
 who were mainly men of local standing,
knowledge and presence.116
Some crown authority and action was thereby passed to particular classes of
subjects, though their exercise of it was somewhat moderated by efforts to involve men
learned in the law in their work. 117
 Although there were many ways in which both
powerful and less powerful interests could and did influence, manipulate and pervert
109 A. Musson and W. M, Ormrod, The Evolution of English Justice. Law,
Politics and Society in the Fourteenth Century (Basingstoke, 1999), p. 10.
110 Ibid., p.11.
111 B. A. Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict in English Communities 1300-1348
(Cambridge Mass., 1979), p. 273.
112 Musson and Ormrod, Evolution of English Justice, p. 53.
113 Ibid., p . 47.
114 ibid., p. 49.
115 B. H. Putnam, 'The Transformation of the Keepers of the Peace into the
theof	 Peace', TRHS, Fourth Series, XII (1929), pp. 19-48.Justices 
116 Musson and Ormrod, Evolution of English Justice, p. 69.
17 ibid., p. 41-2.
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justice , 118 there was nevertheless thereby established 'a permanent judicial presence by
the crown in the localities', 119 Without the revenue to pay for a standing army and
police, the crown was dependent on the nobility and gentry for law enforcement, and
had to tolerate some abuse of their powers. 12° So long as their interests and the crown's
coincided - militarily in the prestige and potential profit of successful wars under a
powerful king, socially in the changed economic circumstances after the plague - it
was, somewhat like the recruitment of archers by the leaders of retinues, a pragmatic,
workable and therefore acceptable arrangement.
In fiscal administration as well, the crown had to face very much the same
problems. Meeting the costs of war 'changed the financial basis of the crown', 121
necessitating new and increased sources of revenue. A succession of lay subsidies raised
by direct taxation of movables had to be assessed and then collected. However, 'There
were never enough paid civil servants to collect the king's revenues, and thousands of
unpaid collectors and assessors had to be pressed into service.' 122 Assessors and sub-
assessors, naturally likely to be influenced by their relationships with their neighbours,
had a tendency to undervalue liabilities, and both the assessed and the net yield declined
from the higher levels of the early 1290's. 123
 To correct this, in 1334, a permanent
assessment was agreed with communities as a lump sum for them to allocate to
individuals, the negotiations being carried out in each county by a high-ranking
clergyman and a government-paid civil servant. As in the requisitioning of ships, when
the numbers needed were small enough to be met from central staff, 124 the government
recognised the desirability of using its own men to manage the process. The subsequent
allocation of the liability to individuals was not made by officials, but left to the leading
men in each community. This can be seen as another example of government
willingness to adopt an administratively convenient and inexpensive arrangement,125
118 J 	 Bellamy, Crime and Public Order in England in the Later Middle
Ages (London, 1973), passim.
119 Mussson and Onnrod, Evolution of English Justice, p. 191.	 •
120 E. Powell, Kingship, Law and Society. Criminal Justice in the Reign of
Henry V (Oxford, 1989), p. 20.
121 w .
 Childs, 'Finance and Trade under Edward I', in J. Taylor and W. Childs
(eds.), politics and Crisis in Fourteenth-Century England (Gloucester, 1990), p. 22.
122 Strayer, 'Introduction', in EGov.W, Vol. II, p. 4.
123 W
. M. Ormrod, 'The Crown and the English Economy 1290-1348', in B. M.
S. Campbell (ed.), Before The Black Death (Manchester, 1991), p. 153.
124 fifteen king's clerks, five justices, three exchequer officials. Strayer,
'Introduction', in EGov.atW, Vol. II, p. 19.
125 The process was quicker, because it did not consume the time of
government staff in making new asessments each time the subsidy was authorised.
254
even though it placed some of its authority for the detail of management in the hands of
private subjects.
The developments in the administration of another branch of revenue, the
customs, show that the government was theoretically aware of the importance of trying
to supervise the local agents on whom it had to depend. Customs officials were
notorious for embezzelment and corruption, as Baker describes. Many corrective
approaches were devised, but they were not consistently or rigorously applied. 126
 He
concludes that it had proved impossible to find fundamentally trustworthy controllers to
reside in the ports and thus provide an effective check on the collectors. The position
was unattractive to the central staff, the king's clerks and yeomen, because it was badly
paid, and, more importantly for the ambitious in any century, took them away from the
centre of government where careers were made; 127
 it was only acceptable to them as a
sinecure. 128
 Nevertheless, under William Edington, treasurer of the exchequer from
1344, and later chancellor, some improvements were achieved, 129
 showing that
determined leadership had the potential to override the difficulties inherent in the
government's unavoidable use of men with local interests.
The fourteenth-century monarchy could not afford to pay enough civil servants
to administer its increasing responsibilities. Consequently, in the levying of taxes, in
the collection of customs charges, in the effort to maintain law and order, as in
mobilization for war, it had to develop the ability to draw upon 'the loyalty and
cooperation of local notables [by making] the king's cause the common cause'. 13° The
reign of Edward III, in particular, showed that with a politically adept, powerful, and
militarily successful king, this could be achieved.
Management
Management has been defined in this thesis, in the context of mobilizations under the
three Edwards, as the steps taken to try to ensure that instructions were obeyed, to
monitor progress, and to correct failures. The mobilizations studied involved many
examples of arrangements and actions by government that had these objectives. It is
not surprising that this is so: the fundamental techniques of effective administration -
126 The English Customs Service, passim.
127 Ibid., p. 50.
128 W. M. Ormrod, 'The English Crown and the Customs, 1349-63', EcHR,
Second Series, Vol. XL (1987), pp. 29-30.
129 Ibid. ,
 pp. 30-32.
130 Baker, The English Customs Service, p. 51.
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information, practicable instructions, on-going communication, and flexibility when
necessary - are constant and obvious. Success in their application depends, of course,
on the ability and assiduity of individuals, and particularly on the number and the nature
of agents that can be used. In these respects the Edwardian government faced
handicaps that were not peculiar to assembling armies and fleets Inevitably it was
failures and aberrations - late and non-arrivals at musters, social disorders and
perversions of justice, peculation and corruption on the part of tax collectors - that were
more likely to be recorded, than what went according to the original intention.
The practical techniques employed in the management of mobilization, by
governments willing to be pragmatic in their acceptance of the necessity to devolve
some responsibility to competent subjects, did produce armies, their supplies, and
fleets, very broadly when and, mostly, on the scale envisaged. It is evidence of
competence in the exercise of active management in Edwardian administration. That
evidence of competence argues for a modification of views that belittle successive
governments' degree of control of the fourteenth-century realm.
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